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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:10 a.m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator Jenner. The committee will be in session.

Mr. Morris. Princess Ileana, and Doctor, will you please stand? Senator Jenner. Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Princess Ileana. So I do. Dr. Issarescu. So I do. Senator Jenner. Be seated.

TESTIMONY OF PRINCESS ILEANA OF RUMANIA

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us, Princess Ileana, your name, and give us your address, please.

Princess ILEANA. My name is Ileana, Princess of Rumania, and Mrs.

Issarescu, and I live in Newton, 30 Hyde Avenue.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please?

Princess Ileana. H-y-d-e. Mr. Morris. Newton, Mass.?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you are accompanied by your husband, who is also going to testify here this morning?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you will tell us briefly, for the record, by way of characterizing you as a witness here today your background in Rumania.

Princess ILEANA. My father was King Ferdinand of Rumania, and my mother was Queen Marie; my brother, King Carol, and my nephew, King Michael.

Mr. Morris. And you lived in Rumania until what year?

Princess Ileana. I lived in Rumania until 1931, when I married Archduke Anton of Austria, and lived in Austria until 1944.

Mr. Morris. And where did you go in 1944?

Princess Ileana. In 1944 I returned to Rumania. Mr. Morris. And how long did you stay there?

Princess Ileana. Until 1948.

Mr. Morris. And did you experience the Communist occupation of Rumania?

Princess Ileana. Yes; from August 23, 1944, until January 12,

1948.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would sketch for us some of the circumstances that you experienced from the Rumanian Communist

government.

Princess Ileana. May I ask you to put that in a more concise form? I mean, there was a lot of experience, both militarily and financially and from a political point of view, and I would like to know which one you would like me to take first.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the reason the witnesses have been called here today is to give testimony about the Soviet redefection campaign,

of which we find a great deal of evidence.

Now, we have some Rumanian Communist newspapers which make

representations about the conditions that exist in Rumania.

Now, this witness this morning has just testified that she has experienced some of these conditions. I think it is rather elemental from the point of our evidence, if we are going to be able to assess the veracity of this Communist literature, of which we are taking cognizance, that we know something of the conditions that exist in Rumania.

For instance, does freedom exist in Rumania?

Princess Ileana. No. There certainly exists no freedom in Rumania, certainly not in the sense of the word as you understand it;

in fact, not at all.

For instance, nobody can travel without permission. Nobody can go on a holiday without a doctor's certificate. Nobody may possess a typewriter without permission, such as you would have for a machine gun. No one really has the right to live in his own house, or any house, without special permission.

Mr. Morris. Now-

Princess Ileana. Nobody may choose his own vocation or take a job. Mr. Morris. You mean, all those things are regulated by the Communist government?

Princess Ileana. Entirely.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there secret police in Rumania?

Princess Ileana. There is a very strong secret police, and it works through terror upon the general population.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any experience with the secret police?

Princess Ileana. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about it?

Princess ILEANA. Well, I would like to speak about one quite specific case. In this case, the name I do not want to divulge because the man is still in Rumania. He was one of my wounded whom I looked after in my hospital, a man who was very severely wounded, and whom I really feel that I pulled through, and he was extremely devoted to me, and there had been a very great friendship between us. He was quite a young man, and he did divulge all his problems to me.

After he left the hospital and returned to see me shortly afterward, his attitude had entirely changed, and I thought it was prob-

ably that he felt shy about the too many things he told me, but I felt there was something deeper to it. And so I tried to get it out of him,

and he wouldn't speak.

So I took him for a walk, where I felt we were safe, nobody could hear us, and I asked him once more, "What is it; what are you doing?" And then tears began to run down his face, and he said, "I have been betraying you. Every word you have spoken to me I have betrayed." I said, "Why did you do this thing to me?" and he said, "Because

my mother has been imprisoned and they have taken off the nails of her

left hand, and by betraying you I am saving her right hand."

I think the moral explains itself.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you allowed any freedom at all during the 4 years that—how many years were you under Communist rule there?

Princess Ileana. Over 3½ years.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you permitted a certain amount of freedom? Princess ILEANA. After the first month, yes. I was, first of all, sort of under semiarrest, and then, as I was a Rumanian citizen, you see—my husband was not, being an Austrian—he was in prison for 2 years, but at home, and I was given an astonishing amount of freedom, when I come to think of it today, but I think that that was thanks to the hospital that I was running, and that, even in their own Communist point of view, it was very difficult to actually accuse someone who is running a hospital for the workmen.

My hospital was for the workmen, so I had a defense in the work-

men themselves.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you have occasion to speak with any of the

Communist officials there?

Princess Ileana. I had a lot of occasions to speak to many of them. They would come in and inspect the hospital, and I got to know them. Mr. Morris. Did you ever run into Anna Pauker?

Princess Ileana. Yes. I had several meetings with Anna Pauker. She herself wanted to meet me and know me.

Mr. Morris. What position did she have at that time?

Princess Ileana. The first time I saw her she had no official position. Afterward she became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Morris. Now, would you relate to us the substance of the con-

versation with Anna Pauker?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

My point in seeing Anna Pauker was to try and ease the life of the people in prison, if through her we couldn't get permission to get the parcels and food to the so-called war criminals and others who were

in prison.

And in that time she explained to me about communism, and I found it a very good occasion to try and get an idea of what they think. And of all the Communists I have ever spoken to, she was by far the clearest, and her point was simply this: Capitalism and all the old ways were destined to die, while communism was destined to live. Therefore, we were fools if we did not go with them; that even if we didn't like it, we would have to join them, because that was the future.

And she explained to me, for instance, that America could easily be destroyed because America was so highly industrialized that, first of all, in industry itself it is easy to plant different communistic movements, but what interested them most of all had to do with electricity

because, she said:

"In the case of a war, before we need to drop an atomic bomb we only need to cut off electricity, and America stands still and is at our mercy, and then we can put our people in the key positions," she said, "maybe without a war."

It was only after I came to America that I realized how very true

this was.

Then, another point which interested me very much with her: In discussing the prison question, I said, "But you are not convincing us. You yourself spent 9 years in prison, and it didn't change

your point of view."

She said, "But we are not trying to change your point of view." I said, "What are you trying to do?" She said, "We are trying to eliminate you but, as we can't shoot you all, your generation cannot be convinced, but the young generation can be taught our way of living. Therefore, you are going to be terrorized into silence, so that you cannot pass on any tradition or any thought out of the past to your children."

That, in a very few words, is the conversation that went well over

3 hours.

Mr. Morris. Well, now, Princess Ileana, I wonder if you could tell

us the circumstances of your leaving Rumania.

Princess Ileana. Well, after the King was forced to abdicate, in the way which I think you all know that he was forced to—

Mr. Morris. What time was that?

Princess Ileana. That was on the 30th of January 1947. Pardon me—the 30th of December.

Mr. Morris. December 30, 1947?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

And we heard it over the radio. The King was not allowed to speak over the radio himself. The message was given.

I then tried immediately to contact the King, which, of course, was very difficult because he was held as prisoner in the palace in Bucharest.

Finally, I got permission to get through to the Queen, and we arranged to meet on the way, and I drove down—I was on the other side of the Carpathians, in my own little castle at Bran, right up in the mountains, with my hospital. So I drove over to meet the King, and I met the King halfway, and there we said goodbye, and I asked the King what his desire was that I should now do, and he said, "If you can, stick it out. But you have six children. I have not the right to ask it of you. It is for you yourself to decide. You are free to decide what you want."

I went down to Bucharest with the firm intention of remaining, because I felt that if the others could stand it, I could stand it, too. But when I saw what the circumstances would have been, what it meant to my children, then my courage broke and I decided, no, for the children I can't take it. And so I said to myself—the Government was in contact with us through underlings at that time. I wasn't any more honored with their personal contact, and that my job was

over, and it would be greatly appreciated if I would leave.

So I accepted to leave, and they gave us papers. And they sent us to Switzerland, but we weren't allowed to take any personal property and no money.

Mr. Morris. Now, when did you come to the United States?

Princess Ileana. I came to the United States in 1950.

Mr. Morris. And you have been living in Newton, Mass., since that time?

Princess Ileana. Since then.

Mr. Morris. Now, are you, Princess Ileana, acquainted with the redefection campaign that the Soviet governments are now carrying on, particularly as it bears on Rumanian-Americans here in the United States?

Princess Ileana. Yes, I am.

Through my many travels through the United States, wherever there are Rumanians or Rumanian groups, I get in contact, and naturally I hear from them quite a lot about it. Besides, my husband receives the newspaper which is published in East Berlin, and which tries to encourage this defection. It is addressed to him in New York where he used to be.

Mr. Morris. And you have frequent contact with Rumanian-Amer-

ican groups?

Princess Ileana. I do.

Mr. Morris. In fact, we read here recently about that shooting in New York.

Princess Ileana. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Before you answer the question about the redefection, I wonder if you could just tell us the circumstances surrounding that shooting.

Princess Ileana. Yes.

There is something about that shooting which leaves one with a certain amount of doubt as to exactly what the meaning behind it

Mr. Morris. I wonder, Princess Ileana, before commenting on it, if you will tell us exactly what happened.

Princess Ileana. We'll, we went to church at quarter of 12.

church was very well filled.

Mr. Morris. What was the occasion?

Princess Ileana. The occasion was the Resurrection service of our Easter which, in this year, falls so much later than the western one

I arrived there shortly before 12. The church was already filled, and also the basement of the church was filled, and the father had arranged to have loudspeakers in the basement so that everybody could hear the service, and our service starts on the Resurrection Night with a procession of lit candles out of the church. The gospel is read outside and then one goes into the church for the mass.

And what happened: The priest had just come out of the altar with his candle. None of us had our candles lit, and he said, "Take light from us," which is the ceremonial words, and began to go down through a very narrow passage to the basement, and we had just left the door of the basement to come out on the steps when I heard quite clearly something that sounded like crackers, or some small explosion, three in succession.

I think that my thought, as well as the thought of everybody, was at that moment that these crackers were a sort of thing of rejoicing, or something—a very bad joke; doubtful feeling about it—and following that, there were shots; exactly how many, I don't know.

police say there were four. That I cannot discuss. There may have

been four, or not.

Then there was water that fell on us. That was one of the air conditioners which was hit. The moment I personally heard the shots, I realized that it was not firecrackers and it wasn't funny. My first inkling was to get out and see who had been hurt, as there was also a scream, and to prevent any kind of panic.

The first person whom I saw hit was a young boy who had extraordinary good fortune that the bullets passed through the back of his neck, but in the darkness we couldn't see, except that the wound

was not deep or serious.

Then I ran up the steps where the priest already was, because the priest was in front of me during the procession. He had already gone up the steps into the church, and I rushed in and found the man dead, the man who had been shot, and then I called my husband to take over, and I took the weeping wife, took her downstairs into the basement, and tried to prevent the hysteria of the rest of the people, and get them to put out their candles. My thought was that fire might break out. And I was quietly waiting for the police to come, and the police came and they say there were these four shots. I am sure that I heard more, and I am not alone in saying that there were more than four shots.

Mr. Morris. Well, a man has been apprehended, has he not?

Princess Ileana. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Morris. A man has been apprehended?

Princess ILEANA. The man has been apprehended. Mr. Morris. And what has been done with him?

Princess ILEANA. He is at Bellevue Hospital, and is being inspected to see if he is mad.

Mr. Morris. Does anybody of the Rumanian-American community

know him?

Princess ILEANA. Yes. They know him quite well, and he expressed a great rage during the whole of Lent, as I understand it, against the priest and against the royal family, and tore down a picture of my mother. That is what the people say. I didn't see him do it. I can only repeat what I was told by the congregation. They immediately knew who he was, and they did not consider him mad.

Mr. Morris. There is no connection, is there, between this particular episode and the redefection campaign we are talking about, nothing

that you know of?

Princess Ileana. No. There is nothing that I can say or prove that this is, but I could see the effect. The first was, you see, you mustn't expose yourself. You see what happens to us if we go together any place.

It was a hit in that direction. If it was meant, or organized, that

is not for me to say, not now, not until we know more about it.

Mr. Morris. Well, Princess Ileana, I wonder if you could tell us about the redefection campaign.

Princess Ileana. Well, there are these newspapers that are coming.

There are letters which come in.

Mr. Morris. You say there are these newspapers?

Princess ILEANA. This newspaper. Mr. Morris. What is that paper?

Princess Ileana. This paper calls itself the Voice of the Homeland—Glasul Patriei—and it is published in East Berlin. It tells one how beautiful and lovely life in Rumania now is.

For instance, this one begins by telling all about the freedom of the democratic election. But, of course, it fails to tell us who was al-

lowed to be—I mean, between what they were choosing.

Mr. Morris. Now, in other words, as far as you know, Princess Ileana, are the facts portrayed in that newspaper false? Are you competent to say, to testify as to whether or not the facts which you read in this newspaper, whether they are accurate and true?

Princess Ileana. I know for sure they are not true. They weren't true when I was there, and I doubt that anything much has changed

since.

In fact, from the news we do get through, for instance, that we cannot really communicate with our friends, that the prisoners are all Besides, if they really are so anxious to have the Rumanians return home, I think it would be a nice gesture if the Russians began by sending back 180,000 prisoners they still have in Russia.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you make the point, Princess Ileana, that if they really want people to return to Rumania for the sake of having them come back, they could return the Rumanian prisoners who are now in the Soviet Union?

Princess Ileana. That is right.

There were 180,000. We understand through the International Red Cross that only 5,000 are still alive.

Mr. Morris. Now, Princess Ileana, who are the people to whom they appeal the most in this redefection campaign?

Princess ILEANA. Here they appeal to the Rumanians generally.

Mr. Morris. In this newspaper?

Princess Ileana. In this one, they appealed to no one in particular. No person is addressed. In other newspapers which I have seen, for instance, there is a letter from Mr. Ghilezan, who lives in the United States, and there is a facsimile of a letter from his mother, asking him to return. There are letters from children to their fathers, letters from parents to their children, from wives to their husbands, begging of them to return, and telling them how beautiful and how perfect life is, and everybody—everything would be just the same as it was before.

Mr. Morris. Now, you say there were some letters to Emil Ghile-

zan?

Princess Ileana. Yes, from his mother.

Mr. Morris. Do you know him?

Princess Ileana. I know him, and I used to know his mother, and I know her for a very brave mother, and I very much wonder what pressure was used on her to write.

Mr. Morris. You say you saw a letter from her, in particular, in

the paper?

Princess Ileana. There was a facsimile, yes, in the newspaper. Senator Jenner. Do you know, or have you learned of the number of Communist troops still stationed in Rumania?

Princess Ileana. I couldn't give you a—no. I'm afraid——Senator Jenner. When you left there?

Princess Ileana. When I left there, it was four of them, I can say. Senator Jenner. Do you have any idea of the number?

Princess Ileana. About a million and a half. Senator Jenner. And that was in 19-

Princess Ileana. 1946. That was when—certainly they controlled all the roads. For instance, you couldn't drive from one place to All the police, even the traffic police, were Russians.

Senator Jenner. Do you know of your own knowledge, or information that you have recently learned, that there are still Communist

troops in Rumania?

Princess Ileana. I have heard some but, of course, I have not seen it. I haven't been there.

Mr. Morris. Princess

Senator Jenner. Have you learned of any people who have redefected, gone back, who had been killed and their bodies left in the

Princess Ileana. No; I have been told. I know about as much, I think, as anybody else has heard and knows about it. I don't know them by name. I only know the same report which was in the newspaper and which was current among Rumanian colonies, but I don't know anything besides about it.

Mr. Morris. What was the story that was current?

Princess Ileana. The story was that it was people who had defected from here who had gone back and who had first been made to speak on the radio and to write in this paper, because there are some who have written in this paper how lovely it was to get back and how they found everything, and afterward were shot for having defected, according to their ideas about defection, I mean, that they were traitors to the Popular Republic.

Mr. Morris. As you say, you do not know whether or not these re-

ports are right, the extent to which they are right.

Princess Ileana. No; I don't know from my own knowledge.

Mr. Morris. You were telling us about one particular letter from Mr. Ghilezan. Will you spell that, please?
Princess Ileana. Yes; G-h-i-l-e-z-a-n.

Mr. Morris. In this particular letter you had peculiar knowledge because of the fact that you were a friend of this man's mother?

Princess Ileana. That is it.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would recite all the facts you know

about that one case so that we might-

Princess Ileana. I quite honestly did not take contact with Mr. Ghilezan after the letter was there. The only thing was that I saw it in the newspaper, that I recognized the writing, and knowing the woman's character from before, I can only say that some horrible pressure has been used upon her to do such a thing.

Mr. Morris. What did the letter say?

Princess Ileana. Unfortunately, we don't have that paper here today. The letter more or less was just: My dear son, come back to me. I am so alone. I am old. I long to see you before I die. I want to embrace you once more. Come back. This is your country. This is where you should be. There is a great future for you here. Come back, my beloved son.

That is about the tenor. Those are not the exact words. I didn't

learn it by heart.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you any instances such as that that you can tell the subcommittee about, Princess Ileana?

Princess ILEANA. Well, the instances, apart from that wherein I actually knew the name—I have seen many other letters, but I didn't know the people. What I know which is of special interest, it seems to me, actually here the contact that the Rumanian consulate has taken is with the Rumanians who are American citizens who have either been born here or brought up here. They don't really take contact with the refugees themselves. There is no direct communication with them. They know that they can't fool them. But they do manage most successfully to fool others, and I have myself had discussions with them where I had the feeling that I was living in another world. I mean, that there was one woman especially in Philadelphia. She is maybe just a little bit not an intelligent person, just a very simple woman, but she told me how she was going back and how she was selling all she had here to go back to Rumania because there she had her family and her home and they told her to come back and everything was all right.

I said, "But you haven't got a home in Rumania. Don't you understand there is no home in Rumania for anybody to go back to? No-

body has such a thing."

She looked at me pityingly and said, "Oh, my darling, but you don't understand. You have still got a memory of the war. That is all long passed. Now it is all beautiful and it is perfect and I will write to you, my darling, from there and then you will come back and we will all be there happily together." And my words had absolutely no effect on her whatsoever. The woman was completely convinced and she is selling all she has to go.

Mr. Morris. Have there been many people returning? I think you

showed us the figures.

Princess ILEANA. I have just spoken this very morning with our priest in Cleveland, but there are 15 Rumanians who have left last week from Detroit.

Mr. Morris. From Detroit?

Princess Ileana. Yes; from Detroit. I would explain immediately why.

And 19 more are leaving next week.

Mr. Morris, From Detroit?

Princess Ileana. From Detroit. And this through the propaganda of the bishop, Bishop Moldovan.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please?

Princess Ileana. M-o-l-d-o-v-a-n. He is a Communist bishop who was imposed here, sent here by the Patriarchy of Bucharest, sent by the Communists against the rule of the American church, the American-Rumanian Church here. According to our church, our bishops have to be chosen by their flock, and then they are consecrated by wherever they come from, and the flock have refused him. That is the interesting part. The flock has refused him here. He has very little power, perhaps only 1 or 2 churches that he has bamboozled into following him, and it is he who is organizing these excursions back into Rumania.

Mr. Mokris. And from Detroit alone there were 15 last week and 19 making preparations to go next week. That is Detroit alone.

Princess Ileana. That is Detroit alone.

Mr. Morris. And you say there is—that is largely the result of the activities of Bishop Moldovan?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What is the situation in Cleveland? Is there a large

Rumanian community in Cleveland?

Princess ILEANA. Yes, but there evidently it hasn't had any success. Mr. Moldovan has no influence on the population, and Cleveland as a whole refused Moldovan. He has failed in our episcopate here and they have not let themselves be impressed.

But I do not know of Mr. Theodore Andrica. Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please?

Princess ILEANA. Theodore just as it sounds. Andrica—A-n-d-r-i-c-a—and he is a reporter on the Cleveland Press. He told me the story himself. He is, of course, not in the slightest bit impressed and he, I believe, has got a visa to go and to come back and he wanted to go to scout what had happened.

So he has gone. He is in Europe now. But he is not one of those who have defected. I am not meaning from that point of view, but it is interesting that he is one of those who could tell you more about

it because he was perfectly clear as to what was happening.

Then, in Detroit itself those who again did not defect but have been asked to go there is a certain printer and his wife, Jack Gasper.

Mr. Morris. Please spell that.

Princess Ileana. G-a-s-p-e-r. He is a printer.

Mr. Morris. In Detroit?

Princess ILEANA. In Detroit, and his address is 5350 Russell, Detroit.

Mr. Morris. Now, what about that? You say he has been the object

Princess ILEANA. He has been the object and they have tried to convince him. Two men came from here, from Washington, from the consulate in Washington, to convince him to go back to Rumania.

Mr. Morris. I see. In other words, you cite that as an instance that Rumanians from the Rumanian Legation here in Washington travel as far west in this case as Detroit.

Princess Ileana. Detroit and Cleveland, yes.

Mr. Morris. Detroit and Cleveland to induce these people to go back to Rumania.

Princess Ileana. That is it.

Mr. Morris. And now you say they have been the object of inducements. Now, do these inducements take—are they any stronger than inducements and encouragement? Are there—is there any pressure involved at all?

Princess Ileana. Any what? Mr. Morris. Any pressure.

Princess ILEANA. No, not exactly. They only offer them a better living. And the pressure is always gently indicated by: "You have a brother; you have a cousin."

Mr. Morris. Back in Rumania? Princess Ileana. Back in Rumania.

Mr. Morris. And the mere fact that they mention the brothers and cousins, the names of the brothers and cousins, is that in your opinion some form of pressure?

Princess Ileana. Plenty.

Mr. Morris. Plenty.

Senator Jenner. This Bishop Moldovan, when did he come to this country?

Princess Ileana. I couldn't tell you that exactly but it was about 5

or 6 years ago. He has two sons in the army in Rumania.

Senator Jenner. You don't know whether he has come to this country since the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act, which was passed in 1950?

Princess Ileana. I am afraid——

Senator Jenner. Would be have come here since the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1950?

Princess Ileana. I couldn't answer that. Senator Jenner. That can be ascertained.

Princess Ileana. That can be easily ascertained.

Mr. Morris. Now, this printer in Detroit, Gasper, he did not go back.

Princess Ileana. Oh, no, no.

Mr. Morris. But he has experienced——

Princess Ileana. He has only experienced it, and they were just telling me about it; well, what is going on.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know Mrs. Perlea?

Princess ILEANA. And he said, he went along with him a little bit in the conversation and said, "All right, that is very interesting. Can I then begin being a printer in Rumania, because that is what my profession is?"

They said, "Well, no, not printing. Printing is a thing that belongs to the government, but we will give you lots of other possibilities."

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know a Mrs. Perlea?

Princess Ileana. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What was Mrs. Perlea?

Princess Ileana. Mrs. Perlea lives in New York and she is the wife of one of our biggest conductors. Ionel Perlea.

Mr. Morris. He is a conductor where?

Princess Ileana, Well, he was with the Metropolitan Opera and now he is conducting in Europe.

Mr. Morris. I see. But he has made the United States his home? Princess ILEANA. He has made the United States his home. He is a permanent resident. He teaches at the Manhattan School of Music, and he travels, gives concerts everywhere, and is at this moment, I think, giving concert, I don't know, I think at La Scala or something like that. That I don't know exactly—his program.

Mr. Morris, And Mrs. Perlea is known well to you? Princess Ileana. She is a very good friend of mine.

Mr. Morris. Was he known to you, too?

Princess Ileana. Both of them are well known.

Mr. Morris. Have they been the objects of any of these inducements?

Princess Ileana. Yes. Already last year he received letters asking him to come back, telling him how useful it would be if he came back, how much he would be doing for the country and what great advantages he would have out of it, and they use as inducements, then, telling him that Enescu, the musician, had accepted to go, which as a matter of fact was not true, and then he died. Enescu died last year. There was then quite a lot in the newspapers about this. that Enescu was going back and—well, he didn't mean to go back. Besides that, the poor man died. And they tried to use his name as an inducement to Perlea to return, and he was very upset about it. It

was just before he left for Europe last year and we induced him—advised him then to go with the letter to the FBI, which I believe he did.

This year he met people who had written to him in Paris who were

there sent on a mission.

Mr. Morris. Just a minute. You say he could identify the indi-

viduals who had been writing to him?

Princess ILEANA. Oh, yes. I will tell you who they were. I know them quite well myself. I knew them, too, and again it is to me one of those horrible things because they are people I have known all my life.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, you say he encountered these two people who had been writing to him in Paris?

Princess Ileana. Yes. He met them in Paris. Mr. Morris. What were they doing in Paris?

Princess Ileana. They were there on some official musical mission sent by the Government, the Rumanian Government.

Mr. Morris. What happened when he met them in Paris?

Princess ILEANA. When they met him in Paris, it seems they were quite open in saying that life in Rumania was very difficult, but to come back to give a concert for just 3 or 4 months. After awhile, they would pay him much better than he had ever been paid before in Europe or in America and, therefore, it would be a very advantageous thing for him to come. And at which he answered, "All right, I will on the day that you liberate a Hungarian singer"—whose name I am afraid I don't know—"who also went back to Budapest under the inducement of a 2-month concert and hasn't returned for 5 years." Upon which day, then—and they used the threat, "All right, you won't come. We will make you come. And we are going to pressure the American Government to send you."

Of course, we know that that doesn't mean anything, but probably

in their minds it did.

Mr. Morris. Now, are there any other instances such as that, people you know, residents of the United States, citizens of the United States, people who are about to become citizens, that have been pressured?

Princess Ileana. No. I have heard vague murmurs. You know. Wherever I have been. But I don't want to say anything which I

can't verify that it is so.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of the activity of any of the representa-

tives of the Rumanian Legation here in the Washington?

Princess ILEANA. Except from what I have heard that they have tried to contact all our churches. Most of our priests have refused to meet them, but they have tried to contact them all.

Mr. Morris. Now, since Rumania has been made a member of the United Nations, you now have a Rumanian delegation to the United

Nations.

Princess Ileana. We have?

Mr. Morris. I am sorry. Princess Ileana. Excuse me.

Mr. Morris. Excuse me. The Rumanian Communist Government now has a delegation in New York.

Princess Ileana. Yes, it has.

Mr. Morris. Have you been able to observe the activities of that particular group as yet?

Princess Ileana. I have heard nothing special and I think it is much too short a time. As much as I know—it is quite short.

Mr. Morris. Has the Rumanian community in general heard any-

thing from them at this time?

Princess Ileana. No.

Mr. Morris. Now, Doctor, I wonder if you could add anything to the testimony of Princess Ileana as of now.

TESTIMONY OF DR. STEFAN ISSARESCU

Dr. Issarescu. Sir, I have nothing to add except for the fact, which she already mentioned, that I am receiving this paper which is published in East Berlin.

Mr. Morris. Now, how many people receive that paper?

Dr. Issarescu. I couldn't tell you but so many people I know of the

Rumanian colonies, everybody tells me he is receiving one.

Mr. Morris. How many Rumanian-American refugees are here now? I use the word "refugees" to describe those people who have

escaped from the Soviet regime.

Dr. Issarescu. I couldn't tell you. I couldn't qualify them all as refugees. But according to the New York Times for May 13, there was a statistic of Rumanian immigrants since 1946 up to 1954 and there is a statement of about 11,500.

Mr. Morris. 11,500.

Dr. Issarescu. I was talking this morning with our Rumanian priest in Cleveland and he has been very active in sponsoring and helping refugees, and immigrants, to come to this country, and he confirms this figure which he knows from his own experience.

Mr. Morris. And to your knowledge, is it your belief that all of

these 11,000 people are getting that publication?

Dr. Issarescu. Pardon?

Mr. Morris. Is it your belief or opinion that all 11,500 are receiving

that newspaper?

Dr. Issarescu. I couldn't say. I don't think so because many of them have unknown addresses. I don't receive my own at my address. I receive it at a place I used to work in New York 2 years ago. I was a doctor in Cornell Hospital and I received it in that place and it is forwarded.

Mr. Morris. Are you an American?

Dr. Issarescu. No, I am not. I am expecting to become a citizen in 2 years.

Mr. Morris. Are you a medical doctor?

Dr. Issarescu. Yes.

Mr. Morris. That is printed in East Germany and it is just mailed? Dr. Issarescu. It is just mailed. The first paper, also printed in East Berlin, I receive from Buenos Aires. The second paper I received in a closed envelope from London, and the third, fourth, and fifth I received from East Berlin.

Mr. Morris. Now, are there any other instances not mentioned by

your wife here this morning that you can tell us about?

Dr. Issarescu. To my feeling it is complete what she has told. I wouldn't have anything to add.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything you can add about conditions in Rumania as opposed to the conditions described in that newspaper?

Dr. Issarescu. Well, I would ask if possible for the press not to put down what I am going to say here because I have family in Rumania and as far as I know, my family lives.

Mr. Morris. You said-

Dr. Issarescu. I would like to ask the press not to publish this part.

Mr. Morris. That is very difficult.

Senator Jenner. It is very difficult to do, Doctor, because this is an open hearing, and if it is something you don't want published, I

suggest you give it to us in executive session.

Dr. Issarescu. It is not a controlled fact because I have no communication whatsoever with my family who is behind the Iron Curtain, but from people who are receiving letters, I don't know how, I learned that my family is in a very bad condition from the point of view of nutrition and anyway from the general conditions. So I believe that this speaks in itself for the conditions which are in Rumania.

My family used to earn their living, but now they do not have any

job and any possibility of earning.
Princess ILEANA. To add to that, I would like to say that it is to give you a picture of how unnatural the lack of communication is, that we have only learned 2 weeks ago that my husband's mother died 2 years ago.

Mr. Morris. Died 2 years ago?

Princess Ileana. Yes; and we had the news only now. So you see

now unnatural it is.

Mr. Morris. Well, do you find any relaxation whatever, on the part of the Communists, of the regimen that you observed while you were in Rumania?

Dr. Issarescu. No.

Mr. Morris. Have you anything else to add, Princess Ileana, about the general situation that we are interested in here, namely, the

redefection?

Princess Ileana. No. I have only one thing I feel I should say and the importance that I feel should be stressed to the Americans, not to us because we know it, that the Communists do not live on their popularity; that it didn't succeed in Rumania because they were popular; that they have never succeeded anywhere because they are popular, but that it is purely a thing of force and of fear, and that is what it is based on.

It isn't a question of illuminating the minds of the people behind the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately it is a question of illuminating the

minds of the free people.

Mr. Morris. The people behind the Iron Curtain know what the The people on this side don't.

Princess Ileana. That is right. They don't.

Mr. Morris. Did you find that to be the case here, Princess Ileana? Princess Ileana. Yes; and through my many journeys I have found it so much so that sometimes I have felt that it is like a voice speaking in the wilderness. So many questions I have been asked at a lecture, like, "When do you go home?" and "How often did you travel over there?"

Mr. Morris. Do you think we have a lot to learn?

Princess Ileana. "Why don't we revolt," is also one of the favorite questions.

Mr. Morris. You say, then, we have a lot to learn?

Princess Ileana. I am afraid so.

Mr. Morris. Senator, I have no more questions.

Senator Jenner. I want to thank you, Princess, for appearing here this morning and for this testimony that you have given this com-We feel it will be very helpful to the committee and to the people of the country.

Thank you very much, both you and the doctor.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Jenner. May I just ask you one more question? Right at the conclusion of your testimony you say many of the people, when you are out lecturing, ask you, "Why do you not revolt?"

What is the answer to that question? Why don't your people revolt? Princess ILEANA. Why don't our people revolt? Well, first of all, because the armament is in the hands of the Communists, of the Russians, quite clearly. Our army was forced to give up their arms to them. Therefore-

Senator Jenner. At that time when they were forced, didn't you

have about 19 divisions?

Princess Ileana. I couldn't tell you that. I don't know. And then they took over everything that had to do with communications, roads, railways, water—I mean ships and so on—telegraph, telephone, all that.

Mr. Morris. Press?

Princess Ileana. Press? Press, yes; the first thing. I forgot that. I have so forgotten the idea of liberty that press, of course, is non-

And then they took anything that was on deposit. Any amount of food, medicines, everything that was supplies was taken. With that

your hands are tied.

And then what they did, of course, was to the peasantry. This is important, though, that they have for the moment got the peasants under their control because of the more immense taxes they have put onto the farms. You see, 85 percent of the land belongs to the peasants; 75 percent of it still belongs to the peasants, but they have to give so much of that that they can hardly live on it. They have to give between 50 and 75 percent of what the land produces. have to give it to the Government.

So, they are hungry and they are tired and they are—they have the impossibility of communicating with each other, and they are

disarmed.

But, they have not been able to force communal farming. They have not been able to close the churches. And they have not been able to educate the young as they wanted. So, hope there is.

(A reproduction of the passport of Andrew Moldovan, whose name appears in the foregoing testimony, was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on May 22, and appears on the following pages.)

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Senator Jenner. Thank you very much.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mitchell, will you take the stand, please.
Mr. Mitchell. I have been sworn previously.

(Mr. Mitchell's testimony will appear in a subsequent volume of the subcommittee's inquiry series entitled "Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments.")

Senator Jenner. We stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was adjourned.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus, research analyst.

Senator JENNER. The Committee will come to order.

Mrs. Coale, will you stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. Coale. I do.

Senator Jenner. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Senator, the hearing this morning will be on the subject of the Soviet redefection campaign. The first witness will be Mrs. Coale, who has been recalled for the purpose of appearing here today.

Mrs. Coale, again will you give us your full name and address?

TESTIMONY OF MRS. GRIFFITH BAILY COALE, ASSOCIATE DIREC-TOR OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR EMIGRES IN THE PRO-FESSIONS, INC.

Mrs. Coale, Mrs. Griffith Baily Coale, C-o-a-l-e, 163 East 81st Street, New York, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. What is your business or occupation?
Mrs. Coale. I am associate director of a nonprofit organization, the American Council for Emigres in the Professions.

Our function is to try to assimilate the intelligentsia and professional refugees into the life of the country.

Mr. Morris. You brought to the attention of the committee the gentleman who testified before the subcommittee yesterday under the name of Andrivve? 1

Mrs. Coale. I did.

Mr. Morris. When did you meet this man?

Mrs. Coale. I have known him for about 21/2 years.

He was sent to me by an American physician who is a personal friend of mine, and who vouched for his integrity and character.

Since then I have had his technical qualifications evaluated by two

American aircraft companies, who have the highest opinion of him.

I have established the fact that he is highly regarded by other Russian scientists working for many years in this country. We have, through our committee, secured work for him for the Government.

Mr. Morris. I have here, Senator, four pages of testimony taken from the same gentleman on the same day as we took the testimony

that was introduced into the record yesterday.

This bears on the subject of today's hearing. I would like to put these four pages into the record. I think we shall do what we did vesterday.

Senator Jenner. Yes; you may proceed.

Mr. Morris. This was Senator Jenner presiding at an executive committee meeting at which Mr. Andriyve is testifying. I will ask the questions, and Mr. Mandel will answer.

(The excerpt from the testimony of E. Andriyve, May 16, 1956, was read into the record, the questions being read by Mr. Morris, and the

answers being read by Mr. Mandel, and was as follows:)

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with any efforts on the part of Soviet author-

ities to encourage redefection?

Mr. Andriyve. Well, personally, I never had any pressure or anything of that sort. I am acquainted, of course, with a lot of cases, which are the subject of discussion among all the immigrants, because, after all, we are all in the same

Particularly, I was told by an acquaintance of mine of cases, numerous cases, in New York, of pressure exerted on persons who entered the United States on not entirely clear papers.

Mr. Morris. Who have not got clear papers?

Mr. Andriyve. Pardon?

Mr. Morris. Who have not got clear papers?

Mr. Andrive. Some of the Russian immigrants who entered here under false names and false addresses, and so on. There is quite a number of such persons here.

Mr. Morris. And that these people are being subjected to pressure?

Mr. Andriyve. I was told they have been specifically subjected to pressure. Mr. Morris. Now, you say you have been told. You do not know of your own

experience, though? Mr. Andriyve. I do not know, and if I knew, I would not tell it to you because the persons concerned are afraid to be deported, and they find themselves between two fires.

Incidentally, I do not know the names. Mr. Morris. We are not asking you any names. I wanted to know whether

you know of any cases directly?

Mr. Andrive. Directly, no; but indirectly I could tell the names and addresses of people who know direct cases.

Mr. Morris. Is there any one particular case that you can tell us about? Mr. Andriyve. Yes. There is one case I do know, and that was a medical doctor in Boston. He was from Russia and was living in Boston for, I believe, 5 years or more. Then one day—it was 2 or 3 weeks ago—he came around to

¹ Another phase of the Andriyve testimony appears at p. 1003 of pt. 19. Scope of Soviet Activities in the United States. Full Andriyve testimony appears in pt. 21.

all these acquaintances and bid his farewell, and said that he was disappearing. Why? Because he is pressured by the Soviet agents to return back to the beloved motherland.

So they asked him, where does he go? He says, "I will go to New York, it is the easiest place to be lost in."

He actually disappeared since that date. I know the man, and also my people, my wife, knows him, and we think that the man really was pressured and really disappeared here just to avoid any Communist agents. He positively did not return.

Mr. Morris. And you do not know where he is now? Mr. Andriyve. I do not know; he did not contact us.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe that he has left the country?

Mr. Andriyve. Pardon?

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe that he has left the country?

Mr. Andriyve. I do not think so. I think, on the contrary, he is here.

Mr. Morkis. Do you have any ideas as to how the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or any executive agencies of the Government can cope with this situation?

Mr. Andriyve. Well, I think I have at least one suggestion. That suggestion

comes from the analysis of what the Soviets actually do in this case.

First, they lure the people by active pro-Soviet propaganda and anti-American propaganda. Then they transport the people back to Russia. Then, by some sort of a mockery they call justice, they sentence the people or shoot them, or send them to camps. That comes usually in a few weeks or a few months, at the most, after the people have been brought to Russia.

Having all those facts, it is easy to combat them.

Mr. Morris. How do you know those facts?

Mr. Andriyve, Well, we know those facts, very simply, because the German POW's who are released from Russia, they bring, usually, the most modern information from there. So we know such facts very closely.

If, say, a group of people are somehow transported back to Russia, they are usually going to Siberia or some other place in the corrective labor camps.

So now it is very easy to cope with this situation, in my opinion. All you need is to challenge the Soviet Government openly to produce, say, to American reporters in Russia, somebody, or better, many people, who returned to Russia a year, 2 or 3 years ago.

They will not be able to produce anybody. Not the man who left the United States last Sunday, no, but the man who left the United States or Germany

1, 2, 3, or 4, years ago.

Mr. Morris. I think that is enough, the point he is making is there. Now, Mrs. Coale, are you prepared to tell us any other instances that you have encountered in your professional work in connection

with the Soviet redefection campaign?

Mrs. Coale. Yes; I have been doing some work on collecting letters, for instance, that are being written to refugees living in the New York City area, pressuring them to go home. I can testify that I have seen eight envelopes which are a sampling of many similar envelopes containing letters written to a Rumanian man living in New York City.

Mr. Morris. In other words, that man got eight letters?

Mrs. Coale. He got a great many more. I just saw eight of them. They get them all the time. They get so many more that—here are 2 or 3 that haven't even been opened—they don't even open them.

Mr. Morris. You indicate that they are coming in great quantity? Mrs. Coale. The letters are coming in great quantity. The letters I specifically saw are coming from Communist agents in Rumania, are mailed from East Berlin, from London, one from the Argentine came by special delivery, from Vienna, from all over Western Europe.

All these letters are from people he has never heard of or from before. Many enclose copies of a newspaper published in April by the Rumanian Communist Government in East Berlin. This is the

paper.

This edition of the paper contains an article or open letter addressed to all Rumanian priests in the United States and Canada, and indeed outside of Rumania, and who are taking care of the spiritual needs of the Rumanian refugees.

The purpose of this open letter is to invite them to return to Rumania. Copies of this paper have been sent to all Rumanian refugees in this country without exception, even to those who have been here up to 45 years and who are United States citizens, and even some who are veterans of United States military service.

This is to show that the Soviets make it obvious that they know the

addresses of every Rumanian in the country.

Mr. Morris. That is the same publication about which Princess Ileana testified here, 2 days ago.

Senator Jenner. The record will so show.

Mr. Morris. The Soviet authorities have the addresses of all the

refugees who live in the country?

Mrs. Coale. It not only indicates it to me, but also to the Rumanians and throws a terrible scare into them, of course. That is the point.

Now, I have here a photostatic copy of an envelope postmarked in Rumania, and portions of the letter it contained. I saw this letter in New York 3 days ago. It is addressed to a young Rumanian man, living in New York City, and is sent by his wife, living in Rumania. He has been getting letters from her written, through the mails, and not every letter has been censored. Some letters came through which are very cheerful, and contained nothing very serious.

This particular letter says:

My heart is bleeding and I cry all the time. I had my hopes that you would return to your home and little child-but now I see that I have been mistaken. * * * You should never forget that you have a child, and that you are morally obliged to give him the necessary education as a father. Remember yourself how you have been brought up alone without anybody's help, and how difficult

I do not know how long I shall resist with my health because I feel destroyed and sick. My heart does not help me any longer, and my tension is so bad that

I may die very soon-and with whom would our child remain?

Therefore, my dear, my only wish is that you should take care of the child, and for your name day, I wish you many happy returns and happiness, but do come to us as we are longing for you.

This letter was obviously written under duress.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mrs. Coale. He had had other letters, you see. Mr. Morris. Did he receive a subsequent letter?

Mrs. Coale. Yes, about 2 weeks later this man received another letter through the regular mails from his wife. She thanked him for a parcel she received, and did not mention his returning. This convinces him that the attached letter was written under duress. is a psychological pressure.

Mr. Morris. Are there other letters you have?

Mrs. Coale. Yes, I have two. I will leave them here. Unless, of course, you want me to read them.

Mr. Morris. No, just make the point.

Mrs. Coale. This one is written from Rumania to a man living in New York. It was mailed on April 7, this year. It speaks of the father of a little boy. The little boy is terribly worried that his father doesn't want to come back to Rumania where his friends can be repatriated. It mentions the fact that because of existing laws, Rumanians outside of Rumania have a right to repatriate if they want to until August 1956.

The letter ends:

If this man does not want to come, it is all right, but let him remain among straugers and all by himself.

This other one—this is written by a son.

Your coming to Rumania is possible if you have serious intentions, and if there is in the United States no other family, and if you still love my mother-

It is just another letter urging him, because the laws have been

changed, to come back.

Mr. Morris. Are there other such letters or such incidents that you

can tell us about at this time?

Mrs. Coale. Well, when this man gave me the photostats of the letters, he had a briefcase which contained hundreds of such letters. There is no dearth of letters.

I think that is the only specific thing I want to say at this time. Mr. Morris. Thank you very much, Mrs. Coale.

Senator Jenner. Thank you very much.

Will you call your next witness?

Mr. Morris. Will Julius Epstein come forward, please?

Before we leave this point, Senator, all those letters will go into the record?

Senator Jenner. They will go into the record and become a part of

the official record of this committee.

(The documents referred to were numbered exhibits 263 to 263–C. Translations of the letters, with explanations by Mrs. Coale read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 263

Attached is a photostatic copy of an envelope postmarked in Rumania and portions of the letter that it contained. I saw the original of this letter in New York City 3 days ago. It is addressed to a young Rumanian man living in New York and is written by his wife. This man has been receiving letters constantly from his wife, all of which were quite cheerful and contained nothing very serious, nor did they ever suggest his coming home.

A translation of a portion of the attached letter reads as follows:

"My heart is bleeding and I cry all the time. I had my hopes that you would return to your home and little child—but now I see that I have been mistaken. * * * You should never forget that you have a child, and that you are morally obliged to give him the necessary education as a father. Remember yourself how you have been brought up alone without anybody's help, and how difficult it was.

"I do not know how long I shall resist with my health (because) I feel destroyed and sick. My heart does not help me any longer, and my tension is so bad that

I may die very soon—and with whom would our child remain?

"Therefore, my dear, my only wish is that you should take care of the child; and for your name day, I wish you many happy returns and happiness, but do

come to us as we are longing for you."

About 2 weeks later this man received another letter from his wife, but this time she was not under pressure. She thanks him for the parcel and does not mention his returning as she did in the other letter. This convinces him that the attached letter was written under duress.

Ехнівіт №. 263-А

Attached is a photostatic copy of a letter and its envelope, the original of which I saw in New York City 3 days ago. This letter was mailed from Sulina, Rumania, on April 7, 1956, to a man living in New York City. A partial translation reads as follows:

"My Dear ———: Peter is very worried because his father does not want to return to Rumania, where many of his friends have been repatriated and have come home. [Note.—Peter's father is in Israel now and intends to come to the

United States.]

"If he does not receive a visa [to go to the United States of America] then he has nothing to do and he should come home, because we shall do everything in our power to bring him back to our country if he want it, because a law was passed according to which all Rumanians outside of Rumania have the right, if they want to, to repatriate until August 1956. If he wants to come it is all right—but if he doesn't, let him remain among the strangers and all by himself."

Ехнівіт No. 263-В

Attached is a photostatic copy of a letter and its envelope, the original of which I saw 3 days ago in New York City. This letter, postmarked in Rumania, was received on March 29, 1956, in New York City by a man who has lived there for the last 35 years. It is written to him by his son who was a young boy of 2 years when his father left. During all this time the father has sent money to his wife and children, and only last week he sent \$100 because his wife has been taken ill.

A translation of the marked portion of the letter reads as follows:

"Your coming to Rumania is possible if you have serious intentions, and if there in the United States you have no other family, and if you are still in love with my mother and with us, and with our country Rumania in which we live today and in which you yourself have eaten bread for 40 years.

"Now this is possible to return here on the basis of the existing laws which permit repatriation of Rumanians living outside of Rumania and who would like

to come back.

"I repeat, my only wish is to know you, and is the only wish which I do not know if it will be realized."

Ехнівіт №. 263-С

I can testify that I have seen eight envelopes which are a sampling of many similar envelopes containing letters written to a Rumanian man living in New York City. These letters come from the Communist agents of Rumania and are mailed from East Berlin, from London, one from the Argentine by airmail special delivery, from Vienna and from Rumania. All these letters are from people

whom he has never heard of or from before.

Many of them sent him copies of a newspaper published in April by the Rumanian Communist Government in East Berlin. This edition of this newspaper contains an article or open letter which is addressed to all Rumanian priests in the United States and Canada and indeed anywhere outside of Rumania, and who are taking care of the spiritual needs of Rumanian refugees. The purpose of this open letter is to invite them to return to Rumania. Copies of this edition of the newspaper have been sent to all Rumanian refugees in this country without exception, even to those who have been here up to 45 years and who are United States citizens and even veterans of United States military service. A copy of this newspaper is attached hereto.

Mr. Morris. Will you stand and be sworn, Mr. Epstein?

Senator Jenner. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Epstein. I do.

Senator Jenner. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF JULIUS EPSTEIN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Epstein, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. Erstein. Julius Epstein, E-p-s-t-e-i-n, 470 Fourth Avenue,

New York, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Where were you born?

Mr. Epstein. Vienna, Austria.

Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. Epstein. On March 9, 1939.

Mr. Morris. What is your business or profession?

Mr. Epstein. I am a writer and a foreign correspondent for Ger-

man newspapers.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Epstein, do you have any knowledge of the subject matter which was discussed by a man who has testified before this subcommittee as Mr. Andriyve, about people being in the United States on false papers?

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about that and the

sources of your knowledge?

Mr. Epstein. This is a very old problem in the United States. There are now 20,000, at least, maybe thirty or forty thousand, former Soviet nationals living in the United States.

They had to falsify their identities in Europe, mostly in German refugee camps, in order to escape forced repatriation behind the Iron

Mr. Morris. Will you explain that, please?

Mr. Epstein. Yes; I would like to quote our President, who mentioned their case in his wonderful message to Congress, on February S, 1956, when he said :

A large group of refugees in this country obtained visas by the use of false identities in order to escape forcible repatriation behind the Iron Curtain; the number may run into the thousands. Under existing law, such falsification is a mandatory ground for deportation. The law should give relief to these unfortunate people.

These are the words of President Eisenhower on February 8.

I understand there is now an amendment pending in Congress which would deal with this problem. But I want to point out-

Mr. Morris. Who are these people; these people, I mean, that are

the subject of this beneficial legislation?

Mr. Epstein. Ukrainians, Russians, some Poles. You know that according to the Yalta agreement, we had to repatriate these people. They didn't want to go back, even those who were deported by Hitler to Germany from Russia. Millions of them preferred to stay in Germany.

But we repatriated between 1 and 2 million of those people, prison-

ers of war as well as civilians, against their wishes.

Now, many who are afraid of this tried to save themselves by

falsifying their identities.

Mr. Morris. Will you explain that? They wanted to conceal the fact that they were Soviet citizens; is that right? Because if they were Soviet citizens, they would have been forced to return to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Epstein. Yes; without any regard to their individual wishes. Mr. Morris. You say there were more than a million people forced to return?

Mr. Epstein. Yes.

Senator Jenner. On what basis were they caused to return? Mr. Epstein. Well, on the basis of the Yalta agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war and liberated civilians—it was signed under the protest of our Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, who, wired our Secretary of State Stettinius, then in Yalta, and warned him against a conclusion of any agreement which could enforce repatriation of prisoners and civilians.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mr. Epstein. I studied very carefully the Yalta documents and I came across a little note, "not printed." A certain document, surprisingly, does not appear in the Yalta papers. So I asked Secretary Dulles to release this diplomatic note to me.

A few days later, I got a letter signed by the Chief of the State Department's Historical Division, Bernard Noble, dated April 28,

1955:

DEAR MR. EPSTEIN: Enclosed is a copy of the Department's note of February 1, 1945, to the Soviet Embassy relating to prisoners of war. You requested this in your letter of April 11, 1955.

You also requested a copy of any answer to the message of February 9, 1945, from the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to Acting Secretary

Joseph C. Grew. No record of such an answer has been found.

Now, this note, which was presented to the Washington representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Novikoff, on February 1, 1945, exactly 3 days before the beginning of the Yalta Conference, explained to the Soviet Government which wanted repatriation of Soviet prisoners then in the United States, captured in German uniforms.

Now the State Department, over our Acting Secretary Grew's

signature, told the Soviet Government that-

We will never return these people. We cannot repatriate these people, because this would be a gross violation of the Geneva Convention. They were captured in German uniforms, and the Geneva Convention does not permit us to look behind the uniform.

Mr. Morris. What is the date of the Grew letter?

Mr. Epstein. The note was presented to Mr. Nicolai V. Novikoff on

February 1, 1945.

Mr. Morris. And you say that note was a protest that we would never return these people because a repatriation would be a violation of the Geneva Convention, and that was dated February 1, 1945? Mr. Epstein. Yes. I quote:

I would like to outline to you the reasons why, in the opinion of the American authorities, these persons cannot, without presenting serious difficulties, be delivered for shipment to the Soviet Union. It appears to the appropriate American authorities, who have given most careful consideration to this situation, that the clear intention of the Convention-

meaning the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929—

is that prisoners of war shall be treated on the basis of the uniforms they are wearing when captured, and since the containing power shall not look behind the uniforms to question the citizenships.

Senator Jenner. So our State Department then was aware that returning these refugees by force after 1945 was a violation of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Erstein. Absolutely. This was not only a violation of the Geneva Convention, but also a complete reversal of the old American tradition of ready asylum for political exiles, because we also repatriated by force hundreds of thousands of civilians.

If you will permit me to read a very illustrative letter which American Ambassador Grew wrote me on September 19, 1955, I will do

I appreciate very much the facts you have set forth about the part I tried to play in the forced repatriation issue. I remember one occasion when as Acting Secretary of State I learned that a ship had already sailed from one of our ports carrying prisoners for forced repatriation. I gave immediate orders which resulted in the ship being held up and returned to port for a thorough screening of those sailors who wanted to return and those who wanted to stay. The figures of the result of such episode are not now before me.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Epstein, you read a while ago in the first

letter from Mr. Dulles that such a note is not in existence!

Mr. Epstein. Yes; but it doesn't appear in the Yalta papers although the Yalta papers contain about 64 documents which were issued before the beginning of the Yalta Conference. reference in one of the cables to this note. Since there is a little footnote "not printed," I had a feeling that might be an important document which proves in official State Department terms that the forced repatriation of about 2 million anti-Communists, prisoners, and civilians, was a violation of the Geneva Convention.

We do not know who overruled at Yalta this well-established State

Department policy.

Senator Jenner. When did you get this letter from Secretary Dulles? Would you read the date of that again?

Mr. Epstein. Yes; on April 28, 1955. Mr. Morris. Mr. Epstein, in other words, may I be sure I under-

stand your position?

You have learned now of the existence of a letter from Mr. Grew dated February 1, 1945, in which he unqualifiedly stated the position of the United States Government to be that they would never permit the return of these 2 million people back to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Epstein. This is not quite correct, Judge Morris. deals with the Soviet prisoners of war captured in German uniforms

fighting on the west front.

Now, for instance, a lot of people, many other Soviet nationals enlisted in the German Army in the hope that they would get the opportunity to fight against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Were there 2 million of those people?

Mr. Erstein. There were about 1 million of those people, 900,000 to

Mr. Morris. And Mr. Grew made the point that the United States cannot return them because it would be a violation of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Epstein. It would be a violation of the Geneva Convention, and also jeopardize our own people. We had many foreign nationals in our own Army who were in fact in exactly the same position. They fought in American uniforms, but they were Germans. We did not want to jeopardize their fate.

Mr. Morris. The Yalta Conference was held a few days after that? Mr. Epstein. Yes; the Yalta Conference opened on February 4,

1945.

Mr. Morris. Do you know what happened at the Yalta Conference

to overrule the United States position on this matter?

Mr. Epstein. Yes. When it became clear that the British and Soviet were going to sign the agreement on the exchange of prisoners, Grew sent a telegram to Stettinius and told him:

We cannot sign this; we just delivered an official diplomatic note to the Soviets which explains that we cannot forcibly repatriate Soviet nationals captured in German uniforms.

In addition to that, we have many prisoners who were not citizens of the

Soviet Union on September 1, 1939.

This is the essence of Grew's telegram of February 7, 1945.

Two days later, Stettinius wired back and informed Grew that we have to sign it because we want our boys, who are now in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany in the Soviet Union, back as soon as possible; that we cannot deal with the intricacies of the Geneva Convention; that we cannot deal with these considerations of humanitarian principles in the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Morris. In other words, we acquiesced in yielding up the terms

of the convention?

Mr. Epstein. Yes. General Dean signed for the Americans and General Grizlov signed for the Soviets the now famous Yalta agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war and liberated civilians.

Mr. Morris. How many people were sent back?

Mr. Epstein. That is a very difficult question, Judge Morris. Nobody knows the exact figure. Maybe the Pentagon knows. But everything concerning the repatriation is highly classified, even now.

I had a lengthy correspondence with the Secretary of the Army and the people in G-2, and so forth, and I couldn't get one paper because

they told me they are all highly classified.

In one letter they wrote me, they said that a representative of the Department of the Army will confer with Senator Eastland about the declassification of the key paper. This is a paper called Operation Keelhaul.

Senator Jenner. At this point I want to direct our staff to communicate with the proper officials to ascertain what are the true facts in the position of the United States Government in the breakdown of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Morris. It shall be done, Senator.

Mr. Epstein. May I give you the exact number and title of this document? This is a highly classified document. The number is 383.7-14.1, Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens, Operation Keelhaul.

This document was issued for internal use only, and is now deposited—at least I hope so—in the Historical Records Section of the

Army in Alexandria, Va.

Mr. Morris. Is that Keelhaul?

Mr. Epstein. That is right. It was named for one of the most barbaric punishments in the old British and Dutch Navies.

According to Webster, it means:

To haul under the keel of a ship, either athwartships or from bow to stern, by ropes attached to the yardarms on each side. It was formerly a punishment in the Dutch and British Navies, and a method of torture used by pirates.

Now, the fact that the military authorities chose this name for an official Pentagon survey of forced repatriation proves that they knew what it was.

Mr. Morris. You say, as a result of this particular situation that you have just described, this violation of the Geneva Convention, that we have a present security problem in the United States that is responsible for considerable Soviet activity here today?

Mr. Erstein. Yes. These 20,000 to 30,000 refugees living under false identities present a tremendous potential pool—

Mr. Morris. Who are these 20,000 to 30,000 people?

Mr. Erstein. These are people who are living here right now under false identities, to whom the——

Senator Jenner. And, but for their false identities, they would

have been forced back into Russia under this agreement?

Mr. Epstein. Yes. They are still afraid because the Yalta Agreement is still in force.

Mr. Morris. So if they used their right identities and right names,

they might be even now forced back to Soviet Russia?

Mr. Erstein. Yes. We know the Soviet intelligence apparatus is very active in this country, and it doesn't take much imagination to imagine how these people are being blackmailed not only to return

to Russia, but into spy activities.

Let us take a man, for instance, who lives in a small community in Minnesota. The Soviet agency might tell him, "We know you are a Soviet citizen, and you are living here in the United States under a false identity. Unless you give us some spy information, we will destroy your existence in this community by exposing you as a swinder, and according to the law you would have to be deported."

Senator Jenner. Under this agreement, the Government would be

forced to deport these people.

Mr. Epstein. Yes, because they must still carry out——

Senator Jenner. The Yalta Agreement has never been repudiated,

so it still stands as a valid agreement.

Mr. Morris. And I might point out that we are looking into that very problem now. There is some reason to believe that there are some cases in which pressure is being put on these people now.

Senator Jenner. There ought to be some pressure put on from all

angles in this situation.

Mr. Epstein. Before I left New York, I spoke to 1 or 2 Russians, and they told me of 1 or 2 cases of people living under false identities, or identification, who have been approached by Soviets. But the man did not give me their names, and did not permit me to use his name, because he said these people are afraid.

Under existing, standing American law, they could be deported.

Some of them even have children in the Army, for instance.

Mr. Morris. Would you agree with Mr. Andriyve, whose testimony we read here today, that it is very difficult to go into these cases because the people don't want to take chances and give their names?

Mr. Epstein. That is right. That is the reason why I proposed, a few weeks ago, in an article as well as in a broadcast over WEVD, that the President should declare a time limited amnesty to these people saying:

If you come forth within a certain time with the whole truth about your falsification and your false identities, and with every shred of evidence of pos-

sible Soviet approaches to you, you have nothing to fear. You may even be allowed to live under your false name.

You see, it is very embarrassing in little communities to change the names. Such an amnesty would yield, in my opinion, a tremendous stream of information for the FBI, therefore enabling the FBI to deal with this problem.

Two days later, after I spoke over WEVD I got two visitors from the Immigration Service, who had listened to this broadcast and then said that Immigration is very much interested in this proposal, and

I should tell them all.

So they came to my office and I told them all about what I know. Mr. Morris. Do you know of any forced repatriation going on at

any time now?

Mr. Epstein. Yes, a few months ago, we had a bad situation in Austria which seems to be better now. But right now there is a certain degree of forced repatriation going on from Trieste to Yugoslavia. I have here a memorandum dated March 20, 1956, written and signed by Constantin A. Fotitch, former Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, and Michael Krek. He is the leader of the Free Slovenes in the United States.

If I may quote a few lines and paragraphs, so you will see how this

situation is, according to Ambassador Fotitch and Mr. Krek.

Mr. Morris. When you do that, you will put the whole document in the record?

Mr. Epstein. Yes. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 264" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 264

Memorandum: Forcible Extraditions of the Yugoslav Refugees in Italy

Political emigrants-escapees from the countries dominated by totalitarian Communist governments have been since the Second World War a generally accepted phenomenon, an effect of the Iron Curtain.

The democratic and other non-Communist governments consider these escapees victims of the struggle for democratic liberties, accept them on their territories with sympathy, assist and help them in their efforts to resettle in the free world.

Due to notorious facts such as the overall suppression of political, economic, cultural, and religious liberties in the Communist-dominated countries and the manifold dangers of illegal, claudestine crossing the borderlines, the escapees have been as a rule generally considered political refugees and given the privilege of political asylum.

This viewpoint and attitude of the free humanity regarding the refugees from the Communist-dominated countries has been preverted by the Italian Government and by the Delegate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

After the London agreement of October 5, 1954, which settled the territorial Trieste dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Italian police authorities made efforts to get rid of the refugees from Yugoslavia and to prevent newcom-

ing escapees from that country.

At the end of 1954 the Yugoslav refugees in the DP camps in Italy were informed that they will have to leave Italy or to face repatriation to Yugoslavia. The Italian police actually invaded the DP camps at several occasions, deported groups of Yugoslav inmates to the Italian-Yugoslav borderline, and delivered them to the Yugoslav border guards.

This practice was discontinued at the beginning of 1955. Since then the inmates of DP camps are no more subjects of "purge actions" of the Italian police. Its efforts are the more concentrated on the newcomers, escapees from Yugo-

slavia.

The official dealings with these refugees are "top secret." The public statements of the Italian authorities are composed of generalities only and evidently phrased for political purposes. The principles and rules applied in the processing of the cases are not known. Known are the deplorable results only.

These are, in short, the following:

The refugees from Yugoslavia have to undergo hearings at the headquarters of the Italian police force (Questura) at Trieste, or Questura at Udine. Afterward, they are questioned and examined by the members of a commission which functions under the authority of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This Commission has its office at Via Pradamano, Udine. The Chairman of this Commission is Dr. Schlater, a Swiss; members are certain employees of the Italian police at Trieste and Udine. Known are the names of Dr. Portada, Dr. Giannini, and Dr. Morelli.

From the moment the Yugoslav refugee reports to the Italian authorities, he or she is considered as under arrest, is deprived of every contact with the outside world, cannot obtain any legal advice or other help, and is put in a camp called Campo di Smistamento dei Profughi at Udine. The interviewing, examining, and other processing of each case is considered "top secret." "Top secret" is also the decision itself. Not even the victim, the person involved, obtains any information about the decision concerning his or her fate until the very moment on the spot when he or she is faced with the Yugoslav guards on the border line.

According to our observers who saw individual groups of refugees escorted and extradited to the Yugoslav frontier guards, and according to news published in the Italian papers, 73 percent of all refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy who crossed

the border line during 1955 were forcibly repatriated.

Reliable inside reports tell us that the employees of the Commission at Udine quite often do not even take the trouble to find out the real motives of escape in each case. As a rule every refugee from Yugoslavia has to be returned. Those who obtain the permission to stay in Italy and then apply for emigration into overseas countries are exceptional cases. The questioning and hearings of the refugees are considered and dealt with as an unessential form of procedure.

Dr. Giannini and the Yugoslav vice consul in Trieste, Mr. Cibić, are in excellent relations. This fact is probably the clue to the explanation of the otherwise mysterious fact that in some cases the refugees from Yugoslavia who reported in the morning to the Italian police in Trieste were deported back to the Yugoslav border line and delivered to the Yugoslav border guards the same day. No opportunity was given to to them to plead for themselves.

During 1955 and January 1956, the Italian authorities as a rule returned to

Yugoslavia by force—

All men who fled the Yugoslavia armed forces and those of military age;

All minors;

All refugees and escapees who asked for political asylum and were not able to prove that they had been persecuted in Yugoslavia for reasons of political discrimination.

The forcible extraditions are executed mostly at night. We were able to trace

the following cases:

From November 1954 to March 1955, 97 persons were forcibly returned

against their will.

On March 5, 1955, 40 persons were forcibly extradited by the Italian police to the Yugoslav border guards at the place Farnetti on the Yugoslav-Italian border line.

On April 5, 1955, again 35 persons were extradited at Farnetti.

On May 12, 1955, a larger group of persons from Beograd was returned by police escort after they reported to the Italian police at Torino and asked for political asylum.

August 3 to 5, 1955, 20 persons extradited.

August 10, 1955, 23 persons extradited. August 12, 1955, 18 persons extradited.

August 13, 1955, 32 persons extradited.

August 24, 1955, 24 persons extradited.

August 25, 1955, 42 persons extradited. In December 1955, 65 persons extradited.

On January 12, 1956, a group of 40 refugees from Yugoslavia was escorted by the Italian police to the Italian-Yugoslav border line and given over to the Yugoslav border guards at Farnetti. These Yugoslav refugees were loaded into a car of the train No. 1674, which according to the schedule should have arrived from Udine to Trieste terminal at 3:12 p.m. The victims were told

that they will be placed into the DP camp at Trieste. In fact, the car with the group of refugees was detached from the train at the railway station Sistiana near Trieste. The police immediately surrounded the car and told the refugees to enter two police buses which transported them to Farinetti where the Yugoslav police unit was already expecting them. At the very moment when the victims saw the Yugoslav police, they began to cry, to shout for help and a few women (there were six among the prisoners) fainted. Nevertheless the Italian police retreated, the Yugoslav guards took over the group of refugees and chained everyone of them. The observers were able to see the dramatic scene of struggle between the refugees and the Yugoslav guards.

The newspaper "Candido" reports in its issue of February 5, 1956, the forcible return of 30 Yugoslav emigrants on January 26, 1956, in following

terms:

"We have informed the Parliament, the Government, and the public, that we (Italians) are the only nation in Europe forcibly returning the political emigrants into a Communist state. We are ashamed of this fact, yet unable to do more. We are stupefied with horror at the reports of the latest trans-

port of a few days ago.

"Horrifying scenes were witnessed at the Trieste jail where those unfortunate people were assembled to be handed to Tito's hangmen. They protested, cried, tore their clothes to pieces, asked to be rather shot than returned. They made desperate attempts to avoid being deported. When the carabinieris came to force them to leave the jail, they barricaded themselves in their cells, broke their beds so that firemen had to be called to help the carabinieris to subdue them. Finally they were firmly tied up, put into police trucks and brought to the frontier."

According to the reports published in Italian and Yugoslav newspapers and according to the reports of our reliable observers, such and similar tragic extraditions of refugees from Yugoslavia have been performed at the Italian-Yugoslav border line repeatedly every month since October 1954. They provoked public attention and sympathy for the victims in Italy and approval in the Yugoslav Communist press. Members of Parliament in Rome protested. In the city council of Trieste sharp and acid words were pronounced against these inhuman dealings with the refugees; newspapers carried exciting stories on the subject, yet it seems that nothing can stop the forcible extraditions (II Piccolo, Trieste; II Messagero Veneto, Udine; II Candido, Milano; II Gazzettino, Trento; La Vita Nuova, Trieste; Osservatore Romano, Vatican; Oggi, Agenzia Italia; Katoliski Glas, Glorizia; Demokracija, Trieste; Slovenski Porocevalec, Ljubljana; Vjesnik, Zagreb).

The Italian Government made several statements on the subject. It asserted that only those refugees from Yugoslavia have to be returned by force to their home country, who are qualified as "economic refugees," as opposite to the "political refugees." We do not know of any statement of the United Nations

High Commissioner on the subject.

International law, practice, and tradition consider every refugee from any country ruled by totalitarian dictatorship, asking for political asylum, a victim of political conditions entitled to protection and help.

The Constitution of the Italian Republic guarantees the right of political asylum to every person who escaped from a country where he could not enjoy

liberties given to the Italian citizens according to the constitution.

The Yugoslav Communist Government is a notoriously known dictatorship. Political liberties, personal freedoms, and economic free enterprise are not existing in Yugoslavia today. It is a fact that the Yugoslav, as any other Communist government, discriminates against non-Communist citizens in all fields of activities.

The refugees from Yugoslavia therefore are political refugees, and have to be considered as such, unless evidence is produced in individual cases to the

contrary.

By the bulk the refugees from Yugoslavia are anti-Communists, democraticminded people, whose lives under the Communist rule became unbearable. They consider the escape as their only means of survival. They are well aware of all dangers which they have to surpass at their clandestine crossing the borderline. They risk their lives to reach freedom.

The present practice in dealing with the Yugoslav refugees in Italy disregards the practice generally accepted in the free world, is contrary to the international law and tradition, contrary to the text and spirit of the Italian Constitution.

The forcible repatriation of the Yugoslav refugees is inhuman according to all standards of the Christian civilization; it is deplorably damaging the efforts of the West in its struggle with the Communist conspiracy and killing the spirit of persistence and resistance in the Communist-dominated countries, particularly in Yugoslavia.

We implore the representatives of the U. S. A. Government to work for the abolition of forcible extradition of the refugees and escapees from Yugoslavia

in Italy.

MICHAEL KREK.
CONSTANTIN A. FOTITCH.

Washington, March 20, 1956.

Mr. Epstein. The Italian police authorities made efforts to get rid of the refugees from Yugoslavia.

Mr. Morris. Tell me this: Did this stop in 1955?

Mr. Epstein. No. It only stopped as far as the old refugees who had been living for many years in Italy were concerned. Until 1955, according to my information, the Italian Government repatriated anti-Communist Yugoslavs who had been living for as much as 10 years in the Trieste area.

They don't do this any more, but the newcomers are repatriated. Ambassador Fotitch quotes a very illustrative article which appeared in the Italian newspaper Candido, in its issue of February 6, 1956.

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Epstein, this indicates that there are people now being forcibly repatriated, but does that pose a security problem

to us in the United States?

Mr. Epstein. In a certain respect; yes, sir.

First of all, we are supporting Yugoslavia and Italy; we recently sent money and machines, and so on, from this country, paid for by the American taxpayer, so the American people have a legitimate interest in the things.

Secondly, those things happen under the eyes of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that for the record, please? Mr. Epstein. Yes. G. J. v-a-n H-e-u-v-e-n G-o-e-d-h-a-r-t.

Mr. Morris. And who is he?

Mr. Epstein. His official title is "United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees," with headquarters in Geneva and an office in New York.

Mr. Morris. He has jurisdiction over this problem?

Mr. Epstein. He has to watch over these people, in my opinion, and it is his duty to protect those people.

Senator Jenner. What has he done to protect them?

Mr. Epstein. As far as I know, nothing.

Senator Jenner. Where is he from? Who is he?

Mr. Epstein. He is a Dutchman, a Dutch writer and a Dutch editor. His background will show that it is not at all too difficult to understand why he has done nothing.

Senator Jenner. What has he done, if anything?

Mr. Epstein. Well, he wrote the introduction to the most vicious pro-Communist book ever published in America, written by Sayers and Kahn, called The Great Conspiracy Against Soviet Russia.

Senator Jenner. He did what?

Mr. Erstein. He wrote the introduction for the Dutch edition of this book.

Senator Jenner. That is a Communist book, isn't it?

Mr. Epstein. That is a Communist, or, at least, the most pro-Communist book, written after the war in the United States. I understand that Mr. Kahn was before this committee as late as March 7, 1955, when he used the fifth amendment when Senator Eastland asked him, "Are you a member of the Communist Party?"

Mr. Morris. You say that this man, who is High Commissioner of

Refugees, wrote an introduction to the Dutch edition of that book?

Mr. Epstein, Yes. Here is the Dutch introduction. I have a

Mr. Epstein. Yes. Here is the Dutch introduction. I have also a translation, if you would like it.

Senator Jenner. I order that the translation go into the record and

become a part of this record.

(The translation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 265" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 265

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, Washington 25, D. C.

TRANSLATION (DUTCH)

Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy [Against Russia], with a foreword by Mr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, ex-Minister of Justice and Chief Editor of Het Parool (Republiek der Letteren, Amsterdam).

[INTRODUCTION]

Asked if I would like to furnish an introduction to the Dutch translation of The Great Conspiracy Against Russia by the two American writers Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, I had to confess that I had never read that book—that book, too, among others. I have since repaired the damage, for that is what it was, and I now emphasize when asked: "This book must be widely read." And it is a pleasure for me to send it on its way through the Netherlands

with a hearty recommendation from me.

Years ago, in view of all sorts of slackness in Dutch and non-Dutch domestic and foreign affairs, I pointed out, in a newspaper article, the need for the emergence of strong men. I meant then, and I still do, that democracy and misery do not go hand in hand; yes, even that democracy is compatible with vigorous leadership of politicians, whose vision is much broader than what we call, with slight contempt, the masses, and who run the risk of standing alone, unpopular, and misunderstood, and consequently are accused of being Fascists. That admission alone firmly pins the Fascist label on me. Years later, during a lecture I pointed out the futility of refusing all collaboration with the Communists because of ideological anticommunism. The result was that, here and there, as foreseen, I have since been called a Communist.

The world—I am sure our country also—suffers from label pinning. Ruthlessly we pin on the statements of almost everybody a political label, thereby often achieving the realization of a miserable objective: the arousing of suspicion. Few have had the good fortune that has been mine: Anyone who has been labeled both Fascist and Communist can also hope to be believed when

he says: I am a democrat.

Being a democrat is for me, above all, the belief in the fundamental equal worth of all men—not their "equality" [sameness]—to be topped by intellectual freedom and thus supporting the rights of the "minority." It seems to me, however, that the democratic concept is at variance with some, perhaps essential, elements of the Communist as well as Fascist ideology. If I were to describe the elements of my idea otherwise, I would risk coming into conflict, with, for example, the Reformed, the Catholic, and the Liberal ideology. But if everyone of us withdraws further into his ideological ivory tower, and especially if every one of us West Europeans—stanch individualists as we are—were to do so, where is the basis for any sort of practical collaboration? Something is missing. As it is the undeniable right of a democrat to maintain his "own concept," it is also his undeniable duty, for the sake, alone, of wanting to live together, to

cooperate with other-thinking persons, whenever and insofar as such cooperation

may be possible.

Nowadays, from a national and international viewpoint, political cooperation of other-thinking persons with the Communist is perhaps the touchiest problem that must be solved for the sake of peace. Likewise, the fabulous war effort of the Soviet Union to stand up against the Fascist strength has not in any way put a stop, either ideologically or emotionally, but carried to a large extent by plainly materialistic motives, to an anti-Russiaism, which a great and admirable military leader such as Winston Churchill introduced into his anti-Soviet speech at Fulton 6 months ago. The immeasurable losses which Soviet Russia sustained on the battlefields from Smolensk to Stalingrad in order to stem the tide of international fascism has done even more to make the world conscious of her anti-Russianism than Litvinov's stubborn efforts to substitute the lack of unity between the nations so welcomed by Hitler by activating the League of Nations to give a clear definition of the term "aggressor." On the contrary, as soon as the flags of England, Russia, and the United States were flying above the ruins of Berlin, the threads of the anti-Soviet campaign, spun in 1917, were picked up again.

Day by day millions of people are in their thought, their speech, and their writing committing the crime of getting ready for world war III-against Russia—by considering it possible, probable, or even unavoidable. A crime, indeed. No military or civilian who between 1939 and 1945 has been in the thick of it can think other than with horror of a repetition of the happenings in those years. No human being can shirk the obligation of doing everything in his power to

prevent this.

But what about the Russians? Aren't they hoping that some day the whole world will adhere to their Communist ideas? Haven't they for years been standing on the threshold of an attack on the world around them daring the world to force its system upon them? Two questions—two answers. Anyone who has any belief to peddle is doing so here, be he American or Russian, British or German. But while Hitler stole into nation after nation like a thief in the night to spread his gospel of violence, nobody can truthfully say that Russia aims at aggression. Nevertheless, millions believe that she is doing just that. Nevertheless the world has talked for well nigh 30 years—with amazing lack of logic—simultaneously about the "approaching crumbling" of the Soviet regime (ad nauseam making all sorts of dire predictions) and the threatening leap

by power-hungry Soviet Russia for world domination.

The nature of the catastrophes has never been indicated by the anti-Moscow hotheads. Twenty years ago Sir Henry Deterding was so sure that Soviet Russia's regime could last 1 year at best. When Hitler flew at Russia's throat the panic-struck suggested that it would capitulate within a month. When "Lady Luck changed her mind" at Stalingrad they announced that, as soon as the Soviet Army had reached Russia's former frontiers, Stalin would stop and make a separate peace with Hitler. When the facts "threw" that tale also "to the ravens," the explanation was that the "Russian steamroller," once set in motion, would roll right down to the beaches of the North Sea. When that "kite," too, "failed to get off the ground," the "tale of Joh" was spread that the Red army would never leave either north Norway or Czechoslovakia. When that alsobut no, the story is really beginning to get monotonous. Thirty years of more or less crusade-like anti-Soviet propoganda have thoroughly poisoned millions of minds, and for these people the Michael Sayres and Albert Kahn book can be effective medicine. With an avalanche of facts, justified by bibliographical notes, the main features of the "great conspiracy" against Russia have been revealed which began in Kerensky's days and has lasted to the present; a conspiracy plotted and schemed with a beautiful ideological feeling of coming to "the rescue of civilization," of "safeguarding of Christianity," of "defending man against beast." But, the real motive, save for exceptions, of its most important and, to be sure, most powerful devisers was too much capitalistic fear for their pocketbooks and too much imperialistic hunger for land.

For years Hitler had kept his criminal designs concealed behind a screen of quasi-humanitarian anti-Russianism; indeed, he himself helped rally the appeasers in every country in favor of signing and rejoicing over the shameful Munich Pact because "the" foe stood in the East and the Fuehrer, in his effort to free mankind from the threat of the "Bolshevist monster" upon acceptance of his "last territorial demand," still found people willing to listen to him. Thus fifth columns sprang up in almost every country serving the sinister German cause behind an anti-Russian camouflage. Thus all governments, including the pre1940 Dutch, found themselves in a pitifully weak situation when their Fascist highway robbers struck their blow, as their anti-Russianism (Mussert of Moscow") had, moreover, been pronounced as a very extenuating circumstance.

For all this, millions—15 million Russians alone—have paid with their lives in the 6 years of the war. The bitterest pill to swallow was the unconditional surrender first of Italy, then of Germany, and finally of Japan. Since then unity, painfully achieved by bitter struggle and after so many years of poisonous propaganda of distrust even more fragile of nature, has melted away. The same world that knew how to win the war is on its way to lose the peace. Anyone with eyes to see and ears to hear doubts that the war years may be followed by any great chance for a resumption of the song of the Russian bogeyman which had been chanted so quickly, so loudly, and so as-though-nothing-had-changed—that is the disillusionment and, at the same time,

in a nutshell, the danger.

Anyone who reads the book by Sayers and Kahn—and really; it must be read—should understand why, however valid the reasons may be, the Russians, from a political viewpoint, are suspicious, and he will forget his gruesome onesideness of the ignorant policy of regarding Russia as "the danger" [threat]. Nobody denies him the right of having misgivings concerning the definite objectives of the Soviet regime, a right that I, too, won't have anybody take away from me. But his understanding of Russian policy as a result of reading the Sayers and Kahn book will bring him closer to it, even maybe to seeking a place in the ranks of those who regard a better understanding and sincere cooperation between the Russian and non-Russian world as a condition for a lasting peace. There are scarcely 2 persons, or 2 parties, or, let alone, 2 philosophies, who don't somewhere in real life come to a crossroads where each must go his own way. The crossroads is at all times reached almost too soon. Irresponsible, to be sure, is the man who today chooses to walk alone, because tomorrow there may not be a chance of walking together.

May the Sayers and Kahn books also in our land promote a more thorough and more honest idea of policy of that country which has made such big and admirable sacrifices for containing the threat which, other than the Russian, has remained very real, yet not one hundredth of the talking and doing about the so-called danger to the peace coming from the East has been evidenced relative to the danger of reactionary fascism with its glorification of violence, with its destruction of intellectual freedom, with its inhumanity practiced by man.

G. J. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART.

OCTOBER 1946.

(Translated by Elizabeth Hanunian, May 8, 1956.)

Mr. Epstein. If you will permit me to quote a few lines.

He says in his introduction to this book, which appeared in 1946 in the Netherlands, about the same time it appeared here:

Asked if I would like to furnish an introduction to the Dutch translation of The Great Conspiracy Against Russia, by the two American writers Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, I had to confess that I had never read that book—that book, too, among others. I have since repaired the damage, for that is what it was, and I now emphasize when asked, "This book must be widely read." And it is a pleasure for me to send it on its way through the Netherlands with a hearty recommendation from me.

And further:

Likewise, the fabulous war effort of the Soviet Union to stand up against the Fascist strength has not in any way put a stop, either ideologically or emotionally, but carried to a large extent by plainly materialistic motives, to an "anti-Russia-ism" which a great and admirable military leader such as Winston Churchill introduced into his anti-Soviet speech at Fulton 6 months ago.

Day by day millions of people are, in their thought, their speech, and their writing, committing the crime of getting ready for world war III—against Russia—by considering it possible, probably or even unavoidable. A crime,

indeed.

Then, again :

While Hitler stole into nation after nation like a thief in the night to spread his gospel of violence, nobody can truthfully say that Russia aims at "aggression." Nevertheless, millions believe that she is doing just that.

Senator Jenner. I would like to state that I think it is outrageous, deplorable that a man who holds such views would be the High Commissioner of Refugees of the United Nations, and I am going to take that matter up with the chairman of this committee.

I think a proper directive should be sent to our American Ambassador to ask him to do something about a man who holds the position and has the views that you have just stated, if they be true.

Mr. Epstein. I agree with you, Senator. Thank you for this statement. I have never read anything so pro-Communist as this book, and this introduction, so I didn't understand how this man could get this high position.

I believe there is an American vote in the United Nations.

Mr. Morris. You have one more letter, have you not, to a man named Klimov?

Mr. Epstein. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you just tell us what that is and put it in the record?

Mr. Erstein. Gregory Klimov is the editor of a Russian refugee periodical appearing in Munich, Germany, called Svoboda, and he is right now in the United States. He gave me, when I interviewed him in December, the first information about the seamen from the *Tuatse*, and told me they are accosted and approached every day by

Soviet agents.

I wrote at that time an article which was distributed by North

American Newspaper Alliance on December 19, 1955.

Mr. Morris. Just tell us the highlights, and put it in the record. Mr. Epstein. Mr. Klimov showed me a photostat of a letter he got from Berlin, signed by General Kolosov, asking him to return.

Mr. Morris. This is a letter from an official in Soviet Berlin asking

him to go back?

Mr. Epstein. Yes.

This article was distributed by NANA on December 19, 1955. This letter reads as follows——

Mr. Morris. Just put it into the record.

Senator Jenner. It will go into the record and become a part of the official record of this committee.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 266" and reads as follows:)

Exhibit No. 266

AGENTS TRAIL RUSSIAN REFUGEES IN UNITED STATES, URGE THAT THEY RETURN TO SOVIET UNION

(Julius Epstein, a frequent contributor to American magazines and United States correspondent for a number of West German newspapers, has been reporting international news for more than 30 years. Stories he wrote in 1951 were instrumental in bringing about the congressional investigation of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers during World War II)

(By Julius Epstein, North American Newspaper Alliance)

New York, December 19.—Nine former Russian seamen who sought asylum in the United States after their tanker was captured by the Chinese Nationalists are persistently being followed by Soviet agents in New York, it was reported today.

The Soviet representatives are urging that the sailors, who are living in

seclusion in New Jersey, return to their homeland.

Disclosure that Russia's campaign to induce its escaped nationals to return had extended to the streets of New York was made by Gregory Klimov, a former

Soviet Army major who is a leader of Russian defectors in West Germany. Klimov, on a visit to this country, learned of the sailors' experiences while con-

ferring with them on their problems as fugitives from the Soviet Union.

Their ship, the *Tuatse*, was captured by the Chinese Nationalist Navy on June 23, 1954, while carrying oil through Formosa Strait en route to Chinese Communist ports. Of the 49 crew members, 11 remained in Formosa, 29 returned to the Soviet Union, and the 9 arrived in the United States October 20, classed as "special immigrants."

Two weeks later, Klimov quoted the seamen, the first effort was made to

persuade them to go back to Russia.

Two of the nine had visited a friend on 141st Street in upper Manhattan and boarded a subway train for Times Square when a Russian representative approached them. He urged them to return home and promised forgiveness and a

new start in life in the U.S.S.R.

The two defectors immediately contacted the New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, they told Klimov, where they were shown pictures of Russians known to the FBI to be operating as agents in this country. Among the photographs, the pair recognized one of the men who had accosted them in the subway.

A third sailor off the *Tuatse* was approached a few days later near Broadway and 42d Street in the heart of Manhattan. This time, a Negro who commanded

fluent Russian spoke for return to the Soviet Union.

The most striking event in the series of persuasion attempts took place November 26, when the whole group of nine attended a "ball of the nations" at New York's St. Nicholas Arena. An unknown man approached the table of the Russians and handed them a big parcel, then disappeared. Inside the parcel the Russians found handwritten letters and photographs from their near and distant relatives, friends, and sweethearts in the Soviet Union. In addition, there was also a letter addressed to all members of the group and signed by the secretary of the Tuatse post of the Young Communist League.

The letter contained an invitation to return to the Soviet Union under the provisions of the Soviet amnesty to Russians living abroad. Minutes later, the seamen found the man who had given them the parcel and asked him for an explanation. He asserted that another man, unknown to him, had given him

the parcel with the request to deliver it.

These events have frightened the sailors, reported Klimov, who himself took refuge in the West several years ago while, as a Red army officer, he was in charge of industrial development in Eastern Germany. The sailors are unable to understand how the Soviet agents are so well informed about their movements and at liberty to approach them in the public streets. They are baffled by the explanation that the Russians, who presumably are in the United States under diplomatic passport, are free to speak to whomever they wish. If a similar event occurred in Moscow in behalf of a foreign country, Klimov quoted the refugees, an arrest would be made immediately. In recent weeks, the sailors have stopped appearing in public; their location is a tightly kept secret. They are being supported by refugee organizations.

The seamen's experiences are illustrative of the vigor of current Russian campaign for redefection, Klimov said. Heavy pressure to come home, he reported, is exerted on Russians in West Germany, where 100,000 former Soviet citizens have lived since 1945 and where the refugee agency he heads has it headquarters.

In East Berlin, Russian General Michailov heads the Committee for the Return to the Homeland, which publishes a bimonthly paper, distributed among refugees from the Soviet Union all over the world, the United States included. The committee also sends out thousands of personal letters, containing a mixture of lure and threat.

Michailov's righthand man, according to Klimov, is Lieutenant Colonel Kolosov, who defected in 1945, went to Australia, and was later deported. He went to West Germany, where he ran a chicken farm. In September 1955 he redefected to the Soviet zone. Today, Klimov reported, he is broadcasting anti-American

speeches from East Berlin.

Klimov, who is president of the most important anti-Communist Refugee Organization in west Germany, called TCOPE (Central Association of Postwar Emigrees From the U. S. S. R.) and also editor in chief of the organization's periodical Svoboda (Freedom) is himself a constant target of the Soviet campaign for the return to the homeland. A few weeks ago, Kilmov received a personal letter, signed by Kolosov. The letter reads as follows:

"Grigorij Petrovich: I am writing from east Berlin, by order of a member

of the Committee for the Return to the Fatherland.

"Frankly spoken, I personally consider you a useless man and would not bother to write to you or to invite you to return to the fatherland. But the committee here considers you and those similar to you with great indulgence. considered as a young and hopeful man who can still be saved. Your work is well known here but it is not considered as very important. You certainly know very well what the success of TCOPE and similar outfits in the fight to overthrow communism amount to.

"You have probably read the Soviet Amnesty; you do not fall under its provi-But there is a rather broad back door through which your friends could let you in and transport you back to the fatherland, together with those who fall under the amnesty directly. The condition is voluntary surrender and participation in patriotic activities. You certainly know what voluntary surrender And the meaning of 'patriotic activities' should also be clear to you. As a leader of the TCOPE you have contacts with many postwar refugees and know their addresses. Through your contact with Lebedev and others, you can obtain the addresses of all those refugees who subscribe to Satirikon. is an anti-Soviet satirical periodical, appearing in West Germany.) have to bother with old emigrees and those who never were Soviet citizens because the amnesty does not include them and the committee has no right to invite them or to guarantee their return to the fatherland. But we need the addresses of the new and newest ones; the committee would like to send them its periodical and personal letters.

"A great deal of your terrible sins would be forgiven if you were able to organize a group which would collaborate with us. But this might be difficult and dangerous for you. Therefore, do rather only one thing, but do it thor-

"Thus, you have a chance to redeem your guilt in a rather easy way. You know when they forgive in our country, they do it with all the broadmindedness

of the Russian soul.

"I don't know who has greater influence upon you, the foreign intelligence services or the fatherland. But I'm telling you, neither you nor your friend Artsiuk, nor the solidarists will overthrow communism. In spite of all predictions, the Soviet Government has lived and will live. If you decide to go home, you'll become an equal member of the family. If you stay abroad, you'll remain an outcast. The old emigration has been wandering around the globe for almost 40 years. You know the results—they lost their human face. same fate will befall you and all those who will reject the magnanimous offer, now made by your fatherland.

(Signed) "MIKHAIL KOLOSOV, East Berlin."

Mr. Morris. I hope you won't mind if we move along. We have four other witnesses here this morning.

I want to thank you very much for the helpful testimony you have given the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator Jenner. Yes, it has been very helpful, very enlightening,

and very shocking.

(A prepared statement by Mr. Epstein was later ordered into the record as exhibit No. 267 and reads as follows:)

Ехнівіт No. 267

STATEMENT BY JULIUS EPSTEIN

I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before this Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and to give testimony about

certain aspects of our present refugee problem.

To give you in this brief statement just one example: There are now at least 20,000 refugees from Iron Curtain countries, mostly Russians, Ukraines, Poles, and Balts living in this country under false identities. They falsified their ties in order to escape American sponsored forced repatriation. They simply forged their credentials while in European DP camps. They presented these forged documents to the American authorities all over Europe and they were admitted to the United States as well as to other countries under these false identities. They are living here in fear and in terror. In many cases, their

sons are in the American Army, Navy, or Air Force. They have daily to continue the swindle unless they want to expose their parents as forgers of documents. All those former Soviet nationals, living now under false identities in our country, represent a daugerous reservoir to be tapped by the tremendous Soviet intelligence apparatus, now operating in this country. It does not take much imagination to envision how Soviet agents may intimidate and blackmail those unfortunate people into submission to Moscow, especially those working in defense plants and living in small communities.

The President has mentioned their case in his message to Congress of Febru-

ary 8, 1956, when he said and I quote:

"A large group of refugees in this country obtain—mark the present tense of the verb 'obtain'—visas by the use of false identities in order to escape forcible repatriation behind the Iron Curtain; the number may run into the thousands. Under existing law such falsification is a mandatory ground for deportation. The law should be amended to give relief to these unfortunate people."

Now, let us take a look at the past. How came it about that we Americans deported to their sure death on Soviet gallows, before Soviet firing squads or in Siberian slave-labor camps, between 1 and 2 million anti-Communist prisoners of war and civilians who had just one desire: To surrender to the Americans, to stay in the West and to fight communism? How came it about that we violated the spirit of the Geneva Convention and reversed the old American tradition of ready asylum for political exiles? By doing this, we destroyed the most valuable potential force in the battle against Moscow's conspiracy against free mankind.

That it was a gross violation of the Geneva Convention and a ruthless abolition of the American tradition of ready asylum for political exiles can be proved by State Department and Pentagon documents. Let me again just give you one example:

When the Soviet Government, early in 1945, demanded from our Government the forcible return of Soviet nationals captured in German uniforms, we right-

fully rejected this demand.

In an official diplomatic note of February 1, 1945, signed by our then Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, we informed the Soviet representative in Washington, Mr. Nikolai V. Novikov, that we could never forcibly return Soviet nationals captured in German uniforms, because their forcible repatriation would constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention. This diplomatic note which surprisingly does not appear in the Yalta papers but was released to me by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was presented to the Soviet representative in Washington just 3 days before the opening of the Yalta Conference. The note proved the well-established policy of the State Department in accordance with international law and old American traditions. This well-established policy against any forced repatriation was overruled at Yalta within a few hours.

When it became clear that our Yalta delegation would—under British and Soviet pressure—conclude the infamous Yalta agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war and liberated civilians, our Acting Secretary of State, Ambassador Grew, sent a wire to Mr. Stettinius, our Secretary of State, then at Yalta. In this wire, Grew strongly warned against the conclusion of any agreement which could ever result in forced repatriation of anti-Communist prisoners

of war and civilians.

It was in vain.

Our Yalta delegation—including Mr. Alger Hiss and possibly under his advice—had no qualms to renounce any consideration of the Geneva Convention of which we were and still are a member, the American tradition of the right of asylum and other humanitarian principles. The secret agreement was signed on February 11, 1945, for the Americans by General Dean and for the Soviets by General Gryzlov.

It was this agreement which served as the pushbutton to unleash the great tragedy, and I do not hesitate to say the crime of forced repatriation of anti-Communists, although even this agreement does not contain any reference to the use of force. We do not yet know whether there was any other secret written or oral agreement at Yalta, providing for the use of force for repatriation purposes. But we do know that the agreement containing not the slightest reference to the use of force was—arbitrarily—interpreted as in favor of force by our Joint Chiefs of Staff. This, too, can be documented by official Army papers.

One of these Army documents is the still unreleased official report: The Recovery and Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War, Occupation Forces in Europe, 1945–46. This highly interesting document was prepared under the

authority of the Army Chief Historian, Col. Harold E. Potter, by the Chief Archivist Gilette Griswold.

This document proves to the hilt that not only SHAEF but the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberately chose to use force to drive Soviet nationals to their death not because they had to but because they wanted to. On page 64 of this docu-

ment we read and I quote:

"The principle of forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens was recognized in Supreme Headquarters in April 1945. Although the Yalta agreement did not contain any categorical statement that Soviet citizens should be repatriated regardless of their personal wishes, it was so interpreted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On instructions from the latter, theater headquarters ordered repatria-

tion regardless of the individual desire.

But we went even further to appease Stalin and his hangmen. We did not only forcibly repatriate anti-Communist prisoners of war and civilians, including women and children, but also anti-Communist heroes of Soviet origin who had fought heroically in our own ranks and who had been decorated by our own American generals. I am referring to the tragic case of Tinio, a nomad from a Turkistanian area who had joined one of our divisions, fighting against the Nazis in Italy under our General Almond. Tinio had joined our ranks, together with a whole band of comrades. After the end of hostilities, a Soviet repatriation mission in Italy asked for his and his comrades' extradition. General Almond had to deport Tinio and his comrades, in spite of the fact that he knew very well it meant the immediate destruction of Tinio and his comrades.

Now, Tinio and his comrades were by no stretch of the imagination "prisoners of war" or "liberated civilians," they were members of an American military unit. Therefore, the Yalta agreement did not cover them, no matter how arbitrarily and wrongly one might have interpreted it. His surrender by American

military authorities was a crime—pure and simple.

But to get the complete picture of the horrible events, the mass suicides, the violation of international law as well as of time-honored American traditions, the Department of Defense should immediately release to the press and therefore to the American people the vast amount of top-secret documents it is still locking away in its files. Among those papers is the report of the forcible repatriation of about 200 Soviet nationals from Fort Dix, N. J. They had to be drugged in order to overcome their fierce resistance to forced repatriation.

The Pentagon should release what is probably the key document to all the still hidden details of forced repatriation after the war. I am speaking of the highly classified document with the file number and title: "383.7-14.1 Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens-Operation Keelhaul." This document was issued for internal use only on September 1, 1948, and is now deposited—at least I hope so—in the Historical Records Section of the Army in

Alexandria, Va.

Keelhaul was one of the most barbarous punishments in old Dutch and British Navies. According to Webster, "Keelhaul" means, I quote, "To haul under the keel of a ship, either athwartships or from bow to stern, by ropes attached to the yardarms on each side. It was formerly a punishment in the Dutch and British Navies and a method of torture used by pirates."

The fact that our military authorities chose Operation Keelhaul as code name for an official report on forced repatriation speaks for itself. It does not

need any further comment.

Today, the specter of forced repatriation is still haunting us. Nothing has ever poisoned our spiritual and moral relations to our secret allies behind the Iron Curtain more than this forced repatriation of millions of anti-Communists after World War II.

We should also not forget that the Yalta agreement is still in force in 1956, and continues to terrorize thousands of refugees and to force them—as the

President said in his message to Congress—to falsify their identities.

But not only that. Forced repatriation of political refugees was a live issue a few months ago in Austria. It is today a live issue in Italy. According to a reliable source, the Italian Government is forcibly returning anti-Communist refugees, Yugoslavs, to Tito's Communist dictatorship. At the same time, it was reported. Tito forcibly repatriates anti-Soviet refugees to Rumania. This latter fact is a direct result of Tito's reconciliation with the Kremlin.

All this is happening under the eyes of thet U. N. High Commissioner for

Refugees, whoses office is partly paid for by the American taxpayer.

While nothing can eradicate the indelible blot on our honor and especially on our tradition of ready asylum for political exiles, brought about by our own deeds, thet least we should do is to find out the whole truth and to give this truth to the American people as well as to our secret allies behind the Iron

It is my belief that Congress has the moral obligation to investigate impartially the whole forced repatriation program as carried out by our military and civilian authorities (UNRRA, IRO) in the years 1945-47. Only such investigation will show the American people how it was possible that we did what turned out to be not only a crime against humanity but also the greatest blunder of our postwar policy.

I deeply hope that Congress will discharge this moral duty not only in the interest of a historical truth of tremendous significance but also in the interest of the restoration of morally and spiritually sound relations to our millions of

allies, before and behind the Iron Curtain.

(The following correspondence between Chairman Eastland and Hon, Henry Cabot Lodge, chief United States delegate to the United Nations, relative to the High Commissioner for Refugees, was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on June 26:)

MAY 18, 1956.

Hon. HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr., The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LODGE: At a hearing of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee held on Friday, May 18, testimony was presented which aroused great concern in the mind of the then acting chairman, Senator William E. Jenner, and in my own mind. Testimony and documentary evidence were presented to show that the present United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. G. J. van Henven Goedhart and former ex-minister of justice and chief editor of Het Parool wrote an introduction to a book entitled "De Grote Samenzwering" (The Great Conspiracy Against Russia) by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, published by Republiek der Lettern of Amsterdam, Holland.

Albert E. Kahn, coauthor of this book, appeared before the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee on March 7 and 8, 1955, and invoked the fifth amendment on the grounds of possible self-incrimination when asked whether he was then or had ever been a member of the Communist Party. I enclose herewith Mr. Kahn's testimony. Michael Sayers' writing have appeared frequently in Com-

munist Party literature, oftentimes in association with Albert E. Kahn.

Permit me to quote from Mr. Goedhart's introduction to this highly pro-

"Asked if I would like to furnish an introduction to the Dutch translation of The Great Conspiracy Against Russia by the two American writers Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, I had to confess that I had never read that bookthat book, too, among others.. I have since repaired the damage, for that is what it was, and I now emphasize when asked: 'This book must be widely read.' And it is a pleasure for me to send it on its way through the Netherlands with a hearty recommendation from me.

"Years ago, in view of all sorts of slackness is Dutch and non-Dutch, domestic and foreign affairs, I pointed out, in a newspaper article, the need for the emergence of strong men * * * Years later, during a lecture I pointed out the futility of refusing all collaboration with the Communists because of ideological anticommunism. The result was that, here and there, as foreseen, I have since

been called a Communist.

"* * * Likewise, the fabulous war effort of the Soviet Union to stand up against the Fascist strength has not in any way put a stop, either ideologically or emotionally, but carried to a large extent by plainly materialistic motives, to an 'anti-Russianism,' which a great and admirable military leader such as Winston Churchill introduced into his anti-Soviet speech at Fulton 6 months

"Day by day millions of people are in their thought, their speech and their writing committing the crime of getting ready for world war III-against Russia—by considering it possible, probable, or even unavoidable. A crime, indeed * * *.

"But what about the Russians? Aren't they hoping that some day the whole world will adhere to their Communist ideas? Haven't they for years been standing on the threshold of an attack on the world around them daring the

world to force its system upon them? Two questions-two answers. Anyone who has any belief to peddle, is doing so here, be he American or Russian, British or German. But while Hitler stole into nation after nation like a thief in the night to spread his gospel of violence, nobody can truthfully say that Russia aims at 'aggression.' Nevertheless, millions believe that she is doing just that * * *. Thirty years or more or less crusade-like anti-Soviet propaganda have thoroughly poisoned millions of minds, and for these people the Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn book can be effective medicine. With an avalanche of facts, justified by bibliographical notes, the main features of the great conspiracy against Russia have been revealed which began in Kerensky's days and has lasted to the present; a conspiracy plotted and schemed with a beautiful ideological feeling of coming to 'the rescue of civilization,' of 'safeguarding of Christianity,' of 'defending man against beast.' But, the real motive, save for exceptions, of its most important and, to be sure, most powerful devisers was too much capitalistic fear for their pocketbooks and too much imperialistic hunger for land * * *.

"Anyone who reads the book by Sayers and Kahn—and really it must be read-should understand why, however valid the reasons may be, the Russians, from a political viewpoint, are suspicious, and he will forget his gruesome, one-sidedness of the ignorant policy of regarding Russia as 'the danger [threat]. Nobody denies him the right of having misgivings concerning the definite objectives of the Soviet regime, a right that I, too, won't have anybody take away from me. But his understanding of Russian policy as a result of reading the Sayers and Kahn book will bring him closer to it, even maybe to seeking a place in the ranks of those who regard a better understanding and sincere cooperation between the Russians and non-Russian world as a condition for a lasting

peace * * * "

In behalf of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, I wish to ask you as the representative of the United States within the United Nations to determine how a man of Mr. Goedhart's outlook came to head the United Nations Organization for Refugees. We would also like to know whether the United States

voted in favor of this choice.

We are particularly concerned about this question at the present time, in the light of our current investigations of pressure being exerted by Communist governments to cause redefections among those who have sought asylum in the free world, a question in which a man with Mr. Goedhart's position and power could wield considerable weight and influence.

We look forward to a detailed analysis of the facts on this matter as far

as you are in a position to present them.

Senator Jenner who presided at the hearing thought that it was outrageous and scandalous that a man who would so associate himself with Communists should have to be looked to by refugees and forced repatriates who are being subject to Soviet pressure and terror and forcibly transported behind the Iron Curtain.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

MAY 21, 1956,

Dear Senator Eastland: This acknowledges receipt of your letter dated May 18 which was published in the newspapers of May 20.

In response to your question, the records indicate that Mr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart was first elected to be the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by the General Assembly of 1950. At that time the United States sup-

ported Mr. J. Donald Kingsley.

In 1953 the mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees was extended by the General Assembly for 5 years over the bitter opposition of the U.S.S.R. The delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries strongly attacked Mr. van Heuven Goedhart personally for not taking action to repatriate the refugees and alleged that he was serving the interests of the United States and other western Governments. The United States supported the extension of the High Commissioner's mandate and the decision to take this action was, of course, made in Washington.

At the 1953 session of the General Assembly Mr. van Heuven Goedhart was the only nominee of the Secretary General for the post of High Commissioner,

and he was declared elected for the 5-year term.

It may be pertinent at this point to say that Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, in his appearances at the United Nations, has frequently taken issue with positions of the Soviet Union and has been a prime target for the attacks of that Government. Last year when the Soviets, as part of their redefection campaign, sought in the General Assembly to get language into the refugees resolution which, in our opinion, might have made possible the forcible repatriation of refugees, Mr. van Heuven Goedhart openly and vigorously opposed this attempt. With the support of the United States the Soviet attempt was defeated.

1, of course, wholeheartedly disagree with the tenor of the statements attributed to Mr. van Heuven Goedhart which you quote in your letter.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) H. C. Lodge, Jr.

June 22, 1956.

Hon. HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr.,

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I refer to my letter to you dated May 18, 1956, and to your reply thereto dated May 21, 1956, in the matter of Mr. G. J. van Heuven

Goedhart, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

You will remember that in my letter of May 18 I called your attention to an introduction written by Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart in 1946 for the Dutch edition of a book by Michael Sayres and Albert E. Kahn entitled "The Great Conspiracy Against Russia." In that introduction, Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart, who is in charge of the United Nations program for refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, referred to "the futility of refusing all collaboration with the Communists," and called for "an avalanche of facts" to overcome "30 years of more or less crusade-like anti-Soviet propaganda" which he declared had "thoroughly poisoned millions of minds."

In your answering letter dated May 21, you pointed out that in recent years Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart has on several occasions taken issue with the publicly stated position of the Soviet Union in matters before the United Nations. You added, however, that you "wholeheartedly disagree" with the introduction written by him for the Sayres-Kahn book.

I now call your attention to an item in the Netherlands News Bulletin, published by the Netherlands News Agency A. N. P., 32 Parkstraat, The Hague, under

date of Wednesday, June 6, 1956. I quote:

"As regards certain reproaches made against him in the United States in connection with a preface he wrote to the book, The Great Conspiracy Against Russia, in 1946, Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart said he thought it was one of the best he had ever written. 'I do not think there is the slightest occasion to defend myself against the nonsense uttered with regard to this preface,' he said. If some United States Senators thought he was a Communist then he was in the same company as Professor Oppenheimer."

In other words, as late as June 6 of this year Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart regarded the statements in his introduction to The Great Conspiracy Against Russia as some of the best he had ever written. And as for his views on communism, Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart considers himself in the same category as J. Robert Oppenheimer—whose security clearance was withdrawn by the Government of the United States after his intimate, extensive, and dangerous con-

nections with Communists and communism had been established.

I will appreciate being advised whether you consider that this latest statement by Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart affects in any way his qualifications to serve as the United Nations official in charge of its program for refugees from Communist oppression and tyranny.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) James O. Eastland, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

[Netherlands News Bulletin, The Hagne, Netherlands, June 6, 1956]

REFUGEE H. C. MIGHT RESIGN

THE HAGUE.—In bitter terms the United Nations Commission for Refugees, Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, has complained at a press conference here of lack of funds for refugees and hinted that he might resign.

He said it was "an absolute scandal that, 10 years after the war, 65,000 refu-

gees are still living in misery in a Europe bulging with prosperity."

Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart was profoundly pessimistic about financial prospects and said he could not see in what way the states cooperating to aid refugees could be persuaded to give new life to the aid programme of the United Nations.

"I have done all I possibly can to get more money for refugees, but the results have been so disappointing that I must ask myself if it would not be

better if someone else took my place," he declared.

Van Henven Goedhart said that "great apathy" could be observed among the refugees now that they had been in camps for more than 10 years, and they no longer make much effort to become independent.

TALKS WITH GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

Talks were now going on with Germany and Austria to liquidate the camps in these countries before 1958.

Without a certain amount of pressure the camps there would never become empty, he said. It was true that the number of refugees had declined since 1954 from 85,000 to 65,000, but on the other hand the number had greatly increased because Austria would have to receive this year 3,000 Hungarians and 3,000 Italians. It was very encouraging, the High Commissioner went on, that the money from the Nobel Prize has made it possible to empty completely a camp on the Greek island of Tinos and to house its 120 inhabitants satisfactorily elsewhere.

As regards the financial side of the refugee problem, Mr. van Heuven Goedhart said that through voluntary contributions by members of the U. N., \$16 million would be collected divided over four years. For the first year a target amount of 4.2 million had been fixed but, ultimately, only 2.7 million was received, a deficit of 1.5 million. The High Commissioner had proposed to the U. N. that this deficit should be added to the target amount for the next year, 1956, so that this would become 5.9 million. But he could already say that this amount would never be realised.

HOLLAND'S "EXEMPLARY RECORD"

Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart had also tried to obtain money from private industry and social institutions. A few countries had shown good will but none of them had such an exemplary record as the Netherlands.

He drew attention to the new fund that had meanwhile been established by Pierre Schneiter, the special representative of the Council of Europe for the problem of overpopulation in Europe and refugees. "This fund is now knocking on the same doors as I am,' 'said the High Commissioner, "but ministers of finance do not usually increase their budget for assistance when the number of organisations is increased. If the number of candidates increases, but the cake remains the same size, then it simply means that everyone gets a thinner slice.'

As regards certain reproaches made against him in the United States in connection with a preface he wrote to the book, The Great Conspiracy against Russia, in 1946, Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart said he thought it was one of the best he had ever written. "I do not think there is the slightest occasion to defend myself against the nonsense uttered with regard to this preface," he said. If some United States Senators thought he was a Communist then he was in the same company as Professor Oppenheimer.

The High Commissioner, just back from a tour of South America, said that, with the exception of Venezuela, there was not much future for European refugees in that part of the world since capital was necessary for emigration

there.

June 26, 1956.

Dear Senator Eastland: This acknowledges yours of June 22 in which you cite further statements attributed to Mr. Van Heuven Goedhart and ask me for

In reply I will say that I completely disapprove of the latest statement which your letter attributes to Dr. Van Henven Goedhart on the basis of a foreign press report and that it is certainly something which, if verified, should be taken into account by those who make the decision on his qualifications to hold office.

I should in all frankness point out that the matter of the United States endorsement of international officials, such as Dr. Goedhart, is one concerning which I receive formal instructions from Washington.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. C. LODGE, Jr.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mischaikow.

Senator Jenner. Will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Mischaikow. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL MISCHAIKOW, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. Mischaikow. Michael Mischaikow, M-i-s-c-h-a-i-k-o-w, 48 Mon-

roe Place, Brooklyn 1, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Senator, before asking this witness questions, the particular evidence that he can contribute today, that this witness can contribute today, bears on still another aspect of Soviet activity in connection with the redefection campaign.

Mr. Mischaikow, you have been in the United States for some time?

Mr. Mischaikow. I am here since January 1956.

Mr. Morris. Where have you been prior to January 1956?

Mr. Mischaikow. In Europe, Germany.

Mr. Morris. How long were you in Germany? Mr. Mischaikow. Eleven—ten or eleven years. Mr. Morris. You are a native of what country?

Mr. Mischaikow. I am Bulgarian.

Mr. Morris. When did you arrive in Germany?

Mr. Mischaikow. I have been a German student at the time of the collapse—the end of the war.

Mr. Morris. How did you escape from Bulgaria?

Mr. Mischaikow. I didn't escape. I actually stayed. I was in Germany and didn't return to Communist Bulgaria.

Mr. Morris. I see. You were in Germany and didn't return?
Mr. Mischaikow. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mischaikow, while you were in Germany, were any efforts made on the part of the Bulgarian Communist officials to

cause you to return to Bulgaria?

Mr. Mischaikow. Not me personally, but especially in the last time, hundreds and hundreds of cases, not only of Bulgarian but all East European nationals living as refugees in Germany and around Europe, have been approached by a letter or personally to return to their homelands.

The striking fact in this action, as far as Europe was concerned, was that the enemy approach is not always coming only from the

face, as far as the refugees are concerned.

This means facing the enemy to what it is. It means many of the letters asking the refugees to go back to their country have been mailed from countries from the free world, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium. What is much more striking psychologically—I would say very dangerous—it has been learned that among these letters coming from the free world asking a refugee to go back to his home

country are also letters mailed in the United States.

Letters mailed in the United States reach European immigrants asking them to go home. It is said the fact that such letters can be mailed in the United States has a psychological effect concerning the feeling of insecurity of this refugee, seeing that the letters can come from the United States.

All signs point to a very good network system operating on such psychological depression, asking them to go to the Communist occu-

pied country.

Mr. Morris. It indicates that there is a network existing around the world?

Mr. Mischaikow. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Which is psychologically playing on their minds?

Mr. Mischaikow. That is right. So the simple, common refugee who believed that he escaped the secret service of the Communists, the NKVD and other political organizations, hasn't escaped the fact that he is nowhere secure, because from all countries of the free world there are small places or nests wherefrom letters or action are coming to press him to go back.

Mr. Morris. You say these letters are from the United States?

Mr. Mischaikow. I learned that letters from the United States reach these European emigrants in Europe, indicating cities like New York or Chicago, asking them to go back to their countries.

Mr. Morris. Have you seen any of these letters from the United

States?

Mr. Mischaikow. I have seen letters. I didn't see the envelopes, but all these letters have been mimeographed, without any heading—I mean official headings, and without any signature, in a very polite way addressing to the person as "Dear Countryman," or indicating that the country is expecting him to go back, and that his amnesty doesn't hold, and so on.

Mr. Morris. Would you describe these letters for us very briefly?

Mr. Mischaikow. It says, as follows:

Dear Countryman: Maybe it is brought to your attention the fact that the government of your country—

indicating the country specified—

issued an amnesty which will provide you no punishment when or if you decide to go home. The country waits on you, and we will be glad to welcome you again in its community.

Mr. Morris. Does this have an impact on these people?

Mr. Mischaikow. Oh, sure, sir. You can't imagine. I know it is a psychological problem, because for a long time I worked in a division of the International Refugee Organization, and I started this psychological problem long ago before it became a political problem, as a psychological background.

Every refugee from Soviet-occupied countries is afraid. He wants

to go as far as possible from the Iron Curtain.

One of the reasons for emigration to far remote countries is that. If these people got letters, especially from countries where they thought they would be secure, you can't imagine the psychological reactions, and the psychological effect which proves that the Soviet claim or the Communist claim that their hand is long and can reach everywhere is true.

Mr. Morris. It indicates to them that the long-handed Soviet intel-

ligence is reaching them, even from the United States.

Mr. MISCHAIKOW. I can imagine that a man who has logical thinking has no explanation if he gets or when he gets letters from the United States.

Never mind who sends the letters, whether it is a diplomatic repre-

sentation or simply a man in charge of such activity.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any of these letters?

Mr. Mischaikow. No; I do not have.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else, Mr. Mischaikow, which you can tell us about this problem?

Mr. Mischaikow. Yes, Judge Morris.

As I arrived in the States in January of this year, for a certain time I tried to keep my address unknown, as we usually do, because of in-

security and so on.

At that time I was trying to get a job, with my line. The new emigrants are looking for a job what they can get. At that time, when I didn't get my proper job, I would say, just in an occasional position.

In Munich where I lived, my house lady has been called by persons indicating to be my friends, asking her to deliver to them my address in the United States. As she didn't know all of my friends, she asked

them to reveal their names. They refuse.

They tried many times, and after they didn't have success, they tried to call at the house at the time the house lady was not at home, and only the children, small girls between 10 and 17 years of age, were there.

They would ask them whether the children could deliver my address to the caller. The children asked for the name of the caller. The caller refused to reveal the name, and insisted that they are my friends, and want my address in the United States.

My house lady asked me in letters whether she should or shall

reveal my address in the United States, and I told her no.

Now, if they are friends, why do friends not reveal their names?

If you consider it as an indication.

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Chairman, before concluding with this particular witness, I would like to point out that all of the witnesses who have been appearing on this general subject have themselves been experiencing particular difficulties and particular fears in connection with their personal appearance.

I think all the more so, Senator, we should be grateful for this and

other witnesses who have appeared.

Senator Jenner. On behalf of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for appearing here and cooperating with us on this very important subject.

Mr. Mischaikow. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Miroshnikov, will you come forward please? Senator, Mr. Barsky has graciously returned to help us with this witness. Mr. Barsky has been previously sworn.

Senator Jenner. Will you be sworn, Mr. Miroshnikov?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Miroshnikov. I do.

TESTIMONY OF IVAN MIROSHNIKOV, BROOKLYN, N. Y., THROUGH HIS INTERPRETER, MR. BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name to the reporter?

Mr. Miroshnikov. My name is Ivan Miroshnikov. I-v-a-n M-i-r-os-h-n-i-k-o-v.

Mr. Morris. Would be object to his giving his address in the public

record?

Senator Jenner. It isn't necessary if he has any objection.

Mr. Barsky. He says he has no objection. Mr. Morris. Where do you reside?

Mr. Miroshnikov. 12 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn, N. Y. Mr. Morris. Where were you born, Mr. Miroshnikov?

Mr. Miroshkikov. The Ukraine.

Mr. Morris. Were you a lieutenant colonel in the Red army?

Mr. Miroshnikov. Yes, I was.

Mr. Morris. Did you defect from the Red army in the year 1948?

Mr. Miroshnikov. June 20, 1948.

Mr. Morris. Did you come to the United States in 1951?

Mr. Miroshnikov. Yes, on November 14, 1951. Mr. Morris. Mr. Miroshnikov, since you have been here in the United States, has anyone urged you to return back to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Miroshnikov. Not until the 3d of May of this year.

Mr. Morris. The 3d of May of this year, 1956?

Mr. Miroshnikov. Right, except that I was receiving the newspapers regularly.

Mr. Morris. What newspapers?

Mr. Miroshnikov. The newspapers published by General Mikai-The newspaper's name is "For Return to the Homeland."

Mr. Morris. Where is that published?

Mr. Miroshnikov. It is published in East Germany, in Berlin.

Mr. Morris. In East Germany?

Mr. Miroshnikov. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Under Communist auspices? Mr. Mirosiinikov. Yes, sir.

Senator Jenner. Did you subscribe to that paper?

Mr. Miroshnikov. No; never.

Senator Jenner. How did they get your address to send it to you? Mr. Miroshnikov. I don't know how did they get my address. They are just sending the paper to me, every issue of it, since No. 3.

Mr. Morris. That indicates to him that they know where he is and

where he lived?

Mr. Barsky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do many other refugees—do many other Russian escapees or Russian refugees receive this publication?

Mr. Miroshnikov. I don't know. I don't meet with many.

Mr. Morris. What happened on May 3?

Mr. Miroshnikov. When I left my house and was closing the door---

Mr. Morris. This was on the morning of May 3?

Mr. Miroshnikov. At 7 o'clock in the morning on May 3.

Mr. Morris. Leaving your home in Brooklyn?

Mr. Miroshnikov, Yes.

Mr. Morris. What happened?

Mr. Miroshnikov. When I was turning my face to the door, closing the door, a man, a colored man of about 27 to 28 years of age came to me and said, "Ah, Mr. Miroshnikov."

Then I asked him, "Who are you and where do you know my name

from?"

He said, "I am from here, from the United States. I am an American, and I know your name."

He did not disclose from where he knew my name.

Mr. Morris. What did the man say to you, and what did you say to the man?

Mr. Miroshnikov. He said to me, "Why should you live in this dirty hole while your homeland is awaiting, expecting you? As I

see, you are living in this dirty hole here."

I answered him, "At the present time, I don't need your advice, but if I would need your advice, and if you would be willing to give it to me, just leave me your address, and I will ask you when I feel so."

After that he left.

Mr. Morris. Did he give his address?

Mr. Miroshnikov. No; he didn't give his address, and left immediately.

In about 2 hours, I got a phone call, and when I asked who was calling, I was told it was the police department calling.

"What do you need?" asked I.

"Does Mr. Miroshnikov live here?" they answered me.

I repeated the question, "What do you need?"

"I have a personal affair with Mr. Miroshnikov," was the answer. Then I told him that I am Miroshnikov and I wondered what he needs. The man who was speaking English said, "O. K., O. K.; all right," and hung up. He hung up the receiver on the other end of the line.

After an hour, there was another call. I asked who was calling.

No answer, and the receiver was hung up again.

Around 5 or 6 o'clock of the same day, I got another phone call. I took off the receiver and was waiting until they say "Who is that

calling?"

There was no conversation, though apparently they were expecting me to say something first, and I was expecting them to say first, and then I hung up after a while the receiver. I am sorry, they hung up the receiver.

Next day there were several calls, again silent calls, neither I nor

they spoke, and after that there were no more calls.

Mr. Morris. I see.

That is the substance of the efforts that he has experienced recently—that you have experienced recently, Mr. Miroshnikov?

Are these people Communists, do you know?

Mr. Miroshnikov. No doubt they are.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Miroshnikov, would you prefer to live in Brooklyn than in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Miroshnikov. If I would have preferred to live in the Soviet

Union, I wouldn't have been in the United States.

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much, Mr. Miroshnikov. I appreciate your testimony, and the difficulties attendant on your coming down.

Senator Jenner. Thank you very much.

The next witness?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Nagorsky.

Senator Jenner. Mr. Nagorsky, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Nagorsky. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ZIGMUNT NAGORSKY, BRONXVILLE, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please, Mr. Nagorsky?

Mr. Nagorsky. Zigmunt Nagorsky. The first name is Z-i-g-

m-u-n-t, 3 Bolton Gardens, Bronxville, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. What is your occupation? Mr. Nagorsky. I am a newspaperman.

Mr. Morris. Tell us how you are engaging in that profession.

Mr. Nagorsky. I am editor of the Foreign News Service. I was a free lance writer.

Mr. Morris. What is the Foreign Newspaper Service?

Mr. Nagorsky. It specializes in news and issues from the satellite countries.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Nagorsky, have you recently been approached by an agent of the Polish Communist Government in connection with their redefection campaign?

Mr. Nagorsky. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about it?

First, where were you born, Mr. Nagorsky?

Mr. Nagorsky. In Warsaw, Poland.

Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. Nagorsky. In 1948.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about this encounter you had with an agent of the Polish Government?

Mr. NAGORSKY. I have a little memorandum I have prepared, which I would like to submit for the record, and give you the highlights of it.

I was approached by a former college mate of mine last December, who was an official of the united national delegation of the Polish U. N. delegation.

He called me at home and suggested a meeting.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Nagorsky, you do know that this man is a member of the Soviet Polish delegation to the United Nations; is that right?

Mr. NAGORSKY. He was a member at that time; yes. Mr. Morris. This is December 1955?

Mr. Nagorsky. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. You say he is known to you personally?

Mr. Nagorsky. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Do you want to give us his name, or do you have some

objection to giving us his name?

Mr. Nagorsky. Sir, I can give you his name, but I would feel perhaps it would be preferable if I wouldn't.

Mr. Morris. You will give it to us in executive session?

Mr. Nagorsky. Yes.

Senator Jenner. That will be satisfactory.

Mr. Morris. Now, tell us about this encounter.

Mr. NAGORSKY. I met this former friend of mine for lunch in New York. I expected to meet a man who would try forcefully to sell me on the idea of going back to my native country. Instead, I met a man whose approach was both flexible and extremely intelligent.

He started talking to me in terms of a Poland which is not free, but a Poland where people like myself can do a much better job in fighting

communism than I could in the United States.

When I asked for explanation, this story unfolded.

Right now, in every satellite country, particularly in Poland, there are two groups of people, one which wants to get the satellite countries into the Soviet orbit and transform them into Soviet republics.

Others are not Communists, but believe in state socialism, and that they feel that in the foreign and defense policies, Poland has to go along with the Soviet Union, and they are engaged in saving the rem-

nants of Polish cultural tradition.

Therefore, those people are doing a much better job for the future of Poland than anybody who is in exile. He told me, in fact, that lining up the interest of Poland or any of the satellite countries with the West today is a mistake, Mr. Chairman.

It is a mistake for the simple reason that the West is weak, divided, and unwilling to take up a stand in case they would be in conflict

between the western interests and interests of Poland.

If there would a conflict, Poland, of course, would be sacrificed as

it has been in the past.

He didn't say so, but he indicated that the number of international agreements which were signed in the past were directly responsible for the fact that he and others had to live in Poland, which is under Soviet domination.

In short, what he wanted to say is this: That Poles in exile are backing the wrong horse, that Poles in Poland, without becoming Communists, can very well be more instrumental in restoring a limited kind of democracy in the future than the Poles in exile would ever have a chance to be.

He also painted to me a picture of how people like myself could help in influencing the youth of Poland and telling them that they should not be Communists. He was constantly talking about the Communists as "they." But would never say "We."

Mr. Morris. But do you think in fact he was a Communist?

Mr. Nagorsky. Well, he is not a member of the Communist Party, but he is a deputy in the Polish Parliament, and few deputies in the Polish Parliament have been elected without the blessing of the party.

There was a genuine concern in one of his approaches. When he was talking about youth, he told me that the youth of Poland is getting

completely cynical about present conditions.

He was referring in this particular case to his own son, and he said, "I am a Catholic; so is my son. But he doesn't believe in God any longer, because the school killed his faith. Yet it failed to instill in him any communistic ideas. He graduated from his school empty. Nothing is left but cynicism, and he is not—he hasn't got any ideology, any backbone, any moral standards to fall back upon. Therefore, people who know the West like you do"—he told me—"if you would ever come back, you would have a terrific job to perform in Poland to bring the youth of Poland back to the cultural traditions.

"You see"—he said to me—"if you bank on western foreign policy, you are bound to lose, because in the West, particularly in Western Europe, the people kept asking me only one question: How can we avoid war? Therefore, it was quite obvious to me that the West would do anything to avoid another world war, and therefore would make any compromises at the expense of the satellite countries in order to pay the price of avoiding war with the Soviet Union."

Mr. Chairman, it seemed to me that this approach was effective, and would be effective on a number of people for two principal reasons.

One is that few exiles living abroad and living in this country have a purpose in life. Secondly, many have felt that they are not welcomed into the community of nations, in the community of free nations, that they are not welcomed, say, in this country and therefore there are various ways and measures to offset that approach of the Communists, that flexible, intelligent, and custom-made approach to every individual case, if you would give the exiles a purpose in life.

I want to make just one recommendation, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I just came back from a trip to Latin America, where I was as a

newspaperman.

I ran into an army of Communist missionaries in Brazil, actual missionaries who would go into the interior and preach Communist faith among the natives. Those people are not paid by anybody. They are the natives who are convinced that what they are doing is really the best solution for Brazil.

They go from one place to another into the areas of Brazil which are out of reach for any ordinary mortal, and sell the natives on the Communist faith, and they are successful. They are successful for one reason, that there is nobody else around to tell those people that

perhaps there is the other side of the picture.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that perhaps the exiles from communism, people who lived under communism, if they could be brought into the picture and used as the missionaries of our side, as people who would go over there to the underdeveloped countries of the world, to the uncommitted countries of the world, you would achieve two purposes.

One, you will give them a purpose in life.

After all, these people escaped communism not in order to have a good job or a better standard of living, but because they were in the political fighting line. You would bring them back into that fighting line.

Two, you would offset Communist propaganda and the Communist

gain in the underdeveloped countries.

Senator Jenner. Did you find this situation existing in any other country in Central or Latin America, with the exception of Brazil?

Mr. Nagorsky. Yes, sir.

Senator Jenner. What other countries?

Mr. Nagorsky. Chile.

Senator Jenner. Any others?

Mr. Nagorsky. Well, I went to Uruguay and Argentine, but there, of course, the situation is different, although acute.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Nagorsky has a six-page statement which he asked to be able to read, but I told him he would have to forego it.

May it go into the record, Senator?

Senator Jenner. It may go into the record and become a part of the official record of this committee.

(The complete prepared statement of Mr. Zigmunt Nagorsky was marked "Exhibit No. 268" and reads as follows:

ZIGMUNT NAGORSKI, JR.

I submit that the redefection campaign is bound to be successful unless two fundamental problems are solved. One is to give the refugees from communism a purpose in life. The other is to make them feel welcome in the community of free nations.

When I was approached by an agent of the Polish Government, it was obvious that he was hoping he would find these two weak spots in my inner fiber. He acted on the assumption that I had become disillusioned and on the hope that I had no other purpose in life than to earn enough money to support my family. He must have also assumed that I did not feel at home in America. His whole line of argumentation was based on these premises.

I must admit that for a Communist missionary who was trying to recruit new converts, he was rather poorly informed. My roots in this country are firm. I have a purpose in life in addition to making money. Ironically enough, that purpose is to help the West in winning the battle for human minds, the battle against communism. This has been my purpose in life since the early days of 1945, when I decided to come to this country and settle here. It is still the

same. One does not change horses in midstream.

Anyway, he came to me as an old friend whom I had known during college days. His attitude was far from that of a party-line agitator. He displayed a fair judgment of the political situation. He was flexible and openminded. He did not try to paint a picture of a Poland where freedom truly exists. Far from it. He gave me to understand that should I ever decide to return I would have to face the reality of the situation. Poland, as a country within the Soviet orbit, has no freedom of speech, press, or in the field of decisionmaking in foreign policy.

When I listened to him, the thought flashed through my mind that if it is so, why should he even try to induce me to go back? But my former friend, an old hand at reading people's minds, was a step ahead of me. "You can combat communism more effectively at home today," he said in effect, "than you are

doing in America."

I was taken aback and waited for him to develop this idea. He did, and the picture he painted presented a life with a purpose—that precious commodity

which is missing from the lives of so many exiles.

In Poland today, he went on, a battle is being waged between those who want to impose a strict party line upon the masses of the population and those who still feel themselves to be Poles primarily. The former are pushing the country into the Soviet orbit, lock, stock, and barrel. They would rewrite history and educate new generations of men whose acts, feelings, and instincts would be conditioned to the Soviet way of life. They would destroy all traditional values and instill new ones in their stead in the young minds. In short, they want to turn Poland into a province of the Soviet Union.

The latter, however, oppose this trend. They have enough political sense and realism not to meddle in foreign and defense policies, but the rest is wide It is important to preserve Polish national traditions, to maintain the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, and, above all, to imbue Polish youth

with certain fundamental values.

Would you like, I was asked, to help in this task?

People like my former friend, I was given to understand, can explain to anyone who might want to go back the best way of contributing to this fight. It is they who get priests out of jail. It is they who see to it that the state publishing plan includes Polish classics. It is they who keep a watch on the preservation of Polish national culture. And it is up to them to make sure that no Communist of note attains a decisive voice in fields other than those of foreign and defense policy.

Here is purpose in life for any creative exile, for anyone who feels that it is important to save as much as is possible from the wreck of Poland. The cultural field is the only one left. But without people like the exiles, who can bring home the personal knowledge of the West and who can contribute greatly to the easing of tension at home, the task of Polish cultural missionaries in the

sea of communism is very difficult.

I could not follow one link in his thinking. I failed to grasp how the returning

exiles could possibly ease tension at home.

That's the easiest part of the job, he came right back at me. If the hostile activities of the refugee centers abroad are curbed, the Polish regime would feel much safer at home. This, in turn, would make the task much easier for those who are defending Polish cultural institutions. The Communists would ease restrictions on the cultural front with an increase of security on the foreign policy front.

The final part of his approach dealt with the futility of the exiles' life. He made no distinction between the exiles still deeply buried in political problems of the past and those who, like myself, have become part of American society. He treated them all as one homogeneous group. They are all wasting their time, he implied by tying up Polish foreign policy with the West. "The West is weak," he said "and furthermore, it would lightly sacrifice Polish national interests. The western frontiers of Poland are a case in point."

What was he offering to me and to people like myself? He suggested that we reconsider our earlier decision. That instead of being uncompromising, instead of backing the West, which has long ago abandoned the cause of a free Poland and of freedom for the other captive nations, we change horses. Political reality indicates that from the two extremes of black and white a gray will emergethe color of compromise between two opposing camps. And there will be no room for the exiles—uprooted people belonging nowhere.

Now is the time for reconsideration. Now is the time to grasp the tremendous opportunity of finding a new purpose in life. The chance to work among one's own people for the preservation of their national traditions. Such work may make it possible for the day to come when much more freedom will be

restored to the captive Europeans than one can imagine today.

What is the alternative for the exiles, he asked me? What sort of incentive do they receive from the West? Most of them are leaving ideological warfare for the sake of making a better living. A great number of them are totally disillusioned. They feel, and rightly so, that the West would pay any price to avoid another war. A small part of that price would be to abandon the exiles and let them rot away.

He left me at that.

I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that I was disturbed by this conversation. was disturbed because I had expected to meet a stiff-necked Communist with limited horizons, no thoughts of his own, and an approach carrying little or no conviction. Instead I met a man who was flexible, ready to admit errorsa man who knew something of the life of an exile and one who knew how to attack the weak spots. To me as a writer he showed the possibility of doing creative writing, writing along the same lines as my writing in the West. would have me fight Communist influence in Poland—to help him in restoring basic values to Polish youth. This was the only time during our conversation that I detected genuine concern in his voice. He has a son who is 18. The boy has graduated from high school and has lost everything which his family had tried to instill in him. But the Communist Party failed to replace this loss with its own ideology and total cynicism resulted. The boy ceased to believe in anything. He left school empty. The purpose in life of such people as myself would be to write on that empty young blackboard whatever I believed was necessary.

Mr. Chairman, this is a persuasive and effective way of tackling people who have escaped communism and have settled in the West. A tailor-made version is used in each individual situation. And when a missionary like my former classmate approaches people whose lives are frustrated, who, after fleeing communism, staked their entire existence on the possibility of fighting communism and contributing to what they consider the most decisive battle of our times, he

can count on a very good response.

What can be done to offset this redefection campaign?

A number of things. The exiles could be encouraged to work in their own cultural fields here. Their scientific and cultural institutions could be sup-The time spent by men and women in refugee camps in Germany and Austria, time spent waiting, could be reduced. Older men, people who are almost at the end of their journey and whose political, scientific, and cultural contributions are often very impressive, ought to be treated with respect. It is not unusual for them to meet with contempt and to be treated as beggars, unable to earn their living by physical labor. Young exiles can be given a vision of a better future, of a world in which material well-being is important, but spiritual values are still more important.

All that, however, is in the realm of theory. Unless there is a clear-cut policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, we have little ammunition with which to fight the redefection trend. But there is at least one avenue open right now which may offset Communist efforts and give the exiles a purpose in life.

About 10 days ago I returned from a trip to Latin America. I went there on an assignment for a newspaper syndicate, to write a series of articles on Com-

munist advance in South America.

The Communists are making progress there as a result of the work of their own missionaries, native, who firmly believe in the faith they are propagating. They go from one settlement to another, from one village to another, and preach communism. They do it with ardor and fire and win disciples.

Why can't people who have lived under communism and have escaped from it

be used as missionaries of the Western World?

The task involves an elaborate scheme, but it is worth considering. exiles, interested and able to conduct an active fight against communism, would be sent to do the job in the first line of fire. Their field of operation could cover the entire noncommitted world-Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their task would be to tell the people who are confused, who don't know and have no way of knowing what communism really means in practice. And once they

would get that part of the message across, they would have to be prepared to answer the inevitable question: What else, if communism is so bad?

The project involves a plan for language history, and social science training for the prospective missionaries. Each of them would have to have basic knowledge of the people, customs, religion, social problems, and language of the area to which he would go. The project also involves a recruitment program. But should this idea ever bear fruit, the exiled communities all over the world would once again be back where they belong. These communities are primarily composed of soldiers fighting for ideas. Once they are idle, the enemy can make heavy inroads in terms of winning their minds and appealing to their national emotions. But give them weapons and something to fight for and the old fire will be burning again.

This is one of the ways of offsetting the redefection campaign. It is also a way of making the tremendous intellectual resources of the escapees a vital part of western society. Missions undertaken by exiles in underdeveloped countries may prove to be one of the most effective weapons in the hands of the Western

countries.

The redefection campaign, however, ought to be stopped now, not a year from now or 6 months from now. One of the most effective ways of stopping it would be to make public United States foreign policy toward the captive nations. Such a statement ought to be combined with a different, more human, more flexible approach to the refugees as individual human beings.

The whole problem boils down to the two points I mentioned at the beginning: give the refugees a purpose in life and make them feel at home in the countries

of their adoption.

Senator Jenner. I want to thank you, Mr. Nagorsky, for appearing here this morning.

Mr. Morris. We have two Polish seamen who have come all the

way from New Britain, Conn.

Before the next witnesses come on, I would like the record to show that in connection with our request for the project, Operation Keelhaul, Mr. McManus of the staff has informed us that Colonel Fleischer of the Pentagon has in the past offered to discuss this particular project with the chairman of this committee.

Senator Jenner. Thank you. Gentlemen, will you be sworn?

Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that the testimony you will give at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

FIRST WITNESS. I do. SECOND WITNESS. I do.

Mr. Morris. These men have requested that their right names not be used in this public testimony today. The have given us their names in executive session. In view of the fact that they have been subjected to pressure by the Soviet Polish authorities, I conceded that there would be no advantage in our putting their names in the public record.

Senator Jenner. Your request will be honored by the committee.

In view of the fact that we are in session, that is a vote call You have both been sworn. I am going to order that you now proceed into executive session, giving this testimony, and I will direct the staff that after testimony is taken in executive session, it may be released to the press.

So at this time we will stand in recess as far as the open session is

oncerned.

Mr. Morris. Before we go into executive session, Senator, Mr. Nagorsky is going to act as interpreter for these men, and he will need

to be sworn as interpreter.

Senator Jenner. Do you swear that the translating you will do from each of these witnesses just sworn before this committee will be truly interpreted?

Mr. Nagorsky. I do.

Senator Jenner. You will now go into executive session, and the testimony will be released to the press.

(Whereupon, at 12 oclock noon, the subcommittee proceeded into

executive session.)



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1956

United States Senate, Subcommittee
To Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:50 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senators Welker and Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator Welker. The meeting will be in order.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the hearing today varies slightly in subject matter from the hearings we have been holding of recent date, they bearing on the Soviet redefection campaign on the one hand and the Soviet efforts to lure back to the Soviet Union the five Russian seamen and then subsequently the Polish seamen.

This morning we have some testimony which, according to the first witness, provided the background for the Russian efforts, the Soviet efforts, to take back the five Russian seamen. The first wit-

ness is Emily Kingsbery.

Now, before beginning, Senator, I would like to put into the record at this time a few facts that have come to the committee's attention in connection with Thomas L. Black. We have learned that Thomas L. Black, who is having difficulty holding his job now in Newark, N. J., has actually been registered under the terms of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as someone who had been working with the Soviets and is not complying with the law.

Now, he was told in 1950 by the FBI that he had to register because he had, in fact, been a Soviet agent and he agreed to do so. The forms from the Department of Justice came to him early in 1953, and on February 9, 1953, under Registration No. WEF: RGB: JKG-146-41-15-131, he has registered and made full disclosure and is so

registered under the terms of the internal security law.

In addition, Senator, I would like to point out that his name came up in the public trials in connection with the testimony of Harry Gold, back in, I think the year was, 1950, Senator, and he has been, for all intents and purposes, in the public record as someone whose position with the Soviet organization has been well known. And it

was not until he made full disclosure before the subcommittee, exposing the Communist organization that he got into any difficulty with respect to his own job.

Senator Welker. And because of the fact that he did cooperate with the committee and with the FBI, he lost his job; is that correct?

Mr. Morris. Well, certainly it took place after that. I do not know the causal connection, Senator.

Senator Welker. I understand the subcommittee is doing every-

thing they can to restore the man to his employment.

Mr. Morris. That is right, Senator. We received some assurances vesterday. Percy Healy has flatly said he will stay on his payroll, but we have not quite gotten the situation at the Newark plant straightened

out yet, at the Schroeder Co., at the Atlas Refining Co.

Senator Welker. I want to speak on behalf of the chairman and the whole committee, that we will do everything we can to help Mr. Black because it has been stated that there is very little need of people coming to our aid if they are then going to be destroyed by virtue of coming to our aid.

Call your first witness.

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Kingsbery, will you stand and be sworn, please? Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. Kingsbery. I do.

Senator Welker. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF EMILY KINGSBERY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter? Mrs. Kingsbery. Emily Kingsbery, secretary of the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings.

Mr. Morris. And what is the address of that organization?

Mrs. Kingsbery. 55 West 42d Street, room 1212.

Mr. Morris. And what is your residence?

Mrs. Kingsbery. My residence: 57 West 73d Street, New York.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us what the Committee To Combat

Soviet Kidnapings is, Mrs. Kingsbery?

Mrs. Kingsbery. The Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings was organized in April 1954, at the time of the brutal Soviet kidnaping of Dr. Alexander Trushnovich in West Berlin. It was originally organized in an effort to save Dr. Trushnovich who had been kidnaped by the Soviets.

Mr. Morris. And it was formed in New York City?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes. Mr. Morris. And who made up the original committee?

Mrs. Kingsbery. The original committee-

Mr. Morris. Just tell us in general. You do not have to go into detail.

Mrs. Kingsbery. Oh, yes. A group of prominent Americans and emigrees.

Mr. Morris. Pardon?

Mrs. Kingsbery. A group of prominent Americans and emigrees. Mr. Morris, Right.

Now, did you know at that time, Mrs. Kingsbery, that there had been a carefully planned campaign originating in Moscow to embark on a

certain course?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Not at that time, but we found that out shortly thereafter, because there was a series of these kidnapings and attempted assassinations, and so we investigated and within a month or two, we had found out that this was the launching of a very definite campaign under orders of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. Now, I notice that you make reference to that in the statement which you have offered to the committee, which you filed

with the committee yesterday.

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Will you look at that paragraph, Mrs. Kingsbery, in your statement?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

A carefully planned campaign was organized in the autumn of 1953, on orders of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, signed by Georgi Malenkov and Nikita S. Khrushchev. The most active emigree leaders were listed for liquidation by assassination. Other prominent anti-Communist Russian emigrees were listed for kidnaping with the expectation (not yet realized) of brain-washing these victims into phony public confessions of "voluntary redefection" to communism.

This was the case of Dr. Trushnovich. This was what they hoped to do. [Continuing:]

Against the rest of the Russian emigration in the free world, a campaign of blackmail, intimidation, and coercion was mapped, in an effort to force refugees and emigrees into collaboration with Soviet agents, or into returning to the U. S. S. R. where they could be propagandized as "voluntary redefectives." Those who did not fall for such Soviet "persuasion" were expected to become sufficiently intimidated to cease any anti-Communist activities.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mrs. Kingsbery, you said that you learned that was the Soviet plan at that time?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, how did you learn that?

Mrs. Kingsbery. We learned it partly through testimony and partly through investigation. The testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov, for example, was extremely informative on this; then the investigation of the——

Mr. Morris. The investigation that you conducted?

Mrs. Kingsbery. That we conducted and that the intelligence, of course, conducted, the western intelligence. Reports from all of these sources were coordinated.

Mr. Morris. I wonder, Mrs. Kingsbery, if you could, as much as possible, and in executive session where security necessitates, give us the basis for that conclusion which you have set forth.

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Thank you.

Now, do you have any suggestion as to the rationale or the purpose

behind this particular project by the Soviets?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes. You see, so many, hundreds of thousands, now of the people from the Soviet Union have come into the free

world. Their very presence here gives the lie to the Soviet propaganda. They constitute also a group of well informed people who can work as a force against communism, that knows what communism is, knows how to combat communism and can give very valuable information to the West. And this was just beginning to be realized by the West. We were beginning to use it; it was beginning to show in our psychological warfare and in our broadcasts and so forth. And so for these two reasons, it was important.

Then, of course, another very important reason is that the most active of these emigree organizations, particularly NTS, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarity, has formed a very definite liaison with the Russian people and constitute a very grave danger to the Soviet Union because they are giving direction to the growing unrest in the Soviet Union and constitute a very strong liaison between the free world and the Russian people, which is the thing which the Soviets

fear above all.

So, for these reasons, it was very necessary for the Soviet leaders to launch this campaign to get rid of as many as—they planned to eliminate the emigrees whom they felt there was no chance of changing or persuading or intimidating, and then to intimidate the others, so that they would not cooperate with the rest, to separate us from these potential allies.

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Kingsbery, you have set forth there, again on the first page of the statement which you filed with the committee,

a summation of those views.

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. So your committee was formed in the face of that Soviet campaign—

Mrs. Kingsbery. That is right.

Mr. Morris. With the rationalization that you have just described?

Mrs. Kingsbery. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And on the occasion of the kidnapping of-

Mrs. Kingsbery. Dr. Trushnovich.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell his name, please? Mrs. Kingsbery. T-r-u-s-h-n-o-v-i-c-h.

Mr. Morris. Now, you are prepared to set forth for us this morning some of the instances of Soviet kidnappings that you have encountered in connection with this work. Now, will you also tell us, before we get into the individual cases, Mrs. Kingsbery, of what efforts you have made and to whom you have directed your appeals by way of letting us know what you have been trying to do in this connection?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Do you want a general review?

Mr. Morris. Yes, please. Mrs. Kingsbery. All right.

Mr. Morris. Senator, I might point out that Mrs. Kingsbery has set forth all of these things rather in full detail in the statement that she has filed.

Senator Welker. Very well.

Mr. Morris. But there are certain things I would like to highlight, Senator.

Senator Welker. Very well.

Mrs. Kingsbery. We wanted to present these to the public opinion of the free world and to the United Nations in an effort to establish some precedent for international justice on cases of their kind. They

were in direct violation of human rights, direct violation of the United Nations Charter and in violation of international law.

Mr. Morris. In other words, these things are a violation of inter-

national law, a violation of the United Nations Charter-

Mrs. Kingsbery. Charter; yes.

Mr. Morris. And particularly those provisions relating to human rights?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Correct.

Mr. Morris. Now, what have you done about them?

Mrs. Kingsbery. We presented these cases formally to the United Nations, in the first four cases that occurred in April through June 1954. They were all major cases. We presented these to the United Nations in July 1954. And they received the usual routine treatment. We learned the process—

Senator Welker. What do you mean by the usual routine

treatment?

Mrs. Kingsbery. They have a routine, Senator. Unfortunately, you send your cases in, you get a letter back that they have been referred to the Commission on Human Rights. Then they can ask— I can read this if you like.

Senator Welker. No. Go ahead and tell me in your own words.

Mrs. Kingsbery. O. K. Fine.

Then they state that following their procedure, this will be presented to the offending Government; it will go into the archives of the Human Rights Commission. But unfortunately—well, they do not say, "unfortunately"—but that Human Rights Commission has no power to take action on cases of violation of human rights.

Senator Welker. In other words, it is a dry run, so far as you are

concerned?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes; definitely.

Mr. Morris. And you got no results at all?

Mrs. Kingsbery. No; we did not. We made every effort and we tried to contact them. We were notified that these cases would be noted in executive session in Geneva in April 1955. And knowing what "noted in executive session" means, we tried to get some kind of outside action from some of the delegates. We wrote to all the delegates, non-Communist delegates, who were going to attend the meeting of the Commission, and to the nongovernmental agencies, suggesting and urging that some kind of statement could be made to the press or some sort of action could be taken outside on the cases.

The reaction to that—do you want that?

Mr. Morris. Yes, please.

Mrs. Kingsbery. The reaction to that was a few formal answers, a few conferences from some interested delegates, all of which were completely fruitless. They regretted exceedingly this 1947 resolution which the Soviet bloc had put through, which rendered them powerless to take action.

Many of the—not many—well, among the smaller nations, of the few with whom we had conferences, they stated that if the United States or England would take the initiative in holding a press conference or bringing these things out into the open, they would back it, but they, themselves, did not feel strong enough to take the initiative.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Mrs. Kingsbery. We had a conference with the adviser at the United Nations delegation who was interested and sympathetic and courteous. We, at the same time, launched an international campaign, using the anniversary of the kidnaping of Dr. Trushnovich, commemorating this anniversary, because this was the first act in this campaign. We got tremendous response all over the free world, in Europe, in South America, even in Malaya and in parts of Asia.

There were protest meetings; there were memorial services. There

were TV and radio and so forth. The press was wonderful.

All of this happened at this same time, but the Commission met in executive session and we heard nothing until we finally, several months later, continued to ask the United Nations what had happened. So we got a little note saying that the Commission had decided to note these cases among others in executive session.

Mr. Morris. To note them?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you run at all into the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations, a man named Van Goedhart?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Has he been very helpful in this project?

Mrs. Kingsbery. We have not needed him particularly. He has asked us for some help.

Mr. Morris. He has asked you for help?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Have you been able to give him any help?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Well, not of the type, perhaps, that he wanted. This was in connection with the refugees in Austria, and we had received word from the refugee camps there that Soviet teams were operating among the refugees in violation of the Austrian Treaty.

We sent telegrams of protest and we sent letters of protest to the High Commissioner of Refugees and so forth and I might add that his

office has been cooperative in supplying figures and statistics.

Mr. Morris. But has he given you any assistance whatever in these

various projects?

Mrs. Kingsbery. No, no. We have not asked him for it particularly. Then he asked us for a report, if we could give him a report as to the basis of our protest against the violation of the Austrian Treaty in connection with the refugees in Austria.

So we are working on that. One of our people is in Europe now. Mr. Morris. Should the High Commissioner for Refugees do something to prevent kidnapings of refugees?

Mrs. Kingsberg. I don't know, sir. I am not well enough versed.

I would think so.

Mr. Morris. But it is your contention, Mrs. Kingsbery, that because nothing has been done—in effect, very little has been done—in connection with these kidnapings, that a situation developed here in the United States?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you make reference to that on page 3?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would read that reference, please?

Mrs. Kingsbery (reading):

The kidnaping of the Russian sailors by Soviet secret police agents in New York on April 7, 1956, bears out the warnings issued for the past 2 years by the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings. The fact that the Communist criminals have been allowed to get away with similar outrages in countries under the protection of the Western Powers for the past 2 years emboldened the Soviets to violate the right of political asylum in the United States itself and under the cloak of United Nations diplomatic immunity.

May I add my favorite quote?

Mr. Morris. By all means, Mrs. Kingsbery.

Mrs. Kingsbery. That all that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing, and the good men of the West unfortunately did nothing and this is happening.

We have a letter on that here. Incidentally, we have a lot of cases

here.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would take 1 or 2 of the more notable cases, particularly those that might relate to the zone under the protection of the United States Government, and then we will put the rest of them into the record for committee perusal.

Mrs. Kingsbery. Of course, the kidnaping of Dr. Trushnovich hap-

pened in the British Zone so we will not go into that.

The first one that occurred in the American Zone was the attempted assassination of Georgi Okolovich. That is O-k-o-l-o-v-i-c-h. That was Frankfort-on-the-Main, which was in the American Zone of Germany. This was before Germany was independent.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that very briefly?

Mrs. Kingsbery. All right. It created quite a bit of sensation. I believe that Nikolai Khokhlov, the intelligence officer who was commissioned by the Soviets to arrange and carry out this assassination, has testified before your committee. So this is in your record. His background is interesting. He was, of course—

Mr. Morris. Mr. Okolovich?

Mrs. Kingsbery. No. This is Khokhlov, Nikolai Khokhlov, the Soviet intelligence officer.

Mr. Morris. Yes; you are talking about his case?

Mrs. Kingsbery. This is tied up with the case of Okolovich. I can't

talk about one without talking about the other.

Khokhlov received orders in October 1953 to carry out the assassination of Georgi Okolovich. Prior to that time, Khokhlov himself had become disillusioned with communism, particularly under the influence of his Christian wife, Yanina. He had tried to get out of the MGB and had been unable to do so. He even risked arrest to do so.

When he was given this order to assassinate Okolovich, he had already learned about Okolovich. He had already learned about NTS, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarity, of which Mr. Okolovich is one of the major executives, and Mr. Okolovich had charge of the underground operations of NTS inside the Soviet Union. In his intelligence work, Mr. Khokhlov had learned of the work of NTS. It is the Russian revolutionary movement against the Soviet regime.

Mr. Morris. The NTS?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes; the Russian revolutionary movement has many, many people who are involved in this. But NTS is the director in this. It is the only organized group that is operating within the Soviet Union itself.

Mr. Morris. What do the initials NTS stand for?

Mrs. Kingsbery. In Russian or in English? Well, NTS in English means the National Alliance of Russian Solidarity. There is no exact translation of the words, but this is what it means.

Mr. Morris. Thank you.

Mrs. Kingsbery. So where were we?

Mr. Morris. You were telling us about the Okolovich case.

Mrs. Kingsberg. Oh, yes. Anyway, Khokhlov had already learned about this. He had become convinced that the Soviet Government is the enemy of the Russian people and he also became convinced that the Russian revolutionary movement, and particularly this directing force, NTS, was the main hope of the Russian people.

So you can imagine his feelings when he was given the orders to arrange the assassination of a man who was in that operation. He was also given very definitely to understand that if he refused the

assignment, it could mean death to him and to his family.

So this was something he could not decide on. He talked to his wife about it, and he even argued that hired assassins will do this thing, "and not I. So if I do nothing, the man will be killed."

She said, "As a Christian and as a Russian, you must not only not

obey these orders but you must actively prevent his murder."

So he agreed. They planned then that he would work out—he would pretend to go along with the order but work out a way to thwart the assassination, which is what he did, and I believe everybody is familiar with the sensational details of the cloak-and-dagger aspects of this, the cigarette case pistol, and so forth.

Mr. Morris. And how did it terminate, Mrs. Kingsbery?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Mr. Khokhlov arranged things so that the assassination could not take place without his coordination of everything. Then he went to the one man that he could trust, who was Mr. Okolovich, and he went to him. From his intelligence work, he knew the one hour that Mr. Okolovich would be alone.

So on February 18, 1954, he went to Mr. Okolovich and told him that he had been ordered to arrange his assassination; he did not want to carry it out; that he wanted to prevent the assassination and also

save his family from the vengeance of the MVD.

Mr. Okolovich, on the advice of NTS, went to the American author-

ities in Frankfort-on-the-Main.

There is an interesting sidelight here. At this particular time, in February 1954, the assassination was scheduled to take place along about this time, but then the Four Power Conference got scheduled in Berlin, and the Soviets did not want any unpleasantness to occur, so they were ordered to delay action on this assassination and this gave Khokhlov that opportunity.

It was also at that time that the United States, after 8 years of holding out against article 16 of the Austrian treaty, agreed to accept

t. This just shows how all of this campaign ties in together.

Am I confusing the issue?

Mr. Morris. I think that is clear, Mrs. Kingsbery.

Senator Welker. Very clear.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mrs. Kingsbery, I wonder if you would get to case No. 4. That also took place in the American Zone; did it not?

Mrs. Kingsberry. Yes. That was in the American Zone of Austria; Linz, Austria. That was Valery Tremmel and this was an attempt by the Soviets to kidnap one of the emigree leaders, hoping, I suppose, to make a phony confession, and the Soviet story was released that Mr. Tremmel and two other people had been arrested in the Soviet Zone for distributing anti-Communist literature.

The investigation of the Austrian police showed that this was completely false; that Mr. Tremmel had been drugged and kidnaped by the two Soviet agents in the American Zone. He lived in the American Zone and he had been drugged and kidnaped by them and taken over into the Soviet Zone.

The investigation got to this point where this was definitely proved and then the pressure of the Soviet authorities on the Austrian au-

thorities halted the investigation.

Mr. Morris. So the Austrians did not even continue their investiga-

tion?

Mrs. Kingsbery. No; because we did not give them very much help, "we" meaning the United States. We didn't even protest on this one. We protested on the others. And the committee sent telegrams and letters. I have the reply here from the Foreign Office. We sent letters and telegrams and so forth urging that a protest be made, urging that they support the Austrian police in their investigation and so forth. We were told that this was being referred to the proper people, and it would seem advisable that it continue.

Mr. Morris. And what was the outcome of that particular case? Mrs. Kingsbery. Well, we have received a report later, since then, within this year, that Mr. Tremmel is in a slave-labor camp in the

Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. And you think that, in that case, you found that nothing was being done either by the United States authorities involved or very little by the Austrian authorities, because they acceded to the Soviet

demands to do nothing?

Mrs. Kingsbery. That is right. They did at first conduct a very active investigation, but then when it got too hot, they acceded to pressure. And this one was officially buried, also in the Human Rights Commission. This was one of the first four that got officially buried. They have a ritual by which they bury them.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Kingsbery and the Committee to

Combat Soviet Kidnapings has set forth 11 cases in all here—

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think that all these 11 should go into the record, from Mrs. Kingsbery's own statement.

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered as a part of the record.

(The statement of Mrs. Kingsbery was marked "Exhibit No. 269" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 269

THE COMMITTEE TO COMBAT SOVIET KIDNAPINGS

The Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings was organized by prominent Americans and emigrees in New York in April 1954, in an effort to save Dr. Alexander Trushnovich, founder-chairman of the West Berlin (Russian) Rescue Committee, who was brutally kidnaped by Soviet agents in West Berlin

on April 13, 1954.

Nine days later, on April 22, 1954, the Soviet plot to assassinate Georgi Okolovich, well-known Russian anti-Communist emigree leader, in the American Zone of Germany, was exposed in Bonn by Nikolai Khokhlov, the Soviet intelligence officer who had been assigned to carry out the plot. Subsequently Khokhlov's wife, baby, and young sister-in-law were seized as hostages by the MVD (Soviet secret police) in Moscow. The committee was asked to handle both of these cases.

On June 20, 1954, another anti-Communist Russian emigree leader, Valery Tremmel, was drugged and kidnaped by Soviet agents in Linz, Austria (Amer-

ican Zone), and this case was also submitted to the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings.

Investigation by the committee revealed that these four crimes marked the launching of an intensified Soviet underground campaign against anti-Communist emigrees in the free world. These emigrees constitute a triple threat to the international Communist conspiracy: (1) Their very presence gives the lie to Soviet propaganda, both external and internal; (2) these emigrees comprise a positive, informed force against communism, the importance of which was (in 1953-54) at last beginning to be recognized and used effectively by the West; (3) the most active emigree organizations, notably NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), have established a dangerous liaison with the people of Russia, supplying direction and leadership for the growing unrest in the Soviet Union, which could lead to internal democratic revolution. fore became necessary for the Soviet Government to make every effort to eliminate and/or immobilize these potentially powerful emigree allies of the free world, before the West should become fully aware of their significance.

A carefully planned campaign was organized in the autumn of 1953, on orders of the Soviet Government and the central committee of the Communist Party, signed by Georgi Malenkov and Nikita S. Khrushchev. The most active emigree leaders were listed for liquidation by assassination. Other prominent anti-Communist Russian emigrees were listed for kidnaping, with the expectation (not yet realized) of brainwashing these victims into phony public confessions of voluntary redefection to communism. Against the rest of the Russian emigration in the free world a campaign of blackmail, intimidation, and coercion was mapped, in an effort to force refugees and emigrees into collaboration with Soviet agents, or into returning to the U. S. S. R. where they could be propagandized as voluntary redefectors. Those who did not fall for such Soviet persuasion were expected to become sufficiently intimidated to cease any anti-Communist activi-

This was and still is the plan of the Soviet redefection campaign, which has been progressively intensifying among emigrees from all Communist countries

during the past 2 years.

In an effort to halt this criminal underground campaign at its start and to save its first victims, and in the hope of alerting the Western world, the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings undertook in the summer of 1954 to bring the four international Soviet crimes noted above (cases Nos. 1 to 4 attached) to the attention of the United Nations and the public opinion of the free world. These cases were formally submitted to the United Nations in July 1954, and were referred to the Commission on Human Rights.

But no precedent exists for international justice in such cases. Bureaucratic redtape and apathy work to the advantage of the Soviets. It soon became ap-

parent that a long-range program was necessary.

In November 1954, political research project was organized to serve as the secretariat and research body of the committee. The office at 55 West 42d Street, New York opened with the first major United States press conference of Nikolai Khokhlov and his dramatic appeal to the American people to help save his wife and baby. At the same time Khokhlov's story broke in the Saturday Evening Post in a series of four articles, "I Would Not Murder for the Soviets." Public and press response were quite encouraging.
In December 1954, the project, on behalf of the committee, participated in

the demand for the return of the 11 American flyers illegally held in Red China.

Early in 1955, political research project was informed that the cases presented by the committee to the U. N. would be presented at the meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in April-May 1955—but that these would be merely "noted in executive session," as the U. N. Commission on Human Rights has no power to take action on the violation of human rights. In an effort to arouse some sort of action—such as statement to the press, queries during the session, etc.—the project wrote to all non-Communist delegates to the Commission and to participating nongovernmental organizations. Sympathetic but nonproductive conferences resulted with a few delegates, including the United States Mission to the U. N. Active and interested cooperation was received from the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Followup letters were sent to the delegates at Geneva, reminding them that:

"All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing."

During this same period, political research project, in cooperation with sympathetic organizations in many countries, organized an international campaign to

commemorate the anniversary of the kidnaping of Dr. Trushnovich. Protest meetings, commemorative services on behalf of all victims of Communist crimes. features in international press, radio, and TV brought widespread public re-Telegrams and petitions with thousands of signatures poured into the United Nations and to various governments throughout the free world.

However, the four cases of international Soviet crimes, together with many other violations of human rights, received quiet official burial in executive session

of the Commission on Human Rights.

In late April 1955 the committee became alerted to the fact that article 16 of thet proposed Austrian Treaty amounted to the legalized kidnaping of some 30,000 ani-Communist Russian refugees in the free zones of Austria. The Ambassadors' Conference on this treaty was scheduled for the first week in May in Vienna. Political research project immediately sparkplugged a vigorous campaign against article 16. Cooperating organizations and individuals throughout the free world responded actively. The press was aroused to action, and humanitarian groups everywhere participated in the campaign. Backed by such support, the Western Powers stood firm, and after a 2-day deadlock with the Soviet Union, article 16 was eliminated from the final treaty draft.

In July 1955, after 6 months of continuous effort, the project was forced to abandon the committee's attempt to promote an appeal campaign through American churches on behalf of Dr. Alexander Trushnovich and Mrs. Yanina Khokhlov. Both of these cases have an especial Christian appeal, since both of these victims of Communist inhumanity were motivated primarily by Christian principles. However, it proved impossible to obtain the cooperation of the churches in such

a campaign.

Early in July the project sponsored a lecture at the Carnegie Endowment International Center by Dr. V. D. Poremsky on "Coordination of the Liberation Movements in Europe and Asia against Communism." Dr. Poremsky was returning to Europe after attending a conference in Taiwan (Formosa) of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, as the invited representative of the Russian people. He was the first person, outside of government officials, to talk with the Russian sailors from the captured Soviet tanker Tuapse.

At the time of the summit conference, political research project (by request) made public the views of the Russian opposition, which had been presented

to the Western Powers prior to the Conference in Geneva.

In August 1955 the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings presented 3 more cases of international Communist kidnapings to the U. N.: The kidnaping of anti-Communist German journalist, Karl W. Fricke, by Red agents in West Berlin on April 1, 1955; the kidnaping of Maj. Sylvester Murau, defector from East German Communist police, by Communist agents in West Germany on August 6, 1955; and the kidnaping of Clara Herskovits, Romanian national, by the Soviets from a "liberated" Nazi concentration camp in July 1945, submitted to the committee by her surviving brother. These cases were well covered by the press, but received the same official routine treatment at the U. N. as previous cases. (Cases Nos. 5-7 attached.)

Representatives of the survivors of the Kalmuk people appealed to the committee for assistance in their efforts to obtain justice in the case of the genocide of the Kalmuk people and others, committed by the Soviet Government in 1943. This case had been presented to the U. N. by the Kalmuk Committee to Combat Bolshevism in January 1954, and had received the usual official burial by the

Commission on Human Rights. (Case No. 8 attached.)

It had become obvious that an international information service was needed, showing the consistently coordinated pattern of international Communist Therefore, in September 1955, political research project initiated such a service on a very modest scale, under the general title, "Behind the Communist Line." The initial special report on Communist global strategy received favorable reviews in the international press, and a rerun was necessary to fill requests. Subsequent monthly bulletins have been mailed to a select list of officials, press, researchers, educators, etc., in most countries of the free world. (The list is necessarily restricted by budget limitations.) The plan and developments of the worldwide Soviet redefection campaign have been covered in the report and bulletins.

In October 1955, the committee backed United States Delegate Jacob Blaustein in his firm and successful stand against the Soviet attempt to push through a resolution to implement the repatriation of anti-Communist refugees through

the U. N.

Representatives of the committee met with the nine Russian sailors from the Tuapse who had been granted political asylum in the United States, under the auspices of Church World Service. The committee has cooperated as much as possible, especially through contacts with Russian emigres, in helping these young men adjust to their new life. Warnings that Soviet agents would attempt to blackmail and intimidate them have been tragically justified.

In December 1955, the project was instrumental in exposing several new developments in the Soviet redefection campaign: The "amnesty hoax" in the case of A. M. Novikov in the U. S. S. R.; the illegal operations of the Soviets among

refugees in Austria; and the Soviet clerical delegation to Canada.

In January 1956 political research project was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York as International Research on Communist Techniques, a private nonprofit corporation, to continue and expand the operations of the project and the committee. It was granted Federal tax-exempt status.

In February 1956, two new cases of international Soviet crimes were submitted to the committee: The Soviet attempt to assassinate Dr. V. D. Poremsky, president of NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), in Frankfurt/Main in December 1955; and the kidnaping of Robert Bialek, former "VoPo" who had exposed Soviet operations in East Germany, by Communist agents in West Berlin on February 6, 1956. Because of the frustrating experience with previous cases submitted to the U. N., it was decided that new procedures should be explored in the handling of these cases. Consultations with highly qualified advisers have been and are being held in this regard. (Cases Nos. 9 and 10.)

Through International Research, the first direct evidence of active Soviet participation in the Korean war was released in an interview (in Europe) with Victor S. Ilyinsky, a former member of the Soviet Signal Corps in Korea, who

escaped from the touring Moscow circus on January 29, 1956.

Response to a questionnaire enclosed with the February 1956 bulletin indicates that this information service is proving of useful value. The record to date shows that the reports and analyses in Behind the Communist Line generally anticipate developments in Communist strategy and tactics by several weeks to International sources and outlets have been developed throughout the Americas, Europe, the Pacific, Asia, and parts of the Middle East. A chief consultant of International Research is currently touring Latin America (April-June 1956).

The kidnaping of the Russian sailors by Soviet secret police agents in New York on April 7, 1956, bears out the warnings issued for the past 2 years by the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings. The fact that the Communist criminals have been allowed to get away with similar outrages in countries under the protection of the Western Powers for the past 2 years emboldened the Soviets to violate the right of political asylum in the United States itself and under the cloak of United Nations diplomatic immunity. (Case No. 11 attached.)

Word of this kidnaping first reached the committee about noon on April 8, and immediately all available facts were obtained and released to the press. Subsequent investigation by International Research, newsmen, and Government authorities substantiates the committee's first statement that this is an international political kidnaping in deliberate violation of human rights, international law, and

the United Nations Charter.

Because of the climactic importance of this case, the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings is seeking high-level conferences for advice on appropriate The committee is convinced that, unless a precedent for international justice can be established in this case, the stand of the free world and the United Nations on human rights will become a complete mockery.

MAY 18, 1956.

PERSONNEL AND SOURCES

International Research on Communist Techniques, Inc., carrying on the work of the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings and political research project, is a private nonprofit corporation, supported by private donations and contribu-It was granted Federal tax-exempt status on February 6, 1956, under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Officers of the corporation, all of whom are American citizens, are:

Vladimir N. Rudin, chairman of the original committee, president. Well known as a writer and political analyst, Mr. Rudin has been active in combating the Communist conspiracy in many countries over a period of 21 years. Eugene Lyons, also a member of the original committee, vice president.

rently a senior editor of Readers Digest, Mr. Lyons spent 6 years as a foreign

correspondent in the U. S. S. R. during the 1930's, and is author of Assignment in Utopia, The Red Decade, Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia, and other works.

A. G. Elmendorf, vice president and treasurer, directed the world student relief program in Greece, headed the refugee work of World Council of Churches in Greece and Trieste, and was recently executive director of the Tolstoy Foun-

dation.

Emily Kingsbery, secretary, served as the committee's representative on the west coast prior to organization of political research project, when she came to New York to take charge of the office. A writer, editor, and public-relations executive, she has had firsthand experience in combating Communist propaganda and infiltration.

Natalie Kushnir, assistant secretary, is a linquist and researcher who has worked with the committee since its inception. She is a student of international

affairs, with firsthand knowledge in countering communism.

Although the regular staff of the corporation is limited by the small budget, International Research is fortunate in having a highly qualified corps of volunteer researchers and consultants, both here and abroad, who not only have a wide background of experience and knowledge, but are also in touch with current events. A minimum of 9 languages is covered within the immediate staff, and among the research consultants this extends to approximately 40 languages and dialects.

Sources of information include exclusive contacts on both sides of the Iron Curtain, special correspondents in many countries, reviews of the press, official bulletins, etc., and an intelligent reading of Soviet press and literature. Special sources include RAP, Russian (anti-Communist) Press Agency, Frankfurt/Main and Bonn; Possev, international Free Russian weekly with special underground edition, Frankfurt/Main; Bote der Freiheit, German anti-Communist newspaper for underground distribution in East Germany, published in West Berlin; For Return to the Homeland, monthly publication of the Soviet Redefection Committee, East Berlin. Research exchanges are maintained with the Institute for Study of the U. S. S. R., Munich; Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, West Berlin; International Committee of Jurists, Hague; Democratic Research Society, Bombay; Institute of International Relations, Taiwan; Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Taiwan; Confederacion Inter-Americana de Defensa del Continente, Mexico; and American organizations in similar field.

Honorary Chairman of the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings is Adm. William H. Standley, former United States Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. and author of Admiral Ambassador to Russia. Members of the original Committee include: Judge Robert Morris, now counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate; Rev. Charles Lowry, now head of the Foundation for Religious Action; Archbishop Paul Yu-Pin, of Nanking, head of Sino-American Amity; Metropolitan Anastassy, United States head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile; Miss Alexandra Tolstoy, founder and president of the Tolstoy Foundation; Adm. Paulus Powell, Gen. Charles Willoughby, Capt. Boris Sergievsky, Mr. Montgomery Green, Prof. Oleg Anisimov, Mr. John

Hvasta, and a number of other important Americans and emigrees.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CRIMES

CASE No. 1. Dr. ALEXANDER TRUSHNOVICH—KIDNAPING

On the night of April 13, 1954, in the British sector of Berlin, Soviet agents brutally beat and kidnaped Dr. Alexander Trushnovich, humanitarian-physician founder and chairman of the West Berlin (Russian) Rescue Committee. Investigation by the West Berlin Police definitely established that Dr. Trushnovich was the victim of an elaborate 3-year betrayal plot, of which Heinz Glaeske, a Soviet agent masquerading as an anti-Communist, was the leader. Subsequent evidence and investigative research indicate that the kidnaping was ordered by top Soviet Government and Communist Party authorities, and that the Soviet intention was to force a phony "confession" from Dr. Trushnovich as a high point in their intensive "redefection" campaign against Russian emigres. His actual fate is still unknown.

Official protests of British and American authorities have been ignored by the Soviets, as have the appeals of Mrs. Trushnovich, the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings and other organizations and individuals. The case was presented to the United Nations in July 1954 by the Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnapings, supported by hundreds of petitions from all parts of the free world. It received official burial at Geneva in April-May 1955 at an executive session of the U. N. Commission on Human Rights, which by a 1947 resolution rendered itself powerless to take any action on violations of human rights.

The case, however, received widespread publicity during 1954 and again in 1955, when commemorative services and protest meetings were held throughout the free world on the anniversary of Dr. Trushnovich's kidnaping.

underground channels and free world broadcasts, this Soviet crime has also been made known to the captive Russian people.

At the time of his abduction, Dr. Trushnovich was 61 years old. He was a Slovene by birth, a Russian by choice, and since 1917 had actively identified himself with the Russian fight against the Communist dictatorship. He was an executive of NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), the directing

force of the anti-Communist Russian Revolutionary Movement.

The Rescue Committee, which he founded in 1950 only 2 miles from the Soviet sector of Berlin, became the outpost of freedom and safety for victims of Communist persecution, and the name of Dr. Trushnovich the symbol of courage and hope behind the Iron Curtain. Fourteen different nationalities are represented among the 2,300 escapees (as of 1954) who reached the free world through the efforts of the Rescue Committee. Thousands of others have received food, clothing, and medical aid.

In 1952, the Communists launched intensive smear attacks against the Rescue Committee, and the Soviet Secret Police began their attempts to kidnap or murder Dr. Trushnovich. These efforts are being continued today against Dr. Trushnovich's successors. Alexander Svetov and Oleg Krassovsky. But the doors of the Rescue Committee, open 24 hours a day, have never closed.

DOCUMENTATION ON TRUSHNOVICH KIDNAPING

Report of West Berlin police investigation Report of NTS investigation Records of West Berlin (Russian) Rescue Committee Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov, former Soviet intelligence officer United States Congressional Record; speeches in British, Australian, and Canadian Parliaments

Letters of Mrs. Zinaida Trushnovich and others Hundreds of petitions

Press file

Case No. 2. GEORGI OKOLOVICH—ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION

On the night of February 18, 1954, in Frankfurt/Main (American zone of Germany), Soviet Intelligence Capt. Nikolai Khokhlov voluntarily gave himself up to Georgi Okolovich, member of the executive board of NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), and revealed the elaborate Soviet plot for Okolovich's assassination, of which Khokhlov was in charge. (NTS is the directing force of the anti-Communist Russian Revolutionary Movement.) Okolovich's recommendation, Khokhlov went with him to American authorities. For 2 months he stalled the MGB (Soviet intelligence), while Western intelligence checked his story and found it to be authentic in every detail. The two hired assassins, Communist agents Kukowitsch and Weber, who had been specially trained in Moscow for the job, gave themselves up and confessed. At an international press conference on April 22, 1954, in Bonn, Germany, the assassination plot was publicly revealed.

Captain Khokhlov belonged to the Ninth Section "for terror and diversion" of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB, at that time part of the MVD). He had been drafted into the MGB at the age of 19, during World War II, and did outstanding service for his country. After the war, however, he became thoroughly disillusioned with communism, and under the influence of his Christian wife, Yanina, found moral direction for his life. But his efforts to leave

the MGB, even at the risk of arrest, proved futile.

In October 1953, Khokhlov was put in charge of the assassination of Georgi Okolovich, who, as director of NTS underground operations within the Soviet Union, was classified in top-secret files as "the most dangerous enemy of the Soviet regime." His assassination was ordered by the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the orders signed by Georgi Malenkov and Nikita S. Khrushchev. (The kidnaping of Dr. Trushnovich (case

No. 1) and the assassination of Dr. V. D. Poremsky (case No. 9) were ordered at the same time.) To Khokhlov, NTS and Okolovich represented the one hope of the Russian people for liberation from the tyrannical Communist regime. Yet to refuse to obey Soviet orders could mean death to him and his family. He confided in his wife, and they both agreed that Khokhlov should pretend to follow orders but find a way to prevent the assassination, regardless of the personal risks involved for them.

Special weapons were designed for the assassination—the now famous "cigarette case poison bullet" electric pistols. On these Khokhlov worked directly with Panyushkin, former ambassador to the United States and other countries, actually a high official of the MVD. Khokhlov carefully selected as assassins two agents whose credentials satisfied Panyushkin, but who could be induced to give themselves up under pressure. He planned every move so that only he could coordinate all parts of the plot for the final outcome. Then he went to the one man whom he could trust—Georgi Okolovich, the intended victim.

This case created a worldwide sensation. As a former officer of the Austrian and German desks of MGB, Nikolai Khokhlov supplied information that completely disrupted these Soviet spy networks. Although this case of attempted international political murder received the same official burial in the U. N. Human Rights Commission as that of Dr. Trushnovich, Khokhlov's continued articles and lectures in the United States are proving to be one of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the fight against the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the Commission of the most protent weaponer in the Commission of the commissio potent weapons in the fight against the Communist conspiracy.

DOCUMENTATION ON OKOLOVICH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov Reports of Western intelligence Report of NTS investigation Testimony of Kukowitsch and Weber (the hired assassins) United States Congressional Record; speeches in other free parliaments Press file CASE No. 3. YANINA KHOKHLOV-HOSTAGE

On June 2, 1954, word reached the West through diplomatic channels that Mrs. Yanina Khokhlov, wife of Nikolai Khokhlov, had been seized by the Soviet secret police several weeks before in her Moscow apartment, and was being held hostage, together with Khokhlov's 18-month-old son and Yanina's 14-year-old sister. These innocent persons are imprisoned by the Soviet in reprisal for Nikolai Khokhlov's refusal to carry out a criminal order of the Soviet Government. His action was legally justified by the Nuremberg resolutions, which were signed by the Soviet Union.

Even under Soviet law, Yanina Khokhlov committed no crime. She is being held in violation of both Soviet law and the United Nations Charter, for the "offense" of trying to prevent her husband from committing murder. Official requests by American authorities and by international organizations that she be allowed to rejoin her husband have been ignored by the Soviet Government. Presented to the United Nations by the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings, this case received the same treatment as cases No. 1 and 2.

It is believed that the continued international publicity about and interest in the fate of Yanina Khokhlov has kept her alive, although she may be in a slavelabor camp. Among the Russian people behind the Iron Curtain, she has become a symbol of moral courage and spiritual defiance of the Communist regime.

Yanina Timashkevich Khokhlov is a Uniat Catholic, brought up in a Christian home, with her faith unshaken by Communist doctrines. At the time of her disappearance she was 32 years old, a quiet, intelligent, and deeply spiritual young She was both a skilled construction engineer and a devoted wife and woman. mother. Under her influence Nikolai Khokhlov, brought up as a Communist, became a Christian. At the risk of their lives, they had their baby baptized in a Christian church. When Nikolai, fearful of reprisals against his wife and baby, argued that the assassins of Okolovich would be hired killers, not himself, Yanina replied that if he was the planner, he was also the murderer. As a Christian, he must not only refuse to obey a criminal order—he must actively prevent the murder.

Khokhlov's major concern when he gave himself up to NTS and then to the West, was how to prevent the assassination of Okolovich and also save his own A plan was worked out to do this in conjunction with Khokhlov's family. revelation of the plot at the Bonn press conference. For some as yet unexplained reason the plan tragically failed, and Yanina Khokhlov, her baby, and her sister were seized by the MVD.

DOCUMENTATION ON YANINA KHOKHLOV HOSTAGE CASE

Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov Report of NTS investigation Confidential reports United States Congressional Record, speeches in other free parliaments Press file

Cases Nos. 4 Through 8

CASE No. 4. VALERY TREMMEL-KIDNAPING

On the night of June 20, 1954, in Linz, Austria (American Zone), NTS member Valery Tremmel was drugged and kidnaped by Soviet agents. These facts were established by the Austrian police, proving false the Soviet claim that Tremmel and his abductors were arrested in Urfahr (Soviet sector of Linz) for distributing anti-Soviet propaganda literature. Further investigation was blocked by Soviet pressure on Austrian authorities. A recent NTS report reveals that Tremmel is now in a Soviet slave labor camp.

DOCUMENTATION

Austrian police report; telephone report from Austrian Embassy in United States; NTS reports

CASE No. 5. KARL W. FRICKE-KIDNAPING

On April 1, 1955, in West Berlin, the German anti-Communist journalist Karl W. Fricke, who had fled from East Germany in 1949, was kidnaped by the Communists after apparently being doped with poisoned candy. West Berlin police report points toward Communist agent Kurt Rittwagen as the abductor, although no direct evidence has yet been established. Case is still under investigation.

DOCUMENTATION

West Berlin police report; press file

CASE NO. 6. CLARA HERSKOVITS-KIDNAPING

Clara Herskovits, a Rumanian national, is reported by eyewitnesses to have been abducted by the Soviets from a "liberated" Nazi concentration camp in Praust (near Danzig) early in 1945, and transported with other inmates for slave labor in the Soviet Union. The case was reported in 1955 by her surviving brother, now in the United States.

DOCUMENTATION

Brother's testimony; eyewitness reports (Rumania)

CASE NO. 7. MAJOR SYLVESTER MURAU-KIDNAPING

On or about August 6, 1955, in Western Germany, two Communist agents kidnaped Major Sylvester Murau, a defector from the East German Communist Police (VoPo), who was apparently betrayed by his daughter. Final report of West Berlin police investigation not yet received.

DOCUMENTATION

West German police report; press file

CASE NO. 8. THE KALMUK PEOPLE-GENOCIDE

At the request of representatives of the approximately 1,000 survivors of the Kalmuk people in the free world, the Committee To Combat Soviet Kidnapings has agreed to follow up on the genocide case of the Kalmuk people. This case was presented to the United Nations in January 1954 by the Kalmuk Committee to Combat Bolshevism, not only on behalf of the Kalmuk people but also on behalf of the Chechen-Ingush, the Crimean tartars and all other peoples who have

been victims of Soviet genocide. It received the same treatment by the U. N.

Human Rights Commission as previous cases.

In December 1943, on order of the Soviet Government, tens of thousands of peaceful Kalmuks in southern Russia were forcibly abducted from lands they had occupied for 300 years. They were herded into unheated cattle cars in freezing weather and carted off by the Soviet Secret Police to death or oblivion.

DOCUMENTATION

Record and photostats of official Soviet documents Eyewitness account by the senior NKVD (Secret Police) officer in charge of Kalmuk genocide

Testimony of surviving Kalmuks

Report of United States House Select Committee on Communist Aggression Report of Djab N. Naminow, officer of the Kalmuk Brotherhood and the Kalmuk Committee To Combat Bolshevism, delegate to Bandung Conference

CASE No. 9. Dr. V. D. POREMSKY-ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION

(The following data was declassified by Supreme Court of German Federated

Republic, as of April 16, 1956.)

On December 29, 1955, in Frankfurt/Main, Germany, Dr. V. D. Poremsky, president of NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), received a telephone warning of an assassination plot against him. The caller identified himself as the assigned killer. Subsequently a meeting between two NTS representatives and the alleged assassin was arranged for December 30, at which time the man gave himself up. He carried forged documents as a political refugee from East Germany under the name of Wolfgang Weber, but revealed himself as Wolfgang Wildprett, SSD (East German Communist Secret Police) agent. showed a loaded Walter police pistol, which was to have been the murder weapon.

Wildprett, 30, has a background of special Nazi school training and postwar connection with the criminal underground of East Germany as a speculator and petty smuggler, until he was drafted by the SSD as an informer. Early in 1955 he faked an "escape" to West Berlin, where for 8 months he posed as a political

refugee in a refugee camp, but actually served as an SSD agent. Early in December 1955, Wildprett received orders to murder Dr. Poremsky in Frankfurt/Main, and necessary data about the intended victim. He was provided with forged documents as Wolfgang Weber, resident of West Berlin, and paid 500 West German marks in advance, with the promise of 20,000 marks after the assassination. Deadline was set for December 30, the day on which Wildprett surrendered to NTS in Frankfurt/Main. He said that 20,000 marks was not worth risking murder for, and that he was afraid that after committing one murder for the Communists they could force him to commit other murders until he got caught.

On the advice of the NTS representatives, Wildprett surrendered to the West German Police at the Frankfurt Procuracy. After preliminary investigation, the case was turned over to the Supreme Court of the German Federated Republic at Karlsruhe, which conducted a secret investigation of the case for 4 months before releasing certain information on April 16, 1956. Final investigation is

not yet completed.

When the above data was released, it was also revealed that Dr. Poremsky was No. 2 on the Soviet assassination list, according to the orders signed by Malenkov and Khrushchev in mid-1953. The lapse of 1½ years since the failure of the assassination attempt against No. 1, Okolovich (case No. 2), indicates the extent to which Nikolai Khokhlov's defection disrupted the Soviet network in Europe. The employment of a gunman from the East German criminal underworld in this latest attempt is in marked contrast to the elaborate plot against Okolovich. This change in tactics indicates two possibilities: (1) Soviet authorities are afraid to risk another high caliber intelligence officer (such as Khokhlov) on an assassination assignment against NTS and/or (2) this assassination attempt against Dr. Poremsky can be merely a blind, calculated to relax NTS vigilance and make Poremsky an easier mark for a more skilled assassin. It also indicates that the top Soviet still consider NTS, the directing force of the Russian Revolutionary Movement "the most dangerous enemy of the Soviet regime."

DOCUMENTATION

West German police reports

NTS report

Personal interviews with Dr. Poremsky and other NTS executives

CASE No. 10. ROBERT BIALEK-KIDNAPING

On February 6, 1956, in the British sector of Berlin, Communist Secret Police drugged and kidnaped Robert Bialek, former inspector general of the VoPo (East German Communist Police), who fled to West Berlin in 1953 and has subsequently exposed the grim Red rule in East Germany in numerous writings and broadcasts.

According to early police reports, Bialek was apparently drugged while a guest at the apartment of his supposed friend, Paul Drzewiecki, another former VoPo officer who allegedly fled to the West, and who has also disappeared. Other guests were Herbert Hellwig, East German police sergeant who was visiting West Berlin, and a young woman who has identified only as Drzewiecki's "niece."

Bialek, evidently realizing that he had been drugged, locked himself in the hall bathroom, where he was discovered unconscious by another tenant who summoned Drzewiecki. Bialek's "friends" carried him into a dark limousine, declaring that they were taking him to the hospital. None has been seen since.

According to West German newspaper accounts, investigation of Drzewiecki's background revealed that he joined the Communist Party in 1945, and soon became an SSD (East German Communist Secret Police) agent identified with previous kidnapings and kidnaping attempts. In 1953 he allegedly fled to West Berlin with his wife, who died the following year. Drzewiecki lost his job. He was recognized by former associates and approached to handle other Communist Secret Police assignments. He has induced Bialek to his apartment by pretending that he was celebrating his birthday. Mrs. Bialek remained at home.

The kidnaping was headlined in the West German press, and received short-

ened accounts in some American papers.

Final police report has not yet been received.

DOCUMENTATION

Preliminary West Berlin police report press file

CASE No. 11. REFUGEE RUSSIAN SAILORS' KIDNAPING

On April 7, 1956, five young Russian sailors who had been granted political asylum in the United States were forcibly repatriated to the U.S.S. R. by Soviet secret police agents, operating from the headquarters of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, 68th and Park, New York. The five victims are: Valentin Lukashov, 25; Alexander Shirin, 26; Michael Shishin, 25; Viktor Ryabenko, 23; Nikolai Vaganov, 23. Evidence indicates this is the boldest political kidnaping committed by the Soviet Government to date.

The young Russians were former sailors from the Soviet tanker Tuapse, captured by the Nationalist Chinese when it attempted to run the blockade to Red China in July 1954. Of the 48 crew members, 28 were persuaded after a year to return to the U. S. S. R., chiefly because of threats of reprisals on their families. The remaining 20 asked for political asylum in the United States, and 9 were

admitted in October 1955 under the auspices of Church World Service.

Almost from the time they arrived, attempts to blackmail and intimidate these young men were made by Soviet agents, operating from headquarters of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations in New York. Letters from family, relatives, and friends—obviously dictated by the MVD—were shown to the sailors. When these means failed, the Soviet tactics became more drastic.

Investigation and testimony to date indicates that the five victims were lured or coerced into the Soviet U. N. delegation headquarters, at 68th Street and Park Avenue, New York, transported to Idlewild Airport under heavy MVD guard, railroaded through a brief hearing by the United States Immigration Service, and herded into the airplane. The young men were flown via Scandinavian Airlines from New York to Helsinki, thence to Moscow, where they are being exploited as voluntary redefectors.

Evidence indicates that the kidnaping was engineered under the direction of or with the cooperation of Arkady A. Sobolev, chief of the Soviet delegation

to the United Nations. Case is still under investigation.

DOCUMENTATION

Personal interviews.
Investigation by United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
Press file.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else, Mrs. Kingsbery, other than what you have here in this report now, that you feel the subcommittee should know in connection with this general subject? Do you, for instance, find out—is it your conclusion that if you make concessions to the Soviets in these things, so as not to stir up trouble,

that tends to placate the situation?

Mrs. Kingsbery. No, definitely not. It tends to aggravate it. You cannot compromise with these people. It is like the old fairy story of St. George and the dragon, you know, and the dragon was besieging the city and they kept feeding him the people and feeding him the people to make him go away. And so he kept on eating up everybody and then he demanded the princess. And until somebody came and challenged, to call the dragon's bluff and kill him, he would have eaten

up everybody.

A demonstration of what happens when you call the Soviet bluff was the demonstration against article 16 of the Austrian treaty. On that one, the campaign was—that is on page 2—and article 16, in the original draft of the Austrian treaty, amounted to legalized kidnaping of some 30,000 Russian refugees in the free zones of Austria. So nothing much was said about article 16. It was brought to our attention first by the people in the refugee camps there in Austria, and by Mr. Julius Epstein who was studying the thing. So we spark-plugged the campaign and this time there was response from everyone, not only all over the United States but all through the free world, and other organizations got into it.

Telegrams, letters, and phone calls came into the various capitals and the Western Powers did stand up against the Soviets on this in Vienna, and because of this tremendous popular support and tremendous popular demand, the Soviets were forced to give in, and

article 16 was eliminated from the treaty.

Mr. Morris. And that is one of the unusual cases, you say?

Mrs. Kingsbery. Yes. And another case in which the United States stood up to the Soviet Union was in the Third Committee in the United Nations, when the Soviets tried to get through a resolution that would facilitate this repatriation of the refugees through the U. N., and our delegate, Mr. Jacob Blaustein, stood up against it. We backed him and other organizations backed him, and the Soviets backed down.

Mr. Morris. I have no further questions of this witness, Senator. Senator Welker. Generally, just what have you done to inform the American people of the work of your committee?

Mis. Kingsbery. Pardon me, sir?

Senator Welker. Generally, just what have you done, or has your committee done—

Mrs. Kingsbery. What have we done on what?

Senator Welker. What have you done to inform the American

people of this kidnaping threat?

Mrs. Kingsbery. We have gotten out numbers of releases—news releases, television interviews, radio interviews, and so forth—and

they have been very well received by the press. The press has been very cooperative and very interested and it has been brought to the attention through all of these media all over the country. We have clips on this.

Senator Welker. Very well. Thank you very much. Mrs. Kingsbery. You are very welcome.

Mr. Morris. Colonel Rudolph, will you stand to be sworn?

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Rudolph. I do, sir.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR RUDOLPH SHABINSKY, AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky, who has been sworn previously and has acted as interpreter previously, is here to assist us again. You have been sworn, Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky. It is not necessary to be sworn again.

Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky. Yes, sir; I was sworn.

Mr. Morris. It is not necessary. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter, Colonel Rudolph?

Mr. Rudolph. Vladimir Rudolph Shabinsky.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that again for the record? There has been a little misunderstanding in the past. Will you spell that last part of your name once again?

Mr. Rudolph (spelling). S-h-a-b-i-n-s-k-y. 23 West 83d Street,

New York.

The Interpreter. 23 West 83d Street, New York City.

Mr. Morris. Colonel Rudolph, you were in the American Zone in Western Germany; were you not?
Mr. Rudolph. Yes. I come in April 1947 and I come to U. S. A.

in summer of 1951.

Mr. Morris. So for 4 years you were in the American Zone in Western Germany?

Mr. Rudolph. Yes. I was 2 years in the Soviet Zone, in the Soviet

military administration.

Mr. Morris. Now, you were born in the Soviet Union, were you not? The Interpreter. I wasn't born in the Soviet Union proper, but the most part of my life I lived in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. I see. And what did you do in the Soviet Union? Mr. Rudolph. I finished high school. I worked in the building

industry, in the ship industry-

The INTERPRETER. After finishing my school I worked in the construction industry and in the naval building industry, shipbuilding industry.

Mr. Rudolph. I studied in Leningrad University.

In 1937 I was arrested. I had 10 years' concentration camp but after 4 years, in November 1941, I escaped from concentration camp and in wartime, the first year I worked in industry, superintendent in my job, and in wartime I am mobilized; I was in army, in Germany, first time, in special committee in Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union—

Mr. Morris. I think that is enough, Colonel Rudolph.

Now, were you ever the object of violence on the part of Soviet authorities while you were in the American Zone?

Mr. Rudolph. Yes. In summer 1948——

Mr. Morris (to the interpreter). Will you shorten the sequences here?

The Interpreter. Well, it is one sentence.

Mr. Morris. Sorry.

The Interpreter. I was living, in summer of 1948, in a country house on Ammersee in village of Eching.

Mr. Morris. That is the Western Zone of Germany?

Mr. Rudolph. The American Zone; yes.

Mr. Morris. The American Zone.

The Interpreter. I was living in a separate house on the second floor.

Downstairs was living the superintendent of the house.

One night after 2 a.m., a car came to the house. Three men de-

scended from the car.

One man has brought the car to the reeds on the border of the lake, put out the lights and left the car there. These three men climbed the fence of the garden. The fourth rang the bell. The superintendent appeared. They asked him whether Vladimir Rudolph lives here. He said, "Yes."

Mr. Morris. Now, who said, "Yes"? The Interpreter. The superintendent. Mr. Morris. The superintendent said, "Yes." The Interpreter. Where is he living?

And the superintendent told him that on the second floor is his bedroom—but that he is not here; he is in Munich.

When the three approached the superintendent, he heard that they

were speaking Russian among themselves.

I slept lightly, especially because I was afraid of the possibility of kidnaping or killing, and therefore, I woke up and overheard this conversation and jumped out from the window on the other side of the house and fled.

In the morning I went to the Augsburg office of CIC, Counterintelligence Corps, and asked them what to do. They advised me to leave

my living place and to go to live in Munich. Next night, these people arrived again.

They brushed off the superintendent and entered the house.

When they got convinced that I was not home, they stayed a while there and, leaving the house, they told the superintendent, "We will catch that bird yet."

I did not return to this house and lived in Munich.

Mr. Rudolph. That is all.

Mr. Morris. Were there any other such attempts made against you,

Colonel Rudolph?

The Interpreter. I don't know whether this was an attempt on my life, but once in the winter of 1949, I was going through the English part in Munich and there were several shots fired at me, but, of course, that may have been simply bandits.

Mr. Morris. Now, Colonel Rudolph, while you were in the American Zone, did you have occasion to learn of the kidnapings on the part of the Soviet authorities of any important people, or any people

for that matter, from the American authorities?

The Interpreter. I am sorry, you said "American Zone," Judge Morris?

Mr. Morris. Kidnaped from the control, from the supervision of the American authorities; in other words, they were under the protection of the American Government at the time.

The Interpreter. I know of kidnapings from American and British Zones, from the Soviet sources, when I was in the Soviet Zone and worked for Soviet Military Administration.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about some of the more notable of these cases, particularly those relating to the technical and scientific branch?

Mr. Rudolph. Yes.

The Interpreter. After the end of the war, all Soviet ministries

have sent their representatives to Germany.

They were busy dismantling factories, finding equipment, but one of the activities was to look for German people, German scientists, who

would be able to fulfill the plans of these particular ministries.

Mr. Morris. In other words, the Soviet authorities wanted to supplement the personnel of these technical and scientific bureaus back in the Soviet Union, or the ministries in the Soviet Union. So in order to get their personnel, they went out into the Western Zone and apparently undertook to kidnap them?

Mr. Rudolph. Yes. The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Were there any particular branches, such as aviation or chemical warfare or anything like that, in which there were specialties?

The Interpreter. The general leadership in this work had the technical and scientific branch of the Soviet military administration.

The cases of which I know were the kidnapings among the aviation specialists, specialists in secret weapons, physics experts, and chemical experts.

But also kidnaped were those Soviet officers and soldiers who fled

to the West.

In the Soviet Zone in the town of Bautzen.

In December of 1946—were imprisoned the Soviet soldiers and officers in two groups. One group was those who were forcibly repatriated by the Western Allies; the other group was those who were kidnaped after the end of the war and of those there were-

Mr. Rudolph. Thirty.

The Interpreter. About 30.

Mr. Rudolph. In December of 1940—

Mr. Morris. May I be sure I understand that, Colonel Rudolph? You say in this prison, maintained by the Soviet authorities, there was a breakdown into two separate compartments?

Mr. Rudolph. Right.

Mr. Morris. In one compartment were those Soviet officers and men who had been forcibly repatriated, and in the other compartment were those Soviet officers and men who had been kidnaped?

Mr. Rudolph. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Now, how many were in each compartment?

Mr. Rudolphi. In December 1946, in this part, the kidnaped people are about 30.

Mr. Morris. How many? Mr. Rudolph. About 30.

Mr. Morris. About 30.

Mr. Rudolph. In December 1946. How many in other parts, I don't know, but hundreds and hundreds.

The Interpreter. Hundreds and hundreds of those repatriated, and

about 30 of the kidnaped.

Mr. Morris. I see.

The Interpreter. At least, that was the number as of December 1946.

Mr. Morris. In other words, at the time, in the prison, even though they had only 30 at that time, there was room for many more?

The Interpreter. They were transient prisoners, because they were being shipped to the Soviet Union from time to time and this is the number for December 1946, of which I remember.

Mr. Morris. Now, who was the Soviet officer who was in the overall

charge of this project of kidnaping technicians and scientists?

The Interpreter. Up to March of 1946, the kidnapings were conducted by Soviet officers who were under command of the special offices in Karlshorst in the Soviet administration and under orders of the then Col. Gen. Ivan Serov.

Mr. Morris. Ivan Serov, S-e-r-o-v?

Mr. Rudolph. Right.

Mr. Morris. And that is the same gentleman who recently had difficulty in England from the English Government?

Mr. Rudolph. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And what was his job at that time?

The Interpreter. Now, he is the chief of the committee for state security at the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us something about the techniques that were employed by these Soviet intelligence officers by which they were

luring German scientists into the Soviet Zone?

The Interpreter. As I have been told by Mr. Krasev, chief of local branch of the Soviet military administration, after March 1946, the Soviet administration has employed German Communists for kidnapings.

Such case was, for instance, on the occasion when German Communists were sent to either kidnap or kill a Soviet defector, Colonel

Mikheyev in Hamburg, in Germany.

The Interpreter. As to the German scientists, and engineers I will give you a sample of one of the three coauthors, or coinventors of the V-1 and V-2 weapons.

Mr. Morris. One of the coauthors of the V-1 and V-2 weapons was among the scientists who were kidnaped by the German Communists?

The Interpreter. He was lured from the Western Zone of Germany by exercising pressure upon his family, relatives, who were

living near Peenemünde in Eastern Germany.

The Soviet authorities have forced his relatives, his immediate family, rather, to write him a letter in the Western Zone in Germany to appear secretly to them in Peenemunde and when he appeared there, the Soviets captured him.

Mr. Morris. What was his name?

Mr. Rudolph. I am sorry, I don't know, but I saw him-

The Interpreter. I cannot remember his name, unfortunately, but I saw him at the Berlin Airport when he was flying to Moscow together with his family.

Mr. Rudolph. And I talked with him.

The Interpreter. I talked with him.

That is one of the samples.

The other sample is that of Engineer Guenter of Henkel aviation factory, chief constructor of jet-propelled aircraft, at Henkel's factory.

Mr. Morris. What happened to him?

The Interpreter. In 1945, there came orders from Moscow, from a special committee headed by Malenkov to find the blueprints and the men who were working on German jet aircraft.

Mr. Morris. How does he know that.

How do you know that, Colonel Rudolph?

The Interpreter. I was working with Saburoff of the special committee in Berlin.

Mr. Morris. Spell Saburoff's name. The Interpreter. S-a-b-u-r-o-f-f.

Mr. Morris. What was his job at that time? The Interpreter. Saburoff's job, sir?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Interpreter. Then he was deputy on German affairs to Malenkov who was presiding over the special committee.

Mr. Morris. I see.

And he knows from that source that Moscow directed that the blueprints for this particular kind of construction be obtained at all costs?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Then General Serov gave orders to his subordinates. They knew that this man whom they were looking for was Engineer Guenter, to find this particular Engineer Guenter and to present him to the Soviet authorities.

I don't know the details of this case but Engineer Guenter was lured to the Soviet Zone of Germany through pressures exerted upon his sister, and from there he was sent to the Soviet Union.

As far as I know, there were three methods of kidnaping German

scientists.

When the Soviet authorities working with German scientists in the Eastern Zone were finding out the names of men in whom they were interested, they were trying to find out, in the first place, whether they had any relatives in the Soviet zone of occupation.

They wanted to lure them primarily into the Eastern Zone of Germany. If that did not happen, they lured them at least to the Western

sectors of Berlin and kidnaped them there.

And only in seldom cases by ultimate means they were kidnaping

the German scientists in the Western Zone of Germany.

I don't remember now the names of two people, a couple, a married couple, who invented the intercontinental airplane in Stuttgart in Germany.

Serov and the special committee have orders to find them.

So far as I know, this couple was at that time in France and the Soviets didn't take a chance to kidnap them from there.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, are there any other examples that you feel that the committee should know about, that you have learned about from your own experience, Colonel Rudolph?

The Interpreter. There is, in American Zone of Germany, an organization of former Soviet soldiers and officers who defected to the West at the end of the Second World War. The Central Organization of Emigres of Post-War Time.

The initials of this organization are COPE.¹ This organization's headquarters is in Munich. In December of 1953, a special agent was

sent to Munich by the name of Igor Gert.

He recruited two criminals and had elaborate plans for kidnaping and bringing to Soviet Union of deputy president of this organization, the COPE, Igor Kronzas. But they were disclosed and at the present time they are in German jail, all three of them, awaiting trial.

Mr. Morris. Trial for what?

The Interpreter. For attempts of kidnaping.

Mr. Morris. Colonel Rudolph, there is one more subject that the committee has gotten into of late, and that is to look into the nature of the security threat that is posed to the United States by virtue of the fact that there are in the United States variously estimated between 20,000 and 40,000 people who are here with false papers. Now, we have been led to believe—and the evidence is beginning to show—that many of these people are being threatened by Soviet agents with exposure. Soviet agents apparently threaten individuals that they will go to the immigration authorities and reveal to them the fact that these people are living here illegally.

Now, do you have any experience whatever with that particularly

difficult situation?

The Interpreter. I know of many people who, after the Second World War, being afraid of forcible repatriation, came to the United

States under false names and false biographical data.

Many of them who are living here 5 or more years are eligible for American citizenship, but being in such situation, they are afraid to take the oath of allegiance, because they are afraid of possible deportation proceedings against them.

But the Soviet agents know who they are. And they are trying to exert pressure upon them by sending to them the newspaper for Return to Homeland published by General Mikheyev's ² Committee in East Berlin, sending them letters or speaking by radio to them.

Mr. Morris. Do you mean, Colonel Rudolph, that these people living here under false papers—now, in every case, they are probably on the record as people from some other country, other than the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic countries, Lithuania or Estonia—do you mean, Colonel Rudolph, that these people are receiving communications from Soviet intelligence people which indicate that the Soviet intelligence knows that they are not what they appear to be on their papers?

The Interpreter. The Soviet authorities are very well aware of presence of such people with false history in the United States, and they are trying to blackmail them and, in several cases, the people are just choosing rather the alternative to return than to stay under these

pressures.

There are several cases where people were personally approached on the streets. If such an emigrant cannot be intimidated to return

¹ Note correction on p. 1320. ² Also spelled Mikailov elsewhere.

to the Soviet Union, they simply denounce him before the immigration authorities, telling who the man is really and exposing his unwilling fraud. And so the question of deportation arises.

Mr. Morris. And the Immigration Authorities have been enforcing

the letter of the law on that subject, have they not?

The Interpreter. Of course, that is what they are doing. They

have a law and they enforce it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have asked some of the people against whom the law is being carried out to testify here, and I think on Friday we will have the first of those witnesses.

Senator Welker. Very well.

Does that conclude your interrogation, counsel?

Mr. Morris. Has Colonel Rudolph finished with that last question? The Interpreter. That is all.

I am sorry. May I read this thing. I just got a notice here. Senator Welker. Very well. Proceed.

The Interpreter. This is the correct initials of this postwar immigration association. The initials are ZOPE and it is called Union of

Russian Postwar Emigrees.

Senator Welker. I would like to say that the evidence this morning impresses me with the plan of the Soviet intelligence of kidnaping and arrests to obtain their objectives. They have used their methods to get important scientists and other human beings to suit their purposes.

The free world has been all too complacent and the Soviets have been bolder as a result of our complacency in the face of our commitments. It is apparent to me because they got away with so many kidnapings in the American Zone of Germany that in April of 1956, they tried it here in the United States with that seamen case which should be in the mind of every person in America.

I want to say as corroboration, to show the plan, the scheme, of the Soviet intelligence and their agencies, we have here received today authentic information of Soviet redefection activities in Norway, and I want to read that for the benefit of the gentlemen of the press:

It has now been disclosed that the Soviet Embassy in Norway was involved in an attempt to persuade refugees to return to Soviet Russia. Two refugees living in Drammen, 45 kilometers from Oslo, were approached by a former friend, Nikolai Til:hanowski, who had already been persuaded by the Soviet Embassy that he ought to repatriate. During the war, he had escaped from a Ger-

man prison camp in Norway and has stayed there since.

The two other refugees, however, refused to follow his advice, and during the Easter holidays, Tikhanowski brought with him two members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo to Drammen to make a final attempt. The Embassy people had brought vodka and specially prepared food with them. argument got hot and ended in a brawl. Tikhanowski pulled out a revolver and fired 2 shots at 1 of the refugees. He also grabbed the bottle and hit his former friend over the head. Police were called and Tikhanowski was arrested. He was indicted before the court 2 weeks later and is still in prison pending final judgment. Because of the refugees, the court session was closed, but it is known that one of the Embassy people who managed to get away is the second secretary, Boris Chirkin. The other was the Embassy's driver who is probably an MVD.

The Norwegian Foreign Office is now investigating the case and trying to collect evidence about the role of the Soviet diplomats involved. It is known that they have been approaching through Tikhanowski several refugees who have remained in Norway after the war, but so far without success.

The incident has caused a stir in Norway and has warned refugees in captive

countries of the activities of the diplomatic mission.

Now, in conclusion, that statement alone, which has been authenticated, certainly corroborates the evidence that the Internal Security Subcommittee has received with respect to the Russian sailors, and I think that it is very apparent that everyone, especially the refugees here and the Americans here, be on the alert for those things to happen in the future.

It has happened in the past. They have gotten away with it. They were smart characters when they got the 5 seamen but they were not

so smart when the other 4 remained here in the free world.

I want to commend my counsel today for his very fine work and I will appreciate very much the hearing coming on in a few days with respect to those whom the Soviets are using as blackmail subjects, because of passports and otherwise, to get them back to either a slave-labor camp or to sudden destruction.

I desire to thank the two witnesses and the interpreter who appeared

before us today on behalf of the whole committee and the staff.

The committee is now adjourned.

Mr. Morris. Senator, before adjourning, may we put some entries from the Morgenthau diary into the record?

Senator Welker. Very well.

(The Morgenthau diary excerpts will be found in subsequent publications of this subcommittee.)

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mitchell, will you come forward, please?

Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky. We appreciate very much your interpreting for us.

Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, one other thing. I would like to offer for the record in connection with our inquiry into the activities of Rumanian Bishop Andrew Moldovan, a passport application made out by that gentleman, dated April 17, 1956, wherein he indicates that he was then planning to go to Soviet Rumania. I would like that to go into the record in connection with our inquiry into that particular matter.

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 270" and appears at p. 1252 in this volume.)

Mr. Morris. I have no further business with this meeting, Sen-

ator.

Senator Welker. The meeting is adjourned.

Mr. Morris. Tomorrow the witness will be Countess Tolstoy who will testify about the nature of Soviet efforts to exploit people living here on false papers.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 a.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene

at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 23, 1956.)



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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

MAY 23, 25, JUNE 13, JULY 20, 25, AND 27, 1956

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1956

United States Senate Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senator Welker.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator Welker. The meeting will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand, to be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDRA LEO TOLSTOY, PRESIDENT, TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC., NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

Miss Tolstoy. My name is Alexandra Tolstoy. My office address is 989 Eighth Avenue, the Tolstoy Foundation, in New York.

Mr. Morris. What is your name, again? Miss Tolstoy. Alexandra Leo Tolstoy.

Mr. Morris. You were formerly Countess Tolstoy?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you might tell us, for the record, Countess Tolstoy, who your mother and your father were.

Miss Tolstoy. My father was the Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy, and my mother was born Bers. I was born in Russia in 1884.

Mr. Morris. And when did you come to the United States?

Miss Tolstoy. In 1939.

Mr. Morris. And now that you are an American citizen, we address you as Miss Tolstoy?

Miss Tolstoy. Miss Tolstoy.

Mr. Morris. Miss Tolstoy. Now, Miss Tolstoy, what is the work of the Tolstoy Foundation?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, the Tolstoy Foundation's business now is primarily in the immigration of refugees, the former displaced persons. And it is according to the RRA; the RRA are bringing people over, and then we are following up the cases that they are bringing over, and also, we are working abroad. We have 14 offices.

Mr. Morris. How many offices do you have in the United States?

Miss Tolstoy. One central office.

Mr. Morris. And you say you have 14 offices abroad?

Miss Tolstoy. Abroad, yes; all over Europe, in the Middle East; and in Brazil, two offices.

Senator Welker. May I ask you, what are the principal functions of the 14 offices abroad? Are they for screening purposes?

Miss Tolstoy. Screening; yes. They send over people, they screen people sent over for immigration in the United States and other countries, and also the settlement, we are greatly helped by the

United States escapee program abroad.

Senator Welker. I wonder if you would tell me just what steps you take in screening an alleged refugee who comes from beyond the Iron Curtain and tells you a story that he or she is a refugee. Would you tell the committee what steps you take in screening that person? How would you know whether or not they are telling the truth?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, usually quite a number of Russians in Europe and the United States, those who reside here, and they always-Russians always know a spy when they see one. That is the mainyou know, they have a feeling that this man is a security risk, and they are afraid of him. And this is the main source, the source that we get from all the Russians that we know very well, for years and years.

Senator Welker. I am still a bit confused. You say the Russians can tell when a man or a woman is a spy. So I think we had better hire a few of them. But I am interested in this proposition.

Someone—and we have had them before this committee, great fakers, great actors come here, they fool the American people, they fool Russia, they have fooled everyone. And I am concerned as to how you can have a definite finding of your committee as to whether or not this alleged refugee is a security risk or not.

Miss Tolstoy. Every refugee we get has to go to CIC, through the

American authorities.

Senator Welker. I understand that. What I am interrogating you about goes to the CIC, too. It seems to me a bit difficult—if the Communists want to plant someone in this country, he could come to your organization, say that he was a refugee who was seeking haven in the free world, and then he might be a spy or an espionage agent.

Do you follow me, madam?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes; I follow you.

And I think that the national groups, more than anybody else, can size up a spy, if we know one. And, of course, we can make mistakes, and maybe we do—I don't know that the Tolstoy Foundation has brought any spies over; we have never heard about it; it might be.

But I think that, knowing our people as we know them, we can, to some extent, understand if this man is a security risk or not.

Senator Welker. Very well, Countess; thank you very much. Counsel, proceed.

Mr. Morris. Miss Tolstoy, you have experience, do you not, in connection with the work you have just described, with coming into direct and immediate contact with thousands of escapees and thousands of refugees?

Miss Tolston. That is right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Now, there are two problems, Miss Tolstoy, before the committee. One is, we are examining the whole Soviet repatriation program, and at the same time we are analyzing a situation that has been called to the attention of the committee, whereby thousands of Russian escapees who come to the United States under papers that are false, in that they give, on their papers, a false place of birth and a false name in order to escape forcible repatriation back to the Soviet Union, where a fate that is very undesirable awaits them.

Now, the subcommittee is analyzing that situation, Miss Tolstoy, to determine whether or not this group of people constitute a security menace to this particular country. I wonder if you are in a position

to give us any testimony on that subject?

Miss Tolstoy. I think they present a pretty good authority for the

Soviet agents to work under.

Mr. Morris. In the first place, have you encountered many of these people?

Miss Tolstoy. I have met hundreds of those people, who came to

me for protection. But what can I do?

Mr. Morris. Will you describe the circumstances surrounding which these hundreds of people that you know about have come to you for protection? I wonder if you would give a little description of

how they come to you?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, there was a man who came to me on Friday, and he said he was an engineer, that he was in the country 7 years. And now his eldest son is graduated from high school and is going to college, or university, I don't remember which. And he says he is offered a very good job as a metallurgist in one of the cities in this country.

Now, he said he does not dare take his second papers out and become a citizen, because, he says, "I cannot lie any more, I just cannot, and I

will not."

And I said, "What is your trouble?"

He said, "I was born, and my children were born, in Russia. But I said that I lived in Poland, and that my youngest daughter was born in Poland. All the rest is right; that we are old immigrants, not new immigrants."

And I told him, "What are you afraid of?"

And he said, "I would be deported if I go and tell the truth."

And I said, "No, you will not, because we had some cases of misrepresentation that we took on, the Tolstoy Foundation took on, and now they are American citizens, because the immigration authorities took into consideration the fact that those people had to lie when they were facing death after the Yalta Agreement was signed, because they were repatriated by force."

So then he said, "Are you sure I won't be deported?"

I said, "We have many cases of the Berezov disease." Those

repatriation cases are called the Berezov disease.

Mr. Morris. I have heard that term many times. I wonder if you could tell us exactly what it is.

Miss Tolstoy. It is when people come into this country on false documents—say he was born in Russia, he said he was born in Poland. In this case he said the daughter was born in Poland, all the rest were born in Russia, and so on. Sometimes they even change their nationalities; they say they are not Russian, they are Poles, or something, or Yugoslavs, or anything.

Mr. Morris. Now, Miss Tolstoy, Berezov was a well-known Russian

writer, was he not?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right. He is a poet. Mr. Morris. What was his first name?

Miss Tolstoy. Rodon.

Mr. Morris. And his last name is Berezov, B-e-r-e-z-o-v?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And you say he was a well-known Russian poet?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, he came here on false papers, did he?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What were the circumstances; do you know?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, I don't know the circumstances very well. I know only that he was to be deported, and then I——

Mr. Morris. Yes. But he came to the United States in order to

escape repatriation back to the Soviet Union, did he not?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right.

Mr. Morris. If he had given his original place of birth, by the terms of the Yalta agreement he would have been forced to return to the Soviet Union?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Rather than do that he chose to come to the United States?

Miss Tolstor. That is it. In all those cases it is the same.

Mr. Morris. Why is it called the "Berezov disease"?

Miss Tolstoy. Because it became known, the Berezov case became

known to everybody.

Mr. Morris. Tell me if this is not so: Did not Berezov choose to—instead of concealing his real identity he choose to come forward and tell the truth and make a test case out of it?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right. He was a professor, a teacher of Russian, and he was dismissed after he told the truth. And then the order of deportation came. And at that time I approached Governor Dewey, who approached Mr. Brownell. Here I have a copy of this letter. And Berezov is still in this country.

Mr. Morris. Is he still under an order of deportation?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, I don't know. I suppose it is pending. But where can you deport those people?

Senator Welker. You don't suppose Russia would accept him back? Miss Tolstov. I don't think the United States would send him back there.

Senator Welker. For what reason?

Miss Tolstoy. Because he would be killed, executed.

Senator Welker. How many emigrees or refugees would you assume came here under false papers?

Miss Tolstoy. Senator, I have young men who come to see me-

Senator Welker. Will you repeat that?

Miss Tolstoy. I have Soviet young men, my friends, who come to me, whom we brought, the Tolstoy Foundation brought over, and sometimes for 4 or 5 years I did not know that they came under false documents.

So how many there are, it is very difficult to say. Unless they know that they are safe, and they all come into the open, I think we find that there are no less than 15,000, maybe more, in this country, under these

false documents.

Senator Welker. 15,000, or maybe more, under false documents in this country?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes. But I cannot—

Senator Welker. Of course, that is estimation on your part?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. But you personally have encountered approximately how many, Miss Tolstoy?

Miss Tolstor. I should say hundreds.

And may I finish this story of this man that I started to tell you? When I told him that he has to go and take his second papers, and that I think he would not be deported, the face of this man—he was another man, he was smiling.

And then he said, "May I ask you to come as a witness?"

I said, "Yes."

So he went, and he was so happy, so happy. And he said, "Now, I will not be afraid every minute of my life, because you told me that you think I won't be deported."

That is the way that they are, all scared.

Now, I know another—should I tell about the school? In one of the Northern States of the United States—I have here a questionmaire that we sent out during the last 5 days to all the people whose addresses we know, asking them if the Soviet agents have approached them, persuading them to go home. And only now we are getting the answers.

Senator Welker. What are the answers?

Miss Tolstoy. I only got nine. Some of these say, "Yes," and they don't give their names. One man came personally, and he said that the group that has settled in one of the States of this country has been threatened all along, saying that they came under false documents, and that they would be deported, and that they would have to go to Ellis Island, and so on, and be deported.

And he came to me and said, "For mercy's sake, protect us, do something, because all the people are so scared of these threats that they don't know what to do. Here we came to a free country, to the United States, we thought that we wouldn't be bothered, and here we

are bothered."

Now, who is this man? Nobody knows. Is he an agent or not? I don't know. Now, we reported him to the FBI, and the FBI will find out if he is a Soviet agent or not. But I think that if they approached these people, they did not approach them as Soviet agents, but they were certain they approached them as their neighbors or their acquaintances, and so on. They will not come into the open.

Senator Welker. You, no doubt, followed the hearings this committee held with respect to the four seamen who refused to go back?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Senator Welker. And that followed very closely the line that you have related here today. They expressed happiness when they knew that our country would stand up and fight for them, rather than permit them to be kidnaped, as was the case of the original 5 or 6. Is that correct?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right. Senator Welker. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. Miss Tolstoy, I am having a little difficulty understanding the advice that you give to these people. You say that the advice is that what they should do is come forward and give their true identity, because even though they would be subject to deportation proceedings, nothing, no effective followup could be carried out upon the part of the immigration authorities, because they have no place to be deported to, even though they would be subject to deportation.

Miss Tolstoy. Some will follow my advice, but the majority will not follow this advice, Mr. Morris, because they are still afraid. And I am hoping so much that this bill is going to pass, which I think has passed the House, where those people could be safe. And it will certainly weaken the efforts of the Soviets to get those people back.

Mr. Morris. Now, Miss Tolstoy, do you know that the Soviet author-

ities know the identity of these people?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes. I don't know if you are acquainted with the newspaper Return to the Homeland.

Mr. Morris. Yes; we have had testimony about Return to the Home-

land.

Miss Tolstor. Well, this newspaper is being sent not only all over Europe but it is being sent now to many escapees in this country. And how they knew the addresses, the residences of these people, I don't know. But many people come to me and say they have received this newspaper. Return to the Homeland, the Homeland Committee.

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Miss Tolstoy: Do you mean that these people who have been living here as Poles and Balts, with false names

and false addresses, receive this paper in their Russian names?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. At the address at which they are living, in an entirely different name?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right. I don't know how many.

Now, I hope that my questionnaire—which I would like to give for the record——

(The questionnaire and accompanying letter, as translated, were marked "Exhibits No. 271 and 271-A" and read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 271

TRANSLATION

DEAR FRIENDS: On April 8 of this year, 5 former Soviet sailors from the ship *Tuapse*, who had chosen freedom in the United States last year, were taken back to the U. S. S. R., under pressure.

What happened? How did these sailors get into the hands of the Soviets? We do not know, but there is full reason to think that they were taken forcibly

by Soviet agents.

Though these sailors were not among the thousands of refugees from the Iron Curtain which the Tolstoy Foundation brought to the U. S. A., their bitter fate has upset all of us and we are sure that it has upset also all of those who in their time left the Soviet Union.

Nearly 40 years personally I am struggling with all the means I have, against the Soviet slavery, and it is already 17 years that the Tolstoy Foundation is

trying to help the largest number of victims of communism. What happened with the five sailors must not happen again. You who found freedom from Soviet slavery here must help us to prevent a repetition of such cases. It is very important for us to know if somebody has approached you or some of your friends or acquaintances who came over to this country with the help of the Tolstoy Foundation and if the Soviet agents threatened them with provocational blackmail to come back to the U.S.S.R.

We do not need your names, we need facts so that we can struggle against them. Please respond, fill out this questionnaire immediately and return it to us. The information which you will give will remain absolutely confidential and it will only be used to defend those who are threatened by the Soviet agents.

We repeat once more, if you do not want to give your names or that of your friends, do not sign your name on this questionnaire. But if you know of some cases of Soviet provocation, please fill out the questionnaire and return it to us. We are waiting for your help. Remember that you can always turn to the Tolstoy Foundation for advice and assistance.

ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY.

EXHIBIT No. 271-A

QUESTIONNAIRE, TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC., 989 EIGHTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

- 1. When did you come to the United States of America?_____
- 2. In which State or States did you live after your arrival, and how long?_____
- 3. Have you ever received the newspaper For the Return to the Homeland or any letters from the Committee for the Return to the Homeland?_____ Yes_____ No____

If "Yes", how many issues? and what letters?

4. Has anybody ever offered you to return to U.S.S.R.?

Yes_____ No____

If "Yes," tell us all possible details about it.

______ 5. Do you know of any instances when your friends or acquaintances were approached with offers to return to U. S. S. R.?

Yes____ No____

If "Yes," let us know about these cases. (We are not interested in names. We

6. We shall be thankful for your additional remarks.

Do not sign this questionnaire if you don't want to, but fill it out and return it to us.

(Miss Tolstoy's comment, received with the foregoing letter and questionnaire, reads as follows:)

In answer to our questionnaire, we have received as yet very few letters. This is one of the samples signed by Nadesda Malchevskaya.

To the question, "Do you know any cases where your friends or your acquaintances were approached with the offer to go back to the U. S. S. R." Yes. Our friends who live in the country about 30 to 40 miles from Philadelphia, were approached with the offer to go back to Poland (former territory belonging in 1939 to Poland), where their children and their relatives are still residing. They were promised good jobs and old-age care. When they categorically refused to go back, they ceased getting letters from their relatives in Poland, U. S. S. R., which grieves them very much.

Miss Tolstoy. I hope that this questionnaire will give more light, because we have in this questionnaire:

Do you receive the Soviet newspaper Return to the Homeland?

I don't know also if you know about the radio broadcast that the Return to the Homeland Committee is now broadcasting, telling the refugees that the United States wants them for forced labor, wants them as laborers, and as spies, and so on and so forth.

All of this is written in this Return to the Homeland newspaper, and is also broadcast by the Soviet agents, by the committee of General

Michailov, in East Berlin.

Mr. Morris. And who is General Michailov?

Miss Tolston. Well, he is heading that committee, Return to the Homeland.

Mr. Morris. And he also publishes the newspaper, does he not?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes. Mr. Morris. Now, if he sends this newspaper, Return to the Homeland to these people who are living here under false names, not the names that they have assumed, but in their Russian names, it would indicate that they know who these people are?

Miss Tolstoy. I suppose you are right, Mr. Morris. Of course, they

would know who they are.

Mr. Morris. I mean, if they are sending it to them in their names.

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, in connection with all this work, Miss Tolstoy, does the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees—is he of much assistance to you in this particular work that you are carrying on?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, he has assisted the Tolstoy Foundation only

once in our relief for the old people, but as a general fact; no.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever observed him working among the

escapees and the refugees?

Miss Tolston. I don't know if you will know about my last year's report to the Appropriations Committee, when I witnessed—well, I would say I expressed my opinion that the appropriation ought not to go to the High Commissioner, because he sent his representative, Mr. Virubov-

Mr. Morris. What is that name?

Miss Tolstoy. Virubov.

Mr. Morris. Would you spell that for the reporter, please?

Miss Tolstoy. V-i-r-u-b-o-v—his representative, together with the Soviet Committee on Repatriation of the escapees living in Germany and Austria. So I thought it was not a proper thing to do, to send his representative, even as an observer, with the Soviet Repatriation Committee.

So I expressed my opinion then.

Mr. Morris. And what was your opinion?

Miss Tolstor. My opinion was that the appropriation should be to the ICEM instead of the High Commissioner. Then I didn't express it. I will express an opinion that much more good would be done if this appropriation, this money, would go to voluntary American agencies.

Mr. Morris. Miss Tolstoy, in connection with the last series of questions prior to this particular subject, you said that these newspapers are sent to the escapees in their original Russian names. Do you think it would be possible, as a result of your questionnaire, to obtain some of those papers in their original wrappers, so that we could really have that list as first-hand evidence?

Miss Tolstoy. I will try to, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Because, you see, that would be a very important point, Miss Tolstoy. It would show conclusively that the Soviet people know who these people are, whereas our own authorities do not know that, for very understandable reasons.

Miss Tolstoy. I will try to obtain such.

Mr. Morris. Miss Tolstoy, it may well be that there are among these people this reservoir of people which you estimate to be upwards of 15,000, people who by their own experiences may well be a source of intelligence for us in the United States; is that right?

Miss Tolstoy. These people—these escapees, you mean?

Mr. Morris. If, for instance, you have a former MKVD man who is living under these circumstances, now he probably, under the circumstances, would be reluctant to come forward and tell his story to the Intelligence people here, because of the bad situation that you have described. Is that right?

Miss Tolstoy. Of course, they would be afraid. I know of cases when engineers, doctors, and people of high qualification, are even afraid to get jobs as engineers, because immediately he would be

asked, "Where did you graduate from?"

In those cases, I had plenty, I had several engineers, doctors, who are doing just manual work, because they were afraid to say who they were and where they got their education.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Miss Tolstoy, as you begin to get results from the questionnaire that

you sent out—how many have you sent out?

Miss Tolstoy. We have sent over three and a half thousand, not counting all the Russian press that we covered with those questionnaires.

Mr. Morris. That is 3,500 you have sent out?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, as the returns come out, will you—and I assure you that we will protect the names of those that want the protection—would you let us know the results of your inquiry?

Miss Tolstoy. Certainly.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything, Miss Tolstoy, that you can tell us about the Soviet repatriation campaign that is now in force?

Miss Tolstoy. Well, I have here a report on the Soviet repatriation campaign, which I would like to leave here for the record.

Senator Welker. Very well; the report will be received and made

a part of the record.

(The report of the Tolstoy Foundation on Soviet Activity To Encourage Repatriation Among Russian Escapees was marked "Exhibit No. 272" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 272

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., European Headquarters, Munich, Germany.

SOVIET ACTIVITY TO ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION AMONG RUSSIAN ESCAPEES

On March 29, 1955, Radio East Berlin broadcast at 0200 hours in the morning that a group of Soviet citizens have requested in writing that the East German

Government allow them to form an organization and open an office in East Germany in the interest of counteracting any anti-Soviet propaganda and to provide facilities for patriotic Russians in the West to return to their homeland. The Associated Press had already reported on March 28, 1955, that the Russians were organizing a propaganda committee charged with the basic task of persuading Russian exiles in the West to return to the Soviet Union. It was disclosed by the East German news agency APM that this committee would be headed by Red army Maj. Gen. N. P. Michailov. Among the claimed members of the committee were to be the Ukrainian writer I. L. Muratov and a G. P. Krutey. The anti-Bolshevist Ukrainian Socialist Party in Munich stated that Krutey had probably been kidnaped by agents, according to the Associated Press release.

The initial manifestation of the activity of the East zone committee was a Russian language four-page newspaper entitled "For Return to the Home Country" which appeared initially in Germany, followed by appearances in Austria, France, and Belgium. Only in the middle of May did the newspaper

make an appearance, being mailed direct from Vienna, in Italy.

The psychological approach of this newspaper has been particularly effective on two important points: the newspaper is mailed as a private first-class letter from various offices in East Germany and in Vienna to the correct name and address of the Russian escapee. By its apparent form as a personal letter the uninitiated Russian escapee opens the letter to suddenly being confronted with this repatriation newspaper propaganda. It is of course most disconcerting to the escapee that his correct name and present address had been used by this committee. This carries into this propaganda field the basic belief which the Soviet regime fosters at every opportunity, i. e., that the Soviets are everywhere and know everything, that no men can ever escape their reach. The wave shock that swept the Russian escapee field can thus be understood.

On April 6, 1955, Tolstoy Foundation was contacted by an American journalist and later in the same day by a German newspaper reporter. Both of them wanted to know the truth about a case which they said had recently repatriated to Russia via the East Zone of Germany. Both reporters stated definitely that they were informed that this case came from the Tolstoy Foundation Karlsfeld Center and that more cases in the center were considering the same action. An immediate check on this story showed that the case referred to was one Sokolowsky who not only had never been in the TF Karlsfeld Center but was further never even registered with the Tolstoy Foundation. He and his wife had been resident in the new German housing project in Ludwigsfeld and had finally gone back

through East Germany.

The repatriation newspaper, issue No. 1 was followed approximately 2 weeks later by issue No. 2, and this in turn was followed 2 weeks later by issue No. 3. A sample of the type of article which appears in this newspaper is attached as

enclosure No. 1.

In Germany the initial concentration of activity was seen. Persons with new addresses as recently as 30 days before the first copy of the newspaper was published, received their copies at their new address. One of the first copies of the newspaper was mailed directly to the United States consulate general in Munich.¹ Unpleasant refugee camp conditions in various areas were commented upon, the situation being of recent date, such as in Ingolstadt. TF was approached by a tremendously increased number of persons who came forward for faster, more efficient migration services so that they could escape from what they felt to be a net that was closing about them. One case that returned to East Germany, that of a man named W. P. Wassilaki was well publicized in the second issue of the newspaper, completed with pictures of Wassilaki departing from East Germany for his home and the promise of an excellent job in the U. S. S. R.

At the beginning of May a few selected people began to receive letters addressed

At the beginning of May a few selected people began to receive letters addressed to them as though written from one friend to another in which the background of the person was mentioned and he was asked why he continued to live in impossible circumstances when he could return to Russia in his profession, be honored and well paid. One or two instances were reported of persons who received letters from relatives in which, because of some personal event that the escapee had knowledge of, were found to have been letters written 1, 2, or 3 years previously and apparently held until an appropriate time. Other sample instances have been reported of persons who have received current letters from close relatives.

¹ On June 14, 1955, an envelope containing No. 3 of this publication addressed to TF, Rockland County, N. Y., was received. Sender Magddeburg, H. Postamt, P-fach 163.

tives in East Germany or in the U.S.S.R. suggesting that they return. The entire approach appears to be that a general amnesty overall is not guaranteed but that the individual may have to pay minor penalty for his rashness in having come west but that after he had served a normal prison sentence, he will be able to pick up normal life in the U.S.S.R. once again.

With the mailing of the second issue of the newspaper, a small handbill was included in the actual native language or dialect of the person to whom it was

addressed, in Ukrainian for Ukrainians, for example.

It would be premature to state definitely the final reaction of this propaganda, which most probably has tremendous financial resources and certainly tremendous numbers of employees serving on its behalf. It would not be rash to consider the possibility that in the near future a transport probably of paid persons or persons under duress would be returning to the East Zone, complete with pictures, newspaper stories, etc., etc. It is most improbable, however, that this action or even the results of the newspapers will sway a substantial number of the Russian escapees from their genuine desire to relocate themselves in the west.

The entire problem in Austria was much more serious than that in Germany as the newspapers were delivered initially at the time that the entire group of refugees in Austria were in grave fear that they would be repatriated to their homelands if the Austrian state treaty were signed including the famous article No. 16. The near hysteria of the Russian group, when faced with the possibility of a repetition of the repatriation activities that took place in Lienz, Austria, at the conclusion of World War II was further increased by the arrival of the first copy of this newspaper. The mailing lists of the Austrian caseload were apparently not as complete as in Germany for in at least 2 camps in the Salzburg area the newspapers were delivered at night throughout the camp, including 1 copy

pushed beneath the door of the Orthodox bishop in Lager Parsch.

The Austrian police action, taken to avoid any possible incident during the formal signing of the treaty, resulted in further anxiety on the part of the Russian caseload. Two cases were reported where Russians were arrested and held without formal charges throughout the length of the weekend. added to the fear of the refugees with regard to the treatment which they could expect in Austria. To most of them Western Germany seemed the nearest and most practical immediate haven. Fortunately article 16 was eliminated from the state treaty and the Russian escapees relaxed only a tiny amount from their careful observation of the Austrian scene. During this period voluntary agencies including Tolstoy Foundation made the strongest possible recommendations in Europe and in the United States of America to the effect that a positive statement concerning the future of the refugees in Austria will be desirable. It is hoped that the USEP program for contact of the refugee in conjunction with the voluntary agency handling that case will prove of value in this regard. refugees will continue, however, to be highly nervous until some public positive approach is manifested. The psychology of the Russian escapees in Austria is of such acute antisovietism that it is not a question that any would consider return to their homeland except possibly for agents planted in the group.

BELGIUM

The repatriation activity in Belgium started before the formation of the "Homeland Committee" in the East Zone of Germany. As early as the fall of 1954 it was reported that some persons in Belgium were returning to the U. S. S. R. including some ill and homesick persons. Russians in Belgium were invited to parties, social gatherings and musical evenings at the Russian Embassy or in other locations with officials of the Russian Embassy as hosts. Special provision was made for the care of children and the emphasis was that the people could return to their homeland without fear of serious retribution. Persons selecting repatriation embarked on a Soviet ship at Antwerp and thus were sent straight back to the U. S. S. R. A tremendous amount of time, energy, and money has gone into this program of the Soviet Embassy in Belgium but to date only a tiny handful of persons have returned. The repatriation newspaper appeared in Belgium for the first time in the month of May.

The problem of the repatriation activity in France is increased by the number of Communist sympathizers in the various branches of the Federal bureaucracy. There seem also to be sufficient part-time workers on behalf of the repatriation

activity that the entire urban area of metropolitan Paris has been combed for the correct name and address of the Russian refugees, resulting again in the mailing of a newspaper with accurate name and address. It is estimated that between five to ten thousand copies of this newspaper have most probably been distributed in the city of Paris alone. Because of the wide scattering of the Russian caseload outside of Paris, it is not possible to estimate the completeness of the activity in rural France at this time.

ITALY AND TRIESTE

Up to the present date there is no record received that the newspaper has been sent into the remaining refugee camps in Trieste. The first copy of the newspaper reporting from Italy was a copy addressed to the Tolstoy Foundation in Rome on May 16, 1955. This newspaper was mailed from Vienna and it can be assumed that Russians in Italy either have or will be receiving copies of this

The overall effect of the newspaper is disturbing because of the individual basis on which the distribution has been based. The refugee problem in Western Europe is that complex and that large that it is not difficult for the newspaper to find material to include in its pages. The best possible answer is in the positive increasing numbers of Russians being migrated, amelioration of present difficult circumstances of living and a positive recognition of the problems facing the escapees so that the people themselves realize that they are neither neglected nor forgotten.

The newspaper itself represents only the serious activity, the far more serious implications are contained in the amount of money and the number of persons actively engaged in this program of repatriation. The initial shock of the newspaper can be and is being well exploited by this concerted effort which is so destructive to the basic tenants of the West and to the escapee who has sought refuge away from communism.

[Excerpts from the newspaper For Return to the Home Country, No. 2, April 1955]

REFUGEE BOSSES SELL DP'S TO AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE

THROW OFF RIDICULOUS FEARS!

The public speech of Mr. W. P. Wassilaki stressed the unfair work done by refugee bosses paid by American Intelligence among DP's. These political profiteers deal with their countrymen, being in a foreign country and in great need, shoving them to a disgraceful and disastrous track of espionage and sabotage against their home country, and preparing them to serve as cannon fodder for imperialistic adventurers.

The refugee bosses are not interested to let displaced persons return to their country, because they are receiving for them good money from Americans to be able to buy cars and country houses. We know that the majority of our countrymen still love their country and sincerely wish to return back. They tarry to return because they have been tangled with false information concerning the Soviet Union, falsehood about repressions awaiting refugees returning to their country.

Countrymen! throw off ridiculous fears, do not believe political profiteers making a fortune out of your sweat and blood! Break with them—and return to your country! This is the only thing to do if your human dignity, conscience are dear to you!

"AMERICAN COMMITTEE" RECRUITS SPIES AND SABOTEURS

The main reason impelling me to return to my country was: my personal contact with employees of the so-called American Committee for Liberation of Bolshevism. I had the opportunity to study closely their scope and practical realization of their work. It is perfectly clear to me that this organization is a governmental institution of the Department of State and that it follows in its practical activity and policy the lines and regulations prescribed by the American imperialism. Facts that prove it are: both chiefs of this committee, Kerk Stevens and Sergeant are official collaborators of the State Department of the United States. Hiring of the chairman and his deputy is also done by the State Department. During my conversation with them they told me that 99 percent of the total budget comes out of funds officially assigned by the American Gov-

ernment and Congress to undermine the work in democratic countries. In fact the committee carries out a campaign directed exclusively to exploit refugees in political and espionage adventures against U. S. S. R. and the democratic countries.

During recent years a great number of refugee organizations were created. The American committee tried several times to consolidate all of them and make them a dutyful and blind weapon for the realization of its policies.

In February 1955 the new chairman of this committee, Sergeant, stated that there will be no money spent any more on any activity of refugee organizations except financial aid given to practical work. By this practical work Mr. Sergeant means espionage, sabotage, terror, and also a political sabotage against U. S. S. R. and democratic countries.

One of the detachments of this American Intelligence Service camouflaged as "Institute for Culture" is administered by American Intelligence Service officers from Heidelberg, officially acting as American advisers (Balles and Alexander). Director of this installation is an emigrant Boris Jacovlev or Noreikis-Bereikis, or Troitzkiy. His real name is Normann, Nikolai. During World War II he was commander of a PW camp in Baltic States and was known as an unhuman person. His assistant, Djakov or Juriy Dikov, treated Soviet prisoners in an also unhuman way.

Miss Tolston. Then, also I can leave the questionnaire.

This is the case of Mr. Dunajew. This is a case that has been cleared by the American authorities, the case of Mr. Dunajew.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 273" and reads

as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 273

DUNAJEW, ANATOLIJ, 7 AUBURN STREET, PATERSON, N. J.

Anatolij Dunajew was born on May 26, 1926, in Krasnyj Lucz, Donbass, Russia. Until 1941 he was a high-school student in his own city, finishing seven classes. When the war started in 1941 he was mobilized and up to 1943 worked on trenches in a laborers' brigade. In the spring of 1943 the Germans occupied Kransnyj Lucz. In the winter of 1943 they began retreating, the whole town was evacuated, including Mr. Dunajew and his parents, at first to Melitopol (South of Russia) and then to Rumania. They had their own horses and carts for transportation. Anatolij and his parents were mobilized to dig trenches for Germans against the In May 1944, Anatolij was separated from his parents. All the Communists. young men were given a choice of joining either the German or the Vlassoff Army. As the Vlassoff troops were hard to reach, Mr. Dunajew joined the Russian Protection Corps (organized in Yugoslavia) and was promoted to sergeant. His service consisted in guarding the railroads in Yugoslavia. In January 1945, 30 young sergeants from the Corps were sent to an officers' school (Vlassoff's) in Muensingen, Germany. In April 1945 this school was transferred to Krumauk CSR. At that time the Soviet troops were approaching from one side, the United States troops from the other. The leaders of the school moved toward the United States troops. They gave themselves up to United States Army asking for protection. In May 1945, after the German capitulation, the Russians remained as POW's with the Americans. The first camp was at Landau, the next at Regensburg.

It was then that rumors started to spread that all Soviet citizens were to be repatriated by force to Soviet Russia. Anatolij was transferred to Plattling, where he changed his documents which stated that he was born in 1918 in Russia (and not in 1926), that his parents emigrated with him to Yugoslavia in 1930 and lived there ever since. Anatolij knew that if his parents were still in Soviet Rumania, they would certainly be sent to forced labor, perhaps even executed, as parents of a "criminal and deserter." He also knew that he would have to face death after having fought against communism, if forcefully repatriated to his homeland. The only way of saving his parents and himself was to change his documents.

In February 1946 his fears were confirmed, as almost all officers of the Vlassoff's Army (there were about 3,000 of them in Plattling camp) were repatriated by force. The fate of these people is well known—they were sent to forced labor or executed.

In May 1946 Mr. Dunajew was discharged from the POW's camp, went to Goebingen near Stuttgart (Wuerttemberg, Germany) and started working there with United States Army as a driver. He lived in Uingen from where he commuted by train to the Army club where he was working. In December 1946 he was returning from work by train at 10:30 p.m. There were a few American soldiers in the same car, and two Russian girls who were returning from their work with Anatolij. The GI's had been drinking and one of them started to embrace one of the girls. She protested, and in order to get rid of him said that Anatolij was her husband. The two girls got off at the next stop, and Anatolij went on further. At that time the trains were not lighted, it was dark. Anatolij suddenly saw one of the GI's quite close to him; something shiny flashed before his eyes, he was hit on the head, and passed out (he still has the scar). Anatolij regained consciousness, he found himself lying across the rails; the GI's had thrown him out of the train while it was in motion. Anatolij tried to get up, but could not, his leg had been cut off. The railroad employees found him near the tracks and took him to the hospital in Goebingen.

The whole case was immediately recorded by United States authorities (the

documents are in claims' office headquarters, Frankfurt).

He stayed in the hospital until the spring of 1947 and returned to his old apartment. He had no money for an artificial leg, he could not work and lived on what his friends were able to get for him.

In the spring of 1948 he received 50,000 reichsmarks as a lump sum from the Army. This was 2 months before the currency reform in Germany, and the devaluation of the reichsmark, so that what he received amounted to only 5,000 deutschemarks. After he got an artificial leg, Anatolij started to work again.

In 1951 Anatolij was informed by a friend that he had read in a newspaper that his parents, Foma and Barbara Dunajew, were trying to locate their son, Anatolij. He immediately wrote to Novoye Russkoe Slovo in New York that he was the searchee, and a week later he got a cable from his parents. They were already living in New York City, brought over by the Tolstoy Foundation. He wrote to his parents about his situation, and in answer received an advice from them advising their son to tell only the truth to the American authorities concerning his birthdate and his residence in Soviet Russia. But he was afraid that he would never be admitted to the United States of America and would never again see his parents if he followed their advice; so he decided to wait until he arrived in the United States.

He applied for immigration to United States of America through Church World Service in Ludwigsburg, and came to the United States of America spon-

sored by them on January 31, 1952.

Three weeks after his arrival (he lived with his parents in Brooklyn, Snedicker Avenue, 339) he started to work for Horo-Light Manufacturing Co. as a welder, and stayed with them until the whole family moved to Paterson, N. J., in January 1953. From January to May 1953 he was working with the Engineering Tool Corp., in Singac near Paterson. In June he started to work with Chambers Manufacturing Co. at 50–54 Hamilton Avenue in Paterson as die and tool maker, a job he is holding now, also working as a foreman in the evenings with a part-time group of mechanics.

Dunajew came to the Tolstoy Foundation Office last week. He was very

disturbed.

"I had to tell the American authorities the whole truth," he concluded. "We were forced to lie in Soviet Russia all the time to save our lives; again we lied in Germany, but now I cannot lie any longer. I want to have a clear conscience—to have a right to be happy, to laugh. I have bought a car, I want to enjoy it. But I cannot, and yet I have not done anything bad. Believe me when I went to the immigration authorities and told them everything, it was as if a heavy load was lifted from my soul * * * Happen what may * * *" The man had tears in his eyes.

He contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service in August 1952. He confessed that he had falsified part of his documents, told them the whole truth

and explained the reason for having concealed it.

In February 1954 Anatolij married a Russian girl, Vera Riasnyansky.

After interrogation of Anatolij and his parents by Immigration and Naturalization Service in the early part of March 1954 Anatolij was called with his father once more to Immigration and Naturalization Service (New York City) and was handed a request for him to appear at Ellis Island on March 31, 1954, where was to see Mr. D. Floyd of the Immigration Service.

Miss Tolston. And this is my letter to Mr. Brownell.

(The letter of September 27, 1954, from Alexandra Tolstoy, president of Tolstoy Foundation, to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., was marked "Exhibit No. 274" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 274

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., New York, N. Y., September 27, 1954.

Re Beresov, Rodion, 312 South Boyle Avenue, Los Angeles 33, Calif.

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Washington, D. C.

Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Dear Mr. Brownell: The Russian daily, Novoye Russkoye Slovo, has just informed me about the case of Mr. Rodion Beresov, alias Rodion Akulshin.

Rodion Beresov came to this country 5 years ago. Soon after his arrival he got a job as one of the teachers of Russian in the Monterey Military Language School. But after some time in the United States Mr. Beresov-Akulshin felt that he could not conceal his true name, Akulshin, and while filling out the questionnaire for the Monterey school he gave the true facts about himself: that he came to Europe in 1944, and not in 1937 as he had stated; he gave his real place of birth and his name—facts which he concealed because of fear of repatriation. As a result, Mr. Beresov not only lost his job but there immediately arose the question of his deportation. A special bill S. 432 was not passed by the Congress, and on the 24th of September Beresov-Akulshin received an order, as I understand, from the San Francisco immigration authorities, to leave the country within 15 days. In case Mr. Beresov does not leave, he will be imprisoned for 2 years and will have to pay \$1,000 fine.

I want to inform you that the Beresov case is known to all the Americans and immigrants of Russian origin from the west coast to the east, as all the Russian newspapers gave it a great deal of publicity. There is even an expression that has been launched by the newspapers—"The Beresov disease." I am positive that in case of Beresov's deportation all the Russian newspapers will again start writing about the case which will be very unfortunate for several reasons:

1. It will certainly not help our escapee program;

2. It will interfere with the desire of all those who are sick with the "Beresov disease" and have concealed their place of birth and sometimes their names because of fear of repatriation, to state the whole truth before becoming American citizens.

3. It will play into the hands of the Soviets, and they might use the "Beresov disease" as means of propaganda against the United States of America.

This is why, dear Mr. Brownell, I am appealing to you with a request of postponing the deportation of Mr. Beresov-Akulshin until the question of those who came under false documents will be solved in its entirety.

Beresov-Akulshin is an average person, he is a writer, a poet. He is honest and I think there is no doubt that he is an anti-Communist and never was a Soviet

But unfortunately, Beresov and his "disease" have become symbols, representing a certain group of Soviet escapees, and this is the main reason why this case has to be treated from the political angle with the greatest care.

I would, dear Mr. Brownell, be very grateful to you if you could inform me at your earliest convenience what your decision is going to be on this most delicate case.

Very truly yours,

ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY, President.

Miss Tolston. Now, mostly, the Repatriation Committee approaches people in Europe.

Mr. Morris. The people who are conducting the Soviet repatriation

campaign?

Miss Tolstoy. That is right.

Now, as I say, the Repatriation Committee approaches those people through newspapers here, mostly, and through maybe agents that are camouflaged. We don't know that they are agents of the Soviet, but it seems like they are too clever to approach those people as real agents of the Soviet, to come to the open.

Senator Welker. Any further questions, counsel?

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions, Senator. But I would like to await the responses that Miss Tolstoy will receive from the 3,500 questionnaires that have gone out.

Miss Tolstov. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Morris?

Mr. Morris. Yes, Miss Tolstoy.

Miss Tolstoy. Senator, I think if a sort of a questionnaire would be printed in the Russian newspapers by the committee, and a certain guaranty would be given to those people, I think you would get thousands of people who would respond to that questionnaire.

Senator Welker. I assure you, madam, the committee's staff will

make a study of that proposal.

To sum up your testimony this morning, madam, may I say that this is perhaps the conclusion of the acting chairman: That you had numerous cases wherein you know of your own knowledge, or of your committee's knowledge, the people who came to the free world, escapees, refugees, from the tyranny of the Communists, using forged passport papers or visas, and have now been threatened by agents, or someone working for and in behalf of the Communist government, threatening them with deportation back to the land where they will face sudden death, or at least a trip to the Soviet labor camps in Siberia, or otherwise. Is that about a correct conclusion of your testimony this morning?

Miss Tolstor. That is right, sir.

Senator Welker. Do you have anything more to add, madam?

Miss Tolstoy. No, Senator.

The only thing I want to add is that as soon as the questionnaire, as was suggested by Mr. Morris here, as soon as I have more answers to that questionnaire, I will have more information for this committee.

Mr. Morris. And there will be investigation on the question: Have you been approached by anybody who seems to you to be a Soviet

agent, or you have reason to believe is a Soviet agent.

Miss Tolstoy. That is the question?

Mr. Morris. Yes; that is included in the questionnaire?

Miss Tolstoy. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Miss Tolstoy.

Senator Welker. Thank you very much. We are happy to have had you before the committee.

The committee will now adjourn.

Mr. Morris. We meet again on Friday.

(Whereupon, at 10:50 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene on Friday, May 25, 1956.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1956

United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws,
of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner, presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, reseach director.

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Gen. Alexander Barmine.

Mr. Chairman, the subject of the testimony this morning will be the situation that exists, the situation that has been described as a bad security situation in the United States by virtue of the fact that there are an unestimated number of people living here on false papers. And the mere fact that they are here with false names, and have given false states of birth, according to the evidence so far, poses a security problem for the United States.

That is as a result of the forced repatriation under the Yalta

agreement.

Senator Jenner. Will you be sworn?

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BARMINE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER BARMINE, ARLINGTON, VA.

Mr. Morris. Would you give your name and address to the reporter?
Mr. Barmine. Alexander Barmine, 1013 South 18th Street, Arlington, Va.

35. 34

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Alexander Barmine is here this morning in his private individual capacity, and he is going to give general testimony on the general subject.

Senator Jenner. Proceed.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Barmine, are you acquainted with the situation which has been described as Berezov's disease?

Mr. Barmine. Yes; I am. In my free time after work I have contacts with Soviet displaced persons, with Russian emigree organizations. I met many of them on my trip to the countries of Europe, and I personally came in contact with many cases identical to the cases you are going to hear of people living under false papers and identities, living in fear and terror of being deported and executed. I think this is a very important problem which deserves the atten-

tion of the Senate Internal Security Committee.

Mr. Morris. Before beginning, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put into the record the biographical sketch of Mr. Barmine. As he has testified before the committee, his background is that he was a brigadier general in the Red army, and has been in the United States since what year, now?

Mr. Barmine. 1940.

Senator Jenner. It may become a part of the official record of this committee.

(The biographical sketch of Alexander Barmine was marked "Exhibit No. 275" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 275

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ALEXANDER G. BARMINE, CHIEF, RUSSIAN BRANCH

Born: August 16, 1899, Mohileff, Russia. Naturalized United States citizen July 15, 1945.

Education:

Kiev, state gymnasium (high school and junior college), 9 years.

Kiev, St. Vladimir University, 1 year. Minsk, Infantry Officers' School, 8 months. Moscow, Frunze General Staff College, 3 years. Moscow, Oriental Languages Institute, 3 years.

Employment:

1919-35: From private to brigadier general, Russian Army, (active duty and reserve).

1921: Military attaché, consul general, Russian Legation, Bokhara.

1923-25: Consul general, Russian Embassy, Persia.

1925-28: Director-general manager, International Book Corp., Moscow.

1929-30: Director-general, Russian trade delegation, Paris. 1931-32: Director-general, Russian trade delegation, Italy.

1932-33: First vice president, Machine Tool Import Corp., Moscow.

1934-35: President, Automoto Export Corp., Moscow. 1936-37: Charge d'Affaires, Russian Legation, Athens.

1937–39: With Air France Co., Paris. 1941–42: National Broadcasting Corp., New York.

1942-43: United States Army.

1943-44: Office of Strategic Services.

1944-46: Readers' Digest.

1948 (Oct.): State Department. Voice of America.

Languages (foreign): Russian, French, Italian, Persian, Ukrainian, Polish.

Books and articles:

Russia: Articles in Russian newspapers and magazines.

Europe:

Book, Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat.

Articles in French, Belgian, Dutch, Scandinavian press.

U. S. A.:

Editorial advisory work for Readers' Digest, Harper & Bros., Life, etc.

Articles in New York Times, Harper's, Readers' Digest, Saturday Evening Post, Catholic Digest, New Leader, Aviation; also in newspapers in United States of America and Canada through NANA, Overseas Press Agency, INS., etc.

Book, One Who Survived, published in 23 languages.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Barmine, will you relate to us some of your own experiences? You say on the basis of hundreds—is that the term you used?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Hundreds of incidents and experiences, you feel that you can give some testimony on this subject?

Mr. Barmine. Yes. I think it is relevant to the situation to explain also how this problem came to exist.

Mr. Morris. Please tell us about that.

Mr. Barmine. I would say that this is a concern of mine as an American citizen of Russian descent, and of many other of my compatriots, primarily on the humanitarian ground, because these people are forced into this situation, and they should receive justice and be able to straighten out the situation.

I would say that it was an unfortunate situation when in the press you have the mention of this affair. The press is saying that there are thousands of people hiding under false papers and false identities.

So, naturally, the question rises why they did it. Did they commit some crime; have they some shady past? Why do they find them-

selves in this situation at this time?

You know that in some kinds of simplification, when the press speaks about the activities of the Communist clique, or their deeds and policies, it often mentioned—they mention and use the term "Russians." And I would like to state in the beginning that we should not confuse the activities of these cliques with the Russian people as such, because the Russian people are the biggest and first victims of the Communist tyranny.

The result of this, what we have now, is that soon after the war in 1945, when the war ended, you had in Germany and the theater of

war several million former Soviet citizens who were there.

I would like to give the committee some definition of what kind of

people were there, and how they got there.

You had about four and a half million prisoners of war who were taken by the Germans during their aggression, rounded up and sent

back to Germany.

This was particularly tragic, because the Soviet Government refused to acknowledge its interest in the fate of any of those prisoners. They didn't care about the fact that the Geneva convention applied The result was that about 3 millions perished from starvation and disease in concentration camps, in the camps of prisoners of war in Germany.

What was the attitude of the Soviet Government about it? quote you the order of the day by Generalissimo Stalin, who mentioned in his order of the day No. 260—he said that those who were taken

prisoner of war are traitors to their country.

And Molotov in one of his statements said: "We don't have prisoners

of war; we only have deserters."

So these people who survived knew what they could expect when Germany was occupied. If they came back then what they could expect was Siberia. And many of them didn't want to return.

The second group which was there were the people taken by the Germans forcibly as slave labor to Germany, against their own will And there were hundreds of thousands of those. They were warned. too, even in some cases by the Soviet repatriation officers, that if

they went back they should not expect to join their families, and also that they would be sent to far parts of Russia for forced labor.

Mr. Morris. How many were there in the first category?

Mr. Barmine. In the prisoners of war?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Barmine. There were about a million and something that were left alive. And of course they were repatriated, partly by force, but many of these succeeded in escaping.

Mr. Morris. The ones that were repatriated by force were the ones which by the terms of the Yalta agreement were sent back to the Soviet

Union?

Mr. Barmine. Yes, the prisoners of war.

Mr. Morris. And in the second category, you say there were hun-

dreds of thousands, is that it, the forced labor group?

Mr. Barmine. The forced laborers that were taken by Germans in Russian territory and sent to Germany. There were also many thou-

sands of them left that didn't want to go back.

There was also a sizable group of people who retreated with the Germans. They knew that the German cause was lost, but they didn't want to change Nazi tyranny for Soviet tyranny again, and they went with the German troops, trying to break through to the Ameri-

can occupation zone, to the free zone

And finally there were the active troops, the Red army that occupied Germany. They were surprised that the state of Germany was not what they were told, the level of life and conditions were so different. They were also disillusioned that the promises that the Soviet Government gave them during the war, of various freedoms, were not fulfilled; and some of them defected, and remained in Germany.

Those who remained chose freedom; they hoped to remain in the free world; they were anti-Communist. And the effort of the Soviet

Government was directed to getting them back.

The Soviet Government was successful in getting back most of them, but many of them remained in order to escape forced repatriation under the agreement which provided that everybody who left the Soviet Union after September 1, 1939, and who was born in the Soviet Union, would be forcibly repatriated.

Mr. Morris. Anyone who left after September 1939?

Mr. Barmine. Anyone that was in the Soviet Union before the first of September 1939, was to be forcibly repatriated.

Mr. Morris. Under the terms of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. Barmine. Yes. Here was the beginning of the problem. They knew that the government could send them to concentration camps in Siberia. They tried to avoid it by trying not to be in this category.

They had to change their names, the place of their birth, the date of their leaving the Soviet Union. In that way, they could avoid the demand by the Soviet Repatriation Commission that they be

deported.

In this action they also had the sympathetic support of many American officers and the members of the military government—of course, not all of them.

I would say IRO and UNRRA were infiltrated by some people that But at the same were trying to help the Soviets to get them back.

time the remaining Americans realized the difficulty.

Now, during 1945 and 1946 we have cases of forced repatriation from many camps, you have the cases of repatriation of thousands and thousands from Kempten, from Dachau, and in Marbourg there were 200 people brought from the United States.

Mr. Morris. What was that?

Mr. Barmine. The camp in Marbourg.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that? Mr. Barmine. M-a-r-b-o-u-r-g.

And, finally, in Lienz, in the British Zone. This repatriation was connected with the terrible tragedy when people were killing themselves, locking themselves in and burning the houses where they were, jumping from trains, killing themselves by jumping from viaducts. I will give you an example. In Plattling, Germany, in 1946, out of

250 people who had to be repatriated on a certain day, 14 were killed,

21 seriously injured, and 100 slightly wounded.

More or less, about 2 million people were repatriated by force, but several hundred thousand escaped by hiding, by changing their names and identities, some of them with the help of those Americans who realized the situation. But not all of them did.

I will quote you the statement of one of the Russian captains.

Mr. Morris. This is a statement of a Russian captain?

Mr. Barmine. Of a Russian captain—I would give his initials as M. B. He spoke to a young American second lieutenant. The second lieutenant said, "I don't understand why Russians don't want to return."

The captain answered him, "Because they can expect to be sent to

the gallows or before the firing squad or to the camps in Siberia."

The second lieutenant answered, "This is impossible. I think you are exaggerating. The country needs you for the reconstruction work. And if you don't like the conditions there, in the next election you cannot reelect Stalin any more."

So this basis of naivete and lack of understanding brought these

tragic cases of forced repatriation.

Mr. Morris. How many people were forcibly repatriated? Mr. Barmine. As I said, about 2 million people were forcibly re-

patriated in the years 1945-47.

Now, this was the condition in which they came in the United States under false identities, and I consider the number higher than Countess Tolstoy mentioned Wednesday. I think we have at least 30,000 or more of such cases.

Mr. Morris. You say at least 30,000?

Mr. Barmine. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you base that on estimates on your own experi-

ences as you described today?

Mr. Barmine. Yes. I met hundreds of them who are living in fear and agony, who are afraid of loss of citizenship, who are afraid to use their ability and knowledge and their talent and what they know, because they think they will be deported and executed.

And the point I want to make is to make clear that these people are honorable and freedom-loving people, and decent, and they could be useful citizens, if we provide them with the possibility of coming out

clean and straightening out their affairs.

They could be useful, for instance, in telling the American people of their experience under Communist tyranny. Now they are afraid to do so.

Mr. Morris. Are there any former NKVD people there who might

give intelligence material?

Mr. BARMINE. I am sure of one thing: Among them are many Soviet Army officers who could give valuable intelligence material, and engineers and scientists who could provide us with information and give help. And also, as I say, these people, were they not in this condition of fear, could be valuable American citizens who could help here to expose the Communist propaganda which is spread among minority groups at the instance of the American Communists, or the international Communists.

I will cite you a case which is known to me as having happened in Chicago. One of these people, in the course of his job, had to join one of the fraternal organizations which was dominated by a leftist pro-Soviet group. In one of the meetings of this organization the people who never were in Russia and knew nothing about it praised the Russian regime. This man could not understand it, and he walked up on the stage and told them the truth. He said, "I was in the Soviet

Union, I lived there, and this is the way it really is."

But according to his papers he wasn't a Russian; on his papers he was, I think, a Pole. And 3 days later he was denounced and the immigration authorities brought him in for arrest and deportation.

Of course, there are many cases where they keep silent and do not say anything, because they might be subject to this, and because of

that we are losing their valuable assistance.

Now, we have the security angle. They have children. The children grow. Some are taken into the United States Armed Forces, some of them might be taken into factories where they make secret products. These children are growing up in the same fear, feeling the same instability of this abnormal situation. There is a potential reservoir for blackmail by Soviet agents. And we hear about cases where already, despite the fact that they are here as Poles, Esthonians, and Latvians, they are receiving the Russian newspaper of General Mikhailov's committee. And the Soviets are letting them know that they know who they are, letting them know that they know where they are. And this is a preliminary statement for possible blackmail, to include them in their blackmail and espionage schemes.

Also, I know many cases, for instance, in my own work, where we have talented writers, propagandists, artists, which we could use. I approached dozens of them, and they were under dire conditions, they had no jobs, but they wouldn't have lied for a job. They didn't offer their services, valuable services that our Government needs, because there is a problem of clearance. They don't want to tell a lie again, and therefore, they prefer to stay where they are, not using their abilities, because then the question of false identity would come up,

and then they might be faced with deportation.

I want to bring to your attention that this situation was acknowledged by President Eisenhower in his message to the Congress of February 8, when he considered the plight of these people. And he

mentioned in his text that a large group of refugees in this country are obtaining visas by the use of false identities in order to escape forcible deportation behind the Iron Curtain.

He said:

The number is in the thousands. Under existing laws that is ground for deportation. The law should be amended to give relief to these unfortunates.

Now, the other things that I want to state. Recently the immigration top officials and executives and many immigration inspectors and investigators were rather sympathetic, understanding, and helpful in these cases; they were lenient. And there were cases that had dragged for years, such as the case of the former Russian writer, Rodon Akulshin, who came under the name of Berezov with a Polish birth certificate, and who, having this thing on his conscience, came out to clear himself.

Now, his case came up for deportation, and it has already been

dragging for 5 years. He was not deported, however.

There are other cases, too. But also, in some places you have individuals in the immigration office, particularly in New York—and I had occasion to meet with some of the victims of the situation—who certainly show an unusual zeal in hounding these people, and putting them under deportation procedures.

But fortunately, up to now there have been no actual deportations in recent cases. And I hope that—of course, I can understand that immigration officials are bound by the law, they have to carry it out, and they probably would be very much relieved also, if this situation

could be straightened out.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I say for the record that General Swing, the Immigration Commissioner, assured us yesterday that he was not actually deporting any of these people, that even though the law requires that, that he is not following the law and exercising some

discretion and restraint in that connection.

Mr. Barmine. Well, the recent activity in connection with the Tuapse sailors, and several cases that have come to our attention from the immigration officials, show that the Soviet authorities are beginning to tap this reservoir of potential agents and blackmail them. We have cases which are very difficult to bring in, because people who are subjected to this are so afraid, knowing that they are in trouble with the American law. And now, being approached by the Soviet agents, they try, instead of coming to the FBI, they try to disappear. They are hiding, they are changing their names and their work, and then we lose trace of them.

I think that the Soviet agents will be able to find them.

Mr. Morris. General Barmine, Countess Tolstoy testified the day before yesterday and said that these people request not to be deported because the Soviet Union will not take them. Does that solve

our problem?

Mr. Barmine. Well, here is the situation, of course. Legally they can be deported to the country where they came from, or the country of their origin. Some of them the Soviet agents think would have interesting possibilities in connection with work in the army or in a factory. The Soviets would not be interested in making them defect; they would like them to stay here, because they could blackmail them here and force them to work for them. But as to the mass of these

people, we must face the possibility that tomorrow the Soviet will declare that they accept all of them and and declare amnesty, and therefore, according to the letter of the law, these people could be deported to the Soviet Union, and certainly will meet severe reprisals instead of remaining, as was their hope and dream, in a free country and living here as American citizens.

Mr. Morris. It is very likely, is it not, that in view of the Soviet repatriation campaign that is being undertaken that they might just

take that attitude?

Mr. Barmine. It is very possible they would take it, as to some of But those that could be valuable agents here, and whom they can blackmail, they might refuse to accept.

Mr. Morris. That covers the point, does it not, General Barmine?

Senator Jenner. Thank you very much, General Barmine.

The next witness is Sergei Szeiko.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

(The witness indicated assent.)

Mr. Morris. Will the interpreter come forward, please?

Senator Jenner. Will the interpreter be sworn.

Do you swear that the questions put to the witness will be properly interpreted by you and properly translated into true facts before this committee this morning?

The Interpreter. Yes, I do.

TESTIMONY OF SERGEI SZEIKO, AS TRANSLATED BY JULIA MANSVETOV

The Interpreter. He was born in 1918 in the city of Smolensk, in the Kiev region in Russia.

Senator Jenner. Ask the witness if he understood the oath just

administered to him.

The Interpreter. Yes, he did Mr. Morris. What is your name? The Interpreter. Sergei Szeiko.

Mr. Morris. His first name is Sergei?

The Interpreter. S-e-r-g-e-i.

Mr. Morris. And where do you reside? The Interpreter. In New York. Mr. Morris. Where were you born?

The Interpreter. He was born in 1918 in the city of Smolensk, in

the Kiev Region, in Russia.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us briefly of your experiences in the Soviet Union?

The Interpreter. In 1935, in the city of Smolensk, he finished high school. After his graduation from high school, he entered the University at Kiev. But, in the university, the War Ministry drafted him to—they took him into the tank school to learn tactics. In 1938 he was drafted as an officer of the Red army in the tank forces.

In 1941 his division took part in a battle with the Germans in west Prussia, and he became a prisoner of war. And in 1941–42 he was in the prisoner of war camp. In 1943, he worked in the forests of Bohemia. And in 1943 he voluntarily joined General Vlassov's army, and till the end of the war he served in General Vlassov's army.

In 1945 he landed in prison camp. He was up against a situation where he would have to go back to the Soviet Union. He escaped from the camp August 15, 1945. And his good friends, American Army people, helped him write documents.

Mr. Morris. Helped him write his document?

The Interpreter. Yes, helped him write his documents.

And in this document he hid the fact that he was born in Russia, and wrote that he had been born in Poland.

Mr. Morris. And you say that friendly Americans, or the military

personnel, helped him prepare these papers?

The Interpreter. That is right.

Mr. Morris. So that he would not have to be forcibly returned to the Soviet Union?

The Interpreter. That is right.

In the fall of 1945, he went to Munich. But in Munich the Repatriation Commission, the Soviet Repatriation Commission, was very active, and he decided to flee to northern Germany in order to escape them. And in June of 1946 he ran away to a small village in northern Germany.

In 1947, his American friends again helped him to escape to the said, "When you get to the United States, everything will straighten out."

He came to the United States and established himself, got a good job. But he cannot apply for citizenship. His children are Americans, and in some way he has to open a way for his children to live honestly in

He said he can't go through life lying. He hasn't committed any crime. His wife is the daughter of an old emigre someone who has

been here long ago.

She was advised to apply for citizenship. Two weeks after she applied for her citizenship papers they were both called into the immigration officials. The immigration officials indicted him and told him that they knew.

The indictment was, first, that he hid his place of birth.

Mr. Morris. You mean the immigration officials knew that he had false documents?

The Interpreter. Yes. And he hid his entire past, that he had been in the Red army, that he had hidden where he had been educated, and so on. His case began, and now has dragged out for 2 years. In January of this year he was arrested by the immigration officials in New York, and they demanded \$2,500 bond. An officer in the American Army helped him raise the bond. In February his hearing began. Yesterday was the first session of this hearing. At this hearing his 10-year-old son, who was not born in America, was also present. He is also to blame.

Mr. Morris. I didn't get that.

The Interpreter. I don't know whether that is his personal state-

(The interpreter spoke in Russian to the witness.) The Interpreter. He is also at fault, the 10-year-old. Senator Jenner. The 10-year-old boy was not born in this country? The Interpreter. Not born in this country, no.

Mr. Morris. Why do you say he is at fault?

The Interpreter. He received a Polish visa, you see, through the papers which Major Szeiko had. The officials in Philadelphia were extremely cordial to him when his case first started.

And also in spite of the extremely cordial attitude of the judge who is hearing this case, he feels that he is being blamed for things of which

he is not guilty.

The situation is very difficult. He earns \$70 a week. He has to pay lawyers \$1,500 in this case. He borrowed the money from three banks which he has to repay. The family of his wife is helping him, and that is saving him from complete disaster.

He would like to enter into American life honestly, and he would like the honorable Senator to sympathize with his case and to know

about it

Mr. Morris. Major, have you been approached by any Soviet agents? The Interpreter. He personally has not, but his friends have been. Mr. Morris. Now, without disclosing the identities of your friends,

would you tell us about these approaches? Give us a concrete case

without disclosing the identity.

The Interpreter. In New York there was a former Soviet chemist. He came to the United States as a citizen of one of the satellite countries. He received his American citizenship this year through those papers. He is now receiving papers and other communications from the Repatriation Committee in Berlin. He went to the post office and said he did not wish to receive that kind of mail. The post office people told him to sign a paper that he refuses to receive this mail. He said he cannot sign this paper, because that would reflect on his family, which is still living behind the Iron Curtain.

So the only recourse left to him, he feels, is to flee from New York to someplace where he will not be found in America. That is one

example.

Mr. Morris. Before getting away from that, did he receive these

papers in his assumed name or in his correct name?

The Interpreter. They send it to him in the name which he had in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Even though he has dropped that name completely? The Interpreter. Even though his name is different on his documents.

Mr. Morris. Senator, in connection with that particular case, you see, as counsel to the committee, I cannot very well ask this man to come in and testify about the episodes, because, in so doing, he would be putting into the formal record facts which could cause a warrant of deportation to be served against him.

Senator Jenner. Any other examples?

The Interpreter. He said that many people received newspapers of General Mikhailov, but they are afraid to come forward and say that they are receiving them. He says he knows of it, but he cannot speak concretely about it.

Senator Jenner. Cannot what?

The Interpreter. Cannot give concrete examples of it.

Mr. Morris. You were before the immigration authorities yesterday; were you not?

The Interpreter. Yes; he was.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that? The Interpreter. This is the fourth session. Mr. Morris. How long did this session last?

The Interpreter. Eight hours. Mr. Morris. Tell us about it.

The Interpreter. The preceding sessions, two sessions, were exam-

inations and interrogations by Government prosecutors.

Yesterday was the cross-examination by his own defense counsel. He said the Government, or the prosecutor, didn't give him a chance to answer questions, but states objections at every question, so that they cannot be answered. The only thing he can answer is "Yes" and "No."

But the questions are so stated that it isn't possible to answer them by "Yes" or "No." He says that this gives the impression that he is really a criminal of some sort, whereas all he did was change the place of his birth.

He said the situation is softened somewhat by the cordial attitude

of the judge.

He said that is all he can tell you.

Mr. Morris. I think, Senator, that is all the questions I have to ask of this particular witness.

Senator Jenner. If there are no further questions, we want to thank

you for appearing here.

And thank you, Miss Interpreter.

Major Berezov.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Berezov. I do.

Senator Jenner. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF RODON BEREZOV, AS TRANSLATED BY JULIA MANSVETOV

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter. The Interpreter. His name is Rodon Berezov, but his real name is Rodon Akulshin.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell your real name?

The Interpreter. A-k-u-l-s-h-i-n.

Mr. Morris. And what is your first name? The Interpreter. Rodon, R-o-d-o-n.

Mr. Morris. The Rodon he has kept in both cases?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you are now known as Mr. Berezov? The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this witness is the witness for whom the situation that we have been describing as Berezov's disease was named. Where were you born?

The Interpreter. He was born in the village of Bilovatova.

Mr. Morris. And will you tell us about your life in the Soviet Union, briefly?

The Interpreter. In 1915, he finished teachers' college. For 10 years he was a village teacher. In 1925 he went to Moscow and started to write stories and poetry, and wrote almost 20 books. And he traveled around the country and gave lectures, and had literary evenings.

In 1941 he was drafted into the army. After 3 months he became a prisoner of war. In this camp there were over 70,000 prisoners. Life there was extremely difficult. There was hunger and cold and freezing. At first 200 people a day died, then 300, 400, and it went up

to 600 people a day.

There was a German-Russian there who tried at least to save the intellectuals and the intelligentsia, and tried to make life a little easier for them. The witness received his freedom from the camp and went to the city of Smolensk. There was a Russian newspaper there. There he changed his name to Berezov, and there he wrote a great deal about how people lived under Stalin and the Bolsheviks.

Mr. Morris. Why did you change your name?

The Interpreter. Because he had a family and relatives in the Soviet Union, and he knew if he used his own name that they would suffer for it.

When the Germans retreated he went with them to Germany. In March of 1945 he found himself in Salzburg, and a month after that, camps were organized there for displaced persons. He was in that

camp.

There were 2,500 Russians there, old emigres and recent emigres. All the new emigres did not call themselves Russian. They thought up other different nationalities for themselves. Organization IRO was functioning. They offered these emigres, proposed that they fill out papers. And then all the Russians started to think up legendary names and places where they were born. And he made up his own legend. On those papers he wrote that he had been born in Poland and, during the first war, he fled to the Volga, and that in 1937 he had fled back to Poland.

Into this camp came the Repatriation Commission of the Russians, 2 members of the NKVD, 2 Americans, and he was called before them and interrogated for 20 minutes.

Two weeks later the Soviet officials called him again. And they wanted to take him back to the Soviet Union.

The third time, only the Americans were there.

The fourth time, when he was supposed to be called, before he could get there he ran away from the camp.

In November 1948 he came back to the camp.

And in July 1949 he came to the United States. He was overjoyed to come to New York; what a wonderful place it was. He worked as an ironer and presser. And he got \$32 a week, but he was very happy.

After 3 months he was assigned to teach Russian in the Monterey School in California. And when he came to Monterey his conscience began to bother him. He thought that America was such a fine country, and it did so much for Russians in this country, that he was deceiving America.

Three days after he got there he decided to tell the truth there about

his papers, and so on. The chief of the school there fired him.

One of the colonels said that it was a good thing that he had told the truth. His documents and all papers were handed over to the

immigration officials in San Francisco.

When he was called to the immigration office at San Francisco, one of the officials said, "Of course, the truth is a good thing, and the truth is the basis of religion, and the truth is written about a lot in books and poems, but truth causes a lot of disturbance with people, and the fact that you told the truth means that you have built up a lot of difficulties for us, and we are going to have a tough time." "This case is going to drag out for years," they said.

He answered, he said, "Yes, but now I have a clear conscience."

In May of 1951 an immigration officer came to his apartment and said that, "You are under arrest, but if you have \$1,500 you can pay it and ${f I}$ will leave you here."

Mr. Berezov said, "No, I don't have it." And the immigration offi-

cial said, "Well, you will have to come with me."

And they took him to the immigration prison, detention house, took fingerprints and profiles of full face. And they led him into a room and locked the door. The prison room was on the 13th floor—a beautiful view, he was overjoyed. And he said to himself, "Well, good, I am going to rest here." The food was good, just like the sanitorium. But unfortunately, 2 days later his friends came to bail him out, and said, "What is the matter, you don't look very happy."

He said, he was quite happy, he was awfully sorry, he just couldn't

learn the way of life in prison.

In October of 1951 his trial began. He engaged a lawyer and witnesses. The judge said, "I understand that you have told a lie to save yourself, but just the same you told lies." And they decided they were going to deport him.

He filed a petition, appeal. The appeal was rejected. He appealed to a Princeton professor, whose friend was Senator Smith. And Senator Smith proposed a bill, a special bill. The bill was not passed.

In October of 1954 he got another paper for deportation. He said it didn't bother him too much. He said, "For a writer, everything is interesting."

Nevertheless, he wrote a farewell to America, and thanked America,

even if she was deporting him, still he loved America.

His papers came to Washington, and every month he appears at the immigration office. And that has been going on for 6 years. He can't even hope for citizenship during this time, of course. And his only thought is when we will hold this hearing. And he would like it to end as quickly as possible.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have here an excerpt from an article

that Mr. Berezov has written.

Senator Jenner. I have read this article, and I would like to make this a part of the record.

(The article by Mr. Berezov was marked "Exhibit 276" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 276

OF REDEFECTORS

(Excerpts from article in Novoye Russkoye Slovo, June 8, 1956)

And so they returned to their homeland; the defectors became redefectors: mechanics Shishin and Lukashev, sailors Shirin and Riabenko, bookkeeper

Baganov.

They did not, of course, return to the homeland on their own initiative or of their own volition, but under pressure. There is no doubt about this. The question is, what kind of pressure? I do not believe that the Soviets exerted physical pressure. Except, of course, during the last stage of their stay in America, when the five men from the *Tuapse* were solidly encircled by Krushchev's boys to keep their victims from changing their minds at the last minute and attempting to free themselves from the guardians thrust upon them. The pressure exerted on the *Tuapse* sailors was of an entirely different nature: it was moral and psychological.

I did not know any of the sailors from the tanker *Tuapse* intimately. But I talked to almost all of them—and at some length. Usually in a bar, over a glass of whisky or gin. Under such circumstances, a person is apt to exaggerate. But, at the same time, he opens his heart, and because of this, what he reveals

is of interest.

I am absolutely convinced that fear for the fate of their relatives and friends was the hook on which the Soviets caught the *Tuapse* sailors, for it all started when letters from relatives and friends were handed over to them. This feeling is understandable to many people, if not to everyone, and no one can judge or blame anyone for it.

But there were other reasons which kept them from living peacefully. The

Tuapse sailors could not understand much of what goes on in America.

"Explain to me," says the half-drunk Shishin, "why the Americans receive Polevoy, Sofronov, and company through the front door as honored guests, while those who work with Radio Liberation or the Voice of America, if they are admitted into politics at all, it is through the back door, like people suspected of something."

I answered that the American Government looks on the Voice of America as the sole means of addressing the Soviet people over the heads of their Government, which conceals much and distorts much. Radio Liberation makes it possible for anti-Communist emigrees and those Americans who do not express the point of view of the Government to make themselves heard.

* * * * * * *

We were both, to put it mildly, slightly high. But we hadn't lost our heads, and I think Shishin was sincere. I remember that he leaned over to me and whispered in my ear: "I know this from reliable sources; I heard it from people who know what's what. Better informed than you."

I must say that at that time I did not pay much attention to this half-drunken conversation. But the circumstances attending the redefection to their homeland of the five *Tuapse* sailors forced me to reflect on what I'd heard. Especially

since Riabenko spoke in the same way:

"One day the Americans heap dollars on your head, and the next you get a kick in the pants and go to work in a match factory, and it's good if you can get even that. Are you sure that someday you won't be dragged in a police car to our consulate—that you won't be thrown out when you're no longer wanted?"

It seems to me that these talks reveal the key to the type of pressure exerted on the sailors from the tanker *Tuapse*. At first they were terrorized by fear for their relatives and friends. They were given to understand that the son would answer for the father, the mother for the son. Then, albeit vaguely, dimly, indistinctly—in somewhat foggy terms—the forced repatriation of anti-Communist-minded emigrees was intimated. And it was pointed out to them that this possibility was not so remote, i. e., after the presidential elections. It would be better if they left voluntarily and did not wait to be thrown out.

I am in America little over 4 years, and am not yet an American citizen. But I know America enough to maintain that this country is not dependent on who will rule her—Republicans or Democrats—and will never refuse to grant the

right of asylum to victims of the Communist regime. In the event the Democrats come to power, there will be no question of any enforced repatriation, nor of any prosecution of anti-Communists. Even the thought of such a thing seems to me to be ridiculous.

But I do believe that both Zarubin and Sobolev would, with the greatest pleasure, dispose of Barmine and Sargent. But God doesn't give horns to a butting

cow. All this I wanted to explain to Shishin.

I am afraid that my words did not make any impression on him. He did not

believe me.

The *Tuapse* sailors judge everything by their experiences on the other side. And what would any change in power in the Soviet Union mean, both at the top and at the bottom, whether it be the death of Stalin or the removal from office of the secretary of the most remote district committee? There will be oppression, the downfall of authority, court trials, the threat of prison, and exile. The young sailors were made to fear that the same things would happen in America.

The Tuupse sailors were not yet made to understand that America is not the

Soviet Union; and that democracy is not totalitarianism.

Mr. Morris. Where do you presently reside, Mr. Berezov?

The Interpreter. He lives in San Francisco.

Mr. Morris. And what is your age?

The Interpreter. Sixty.

Mr. Morris. Now, does this situation that he has so colorfully described, does this present any security hazard to the United States?

Mr. Barmine, I wonder if you might help us. We are having difficulty conveying that last question.

Do you understand the question, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. Barmine. What is the question?

Mr. Morris. Does the situation which he has so colorfully described, does this present us with a bad security hazard?

(Mr. Barmine confers with the witness.)

The Interpreter. He said the situation was extremely harmful to the United States—are you talking about his particular situation, or his and thousands of others?

Mr. Morris. Does he understand, does the situation that he has described generally present any security hazard to the United States?

The Interpreter. He said yes, because thousands of people actually lead a double life. And people have to conceal things, and if they have to conceal and hide, then they are afraid. And if they are afraid, Soviet agents take advantage of the situation and press on it.

Mr. Morris. I have no further questions of this witness.

Senator Jenner. It seems to me this situation has resulted because of the squirrel-headed attitude of our country at Yalta. And as a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the Judiciary Committee, I plan to do everything possible to expedite the passage of legislation to remedy this situation so far as that can be done by the Congress. And I intend to propose an individual bill of my own, and I will have it referred to this committee.

If there are no further witnesses the committee will stand in recess.

Mr. Morris. The next meeting will be Tuesday.

Thank you very much, Mr. Berezov. Thank you for coming and

testifying today.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 29, 1956.)



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1956

United States Senate, Subcommittee TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 12:20 p. m. in room P-63, United States Capitol Building, Senator John M. Butler presiding.

Present: Senator Butler.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator Butler. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Will Mr. Pirogov come forward, please, and the inter-

Senator, will you swear in Mr. Barsky first? Senator Butler. Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. Barsky. So help me God.

Senator Butler. Mr. Witness, hold up your right hand.

Do you in the presence of Almighty God solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before the Internal Security Subcommittee this morning will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Pirogov. I do.

TESTIMONY OF PETER PIROGOV, AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Senator Butler. You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. Morris. Would you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. Pirogov. Peter Pirogov, 612 Hill Court, Alexandria.

Mr. Morris. You are a defector from the Soviet Union, are you not, Mr. Pirogov?

The Interpreter. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us briefly the circumstances surrounding

your defection?

The Interpreter. In 1948 I and my friend, Anatole Barzov, took a Soviet airplane from the base in Kolomaya and flew to the American Zone of Austria.

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Barzov and yourself then come to the United States for asylum?

The IPTERPRETER. After 4 months in the American Zone in Austria,

we got permission to go to the United States.

Mr. Morris. And did Mr. Barzov stay in the United States after he arrived?

The Interpreter. Yes, he stayed, and was here until August 15, 1949.

Mr. Morris. How long did he stay in the United States?

The Interpreter. About 6 months. Mr. Morris. And then did he return?

The Interpreter. And then he returned to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Now, did he talk to you before returning to the Soviet Union, Mr. Pirogov?

The Interpreter. During 1 week prior to his return to the Soviet

Union he was talking with me.

Mr. Morris. This was 1 week before he returned to the Soviet Union, and the date, therefore, is 1 week before August 15, 1949?

The Interpeter. Yes, but not on the day, during the week pre-

ceding.

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The INTERPETER. We lived in one room, but I didn't know that he was already to the Soviet Embassy and had decided to return to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. And he did urge you to go back, too?

The Interpreter. During the whole week he was trying to persuade me by ways, so to speak, not openly, to return to the Soviet Union, and only 2 hours before he left actually for the Soviet Union he discovered that he wanted to go himself.

Mr. Morris. Was he promised anything by the Soviet officials here

in the United States?

The Interpreter. His last statement to me was that he was to the Soviet Embassy here, and he showed to me his passport which he has got from the Soviet Embassy. And he said that when he was in the Embassy the passport for him was ready, and also for me.

And he asked me why I didn't want to return.

I told him—not too seriously, though—that I signed a contract with the publishing house, Duell, Sloane & Co., and got from them quite this big amount of money; and, therefore, I cannot return to the Soviet Union until I paid this debt off.

He told me then that the Embassy—that the people in the Embassy

told him that whatever money I would need would be given.

Mr. Morris. Did he have a promise from Ambassador Panyushkin?

The Interpreter. Yes; it is so.

Mr. Morris. What did Barzov tell you that Panyushkin promised him?

The Interpreter. Panyushkin told him——

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, for the record, Ambassador Panyushkin was the Soviet Ambassador in Washington at this time and, according to the testimony of Mr. Rastvorov and other information that we have since received, he was then head of the NKVD in the United States.

The Interpreter. Ambassador Panyushkin told Barzov that, although he has committed a crime, if he returns-if he returns alone he will get only 2 years in jail. If Barzov could persuade me to come back, too, he promises that we will not be punished at all, neither of

Mr. Morris. And if he goes back alone? The Interpreter. Then 2 years of prison.

Mr. Morris. That was the promise Panyushkin gave Barzov?

The Interpreter. That was the official promise.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we received what I believe is an advance copy—I know it was very difficult to obtain—of a book by Vladmir Petrov.

Vladmir Petrov is the man who defected from the Soviets in Australia. And he has written about this episode. I would like Mr. Mandel to read certain portions of that excerpt into the record at this time.

Senator Butler. It will be so ordered.

Mr. Mandel (reading):

Excerpt from Empire of Fear by Vladmir and Evdokia Petrov, published by

Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1956 (pp. 340-341):

"The story of Borzov has probably never been told before, but it is a story which should be known everywhere, especially among former Soviet citizens abroad who may be moved by a yearning to see their native land and their loved

"I remember reading in 1949 a small paragraph in Pravda to the effect that 3 Soviet airmen had been forced by petrol shortage to land in the American Zone of Austria; 2 of them had gone over to the Americans, the third had in-

sisted on returning to his Soviet homeland.

"The man who returned was the radio operator, the two who went over to the Americans were the pilots, Pirogov and Borzov. I have just read with great interest Pirogov's book in which he describes the careful planning of the escape, the flight, the arrival in the American Zone, the International Commission which examined their case, the arguments of the Soviet representative who strove to induce them to return to the Soviet Union. They disbelieved his promises and went to America, where they gave interviews and made speeches. Pirogov is

presumably in America still.
"But Borzov, after a time, began to pine for his wife and his 4-year-old son, whom he had left behind. In the end he could bear it no longer, and approached the Soviet authorities in the United States, who encouraged his hopes and arranged for him to be repatriated to the Soviet Union. That is where I take

up the story.

"One day in 1950 at MVD headquarters in Moscow, my colleague Igolkin, who worked in the American section of the SK department, told me of Borzov's return and said that he was interrogating him in his cell in the Taganskaya Prison. Igolkin had a series of interviews with Borzov, who supplied a mass of valuable information. He was talking freely and was describing every detail of his experiences in American hands, in the hope of working his passage back to pardon, and of being permitted at least to see his wife and son again. As Igolkin described it to me, 'Each time I go to see him he looks at me like a dog that wags its tail and gazes at you in the hope of a bone.

"They kept Borzov about 8 months in prison because he had so much interesting information to supply and because so many senior MVD officers wanted to

check up on various points in his story.

"Of course, no one told him that he had been sentenced to death while he was still in America. When they had finished with him they shot him without letting him see his wife and son again.

"If this story helps some waverers who are hesitating on the brink of returning to their Soviet homeland, it will have been worth the telling."

¹ Also spelled Barzov.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Pirogov, is this the first information that you have heard about your fellow flyer, Barzov?

Mr. Pirogov. Officially this is the first news of him.

Mr. Morris. You have been trying to find out for a long time what

happened to Barzov, havent you?

Mr. Pirogov. I was always trying to find out his fate, and was following the Soviet press for some news about him. But I got a possibility of getting some news of Barzov when the Soviet agriculture delegation was visiting the United States last year.

I was then in Mount Vernon. While I was speaking with my wife

I was then in Mount Vernon. While I was speaking with my wife in Russian, a representative of the Soviet Embassy, by name Zegal, approached us and started to talk to us by remarking that we speak

Russian well.

I answered him that if he would spend so much years in America as I spent in Russia he would undoubtedly talk as well English as I do Russian.

That started our conversation. He asserted that after Stalin's death everything has changed to the better in the Soviet Union. But I decided to ask him the main question, the question about Barzov.

He told me that he knew about this case, and that he is sure that Barzov is still alive, although he doesn't know where does he live. In order to prove his statements, he has given me the following

example.

He said that in 1946 he met a man, a former Soviet citizen, who killed a Soviet officer and went over to the Germans during the war.

In spite of this, he met him 2 years later in 1948 in Riga, where this

man has married and is living happily.

He told me if this man who killed a Soviet officer during the war and went over to the Germans was pardoned for these crimes, what reasons do you have to doubt that Barzov, who didn't commit such a crime, was pardoned, too?

To my question, "Why Barzov doesn't write to me"—not to me, why Barzov doesn't write to people whom he promised to write. My wife told him he promised to write to me, although she didn't know him.

He said it is stupid to expect a letter from Barzov, because the American authorities would never let the man receive a letter from Barzov.

I asked why.

He told me that if some one of the Russians will receive here a letter from Barzov, the whole American propaganda machine would be beaten, because they are trying to prove that he has been killed.

Mr. Morris. Now, this is Victor Zegal who is talking?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. He is the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy?

The Interpreter. I don't know who he is.

Mr. Morris. We have reason to believe that Victor Zegal is now the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

Now, Mr. Pirogov, is that man telling the truth, do you believe?

The Interpreter. No; to my best conviction he didn't tell the truth. Shortly afterward I wrote an article for a Russian emigree publication called Svoboda, which means "Freedom," in which I gave account of my meeting this man who told me that Barzov is alive.

As proof that Barzov is not alive any more, I said that he would be

the best case for the Berlin committee of General Michailov.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you challenged General Michailov to produce Barzov?

The Interpreter. It was not an official challenge to Michailov, it

was a challenge to our publication which they ignored.

Mr. Morris. Would you be willing to make a public challenge at this time today, Mr. Pirogov, to Michailov?

The Interpreter. I am fully prepared to make this challenge right

here now.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you challenge Michailov that if their repatriation campaign is genuine that they should be able to prove that Barzov received the reward Ambassador Panyushkin promised him at that time?

The Interpreter. Very correct.

Besides, I want to say I also consider as lies all the promises of the official Soviet persons that are given to emigrees in the countries this side of the Iron Curtain.

I would like every emigree who has been or will be approached by Soviet representatives to understand that all their promises are only

a lure to death by returning to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, there are some other incidents that this witness can testify to, but I think we can take it in executive session and put it in the record later on. We have the Korolkoffs here.

Will you stand by, Mr. Pirogov.

Mr. and Mrs. Korolkoff, will you come forward, please?

Thank you, Mr. Pirogov.

Will you stand and be sworn, please?

Senator Butler. Will you hold up your right hands.

Do you swear in the presence of Almighty God that the evidence you will give to the Internal Security Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Korolkoff. We do.

TESTIMONY OR MR. AND MRS. NICHOLAS KOROLKOFF

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, first, Mr. Korolkoff?

Mr. Korolkoff. Nicholas Korolkoff, Farmingdale, N. J. Mr. Morris. Mrs. Korolkoff, will you give your name?

Mrs. Korolkoff, Mrs. Nicholas Korolkoff, West Farms Road, Farmingdale, N. J.
Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. Korolkoff. In 1929.

Mr. Morris. And you, Mrs. Korolkoff? You came together?

Mrs. Korolkoff. We came together.

Mr. Morris. And you have been living in the United States continuously since 1929?

Mr. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. While in Farmingdale, N. J., you have been aiding Russian emigrees to integrate themselves into our society; have you

Mrs. Korolkoff. Helping resettle people.

Mr. Morris. Helping to resettle people. How many Russians have you helped to resettle?

Mr. Korolkoff. Over 2,000 people directly.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us briefly how you managed that? How do you do it? What is your contribution to this resettlement?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Are you asking me?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mrs. Korolokoff. O.K. We were working through the Church World Service and the Tolstoy Foundation, they asked us to sponsor some people. We live in a place where there are mostly chicken farmers, and we can resettle them better than other places.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you get them jobs?

Mrs. Korolkoff. We get them jobs, and when they arrive we tell them they should rest a little while, for a few days, and then we send them to work. Sometimes the farmer who sponsored them has a very good couple, he says, "I am sorry, I have a very nice couple," and maybe you just resettle with somebody else. It is quite a problem, because we have go no resettlement house, nothing. And then we asked a displaced person that came before, 5 years ago, if they could take the people in for a week, or whenever we find a job for them.

From the start it works all right, but when you have to go there

every week people get tired of that.

So that is the problem. Otherwise, it works out all right. Mr. Morris. Mr. Korolkoff said you helped more than 2,000. Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes, we have Kalmucks, people of the Mongolian

race.

Mr. Morris. What about Kalmucks?

Mrs. Korolkoff. We have them, too, and sometimes it is a problem, we can't place them very well in factories, because they are the yellow race, and they cannot get jobs so easily like other people.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you had any experience with this Soviet

repatriation campaign?

Mrs. Korolkoff. We have had a few experiences with a group of people that came under other names—they are from Soviet Russia and they are receiving some kind of paper, it says to come back to your homeland.

Mr. Morris. Before going into that, Mrs. Korolkoff, can you estimate how many of these more than 2,000 people that you have resettled

have come here on false papers?

Mrs. Korolkoff. My husband knows that. Mr. Morris. Will you tell us, Mr. Korolkoff?

Mr. Korolkoff. About 40 percent.

Mr. Morris. And why are they here on false papers, Mr. Korolkoff? Mrs. Korolkoff. Because of the fear, otherwise they wouldn't come here.

Mr. Morris. What is their fear?

Mr. Korolkoff. Because this time, sending them back to Russia, the repatriation committee sends people back—they are Ukranian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, they said, and the repatriation committee would send them back.

Mr. Morris. Why are they here on false papers in the first place? Mrs. Korolkoff. You see, when the repatriation commission comes to the displaced persons camp, if you are Soviet Union you have to go back.

Mr. Morris. In other words, they did that so they wouldn't have to

go back to the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Korolkoff. The Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had a bill that came out of the Judiciary Committee yesterday. I wonder if in this part of the record

Mr. Rusher will tell us what happened to that bill.

Mr. Rusher. The bill reported yesterday was H. R. 6880 and certain amendments, but in the bill as reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee there is included the original section 7, now renumbered section 6, which provides that those provisions of law which would require the deportation of an alien for misrepresenting his place of birth, identity, or residence, shall not apply in the case of an alien who obtained a visa by such misrepresentation because he was a fraid, if repatriated to his homeland, he would be persecuted because of his race, religion, or political opinion, and if this misrepresentation was not committed simply for the purpose of evading quota restrictions, or an investigation of the alien.

In other words, it removes the threat to these people who are here simply because they misrepresent that fact in order to avoid being

forced back to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. And the Internal Security Subcommittee is very interested in that aspect of the bill because of the testimony that has been taken.

That has already passed the House; is that right?

Mr. Rusher. It has.

Mr. Morris. And there will be a conference on the bill as it is approved by the Judiciary Committee?

Mr. Rusher. As I understand it, that is correct.

Senator Butler. That has not yet been passed by the Senate?

Mr. Rusher. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. With respect to this 40 percent, Mr. Korolkoff, of the people who are here on false papers, do you have any reason to believe that there are Communists or Communist agents working on these people?

Mr. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. Korolkoff. Well, many members of our organization got pamphlets from this committee.

Mr. Morris. The mere fact that they got pamphlets and letters from the Michailov committee, does that show to you that the Communists

were working in your group?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Because we live in the country, we have mailboxes outside before the houses, and we get numbers from the post office, and lately, because the township is growing, we are having a new route, new numbers, and all of these pamphlets to come back to your homeland come under old numbers, like—the man that I am talking about has 118 now; before he had 259. That is such a long time ago, and still he receives mail under that address.

And another person, we always thought he comes from Yugoslavia, that is how he was accepted between our people. And he received

the same pamphlet.

And he came in at nightime all upset, because it means so much to them, such a thing. And we asked him, "We always thought you were from Yugoslavia, why should you be worried?"

And he says, "I came as a Yugoslav, but I came from Soviet Russia. But who knows that I am not Soviet and have that kind of name?"

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was receiving the Michailov literature in his right name?

Mrs. Korolkoff. In his right name and the right address too. And

we personally sponsored him.

Mr. Morris. And you had no idea of that?

Mrs. Korolkoff. And we were friends, and he always talked about that he came from Yugoslavia, and then it turned out that he did come from Soviet Russia.

And he said he was upset because the people came here peaceful, and

they found a little peace, and they start all over again.

It is upsetting us, because we trust them and we want to help them, and continue helping them. And we don't know who is doing things like that. We would like to find out.

Mr. Morris. You know the Michailov committee knows the true

identity of these people?

Mr. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And somebody is giving them the numbers of the mail-

boxes?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes, because it is an old box, it isn't done this year, it must have been done last year or 2 years ago, because this year we have different numbers on the mailboxes.

Mr. Morris. What is this letter you have given the committee, Mr.

Korolkoff?

Mr. Korolkoff. This is a letter from the General Michaelov committee, "Come back to the homeland."

Mr. Morris. And you have taken off the name of the person who re-

ceived that?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And the man who received that, is he a man who has false papers?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes.

Senator Butler. And this is directly from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Korolkoff. No, from east Prussia.

Mr. Morris. East Berlin?

Mrs. Korolkoff. It is propaganda. And we have a class of people which are not highly intelligent; they are from farms and they were punished for things they didn't do, and they know all the propaganda about Soviet Russia. This is a new kind of propaganda, because they are playing on their heartstrings, calling them back.

The wives are crying for their husbands, the children for their fathers, and it upsets the people. They have a good living here, and they are happy. And now the wives and children are calling them back, and now they don't want to go back, because they know what

is waiting for them.

They are never going to see them anyway. It upsets them.

Senator Butler. Have they, to your knowledge, helped the Communists by reason of threat of exposure?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Only one in Paterson. Senator Butler. There is one case that has been effective?

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes. Senator Butler. But in the other cases they told you about it, and this law is to protect that sort of people.

Mr. Korolkoff. Right,

Mrs. Korolkoff. Another thing, we are working very hard for them, and they are always sending—they are writing from Russia to their husband, and they want to help their wives. They are sending all the money. They never receive anything—he writes a letter, "Send me a picture what you bought for the money," but they never got anything back. And we don't know if they received the money, and we don't have the heart to tell the man, "Don't send your wife any money."

Mr. Morris. According to all the evidence, the publications of the

Michailov Committee are causing a great deal of terror.

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. In France they have banned publications from the Michailov Committee, they have passed a law against these things coming into France.

Senator Butler. Is there a similar law pending here?

Mr. Morris. Not that I know of.

Mrs. Korolkoff. Most of the letters don't come directly from Europe. Some of them are mailed in New York from the post office.

Mr. Korolkoff. Some from Berlin.

Mrs. Korolkoff. And some from New York.

Mr. Morris. And some came from New York, which indicates that someone in New York is working with them.

Mr. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mrs. Korolkoff. And mailing them from the post office in New

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have here, now that the photographers have gone, a man who would be willing to testify, but who has received threats the last week, or very recently—last week, I think is an Just very recently. overstatement.

But he does not want to give his name into the public record, because he also is here on false papers, and also has relatives in the Soviet

Union.

And if, Senator, you can see your way clear to taking testimony under those circumstances, I think it would be a valuable asset for the record.

Is there anything, Mr. and Mrs. Korolkoff, that you feel we should

know about this further?

You are experts, you have been dealing with these people, and you say there are 40 percent with false papers.

Mr. Korolkoff. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And that the Michailov literature is terrorizing them.

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And that the Michailov Committee seems to know the true identity of the people.

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes. Mr. Morris. There was one man who said he was a Yugoslav, and

you thought he was.

Mrs. Korolkoff. I have known him for 5 years as a Yugoslav. He came in one time and we were discussing it, and he didn't know what to do. They came to us, and it is 20 miles to drive at night, and he asked us what we should do. And what can we do? We wish somebody would find out what is going on in that place, because there are many displaced persons there.

Mr. Morris. We have heard from time to time of the great work the Korolkoffs have been doing, at the great personal sacrifice to themselves. They have been helping a great many people. And because of that reason, and their reputation, and the things that they are doing for people, we thought that their testimony would be helpful.

Senator BUTLER. Is there anything further that you would like to

say, Mr. Korolkoff?

Mr. Korolkoff. I know in Europe, in France, or Switzerland they don't get permission to send these papers.

Mr. Morris. They do not allow it? Mr. Korolkoff. That is right.

Mr. Morris. That coincides with my understanding. You make the suggestion, Mrs. Korolkoff, that we do something about it here. Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes. I would appreciate it very much, because

Mrs. Korolkoff. Yes. I would appreciate it very much, because I worry about the displaced persons in my section. They trust us and talk to us, and they look to us to help them, and we don't want to disappoint them.

Senator Butler. You say some of this is brought into America and

mailed in New York.

Mrs. Korolkoff. From New York.

Mr. Korolkoff. Directly from New York.

I asked our mailman. He said he had a hundred letters. And

people destroy them——

Mrs. Korolkoff. Some of them are afraid to bring it to us, and they don't want to tell us. And we feel, you know, that when you have a group of people, you can feel that something is going on. We don't know what we can point a finger at. They are all upset and worried.

Senator Butler. If you only had one defection I think you have

done a very marvelous work.

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much. Sir, will you come forward now?

We guarantee this man that he will not have his picture taken or his identity known.

Senator Butler. The interpreter has heretofore been sworn.

Will you stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly promise and declare that the evidence you will give to the Internal Security Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. Yes; I do.

TESTIMONY OF AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON (LATER IDENTIFIED AS MICHAEL SCHATOFF), AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this man has given his name to us in executive session, and for that reason I am not going to ask him his name now. And he also has given us the name of the two men of the Soviet delegation of the United Nations who approached him. And he is going to tell us about those approaches. But because it would tend to identify him to the Soviets, we are not putting their names into the record at this time.

We will, however, transmit the information to the FBI.

When did you come to the United States, roughly, don't give an exact date?

The Interpreter. In January 1952.

Mr. Morris. And you originally were in the Soviet Union; were you not?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. When did you defect from the Soviet Union?

The Interpreter. In 1942 I was imprisoned by Germans during the war.

Mr. Morris. And did you later join Vlassov's army?

The Interpreter. In 1942 I joined the Russian National Peoples Army under command of General Boyarsky, who was senior adjutant to the late Marshal Tuchavsky. Upon a certain time this army was disbanded by Germans because its nationalistic Russian feelings were not in conformity with the Nazi ideology.

The commanders of this army were sent to the German concentration

camp.

In 1944 I joined the army of General Vlassov.

Mr. Morris. And briefly, at the end of the war, you were supposed

to go back to the Soviet Union; is that right?

The Interpreter. I was, as a former Soviet citizen, subject to the Yalta agreement, but of course I didn't want to return to the Soviet Union willingly.

On 16 May 1945 I received my first false papers in order to escape

the forcible repatriation.

Mr. Morris. In other words, without going into details, you gave a false name, a false place of birth, to the authorities?

The Interpreter. I changed my nationality to Bulgarian so that

nobody could suspect that I was a Soviet citizen.

Mr. Morris. And you are now in the United States as a Bulgarian?

The Interpreter. No; I am stateless now.

On the 17th of May I was arrested in the town of Schwatz in Austria. Someone has alleged that I am an S. S. officer—that I was an S. S.

officer in the German Army.

I confessed to the CIC people everything what happened to me, and was told that I would be forcibly repatriated. The head of the American officials of the CIC thought I should be, as a regular prisoner of war, given to the proper authorities.

I was transferred to the camp in Ludwigsburg, where several Vlassov

generals were imprisoned, too.

These were extradited to the Soviet authorities, and I was trans-

ferred to the camp in Heilbron, near Stuttgart.

The interpreter in this camp was very kind to me. And I was left in the camp and not repatriated as many others. And after a certain time I left this camp as a free man, also with the help of that interpreter.

I came to Stuttgart, and I assumed an identity of a Polish Ukrainian from Galicia. But since I had a pass as a Bulgarian they put me in

the Bulgarian part of the camp.

The hero of the Soviet Union, Zharov, head of the repatriation mission in Stuttgart, wanted to speak to us, which prompted me to flee from the camp. I fled to the French Zone, where my family was. On the second day of my sojourn in the French Zone a Soviet detachment

arrived. I fled, although they fired on me, and I am happy to have stayed alive.

Mr. Morris. You mean they actually fired at you, fired guns?

The Interpreter. Yes, they did. I have hundreds of witnesses and

documentary proof of this.

Because I had Bulgarian papers, and my wife was Russian, we had to legalize our position by going to the German civil authorities to legalize our marriage.

On May 9, 1945, a son was born to us.

My wife has registered this child with my name in my absence, and

therefore, we had to legalize it.

Mr. Morris. We haven't much time left. Would you just come down to the present issue? I mean, it is very important, but we do not have the time for it now.

The Interpreter. In 1948 I again told the CIC my story—

Mr. Morris. You mean you told them your true identity?

The Interpreter. No; they didn't ask me for my real name, and I didn't tell them.

I was deprived afterward of displaced persons status, and had to wait in 1952 for the permit, the entry permit into the United States.

Mr. Morris. Since you have been in the United States have any Soviet officials approached you?

The Interpreter. Recently in one of the schools I am attending I

have met Soviet officials.

Mr. Morris. Were they officials of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations?

The Interpreter. Yes, they were.

Mr. Morris. Therefore, subordinates of Arkady Sobolev, the chief delegate?

The Interpreter. They were subordinates to Sobolev.

Mr. Morris. What did they do?

The Interpreter. At our first meeting I assumed that I was speaking with regular Russian emigrees. On April 9, 2 days after, 2 Soviet officials of the United Nations delegation were expelled from the United States. One of them has shown me his identification card, and asked me whether I am afraid to talk to him, being a Soviet official.

I told him that I am living in the United States, and therefore, I am not afraid to speak to anyone, but his career may be endangered

if he would be caught speaking to a Russian emigree.

He told me that he is not afraid. As a matter of fact, he told me such meetings are encouraged by our superiors. And later on I got a confession from him that our conversations were reported by him through the channels to the upper echelons.

Mr. Morris. Did he know that you were a Russian emigree?

The Interpreter. On this same day he told me, why do I sign documents against the Soviet Union which are published in the Russian emigree newspapers?

I told him that I felt it is my duty to be against the Communist

government

The main line of his conversations with me was that America will at the end lose its fight, lose her fight against communism. The emigrees are not in too good a position, and the sooner they return to the Soviet Union the better it will be for them.

Mr. Morris. Did he know that you were a Russian emigree?

The Interpreter. Yes; he did.

Mr. Morris. Did he know your real identity?

The Interpreter. On the 19th of May one of them told me-we were speaking about Vlassov's army—

Mr. Morris. One of the members of the U. N. delegation, the Soviet

delegation?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. One of them told you that!

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What did he tell you?

The Interpreter. He told me that he knows who I am, and knows of my position in Vlassov's army, and he does not know these things only about me, but about many others.

Mr. Morris. Did he know your name, your former name?

The Interpreter. He didn't tell me directly that, but he let me understand that he knew my name—I am sorry, it was not the 19th of May, it was the 19th of April—the same day he named the emigree political organization, of which I am a member.

From the manner of his talk I felt that he had a very secure position to do so, and perhaps was even sent to speak to emigrees about

such matter.

The same day he invited me to visit him, play chess, drink some vodka.

I have all these conversations recorded in my writing in Russian, and if the committee would like to have them for the record I would

be willing to give them for the record.

In one of our conversations I told him that the Soviet Finance Ministry owes me much for my services. And he proposed that he regulate these debts of the Soviet Ministry—made it clear that he is in position to do so, which I regarded as a case of a rather subtle attempt for blackmail.

On May 17, at 10:25 in the morning, he called my office and asked me by phone, asked me whether I have accomplished the tasks he

has entrusted me with.

Mr. Morris. You say he called you on the phone May 17 and asked you if you accomplished the tasks that he gave you?

The Interpreter. Right.

Mr. Morris. Had he, in fact, given you any tasks?

The Interpreter. He wanted me to buy for him a rather insignificant thing which he could have bought himself anyplace in town, but because he felt that I knew America better and speak better English, that I would do this errand for him.

Since he called me from his office—and I presume that the wires may be tapped—I think that this was again an attempt of throwing a shadow on my loyalty to the United States, since he didn't mention what kind of errand was that, but simply asked me whether I accomplished the task he gave me.

Mr. Morris. And you think he recorded the conversation, and will

sometime use it for blackmail purposes?

The Interpreter. Maybe so.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else to add to that? Senator Butler has to go, and I was wondering if we could conclude it.

The Interpreter. I may tell something about another Soviet representative if you want me to.

Senator Butler. Yes; you may proceed.

The Interpreter. Later on I met another man who approached me with the same question, why do I write against the Soviet Government and work against the Soviet people, as he chose to express himself.

This man was mostly interested in economic and other literature published by Russian emigrant organizations, Russian emigrant organizations, and was also very interested in the activities of these organizations.

After all our conversations, when he knew very well that I am opposed to the Soviet Government, I asked him, "What do you want?"

He told me that he wanted me to come home and to cease my political

activity in emigrant circles.

Ten days ago I received a letter from Australia, a former member of the French resistance army writes to me that a former Vlassov man who is now set free in the Soviet Union is trying to locate Vlassov men who are abroad. This letter I gave to the American security

That will be all I could testify to now.

Mr. Morris. Have you been in touch with the FBI?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record, in connection with this present series of hearings-which I think we can conclude, Senator, and make our report—an article that appeared in the Novove Russkove in New York, which was an appeal to people who were in the position of this particular witness and other witnesses who have been described here today, that if they would come forward and send their cases to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that we would take the cases and not disclose their identity and work them into the report.

I would like to put into the record that appeal that went into the

Russian-language newspaper in New York.

Senator Butler. It will be so ordered.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 277" and reads as follows:)

Ехнівіт №. 277

Now It Is Up to the "Berezovtzy" (Cases Similar to Berezov's)

By V. Yurassov, Novoye Russkoye Slovo, May 29, 1956

Every refugee knows what is meant by the so-called Berezov illness. Novoye Russkoye Slovo at one time described it in detail. Novoye Russkoye Slovo frequently collected petitions and letters addressed to the Congressmen, Senators. and the President. And refugees always responded to this newspaper campaign against the Berezov illness.

But the so-called Berezov illness is linked to the McCarran-Walter Act. The review of this act would be quite a complicated matter for several reasons. Berezov illness continues to poison refugees. Thousands are still afraid of what might happen to them. Thousands of our countrymen who have lived in the United States of America for the past 5 years or more are afraid to take out American citizenship. Many people who have wide and valuable knowledge of Soviet reality are forced to stand aside. They are not taking part in useful activities because they cannot talk about their Soviet past. Some Berezovtzy risked becoming citizens with falsified biographies and thus they were doomed to constant fear and to possible deportation according to the existing laws.

Recently, in connection with the intensified activities of the infamous Com-

mittee for the Return to the Homeland and the harmful acts of the Soviet Government directed against refugees, cases of pressure and blackmail against the Berezovtzy increased. There were incidents when a refugee residing in the United States of America under an assumed name and listed as an emigree from Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, received the newspaper, For the Return to the Homeland, or letters from the U.S.S.R. Sometimes the refugee was addressed by his real name. One woman emigree received a letter from her relatives in U. S. S. R. which was delivered to her by the representative of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations.

One refugee visited a few days ago the editor of the Novoye Russkoye Slovo, M. E. Weinbaum, and told the editor that he had an argument with an acquaintance who happens to know that he is a Berezovetz. The refugee said: "I am afraid that he will denounce me. What am I to do?" Someone spread the rumor in American circles that emigrees in the United States of America with falsified biographies are a menace to United States security; that Soviet agents were planted as Berezovtzy. Some Berezovtzy started thinking: Why should I wait until they deport me from United States of America? Wouldn't it be wiser for me to

return to the U.S.S.R. of my own accord?

The Senate Internal Security Committee was confronted with all these problems during its investigation of the case of the five sailors from the tanker Tuapse and of the kidnaping of other refugees. Senators Eastland, Jenner, and Welker admitted that the situation involving the Berezovtzy gives the Soviet agents a chance to blackmail the emigrees and to carry on disruptive activities against them and against American interests.

It was decided to start a special investigation of the Berezov cases.

On Tuesday of last week the former lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Army, Vladimir Rudolph, testified before the subcommittee; on Wednesday, Alexandra Tolstoy; and on Friday, the former Soviet diplomat, Alexander Barmine, a Berezovetz, Sergei Szeiko, and Rodion Berezov, who was summoned from San Francisco.

Readers of Novoye Russkoye Slovo already read about the testimony given by Alexandra Tolstoy, Rodion Berezov, and Alexander Barmine. Alexander Barmine, by the way, told the committee about the postwar forcible repatriation which resulted in the so-called Berezov illness. He assured the subcommittee that the absolute majority of the Berezovtzy are loyal to the United States. They are all anti-Communists and would become useful American citizens. He reminded the Senate subcommittee about the President's message to Congress of February 8, in which the President said:

"A large group of refugees in this country obtained visas by the use of false identities in order to escape forcible repatriation behind the Iron Curtain, The number may run into the thousands. Under existing law such falsification is a mandatory ground for deportation. The law should be amended to give

relief to these unfortunate people."

Senator Jenner declared that the committee will introduce a bill which will do away with the unhealthy and dangerous position of the Berezovtzy. But does it mean that the question concerning the Berezovtzy has already been

solved? Not at all.

The Senate sul committee must have facts to enable Congress to pass the law which would give the Berezovtzy the right to reconstruct their biographical data. The subcommittee needs facts which would confirm the danger of the so-called Berezov illness. Witnesses are needed from the Berezovtzy group, who would tell the committee about the pressure used upon them by the Soviet agents and the Michailov committee.

In short, the successful outcome of the case depends now on the Berezovtzy

themselves.

Everyone who received the newspaper, For the Return to the Homeland, or letters from the U. S. S. R.; to everyone who was warned by Soviet agents or who was subjected to blackmail and pressure should apply to the Senate sub-committee: Mr. Robert Morris, chief counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee,

the Senate, Washington, D. C.

The Senate subcommittee is aware of the fact that the persons suffering from the Berezov illness are frightened and that they are afraid to speak about themselves. The Senate subcommittee is aware of the fact that these people are worried about their future and the fate of their relatives in the U.S.S.R. The Senate subcommittee is willing to hear their story without making their names public; if they prefer to do so, they may use a different name at the hearing; the Senate subcommittee may arrange an executive session for this purpose.

The Senate subcommittee will protect each witness. This means that every refugee who will report his case does not risk anything, but, on the contrary,

will be assisted by the subcommittee in his difficult position.

The practical solution would be for each Berezovetz who underwent pressure from the Soviets to write a letter to the above address with a brief description of the kind of pressure used upon him. This letter may be written in any language. The Senate subcommittee will subpena the witness it may need. A subpena is an order to appear before the Senate. All expenses covering the trip (airplane, train, or bus fare) will be paid by the Senate. The existing allocations will cover subsistence and hotel bills. A person who is called to the Senate and has such a subpena in his possession, is entitled to assistance from American citizens and institutions. He will get assistance from his employer, the airport administration, and from the railroad officials.

Until now refugees often complained that the American legislative bodies and the American Government don't do a thing to help the Berezovtzy to become useful members of society. Now the emigrees got this opportunity. The final successful outcome depends on the emigrees themselves. It is up to those

people who have suffered from the Berezov illness for so many years.

Berezov illness, this tragic situation concerning thousands of people, may now be settled by the Berezovtzy themselves. They must do this for their own sake, as well as for the sake of their families, their children, and other emigrees. They must do this for the good of our new homeland—the United States of America.

Mr. Morris. I would like to put in the testimony of Mr. Bialer which we took in executive session and didn't finish in open session last week. I would like to put that in the record.

Senator Butler. It will be so ordered. (The testimony appears in pt. 29.)

Mr. Morris. And we also are receiving the results of a questionnaire which Countess Tolstoy sent out, and we have promised that we will have the result of that questionnaire in 2 or 3 weeks. And we have gotten 6 letters as a result of this appeal in the Russian newspaper which we have, and we are working on it.

Senator Butler. The subcommittee will stand in recess until the

notice of the chairman.

Mr. Morris. The witness tomorrow will be Bella Dodd, at 10:30. (Whereupon, at 1:40 p. m., the subcommittee recessed until 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

TESTIMONY OF PETER PIROGOV—Resumed

Mr. Morris. Mr. Pirogov, since you have been in the United States have you been approached on any other occasion by persons you recognized as Soviet officials?

Mr. Pirogov. No; except one case which happened after Mr. Barzov

decided to return to Russia, and at that time we met.

Mr. Morris. When was that?

Mr. Pirogov. In a restaurant here in Washington.

Mr. Morris. What happened at that time?

Mr. Pirogov. Well, it is hard to say. I still don't understand today what actually happened there. And if I can't tell——

Mr. Morris. Tell us what happened. You were there.

Mr. Pirogov. This is what happened. Barzov had gone from New York to Washington for good with his plans to return to Russia.

Mr. Morris. He had left Washington and gone to New York?
Mr. Pirogov. No; he left New York and went to Washington to
see officials in the Embassy to receive tickets for his ship or airplane

on his way to Russia. And then after 1 week I decide to send him a letter and meet him once more before he left the United States and tried to help him to change his decision about that.

Mr. Morris. You advised him, had you not, not to go back?

Mr. Pirogov. Of course, but this particular time I wanted to have one more meeting with him. And then the next morning—well, I sent a letter, for instance, the next morning, I was not in my room in the hotel, but somebody, the manager, told me that some man was here and left a letter for me. I took that letter, that letter was Mr. Barzov, from Washington, from the Russian Embassy. In that letter he said, "I want to have a meeting with you in one condition that supposed to be without any witnesses, just you and me."

Mr. Morris. This is what the letter said? Mr. Pirogov. Yes; his letter said that. Mr. Morris. Do you still have the letter?

Mr. Pirogov. Oh, I think somebody has it. I don't. I think the FBI people; I don't know who. And then he said, "I want to meet you in the Three Musketeers Restaurant," and he put in the same letter a small piece from a newspaper, advertising about that restaurant.

Well, he said, "I want to see you today—no—tomorrow at 5 o'clock." Since I received that letter I called friend of mine in Washington and asked him if he thinks it is okay that I will go and see Barzov. He said, O. K. Then I take a train the next morning and come to

Washington.

Well, I was afraid to go just by myself to that restaurant and see Barzov. I asked that friend if he will come with me. He said, "No; I don't want to go with you, but you supposed not to be worried. I will be there, or somebody will be there whom I know." Now, he give me a plan of that restaurant.

Mr. Morris. Who gave you the plan of that restaurant? Mr. Pirogov. My friend. He said, "You supposed to meet Mr. Barzov in the dining room, not in the barroom." Well, then I took a taxi and come to the restaurant, and I was waiting on the street. Well, it was about 5 or 6 minutes and then Barzov come. He looked strained and tired and completely different in appearance from what he was before.

And he said, "O. K., let's go in the restaurant and have some talk." And then when we arrived in that restaurant and that barroom there, too many people over there, it is almost impossible to expect to find a table. Then the waiter come to us and say, "You looking for a table?" We said, "Yes." He said, "For two?" and we said, "Yes," and he said, "Come with me."

And that table was already reserved for us, by whom I don't know.

Mr. Morris. By whom you don't know?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes. That table was close to the wall. He showed me a chair which was close to the wall. I was afraid to sit there and I just decided to sit on the chair which was opposite the wall. And then a waiter come and Barzov ordered two drinks. Then I ask the waiter if he had a dinner, because I had just come from the train and I want to have some dinner. The waiter said, "No, sir; that is not the dining room. We have a dining room just across the hall."

Then I recognized I had made a mistake. I was supposed not to be there, but friends of mine would sit in the dining room. Then I

just get up and said, "Well, I am sorry. Let's go to the dining room, and I want to have my dinner. And you can order drinks from here

and they will deliver them to the dining room."

Well now, the restaurant, you know, the King Cole Room is on the right side and the dining room or restaurant, Three Musketeers, is on the left side; between the two halls is a small corridor. I was going first, I just stopped in the corridor, then I see 2 men from this—3 or 4 men from another side, you know, just located us in the center of that corridor. With our not talking or saying anything or any questions, I just, or somebody, hit me. Then, you know, another man took my arm and put it in back and put handcuffs on my right hand. Then in front of me a small man, I will say about 5 feet, took a pistol and I don't know what he started, but I just hit him with my leg. At that time another man took that pistol from his hand and knocked me in the head.

Well now, that happened in the corridor between this hall and this hall, and the door in the dining room was locked. It was closed. Then, I just—I mean I tried to give some signal to a friend of mine who was sitting in the dining room. I am sure he was there, but since it happened—you know, just too many movements. Then I come too close to that door and knocked that door and the door opened and then, you know, many people there. I don't know, maybe 10 or 15 boys stand up and come out from that dining room. I understand that the people who come from the dining room, it was people whom my

friend asked to be there.

Mr. Morkis. In other words, this other episode where someone tried to put handcuffs on you and pulled the gun on you was in the corridor concealed between the dining room and the bar?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes.

Mr. Morris. It was all concealed and hidden in there?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes. And then when these people come, friend of mine and his friends, well, that time fight started which I couldn't understand who is who and who hit whom. I know one thing, I have couple more in my head and face, and one man just tried to do everything to put that second end of the handcuff on my wrist, you know, arm, but he couldn't, you know.

Mr. Morris. In other words, somebody was trying to forcibly kidnap

you?

Mr. Pirocov. Yes. Well, it looked that way, is how it happened to me.

Mr. Morris. You know whether these men were Russians?

Mr. Pirogov. Well, I don't know. One thing I forget to tell you. Before I met Barzov, I step out from a taxi and then I thought Barzov already waiting for me inside. Then I come inside, in that entrance was small couch, 2 very young, I mean, 2 very pretty girls sitting on that couch, and when I pass I heard a Russian word, "on," which means "him."

Mr. Morris. Which is Russian for "him"?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes. Then I was afraid, completely, you know, what to do. You know people mention that is him. That concerned me. Then, I go out of there and I met Barzov and then, you know, we come in and that happened in that corridor you know. And then my friend and his friend come to me, took a taxi and go to some

house. I don't know, I think it was some hotel, and then some trouble come, because they couldn't remove the handcuff's from my arm.

Mr. Morris. They couldn't take the handcuff off your arm?

Mr. Pirogov. No; and it took about 1 or 2 hours, because, you know, too many keys they tried. At last they find one.

Mr. Morris. Who were these people who tried to remove the hand-

cuff?

Mr. Pirogov. They were my friends.

Mr. Morris. Have you any reason to believe that the management of either the Three Musketeers restaurant or the King Cole bar, or any of the employees, such as the waiter, were a party to this thing that happened?

Mr. Pirogov. I am sure now, because the waiter, you know, the same waiter come first to me when I arrived first there to seek Barzov.

He immediately came to me and asked if I want to have a table. I

said, "No, I wait for a friend of mine."

Then, the next time we arrived, both, with Barzov, same man come and offered us table. When there were too many people, it was impossible to mention you can find table.

Mr. Morris. In other words, there was no other empty table in the

whole restaurant?

Mr. Pirogov. No; that was the main point that I was surprised about. That seems to me like somebody ordered that table before or asked that waiter to have that table empty.

Mr. Morris. Did the waiter seem to know Barzov?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What makes you say that?

Mr. Pirogov. Because just how he looked at him. We just come in, you know, and that man seems so familiar, you know, or like you meet somebody who knows you, but at that time I interpreted, then, because Barzov was staying I week in the Russian Embassy. The Russian Embassy was too close to the restaurant, to Three Musketeers.

Mr. Morris. What street is the Three Musketeers on?

Mr. Pirogov. Connecticut Avenue.

Mr. Morris. In other words, it is near the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Pirogov. Yes. And I thought Barzov often come to that restaurant and that is why the waiter know him. But I don't know, but it

was so—everything was prepared.

Mr. Morris. Had you warned Barzov he would be shot in 6 months? Mr. Pirogov. Certainly, I told him many times. We just sit at a table, we start to talking. He look at me and said, "Well, you want to smoke a cigarette?" He opened a pack of Russian cigarettes, Kazebek. Well, I said, "No, I have mine," and I took some cigarettes. He look at me and said, "You think that is already yours, you qualified yourself like an American already." I said, "No, I am still not American, but I try to be." He said, "Nonsense."

Then, conversation is finished. He said—that is before the waiter come, you know, for the order, and he said, "You see, I start writing, too, but I will write book which will be much better than any books

which emigrants wrote here in America about Russia."

I looked at him and said, "You supposed not to be worried about your book. They will write for you. You will sign your name and after 6 months, the author will not be alive. They will kill you."

He said, "Well, after 5 or 10 years you will be there, too." He said, "I will be free, but you will replace my place where I

come now."

That means, in 2 or 3 years he will sit in jail and then will be free. And they told him—I forget to say that—when he returned from Washington, he said, "They said to tell Pirogov if he don't want to return now, he supposed to know that 5 or 10 years will pass, but he will be in our hands."

Mr. Morris. You, of course, have no intention of going back to

the Soviet Union?

Mr. Pirogov. No, I would not even think about it. I have my family here. I mean, I am satisfied with living here, and I like to be here. Why I should want to go there? I just heard yesterday they killed him. Even if that was not happened, you know, I still don't think of going back there.

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much. That is all. (Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., adjournment was taken.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1956

United States Senate Subcommittee
To Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:20 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator John Marshall Butler presiding.

Present: Senator Butler.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator Butler. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Morris. Senator, the subject of this morning's hearing will be the effort on the part of Soviet agents in the United States to induce, by various means, Russian emigrees and Russian refugees to return to the Soviet Union. The first witness this morning will be Mr. Michael Schatoff, who previously testified before the subcommittee, Senator, but at that time did not disclose his name, for security reasons.

Mr. Schatoff, will you stand to be sworn, please? Senator Butler. Will you hold up your right hand?

Do you, in the presence of Almighty God, solemnly promise and declare that the evidence you give this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Schatoff. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, Mr. Grigorovich-Barsky has previously been sworn. So it will not be necessary to swear him at this time.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL SCHATOFF, AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Schatoff, I wonder if you will tell us very briefly, very succinctly, the substance of your last testimony before the subcommittee.

The Interpreter. I was learning the English language at Columbia University. I was late in starting these courses because I was in Ger-

many at an anti-Communist conference.

Several times I was together with a Mr. Petukhov, of whom I didn't know that he was a member of the Soviet U. N. delegation. After several meetings, Petukhov has shown me his credentials as a Soviet diplomat.

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His first question was whether I was afraid to speak to him, to which I answered that I lived in a free country, in the United States, and I haven't got fear of anything.

Mr. Morris. Now, who was this gentleman who was talking to him,

now?

The Interpreter. Petukhov.

Mr. Morris. That was Mr. Petukhov?

The Interpreter. Petukhov.

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, Mr. Petukhov, Aleksei Petukhov, is working for the Secretariat of the United Nations and is the Technical Assistance Program Director for Asia and the Far East, at the United Nations.

Now, that is the man, Senator, that Mr. Schatoff is now talking

about.

The Interpreter. He didn't tell me his occupation in detail. I only

knew that he was a Soviet diplomat with the United Nations.

I wondered why Petukhov should worry about my career and my prosperity here, and I told him he had better take care of his own career, which may be jeopardized by speaking to me.

Petukhov told me that at the present time they are encouraged to meet emigrees and that he is in no way jeopardizing his career while

speaking to me.

In the course of our next meeting, Petukhov told me that I have no future in the United States and that, on the other hand, the emigrees' plans about changes in the Soviet Union will never be accomplished and that the sooner I return to the Soviet Union the better it is for me.

Petukhov also told me at one of our meetings, not directly, but by allusion first, that he knows who I am and what is my name, and once

he even told me directly that he even knows who I am.

Further, Petukhov tried to blackmail me and expressed some threats, and I understood that they wanted to make me a Soviet agent.

Mr. Morris. Now, you say they tried to blackmail you, Mr. Schatoff.

Will you tell us what that effort of blackmail was?

The Interpreter. I got a call from him in which he asked me whether I accomplished that which he asked me to accomplish.

Mr. Morris. Now, who was this speaking?

The Interpreter. Petukhov.

Mr. Morris. Petukhov, again. Now, so far, has Shapovalov come into this at all?

The Interpreter. Pardon me?

Mr. Morris. Have you mentioned Shapovalov at all?

The Interpreter. After several meetings with Petukhov, Mr.

Shapovalov—

Mr. Morris. Now, may the record show that Mr. Shapovalov spells his name R-o-s-t-i-s-l-a-v S-h-a-p-o-v-a-l-o-v, and he is the second secretary of the Soviet mission to the United Nations. So we have two individuals in separate categories here. We have Mr. Petukhov, who is with the Secretariat of the United Nations, whereas Mr. Shapovalov is working with the Soviet mission to the United Nations, two different categories.

The Interpreter. Yes. Mr. Shapovalov approached me and gave me to understand that he knows who I am and he knows my back-

ground.

Shapovalov asked me to get for him the literature of the Munich Institute for U. S. S. R. study, in which there is shown his intention to make me a member of the Soviet agents' group.

I gave my testimony here on the 13th of June.

In the evening there was a report in the press that two Soviet U. N. mission members were involved in pressure upon Russian emigrees.

Mr. Morris. Now, let me see if I understand this, Mr. Schatoff. You testified here on June 13. That evening there was a report in the papers. Was there a report of your testimony?

The Interpreter. No, it was not.

Mr. Morris. What was this report in the papers that was men-

tioned on June 13?

The Interpreter. There was a brief report that there was a closed session of this committee and that on this session a former Soviet oflicer has reported the attempt of two Soviet U. N. delegation members to approach him.

The next day, on the 14th of June, at 4:18 p. m., Petukhov called

me on the phone.

Mr. Morris. Now, this is the day after your testimony here?

Mr. Schatoff. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Morris. Now, this you have not told the subcommittee before, naturally, because this happened after your appearance here; is that right?

The Interpreter. Yes, that is right, sir.

Mr. Morris. All right. Now, what happened at that time? The Interpreter. My friend at work told me that this was the same voice who had called me the day before, on the 13th.

Mr. Morris. In other words, the very day you were down here testifying, Mr. Petukhov was calling you in New York?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, that was on the 13th. Now, he called again on the 14th; is that right?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, on the 13th, you did not speak with him, but on the 14th you did speak with him?

Mr. Schatoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Tell us what happened.

The Interpreter. Yes, I spoke to him on the 14th, and I told the colleague who took the calls on the 13th to tell Petukhov that I don't work any more in the university.

From the words of Petukhov, I understood that he is very well in-

formed as to the happenings of the 13th.

He asked me whether I lived in my old apartment. He invited me to go with him to Long Beach, and told me that it was of utmost importance to meet with him immediately.

Mr. Morris. Now, excuse me. When he asked you to go to Long Beach—that is in New York—when did he want you to go to Long

Beach? That day or some subsequent day?

The Interpreter. There were several invitations to go to Long Beach, and that was one of them. It was not a specific date that he was talking about.

There was again talk about whether I accomplished his mission, whether I had done what he had asked me to do, in the same conversation.

I refused to meet with him.

Mr. Morris. Now, what was that that he asked you to do previously?

What was the mission he had discussed?

The Interpreter. I don't know what he was talking about. There was no specific task that he had assigned me at that time, and I regarded that as another attempt to discredit me. Since I gave the testimony in a closed session, apparently they did not want it to come to an open session, so that I could testify some more.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Schatoff, had he known who it was who had

He did not know it was you testifying, did he?

The Interpreter. According to his conversation, I have no doubts that he knew about it.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, you had testified previously that you felt when he mentioned the word "mission" on the phone, you felt that the conversation was being recorded?

The Interpreter. Yes, it could have been recorded just for black-

mail purposes in the future.

That forced me to make my testimony public, and on the 21st of June, I appeared at a press conference in New York.

Mr. Morris. I see. And then you related all the events that you

had told the subcommittee previously?

The Interpreter. Yes, I repeated the testimony before the sub-

Mr. Morris. Did you mention the most recent approaches, the subsequent approaches, to your appearance before the committee?

The Interpreter. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. Morris. Did you mention at the press conferences the subsequent approaches upon the part of Mr. Petukhov which took place

after your appearance before the subcommittee?

The Interpreter. Yes. I mentioned it at the press conference, and I again emphasized that these approaches have forced me to make the public testimony here and herewith to appeal to the American public, and for the protection of the American Government.

Mr. Morris. Now, during this period were you in touch with the

FBI?

The Interpreter. Yes. I was in touch with the FBI, and they advised me not to meet with Petukhov any more.

Mr. Morris. Now, previously had you been in touch with the FBI?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, during this period you also received at the same time, contemporaneously, you also received some literature from the Soviet Union; did you not?

The Interpreter. Yes, I did.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that? The Interpreter. Yes. At that period I received a letter from Australia, from a friend of mine, who was notified by another friend in France that a former officer of the Vlassov army, who had served his term in a concentration camp in Siberia and is free now, is looking for his former friends, namely, for me, too.

That gave me the idea that they know who I am even in Soviet Union, and that this is somehow a concerted approach to force me to go to

do something for them.

Mr. Morris. And is that the whole story about receiving the literature from abroad?

The Interpreter. Yes, that would be all, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, how long have you been in the United States, Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. Since January 1952.

Mr. Morris. I see. And you came to the United States having previously been an officer in the Red army; did you not?

Mr. Schatoff. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And, for security purposes, can you tell us what your present job is?

The Interpreter. I am working at Columbia University in the

acquisition department as a researcher.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know a man named Boris Olshansky? The Interpreter. Yes; I knew him very well, about 7 years.

Mr. Morris. Now, that is O-l-s-h-a-n-s-k-y?

The Interpreter. O-l-s-h-a-n-s-k-y. Mr. Morris. That is Boris Olshansky?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you have known him for 7 years?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. So your knowledge antedated your arrival in this country?

The Interpreter. Yes. I knew him well in Germany and I know

his family, too.

We belonged to the same organization of Russian emigrees.

Mr. Morris. And how frequently have you seen him since he has been in the United States?

The Interpreter. When he was living in New York, I saw him

almost every week, or even more often.

We were meeting at the offices of the Voice of America in New

York and also in Radio Liberation.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Schatoff, did he reflect at any time any disaffection or any dissatisfaction with the United States?

The Interpreter. No; I have never heard of it.

Mr. Morris. When did you first learn that he had disappeared?

The Interpreter. I learned about it only a few days ago.

Mr. Morris. Now, what do you know about his disappearance?
The Interpreter. The only thing I can tell is that I think that his disappearance is the result of work of Mr. Sobolev and Zarubin.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Sobolev is the chief of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, and Mr. Zarubin is the Soviet Ambassador?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, what is the basis for that conclusion on your

part, Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. All activities of Mr. Olshansky here in the States showed that he was anti-Communist. He wrote a book about his deception. He wrote almost in every political newspaper of Russian emigrees. He wrote for radio stations.

Of course, I do not know the technique of forcing such people to go back to the Soviet Union. But, in my opinion, I firmly believe that

the Soviet officials were guilty of his disappearance.

Mr. Morris. What is the basis for that conclusion, Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. Nobody is taking care of repatriation to the Soviet Union but Soviet officials.

Mr. Morris. Yes. But why do you think he did not return of his

own volition?

The Interpreter. I think he is wise enough not to go to the Soviet

Union to be faced with an execution squad.

Mr. Morris. Did you have any personal conversations of any kind with Mr. Olshansky about whether or not he would like to go back to the Soviet Union?

The Interpreter. Many conversations. I was in his family and we met very often in organization meetings, and he has never shown

any desire to depart for the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. What can you tell us about his anti-Soviet activity here

in the United States?

The Interpreter. I repeat that he was systematically working for political emigrees' newspapers which are appearing in the United States. He was appearing at programs of the Voice of America and of the Radio Liberation. Also, he made several appearances, public appearances, in meetings of Russian emigrees.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know the circumstances of his disappear-

The Interpreter. I don't know anything in detail.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he had an assignment to go to Ger-

The Interpreter. Yes, I know that.

Mr. Morris. What was the nature of his assignment?

The Interpreter. He had to go to Germany to work for a Russian political organization, the NTS-

Mr. Morris. Now, you are a member of the NTS, are you not? The Interpreter. No; I am not.

Mr. Morris. What is the NTS?

The Interpreter. I am sorry. I did not finish his previous answer.

Mr. Morris. I am sorry.

The Interpreter (continuing). To work for NTS in its newspaper called Possev.

I am not a member of the NTS myself.

Mr. Morris. What is the NTS?

The Interpreter. It is a revolutionary political organization which fights for liberation of peoples of the Soviet Union from the Bolshevists.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Schatoff, would you tell Senator Butler what is the nature of the NTS?

The Interpreter. Shall I repeat that?

Mr. Morris. Yes. Will you repeat what he just said as to what the NTS was?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. The NTS is a revolutionary political organization of Russian emigres which is fighting for liberation of

peoples of the Soviet Union from communism.

Mr. Morris. Senator, this man, Mr. Olshansky, whom Mr. Schatoff testified he has known intimately for a period of 7 years, has recently had an assignment to go to Germany for the NTS, for this organization which he has just described, and he never did report there, did he, Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. No; he never did report there.

Mr. Morris. And instead, he turned up in the Soviet Union, did he not?

The Interpreter. Instead he turned up in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. Now, you only know that he turned up in the Soviet Union, not from your own personal experience, but from what you have heard?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And let me sum up your evidence. You have no direct knowledge of what happened to Mr. Olshansky here? You have no direct knowledge; however, you have testified that, knowing the man on the basis of 7 years and knowing his extensive anti-Soviet activity, that you feel that he did not go there voluntarily?

The Interpreter. Yes. That I assert.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know whether or not there was any redefection involved in this, which is asking the same thing another way, Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. I presume this is a series of the same work of the

redefection campaign.

It has two aspects: First, to prove to American authorities that they cannot trust to the defectors from the Soviet Union; and, second, to disturb the confidence which Russian emigrees may have in such people and sow distrust among the emigree circles.

Mr. Morris. Would it not occur to you, Mr. Schatoff, that if this man were really redefecting and had really gone back to the Soviets, that it might have been important for him to stay on his job with

NTS?

The Interpreter. To stay on the job?

Mr. Morris. If this man had seriously redefected and gone back to the Soviets, might not it have been strategic for him to stay at his job at NTS, and in that way work for the Soviets?

The Interpreter. And not to go back to the Soviet Union, you

mean?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Interpreter. Naturally.

Mr. Morris. Senator, this evidence that we have here, you see, is indirect evidence, and it is only based on Mr. Schatoff's knowledge of this particular man. However, Senator, I feel it fits directly into this particular inquiry that the subcommittee is carrying on, and we shall endeavor to learn some facts to see whether or not there are factors in this thing which should be known by the Senate.

Now, Mr. Schatoff, do you know anything more about the activities of Soviet subordinates of Arkady Sobolev here in the United States?

The Interpreter. I know as a fact that the private chauffeur of Arkady Sobolev approached a Russian emigree in order to persuade him either to go back to the Soviet Union or to work here as a Soviet agent.

Mr. Morris. Who is the private chauffeur of Arkady Sobolev: do

you know?

The Interpreter. I don't know him personally, but I have knowledge that he is the son of one of the former Fishery Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morris. What knowledge is that that you have, Mr. Schatoff? The Interpreter. Knowing that I was testifying in the Senate,

the man whom the chauffeur approached has spoken to me and he has told me that.

Mr. Morris. I see. He told you.

Now, how did he know? You say that the man who was approached by the personal chauffeur of Sobolev told you that Sobolev's chauffeur was the son of the Commissioner of Fisheries?

The Interpreter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, how did the emigree who was approached by the chauffeur know that?

The Interpreter. The chauffeur told him that himself.

Mr. Morris. All right.

Now, Senator, instead of accepting the testimony of Mr. Schatoff on this, since it is indirect testimony and hearsay testimony, I suggest that we try to ascertain the identity of this emigree who was approached by the chauffeur of Arkady Sobolev and find out from him the direct story and have him tell that under oath. So we shall, Senator, endeavor to find out from Mr. Schatoff the identity of this emigree and let him tell us the story directly.

Senator Butler. Do you have any further questions of Mr.

Schatoff?

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else, Mr. Schatoff, that we should know at this time, about this particular case?

The Interpreter. The last one; not about this case, but about an-

other one.

Sobolev, the head of the Soviet delegation to the U. N., has called

my testimony a provocation and a lie.

And they are trying to represent that case as though I was working for some American organization, for some organ of the American Government.

I solemnly testify here that I was under no obligation to any American governmental agencies and that I acted only according to my conscience as an anti-Communist and as a man loving the United States.

The committee may ascertain the sincerity and the truth of my

testimony.

If Mr. Sobolev would like so, I could testify to the same facts in

any American court.

Mr. Morris. You recognize you are under oath this morning? You recognize, do you not, Mr. Schatoff, that you are now testifying under oath?

The Interpreter. Yes; I know.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Schatoff, during the period that Messrs. Petukhov and Shapovalov were approaching you, you were in contact with the FBI; were you not?

The Interpreter. Yes; I told the FBI about this thing.

Mr. Morris. Contemporaneously? Did you tell them contemporateously about these approaches, while they were going on, Mr. Schatoff? Did you tell the FBI while these events were going on?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. So, in other words, if it would be possible at some time for corroboration, the reports, the contemporaneous reports, that Mr. Schatoff made to the FBI would support the testimony he now gives under oath?

The Interpreter. Yes. I may also give some witnesses from the university who could testify about our interrelations during this episode.

Mr. Morris. In other words, Mr. Schatoff, you have given the subcommittee the names of some persons who witnessed some part of

these particular episodes?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And the subcommittee has subpensed two of these people, has it not?

The Interpreter. Yes, as far as I know.

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, at this point I would like to ask the photographers if they would cooperate with the committee to the extent of not taking pictures of the next two witnesses. They have agreed to testify, and they have given us their names in executive session, and they have asked that their names not appear in the newspapers.

Now, I think if their pictures were taken, their privacy might be invaded to that extent. It is an open hearing, and we can only ask

the cooperation of the photographers.

Thank you very much, Mr. Schatoff. We appreciate your testimony.

Senator BUTLER. Thank you.

Mr. Morris (to the next witness). I do not want to call you by name. Would you come forward?

Will you stand and raise your right hand?

Senator BUTLER. Do you solemnly promise and declare that the evidence you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The Witness (through the interpreter). Yes.

TESTIMONY OF AN UNIDENTIFIED WITNESS. AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would like the record to show that the witness who has just been sworn has given us his name and address in executive session, and it is now in the committee records, and at the request of the witness we are not making it public at this time.

Now, I wonder if you could tell us, if it fits with your idea of se-

curity, where you work now.

The Interpreter. Yes, I can. I work at Columbia University. Mr. Morris. And do you know Michael Schatoff, the previous witness?

The Interpreter. Yes, I know him.

Mr. Morris. How well do you know Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. During the last semester we met maybe 3 or 4 times.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Did you ever see him in the company of Mr. Shapovalov?

The Interpreter. Yes, I saw him.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that?

The Interpreter. Yes. Mr. Shapovalov was learning English at the same course.

Mr. Morris. At Columbia University?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, the man that we are talking about is the second secretary to the Soviet mission to the United Nations.

Senator Butler. Yes.

The Interpreter. I did not know he was a Soviet representative, but I know it now. I saw him meeting with Mr. Schatoff, and I think it was two times that they left the auditorium, after the lessons, together at 10 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. Morris. Now, could you approximate the time? The Interpreter. In March and April of this year.

Mr. Morris. And you say you saw Mr. Shapovalov and Mr. Schatoff together twice? You saw them leave the auditorium of Columbia University together?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you personally have any dealings with

Shapovalov?

The Interpreter. I don't know from where he knew that I speak Russian, but one evening he approached me with approximately the following words—

Mr. Morris. He even approached you, then?

The Interpreter. Yes, he did.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that speech?

The Interpreter. Shapovalov said: "I know that you are a man with a university education and that you are working here as a janitor."

Mr. Morris. Proceed.

The Interpreter (continuing). "There are better places where you

could work."

I answered him that I am very satisfied with my present work and that it has no importance whether I work as an intellectual or as a physical worker.

I saw that he was dissatified with my answer, and then I left.

Mr. Morris. Was there any other conversation that you had with him?

The Interpreter. No, there was not any.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you interpret his approach to you in any way?

The Interpreter. I think that he was approaching me as he does

it usually, to attempt to persuade me to go home to Latvia.

Mr. Morris. And in addition to the approach to you, you also can testify, as you have testified today, that Mr. Shapovalov—that you did in fact see Mr. Shapovalov in the company of Mr. Schatoff?

The Interpreter. Yes.

Mr. Morris. All right. Thank you very much for your testimony here today, sir.

(To the next witness:)

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

Senator Butler. Do you solemnly promise and declare that the evidence you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF AN UNIDENTIFIED WITNESS, AS INTERPRETED BY CONSTANTINE GRIGOROVICH-BARSKY

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, the circumstances are the same for this witness. He has given us his name and address in executive session, and he has asked us that, for the sake of security, he not put his name in the public record, and I see no reason, Senator, as far as our evidence is concerned, why we cannot comply with his request.

Senator Butler. It will be so ordered.

Mr. Morris. Do you know the witness Michael Schatoff?

The Interpreter. Yes, I know him.

Mr. Morris. Do you know a Soviet official, Aleksei Petukhov?

The Interpreter. I met him for several minutes in the company of Mr. Schatoff by accident.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us when that meeting took place?

The Interpreter. A couple of months ago I walked into a bar and ordered a beer. I saw, then, my acquaintance, Mr. Schatoff, who was sitting at the table with a person unknown to me. I approached Mr. Schatoff to greet him, to say "hello" to him. Schatoff introduced me to a man who was sitting with him and who called himself Petukhov. I didn't know at that time who he was. We exchanged a couple of insignificant sentences. I told him that I had to finish my beer and go home. He invited me to sit down to have a conversation with him, but I refused.

Mr. Morris. Who invited you to sit down? Mr. Petukhov?

The WIENESS. Mr. Petukhov.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, did you know at this time, at the time of the invitation, that he was a Soviet official?

The Interpreter. No, I did not have any idea of it.

Mr. Morris. Now, was there any other conversation between you and him?

The Interpreter. No; only insignificant sentences. One of the sentences was—I noticed that one of the guests at the bar went to take some relish and some herring which is given free to people sitting at the bar. I told Mr. Petukhov that if such a custom of giving free relish and herring was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet workers would be swarming to dine in such bars.

Apparently he did not like that remark, and he told me that much

has changed in the Soviet Union in recent times.

After that, I left the bar, and Mr. Schatoff and Petukhov remained there.

Mr. Morris. And is there anything else you can tell us about this particular episode?

The Interpreter. No, not much more.

Mr. Morris. Senator, that is all the testimony I have here.

Senator Butler. Mr. Morris, if there are no further witnesses, I will recommend that the subcommittee pursue this inquiry into the activities of Soviet U. N. representatives and that a transcript of these hearings be sent to Henry Cabot Lodge, our American Ambassador at the U. N. for immediate action.

If there are no further witnesses, the subcommittee will stand in recess until called by the Chair.

Mr. Morris. Senator, before finishing, we have issued a subpena for Mrs. Olshansky in connection with the thing that incidentally came up during the course of this inquiry, and we have also looked into the matter, and at this time we cannot find any evidence at all that there was any sign of violence or any sign of kidnaping on the part of any Soviet officials.

The only thing the record shows is that there is a presumption, because of his anti-Soviet activities, that he may have gone involuntarily. But I would like the record to show that we have no evidence

to the contrary, Senator.

Senator Butler. Very well.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in room 121, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Mr. Rusher. This is Mrs. Olshansky.

Senator Jenner. How do you do? Will you be sworn to testify? Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. Olshanky. I do.

Mr. Rusher. And Mr. Vlad Treml.

Senator Jenner. Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Treml. I do.

Mr. Rusher. Senator, before we proceed, will you accept for the record five items which I have here to be put in appropriate places in the record? They refer to previous hearings.

Senator Jenner. They will go in the record, and become a part of

the record at the appropriate place.

Mr. Rusher. Thank you.

(The document thus ordered into the record will appear at the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Treml.)

Senator Jenner. You may now proceed, counsel, with the ques-

tioning of the witness.

Mr. Schroeder. Thank you very much, Senator.

(Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 11:10 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, the same day.)

TESTIMONY OF GERDA MARGUERITA OLSHANSKY

Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and address to the re-

Mrs. Olshansky. My address is 1418 N Street NW., Washington,

D. C.

Mr. Morris. Now, for how long have you been married to Boris Olshansky?

Mrs. Olshansky. We married in 1948. Mr. Morris. And where was that marriage?

Mrs. Olshansky. In Regensburg, Bavaria, in Germany.

Mr. Morris. And what was Mr. Olshansky doing at that time? Mrs. Olshansky. We were doing nothing. We had just skipped from east to west and got married as soon as possible and we didn't have a job then. Just I worked a little bit as a housekeeper.

Mr. Morris. You were a German national at that time, were you?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And he was an escapee from the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What had he done in the Soviet Union? Mrs. Olshansky. I met my husband as a captain. Mr. Morris. He was a captain in the Soviet Army?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And he had escaped, had he, from the Soviet Union? Mrs. Olshansky. No, not then. In 1945, he was a Soviet captain. Mr. Morris. Yes. But how did you leave the Soviet Union after 1945?

Mrs. Olshansky. We lived for 2 years in East Germany and were under the Soviets. My husband was released from the Army December, one year, 1946, and he was a teacher in the Russian school there, in the Russian high school, a teacher of mathematics.

Mr. Morris. And he met you and you were married in 1948?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Morris. Now, when did you come to the United States? Mrs. Olshansky. The 2d of January 1952.

Mr. Morris. And what was his immigration status?

Mrs. Olshansky. DP.

Mr. Morris. He had DP status. Both of you?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. You had not become a citizen, however?

Mrs. Olshansky. Not yet, no.

Mr. Morris. You have applied for citizenship?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes. Mr. Morris. Had he?

Mrs. Olshansky. Well, we had our first papers. Mr. Morris. Both of you had your first papers?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, while he was in the United States, was he active in anti-Soviet work?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes, he did.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us about it to some extent. Mrs. Olshansky. My husband sold articles and columns in emigration papers, and he also wrote articles in American Mercury and New Leader, and he also wrote a book about his experience during the Second World War.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything more you would like to tell us

about his anti-Soviet activities?

Mrs. Olshansky. No; just his journalistic work.

Mr. Morris. He testified before at least one congressional committee: did he not?

Mrs. Olshansky. That is right. He testified—I cannot say it.

Mr. Morris. That is the committee that was investigating the Katyn massacre?

Mrs. Olshansky. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And did he ever express to you any feeling about re-

turning to the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Olshansky. Well, whenever we talked about it, he always knew that he will be hanged in the Soviet Union if ever he returns back or if ever he gets caught. At least, he gets 15 years of concentration camp, and he always knew this and he always expressed this

Mr. Morris. At any time did he ever give any intimation of any

weakening of his resolve not to go back to the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Olshansky. He sometimes asked me, if Soviet Russia becomes free of communism and he would go home, if I would go with him.

Mr. Morris. But not under the present circumstances?

Mrs. Olshansky. No; not with communism. If ever it becomes free, he said, if I would go to Russia with him. I always answered that this would be a reason for divorce. So he always knew I refused to go to Russia.

Mr. Morris. He did not at any time express a desire to go to the

Soviet Union?

Mrs. Olshansky. No; not at any time. Mr. Morris. Or any inclination whatever?

Mrs. Olshansky. No.

Mr. Morris. Now, what was his employment, Mrs. Olshansky? Mrs. Olshansky. We used to live in New York for 1 year. My husband worked for the American committee in New York for a while.

Mr. Morris. Which American committee is that?

Mrs. Olshansky. I don't know what it is.

Mr. Epstein, do you know?

Mr. Epstein. American Committee for the Liberation of Bolshevism, Radio Liberation.

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Epstein, who happens to be one of the people listening to this hearing today, has suggested that it was the American Committee for the Liberation-

Mr. Epstein. Liberation of Communism.

Mr. Morris. Liberation of Communism. Is that the organization?

Mrs. Olshansky. That is right.

And later my husband obtained a job here at Georgetown University as a teacher of the Russian language, and we moved to Washington. He worked there for a year and a half.

Mr. Morris. What did he do in Washington?

Mrs. Olshansky. Well, he was a teacher at the Georgetown University. Then he lost his job. He was unemployed for a couple of months, and then he started to write scripts for Voice of America again, and for Free Europe. Besides, he worked in a bookstore at

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was experiencing financial difficul-

ties?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us how he got his job at Georgetown University?

Mrs. Olshansky. Mr. Boldyreff.

Mr. Morris. He helped him get the job?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, when did you last see your husband?

Mrs. Olshansky. I saw my husband last time when he went to the airport to leave for Montreal.

Mr. Morris. This is in connection with the assignment that you

had assumed he was taking up?

Mr. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us when you first heard about that assignment?

Mrs. Olshansky. That my husband is missing?

Mr. Morris. No. He had an offer for a job, did he not?

Mrs. Olshansky. Oh, I see.

Mr. Morris. Tell us when you first heard about that offer for a

job?

Mrs. Olshansky. It was a month ago. My husband said he is going to have a better job with a better salary, and I asked him what He said it is a job we were talking about since 2 years for the paper, Possev.

Mr. Morris. Now, who had offered him that job?

Mrs. Olshansky. Mr. Romarov, in Germany, Frankfurt-am-Main.

Mr. Morris. Now, when had that offer been made?
Mrs. Olshansky. We were talking about this for 2 years. I didn't let my husband go 2 years ago. I wanted him to wait. Unless he had citizenship, I feared he wouldn't come back.

Mr. Morris. You mean your fear was based on immigration diffi-

culties, and not for any other reason?

Mrs. Olshansky. It is too dangerous for him to live in Germany right now, because of the Soviets.

Mr. Morris. So you were opposed to his taking this trip, or taking

this assignment?

Mrs. Ölshansky. Well, my huband did not tell me that he goes to Germany. He knew that I would be against it, even right now. He said he is going to work for Possev, but in New York, and maybe later on he had to go to Germany for that work. So I did not know when he had left that he was leaving for Germany, but for New York.

Mr. Morris. So when he left on June 4, you did not know he was

en route to Germany? Mrs. Olshansky. No.

Mr. Morris. You thought he was going to New York?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes. But he told my son that he is going to Germany, and he has to tell me now that he is on the way to Germany, because he did-

Mr. Morris. How old is your son?

Mrs. Olshansky. He is 15.

Mr. Morris. Was he the son of Mr. Olshansky?

Mr. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. He is not your son, though, is he, Mrs. Olshansky?

Mrs. Olshansky. No.

Mr. Morris. He was the son of Mr. Olshansky by a previous marriage?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, you say that Mr. Olshansky told him——Mrs. Olshansky. Yes, to tell me——

Mr. Morris (continuing). To tell you that he had gone to Germany?

Mrs. Olshansky. To tell me that he had gone to Germany.

Mr. Morris. And you have not seen him since June 4?

Mrs. Olshansky. No.

Mr. Morris. Have you heard from him since June 4?

Mrs. Olshansky. Not until the last letter we had last week, Tues-

Mr. Morris. Tuesday of last week?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes, when I received the letter from Moscow.

Mr. Morris. You received a letter from Moscow?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that letter?

Mrs. Olshansky. I received one letter which was written to my little son, Victor. It was written in Russian, and he said that he is in Moscow now and thinking all the time about his children, his family. Then at the same time, I had a little paper that the postman dropped in my post box that I had to pick up a registered letter at the post office, and I became suspicious that it might be a letter of my husband. I went to the post office right away and it was a letter from my husband written by himself and had the post stamps from

Mr. Morris. And what did he say in that letter?

Mrs. Olshansky. He said that he is in Moscow and he asked me to follow him with my children right away, not to be afraid and to meet my husband in Moscow. He would stay in Moscow and wait for my answer.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any other letter from him?

Mrs. Olshansky. Just these two, but he mentioned that he wrote more letters which obviously I did not receive.

Mr. Morris. Now, let me see. You say that your son received a

post card?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you received a registered letter?

Mrs. Olshansky. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And you have received no other letters?

Mrs. Olshansky. No other letters.

Mr. Morris. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Morris. Back on the record.

Now, were both the letter and the post card delivered by the United

States post office?

Mrs. Olshansky. No. The registered letter had been postmarked and delivered by the post office. But the other letter was given to me by the lady next door. It had no post stamps.

Mr. Morris. The other letter you referred to was a post card?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, did that have a postmark on it? Mrs. Olshansky. It had no postmark on it; no.

Mr. Morris. You say the woman next door gave it to you?

Mrs. Olshansky. That is right. Mr. Morris. Where did she get it?

Mrs. Olshansky. She said it was dropped in her post box. It had my address, but it was dropped in her post box.

Mr. Morris. But it did not have any postmark on it? Mrs. Olshansky. It did not have any postmark on it. Mr. Morris. Where are this letter and post card now? Mrs. Olshansky. I gave it to the FBI for copying.

Mr. Morris. Now, they will return it to you, will they not?

Mis. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mrs. Olshansky, when they return it will you allow us to see it in the event that we may want to make photostatic copies or examine them for the purpose of this inquiry?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, are there any other facts, Mrs. Olshansky, that you feel that Senate Internal Security Subcommittee should know in trying to determine the circumstances surrounding your husband's departure to Moscow?

Let us just state for the record here what we are trying to do. This Internal Security Subcommittee is trying to determine the nature and

scope of Soviet activities in the United States.

Now, if your husband voluntarily returned, if that is the case, we would like to know what Soviet officials here may have had an influence on him. If, of course, his departure was involuntary, then we want to know the circumstances surrounding this involuntary departure.

Mrs. Olshansky. I myself cannot believe my husband went to Moscow by himself. There are so many reasons. At first he did love

his own family very much.

Mr. Morris. You just relax now, Mrs. Olshansky. I know this must be very difficult.

Mrs. Olshansky. I catch myself up in a minute.

Mr. Morris. You take your time now.

Mrs. Olshansky. He was always a good father and worried about his children, and if ever he would have to return to Russia, he would know in what difficulty he leaves me here. The second reason is that he knows what is expecting him. He always knew it.

Mr. Morris. He knows what awaits him in the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Olshansky. He would know that there is no life for him; he has to be executed or to live in a concentration camp. He knew this. Those are the two reasons.

Then my husband was very happy to have a job now which gives him better pay and gives him—he could support his family better, and it was going to be all right here after we made some money and we could live happy here. He thought a great lot about the job he became at Possev. So I see no reason why my husband should go of his own will to Russia.

And by the way, he also did not take his luggage along to Russia. As I remember, when we escaped from East to West my husband did not take a suit, nothing with him, but he took his personal souvenirs, his letters from our first love letters and the letters of his wife. had them always in his hand. He would not leave them for nothing.

And now he just sent them to Germany, as we know his luggage is in Germany.

Mr. Morris. Now, you say he did not take his luggage? Mrs. Olshansky. No; he did not take his luggage.

Mr. Morris. It is in Germany?

Mrs. Olshansky. No. It is not in Germany.

Mr. Morris. He took it from home?

Mrs. Olshansky. He did take it from home. Mr. Morris. Where is his luggage now?

Mrs. Olshansky. His luggage is in Bremerhaven, in Germany.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mrs. Olshansky. Just a few days ago the publisher from Possev wrote a letter to us. The company of the ship wants my answer what to do with my husband's luggage, to mail it back or what to do with it. There are two suitcases in Bremerhaven.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you have gotten word from Possev

that his baggage arrived in Bremerhaven?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes; that is right.

Mr. Morris. Did they tell you by what means, by what route his

baggage had arrived in Bremerhaven?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes. They said it came with the boat, the Seven Seas, exactly the boat my husband was supposed to take to Germany.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you do now know that he booked pas-

sage on the liner Seven Seas?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes. He intended to go with the boat, the Seven Seas, to Germany.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mrs. Olshansky. Because his luggage was on the boat, and my husband cannot have too much time here. He left here the 4th of June and the boat was supposed to leave the 5th of June. So he just shortly arrived in Montreal, and he just could place his luggage on the boat and he had to leave the other. That is my own theory.

Mr. Morris. Now, did he have his baggage personally with him when he left on the 4th, or had he sent his baggage on ahead?

Mrs. Olshansky. No. When he left, he had two suitcases.

Mr. Morris. And those were the two suitcases?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes; the ones that are at Bremerhaven.

Mr. Morris. And you do not have any independent knowledge whether he himself was on the ship to Bremerhaven?

Mrs. Olshansky. No. I don't know anything where he

Mr. Morris. What line operates the Seven Seas?

Mrs. Olshansky. I couldn't find out.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else that you feel you should tell the committee at this time, Mrs. Olshansky? Have you heard from the Possev people in Germany other than the notification that

his baggage had arrived?

Mrs. Olshansky. No. They wrote a letter about 5 weeks after my husband was missing. They informed me that my husband did not arrive in Germany and that they fear my husband has been attacked by the Russians and something happened to him. They asked me to report it right away and to ask for help and to search for my husband.

I reported it right away to the FBI, but we could not find anything

out until we had the letter from Moscow.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mrs. Olshansky, the staff of the committee now has your telephone number and you have the number of the subcommittee; have you not?

Mrs. Olshansky. Not yet; no.

Mr. Morris. We will give it to you. And if anything develops on this, will you call us, Mr. Schroeder here-

Mrs. Olshansky. I shall.

Mr. Morris (continuing). Who will see that you have our number and how you can reach us day and night. If there are any developments, will you keep us informed?

Mrs. Olshansky. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you come forward, Mr. Treml? Mr. Treml. Yes. And may I have this with me?

Mr. Morris. Surely.

TESTIMONY OF VLAD TREML, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Treml, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. Treml. Vlad Treml. Mr. Morris. Where do you reside?

Mr. Treml. At 247 Vermont Street, apartment 16, Brooklyn 7, N. Y.

Mr. Morris. And what is your occupation?

Mr. Treml. I am a graduate student at Columbia University, and I have a part-time job at night in a brokerage house.

Mr. Morris. Where were you born, Mr. Treml?

Mr. Treml. I was born in the Soviet Union, at Kharkov.

Mr. Morris. And you left the Soviet Union during the war; did you not ?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Were you in Germany during the years 1944 to 1950? Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Did you work for the International Refugee Organiza-

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. For what period of time?

Mr. Treml. For 3 years.

Mr. Morris. And then what else did you do in Germany?
Mr. Treml. I worked for the Technical Intelligence Branch, European Command, United States Army.

Mr. Morris. What did you do for them?

Mr. Treml. I was a monitor. I was monitoring the Soviet broadcasts, interpreting, and I was reading the news.

Mr. Morris. And when did you come to the United States?

Mr. Treml. In April 1950.

Mr. Morris. Have you served in the military forces of the United States?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir. For 2 years I was serving with the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. Morris. And what rank did you have?

Mr. Treml. I was honorably discharged with the rank of corporal,

Mr. Morris. What branch of service were you in in the marines?

What section of the marines?

Mr. Treml. I was attached to the G-2, Intelligence Section of the Headquarters of the 2d Division, and I was instructor on communism, Soviet weapons, Soviet Army, and Soviet economics for the intelligence school of the division.

Mr. Morris. Where was the Headquarters of the 2d Marine Divi-

sion?

Mr. Tremt. Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with an organization called the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir. In Russian this organization is called the

NTS, and I am a member of the NTS since 1946.

Mr. Morris. You are married; are you not, Mr. Theml?

Mr. TREML. Yes; I am married.

Mr. Morris. And you have how many children?

Mr. Treml. One child.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Treml, do you know Mr. Boris Olshansky?
Mr. Treml. Yes, sir. I know Mr. Boris Olshansky personally.
Mr. Morris. When did you first meet Boris Olshansky?

Mr. Treml. I don't exactly remember the year, but this was a few weeks after his arrival in this country, when I was assigned by the NTS to help him find an apartment in Brooklyn.

Mr. Morris. Have you seen him regularly since that time?

Mr. Treml. A few times, sir.

Mr. Morris. Could you tell the committee anything about Mr. Olshansky that may be helpful in connection with this present inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his recent departure from the United States and his appearance in Moscow?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir. First, I would like to give the committee a few details about his planned trip to Germany and the assignment

he took with the newspaper, Possev.

Mr. Morris. Now, are you acquainted with those details?

Mr. TREML. Yes, sir; I am acquainted, and I am officially authorized to speak on behalf of the United States branch of the NTS.

Mr. Morris. You are authorized to speak here today?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what the NTS is, in connection with Mr. Olshansky? What is the relationship between Mr. Olshansky and

the NTS?

Mr. Treml. About a year ago Mr. Olshansky suggested that he would go to Germany to work for the NTS newspaper, Possev, in Frankfurt, Germany, and for several months there were several exchanges of letters, and then finally the editor of Possev accepted his proposal and arrangements were made for his transfer to Germany, where he was supposed to live in Frankfurt and work just as a regular staff writer, staff journalist, at Possev and for the magazine Grani.

The NTS knew Mr. Olshansky as a very gifted journalist and a gifted writer. Here is the book he published, a very interesting, fiercely anti-Communist book, "We Come From the East." This

would be the English translation of it.

Besides this, Mr. Olshansky was known that he had written various, from my point of view, excellent anti-Communist articles in Russian

emigrant newspapers. He was broadcasting and he was writing scripts for Voice of America. In general, he was known as a very gifted writer and as an anti-Communist. And he accepted the proposal that he would be working for Possev for 350 deutschemarks that is German currency—per month, which is the regular salary in Frankfurt, where everybody receives the same sum.

In addition to this, the NTS agreed to pay \$100 monthly support for his wife and children, who were supposed to stay in Washington, D. C., and the NTS agreed to pay all his expenses incurred during

his trip to Germany.

Mr. Morris. They would pay his expenses and pay his wife \$100 a

month in Washington?

Mr. Treml. Yes, as long as he is employed by Possev in Frankfurt. Arrangements were made for Mr. Olshansky to go to Germany on May 11, 1956.

Mr. Morris. The arrangements for him to depart on May 11, or

arrangements were made on May 11 for him to depart?

Mr. Treml. No; for him to depart on May 11. But he could not get everything cleared with the immigration office. And the trip was postponed until June the 4th, and he was supposed to leave on the steamship Seven Seas, Happag-Lloyd Lines. They are the travel agency which was assigned—the Happag-Lloyd sent the tickets for the sea voyage from Germany. The tickets were purchased in Frankfurt and sent to Mr. Olshansky. And on June the 4th, Mr. Olshansky was supposed to leave Washington, D. C., by plane to Montreal, Canada.

Mr. Morris. He was supposed to leave Washington?

Mr. Treml. He was supposed to leave Washington, D. C. I have a letter from him, not addressed to me, but addressed to Mr. Samarin, who is the head of the United States branch of the NTS, and the letter said that he is ready to depart.

Mr. Morris. That was mailed from Washington?

Mr. Treml. It was postmarked in Washington. As a matter of fact, I have two letters. The first one—the first sentence is: "I am writing this letter 3 hours before departure."

The second letter is just that he received some money; he thanks, and he shakes Mr. Samarin's hand, "sincerely yours, yours truly."

Mr. Morris. Now, will you make these available for our record? Mr. Treml. Yes, sir, these and——

Mr. Morris. Now, just put the portions in the record that may be relevant to this inquiry. There is some personal material in the letter; is there not?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. If it is put into the published record, we will take those personal things out that do not relate to the subject of this inquiry.

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you have any reason to believe that he did not

go directly from Washington to Montreal?

Mr. TREML. In his letter he says that his plane would stop in New York, but for such a short period that he won't be able to see Mr. Samarin. I was not able to get anything out of the airlines. So I have no information about whether he actually did go to Montreal or not.

Mr. Morris. In other words, no inquiries were made at this time as to whether or not he left the plane at New York when it stopped?

Mr. Treml. Not by us.

May I just present a few more facts?

Mr. Morris. By all means.

Mr. Treml. Then on June 26, we received a telegram from Frankfurt telling us that Mr. Olshansky did not arrive in Bremerhaven on the ship, the Seven Seas. We immediately notified the proper authorities about his being missing, and started to conduct inquiries, trying to check on his whereabouts.

Recently, about a week ago, we received a telegram and then a

letter from Germany that his luggage arrived in Bremerhaven.

Mr. Morris. Was Bremerhaven the port that the Seven Seas was to go into?

Mr. Treml. The destination; yes, sir.

The question might arise why it would take so long, from June 5 until July 9, because a sea voyage to Europe takes about 5 or 6 days. This was a very small line which stopped at various points between, like Quebec and various other cities.

Mr. Morris. Have you checked from the steamship line whether

or not he was ever on the ship?

Mr. Treml. He had never entered the ship, and neither did he cancel his reservation, which he had on the ship.

his reservation, which he had on the ship.

Mr. Morris. But the baggage did arrive?

Mr. Treml. The baggage did arrive.

Mr. Morris. Did you ascertain how the baggage arrived aboard

ship?

Mr. Treml. No, we could not. All we know is that the steamship told our agent in Bremerhaven that he never boarded the ship again. Neither up to the present moment did the ticket turn up any place. It was neither canceled nor sent back nor cashed. At least, the travel agency which usually arranges for all our trips didn't receive the ticket.

Mr. Morris. When you say "never boarded the ship again," you mean "never boarded the ship"?

Mr. Treml. Yes; never boarded the ship.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Treml, do you know of anyone who saw Mr. Olshansky after he had boarded the airliner in Washington, June 4?

Mr. Treml. We were told by Mr. Rudolph—

Mr. Morris. That is Colonel Rudolph?

Mr. Treml. Yes; Colonel Rudolph, who works for Radio Liberation, that he received a call allegedly from Mr. Olshansky, but Mr. Rudolph was not home at that time, and the landlady just took down the name. Unfortunately, Mr. Rudolph doesn't remember the exact day, or at least he didn't remember when he told us, but all he can remember was that this was after June 10.

Mr. Morris. That was the day that Mr. Rudolph was in Wash-

ington?

Mr. Treml. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Rudolph also has stated, has he not—at least, he has told me this on the telephone, and I am asking you if you know anything about it—that his landlady was a person who would not recognize Mr. Olshansky's voice if she heard it?

Mr. Treml. I don't know. Mr. Morris. You don't know.

Now, is there anyone else who saw or heard from Mr. Olshansky while he was in New York or in Montreal?

Mr. Treml. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Morris. Or any place else in the United States?
Mr. Treml. No, sir. We checked with various members of the NTS in New York and in Montreal in our group, and nobody either saw or heard from Mr. Olshansky in this period between the 4th and the present day.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else, Mr. Treml, that you can tell the subcommittee with respect to this inquiry that we are making, surrounding the circumstances of his disappearance to Moscow?

Mr. Treml. Yes. We want to present our interpretation.

course, we cannot be sure, because we do not know all the facts.

Mr. Morris. But what you have told us up to now are direct facts that you know?

Mr. Treml. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you would like to present to the committee your interpretation?

Mr. Treml. My interpretation, and a few more either facts or a few

more points from his letter which may be enlightening.

Mr. Morris. Proceed, Mr. Treml.

Mr. TREML. In the first place, since we are more or less well informed about the methods and the purposes of the activities of the Soviet agents in the United States, it would surprise us very much if Mr. Olshansky was a Soviet agent.

Mr. Morris. You mean, you are considering the possibility that he

has been a Soviet agent through the years?

Mr. Treml. Yes. If he was a Soviet agent, he would be most definitely told to go to Frankfurt, at least for several weeks, because, from various sources, we know that the Soviet Government is highly opposed to our organization, and this would give the Soviet Government a wonderful propaganda weapon if Olshansky would go to Frankfurt and then go to the Soviet Union.

In addition to this, if Mr. Olshansky was a Soviet agent, he would, of course, bring some material to Moscow, like addresses, names, and possibly pictures from Frankfurt. This is one reason to believe that

he was not a Soviet agent, and he didn't go of his own will.

Mr. Morris. Of course, you base that on just the facts that are available to you?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Without raising any issue about what things could have happened. If that was the case, and purely suppositious, he could have learned that his identity was known and he might have made a fast departure. So it does not rule it out completely.

Mr. Treml. It is possible.

The second reason is this. If he wanted his wife to be in Moscow with him, why didn't he take her and his children together with him, because it is quite normal that anybody in this country can declare his intention to return to the country of origin.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Treml, his wife's views on her refusal to go to

Moscow were pretty well known.

Mr. Treml. So were—

Mr. Morris. In fact, you heard her testimony here today that under no circumstances would she ever consent. In fact, when he left here, he had to leave on the assumption, until he told her, that he was going only to New York, and not to Germany.

But continue, Mr. Treml.

Mr. TREML. Mr. Olshansky, of course, knew quite well what he should expect in the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, he told on various occasions to our NTS members about the future of those who are foolish enough to return to the Soviet Union. So he was well aware of the fact that he would be punished and possibly sentenced to years in prison or a concentration camp, and so on.

Now, there are a few points about his marriage life. Mr. Morris. Just a minute, now. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.) Mr. Morris. Proceed.

Mr. Treml. According to what we know, he lived separately from his wife, and they had certain difficulties in the past for which he was

to blame, as far as we know.

Mr. Olshansky had certain human weaknesses and his married life in the last few years was not exactly a happy one. There are reasons to believe that he was influenced in his decision to go to Germany by his desire either forever to part with his wife or at least to separate for some time. In a letter which I would present to the committee for the record, he asks us not to reveal to his wife his destination, that he is going to write to her personally. Then he makes a comment about the generally strange nature of this woman who was so dear to him, but who made his life so difficult.

Now again, it would be very strange if Mr. Olshansky, after his arrival in Moscow, would suddenly change his mind and invite his

wife to join him in Moscow.

Mr. Morris. You are making reference to the fact that his letter, which has become known to you, urged his wife to come to Moscow?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.
If we assume that Mr. Olshansky was a Soviet agent and went voluntarily, for a few weeks, at least, he would be a celebrity in Moscow, and nobody would approach him with any requests to write a letter against his will.

Now, I believe that this letter was, according to all the evidence we have, written against his will. It was just directly dictated to

Mr. Morris. You feel that because his wife and he were, in fact, separated, that an invitation to her to come there did not properly reflect the attitude that you knew at the time?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

In addition to this, in this letter—I have not seen the letter, but I was told that in this letter he requests her to send his luggage from Washington to Moscow. Now, since we know that he took all of his belongings with him to Canada, this is interpreted, at least by his wife, as she told us, that he wants her not to believe this letter, because it is a known fact that he didn't leave anything behind in Washington; that, in general, this is a confused letter which does not correspond either to the facts, nor would reflect the true family relations.

Mr. Morris. We will have the letter, Mr. Treml.

Mrs. Olshansky, as you heard, has told us that when she receives the letter from the FBI, it will be made available to us. And if the point is as you say it is, it is certain that the committee will look into it.

Mr. Treml. Now, what could have happened, in our opinion, is this. Mr. Olshansky was an anti-Communist and was a gifted person, an intelligent person, but he had certain weaknesses and he had many difficulties, in this country especially. He could not adjust himself to life in the United States. He changed various jobs and various positions. He always had financial difficulties.

I personally was in contact with him for about half a year when he was asking me to arrange for him to be employed by the stockbroker I work for, and at least on the phone he just sounded desperate, "We

are just about starving, no money, no position," and so on. Now, I quote from his letter of February 25, 1956.

Mr. Morris. His letter to you?

Mr. TREML. A letter to Mr. Samarin. All these letters are to Mr. Samarin.

If I am going to stay in this country for 1 or 2 more years, I am going to go down. The only way out for me is to go to Germany to work.

According to the entire letter, the work he makes reference to is the work for the NTS.

In the next letter, he refers to work in Possev as the "searchlight of my life." That is a direct translation.

Mr. Morris. This indicated to you that he was very anxious to take up this job in Germany?

Mr. Treml. Yes. And in another letter he calls the departure and

the work in Germany the "present purpose" of his life.

We were aware of certain weaknesses in his character, and we, of course, in a polite form, warned him about the conditions in Frankfurt, and that 350 deutschemarks is not very much, and that the people worked very hard in Frankfurt, and so on, and that he would have to adjust himself. And I believe he personally was thinking of his trip

to Germany as the last resort, the last chance he had.

Now, if any blackmail or anything interfered with his doing his trip, if, for instance, he became intoxicated or anything which could put some blame on his name, he would probably know that the NTS would cancel the entire arrangement, and, of course, then, according to the letter, according to the interpretation that he gave of this, according to all the hopes he had about this job, he could become quite desperate.

Now, his two weaknesses he had could have made him a very easy

target for the Soviet intelligence agents here.

Mr. Morris. Tell me, did he have the reputation of drinking? Is

that the weakness you referred to?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir; at least, I heard it from several of his friends, and it was claimed. He was not an alcoholic or not a drunkard, but he was seen intoxicated several times.

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else, Mr. Treml, any other facts that you think we should have in connection with this inquiry?

Mr. Treml. I would just like to mention the fact that I have just finished to prepare a special report for the Tolstoy Foundation in New York about the entire Soviet redefection campaign, and I believe this report would show a quite impressive Soviet intelligence net, at least in large metropolitan centers.

Mr. Morris. Now, is that report almost ready?

Mr. TREML. The report is ready in a draft form and is being edited

Mr. Morris. When will you have that? Mr. Treml. I would say in a few days, sir.

Mr. Morris. Will you offer that just as soon as you have it, for our record?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And that will be in a few days?

Mr. Treml. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Just as soon as you have that ready, will you notify us? Mr. Treml. I do not know whether the subcommittee might be interested-

Mr. Morris. This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Treml. Has Mr. Olshansky ever

actually worked for the NTS?

Mr. TREML. He has only written several articles for the Possev, but he was never actually working for the NTS, nor was he a member of the NTS.

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much, Mr. Treml.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following documents, two letters from refugees and a press release of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee dated March 13, were ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on June 26:)

NEW YORK, June 3, 1956.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

Chief Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee, The Senate, Washington, D. C .:

We are very glad that you, dear Senator, most honorable President of the United States of America, and the majority of honorable Congressmen wish to help us. We don't doubt that you have the best intentions. I am in the same position as many others. I had a talk with 4 Communist agents: 2 Russians and 2 residents of South America. There was no pressure; there were only explanations. Although they do have some trump cards against me, I know from past experience that they are not going to use them as long as I am not too active. The agents spoke to me in a friendly manner. They probably were in-

formed about my temper. Besides, I don't walk around emptyhanded.

Dear Senator, I cannot appear before you because after that I will become an illegal resident. At once some of the so-called legal but actually dark forces who were responsible for the death of millions in Austria, Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and the United States of America, will start proceedings against me. At present we are law-abiding citizens. It is safer this way. And now N. Khrushchev's visit to the United States is expected. God knows how all this will end. I noticed only one thing: that Washington actions forced the Cominform agents to withdraw. Even the number of the house of the local branch of the Michailov repatriation committee was recently rubbed off.

Very truly yours,

[Signature illegible.]

JUNE 15, 1956.

To Whom It May Concern:

I am suffering with "Berezovski sickness." Here is a short autobiography of my tragical life. This is what made me change my name and birthplace.

I am White Russian but in all my papers I wrote that I was born in Poland. I was born in a small village and was educated in a public school. I was raised in middle-class family.

In 1929 it was the beginning of sending people to concentration camps. My first relatives to be sent were Peter and his family of 13 members—8 of them died in the concentration camp.

In 1930 my father and sister were on the way to Siberia but they escaped and lived on forged papers. In that same year my aunt was sent to Siberia but a group of five people, including her, escaped. She also lived on false papers.

The others were not as fortunate as those who escaped. In 1930 my brotherin-law was sent to concentration camp in Far East. My uncle, in 1930, was

sent to concentration camp at Vladivostok for 5 years.

In 1935 my other uncle was sent to concentration camp at Karand. He was sent on NKVD line for 5 years. In 1937 my aunt was sent to concentration camp at Marinsk, Siberia, for 10 years on NKVD line.

Many of my close relatives were shot by the Communists. In 1942 my 8-year-old cousin and 70-year-old uncle were shot by the Communists. In that same

year my aunt and second cousin were shot by the Communists.

In Germany, I and 12 other members of our family worked on a farm. In December of 1944, Soviet Army was coming to that farm; I and four members of my family escaped to the region where American Army occupied. The other eight members were lost and by this day I don't know what has happened to them.

After the war I had to change my name and birthplace from White Russia to Poland. I done this because for me and my family there was a danger of forced deportation to U. S. S. R. After my change I and my family were accepted into Polish camp.

We came into United States on a false name. We would like very much to become citizens of the United States. We live in United States and obey all laws and pay all the taxes. I always be ready to take arms against Communists.

I am asking the Congress of the United States to look at my hardship.

If you want more information I will be glad to give it to you. You can send any message to be published in Novoye Russkoye Slovo, 243 West 56th Street, New York 19, N. Y. I will be looking for it.

Thank you.

Washington, March 13.—Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat, Mississippi, said today he had been assured that a deportation order against Klaus Samueli Romppanen, a former ammunitions inspector for the Finnish Army, will be reviewed.

Romppanen was scheduled to sail for his homeland tomorrow.

Senator Eastland said he had been assured by the office of Gen. J. M. Swing, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, that the deportation order will be stayed until it can be reviewed by the Commissioner's office.

A statement which appeared in the press on March 9 said Romppanen had turned over, to the United States Defense Department, official documents con-

cerning Communist activities in Helsinki.

Senator Eastland, who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and of its Internal Security Subcommittee, said he has asked Commissioner Swing to

determine the truth or falsity of the statement.

"I feel," he said, "that the circulation of such a statement could be harmful to the security of this country. Accordingly, I asked Commissioner Swing to make a careful review of the case and to advise the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of his findings.

"I was informed by his office today that this will be done."

(The following article from the New York Times was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on July 25:)

[New York Times, July 20, 1956]

ARMENIANS SEEK TO RETURN TO UNITED STATES

EMIGRES WHO WENT TO SOVIET IN 1947–49 ASK EISENHOWER TO HELP THEM COME BACK

By Harry Schwartz

From Erivan in Soviet Armenia has come a dramatic appeal to President Eisenhower to permit the return to the United States of a group of Armenians who emigrated to the Soviet Union during 1947–49.

The appeal was given in Erivan to a New York businessman who visited there recently as a member of a delegation to the Soviet Union. The American,

who requested anonymity, returned here this week.

"We now appeal to the magnanimity of the Government of the United States, to forgive us, its errant children, who want to return home," the handwritten appeal says. "We feel we have paid the penalty of our mistake and we did our American-born children a great injustice in depriving them of their right to live as Americans."

The document explains why these former Americans wish to return home

in these words:

"We have gone through all manner of hardships and discrimination to maintain our sustenance, but the greatest of our suffering has been the lack of freedom and justice. It is solely this reason for which we and our children cannot adapt ourselves to this mode of life and remain here.

"Many among us tried to get in touch with our Ambassador since 1948, for which attempt they were arrested and exiled from 10 to 15 years, often without

trial. Included were young boys of 17, a young girl of 18, and a woman.

FEAR IS EXPRESSED

The fear of the group that sent the petition is expressed in one paragraph: "In closing we plead for precaution and not to expose us to publicity until such time as you think safe. For the threat of Siberia is ever imminent. Also, if you ever hear or receive anything that we are not desirous to return, please understand that such a paper has been forged or forced upon us."

The New Yorker who brought back the appeal explained he had decided to make it public because of his hope that publicity might enable congressional action to be taken to help the disillusioned former Americans. He sent the appeal yesterday to a State Department official for transmission to President Eisenhower.

In Erivan, the businessman, he was told that about 300 persons had gone to Soviet Armenia from the United States. The adults are believed to have given up their United States citizenship and become Soviet citizens, but it is believed that the minor children who accompanied them retained their United States citizenship.

"I talked to about 30 of these people in Erivan," the New Yorker said. "They were from Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and other cities and were desperately

anxious to know about the United States and their hometowns.

"Their condition was heart-rending. They earn from 350 to 550 rubles a month. On that pay scale a day's wages are just enough to buy a pound and a half of sugar. Their wives all have to work and one wife made 300 rubles a month, I was told. One woman told me she had sold everything she had, including her wedding ring, in order to survive."

SOME HAVE ADJUSTED

He added that he had been told a few of the former Americans had adjusted and were satisfied. The leader of one of the groups of emigrants is now an important figure in Soviet Armenia and a member of the Armenian supreme court.

Some of the emigrants admitted they had been members of the Communist Party in the United States, the New Yorker said. They also told of having been promised they could return to the United States within 2 years if they did not like Soviet Armenia. But after their arrival and disillusionment they found there was no way to return.

One United States Government official aware of the appeal said its publication might have a powerful deterrent effect on the present Soviet campaign to induce

former Soviet and eastern European citizens to return home.

The New Yorker reported that he had been told by the United States Embassy in Moscow that its personnel were not permitted to go to Armenia and therefore had no way of getting into contact with the would-be repatriates.

Several months ago when Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister, visited Erivan he was besieged in the streets by Armenians who had emigrated from

France and who begged him to help them return there.

A visitor to Erivan last October met several former Americans who similarly pleaded they be allowed to return to the United States. They painted a grlm picture of hunger and oppression and declared themselves to have been fools to have believed Soviet promises and to have emigrated. One of them said;

"I was a GI in World War II. I just hope United States troops march in here and when they do I am going to go back on active duty by reporting to the nearest commanding officer."

(The following documents were entered in the record during the foregoing hearing, in addition to others which have been attached to testimony to which they referred and therefore appear in other printed volumes. Correspondence relating to the subcommittee's report on recording of jury deliberations, published July 12, 1956: (1) Letter July 15, Chairman Eastland to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., submitting report as directed by subcommittee; (2) acknowledgement by Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers:)

JULY 10, 1956.

Hon. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,

Attorney General of the United States,

Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I herewith enclose a transcript of the record and a report thereon by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the recent investigation into the recording of jury deliberations.

I call your attention to the recommendation of the subcommittee which reads: "That the transcript of these hearings be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for his examination and determination as to whether any violation of the law occurred during the operation of this project by the University

of Chicago."

On January 9, 1956, I introduced S. 2887 (to further protect and assure the privacy of grand or petit juries in the courts of the United States while such juries are deliberating or voting), which passed the Senate and is now before the House Judiciary Committee. I am also enclosing a copy of this bill, together with the report thereon.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

United States Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Washington, D. C., July 17, 1956.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND.

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: On behalf of the Attorney General I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of July 10, enclosing a transcript of record and accompanying report thereon of the recent investigation by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary into the recording of Jury deliberations and also a copy of your bill (S. 2887), to further protect and assure the privacy of grand or petit juries in the courts of the United States while such juries are deliberating or voting, and the report of your committee thereon.

This matter will receive careful consideration by this Department.

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, Washington, July 25, 1956.

Hon. James O. Eastland, United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: This will reply to your letter of July 10, 1956, forwarding to the Attorney General a transcript of the record and report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's investigation of the recording of jury deliberations.

The hearings do not disclose any conduct in violation of existing Federal criminal laws.

On January 6, 1956, the Attorney General addressed letters to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives transmitting proposed legislation to make it a criminal offense to eavesdrop upon or record in any manner the deliberations or proceedings of Federal juries. In submitting the proposed legislation, the communications stated that there is no Federal rule or statute which now specifically prohibits eavesdropping upon the proceedings or deliberations of Federal juries.

With respect to S. 2887 which passed the Senate on March 26, 1956, the Deputy Attorney General in a letter to the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary on April 16, 1956, urged favorable consideration of that bill.

Sincerely,

WARREN OLNEY III, Assistant Attorney General.



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in room 232, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins (presiding).

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator Watkins. The committee will now be in session.

Mr. Martin, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Martin. I do.

Senator Watkins. You may continue with the hearing.

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS N. MARTIN, DETROIT, MICH.

Mr. Morris. What is your name, sir?

Mr. Martin. Nicholas N. Martin, M-a-r-t-i-n.

Mr. Morris. Where do you reside?

Mr. Martin. At 17922 Brush Street, Detroit 3, Mich. Mr. Morris. And what is your present occupation?

Mr. Martin. I am promoting the American Eagle spark plugs for the American Eagle Corp.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you are a salesman?

Mr. Martin. Well, salesman and public-relations man for the company.

Mr. Morris. Have you been the controller of a Rumanian church

 ${
m in \ Detroit \, ?}$

Mr. Martin. Pardon me; wouldn't it be better to give the name of the church?

Mr. Morris. I am asking you. What is the answer?

Mr. Martin. I was the controller of the Holy Trinity Church, 1799 State Fair Street, Detroit, Mich.

Mr. Morris. And when were you the controller? Mr. Martin. 1954; just 1 year.

Mr. Morris. What were your duties when you held that office?
Mr. Martin. Well, just checking the books, auditing the books to see that the finances of the church are in good standing.

Mr. Morris. Do you know a Bishop Moldovanu?

Mr. Martin. Yes; I do.

Mr. Morris. Who is Bishop Moldovanu?

Mr. Martin. He is the canonical bishop of the Rumanian Orthodox diocese of the United States and Canada, but there are very few parishes that recognize him as such, for the reason of having been ordained in Rumania in 1950, while the Holy Synod was under the domination of the Communist government.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Martin, was the church to which you were

controller under the see of the Rumanian Orthodox bishop-

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. That you have just described?

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Was that one of the churches that recognized his supremacy?

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. It was?

Mr. Martin. It was. Mr. Morris. Did you have any dealings, direct or indirect, with the bishop while you were acting as controller to that church?

Mr. Martin. Yes; I did.

Mr. Morris. Have you met him personally?

Mr. Martin. Yes; I know him since 1923, ever since he came to this

country.

Mr. Morris. Now, we have had testimony from Princess Ileana, who said that the man has been—I don't think she used the word "technically," but she said that he was a Communist.

Now, do you know anything about his activities which would indi-

cate that he has been working for the Communists?

Mr. Martin. Well, in my association with Bishop Moldovanu, prior to his ordination as bishop, I always found him a good American and

a good Rumanian.

After he was ordained as a bishop in 1950, I naturally held the position, even though we didn't have a bishop, but we had somebody that held—like vicar, he held the seat of bishop, and I was the adviser to the diocese and the bishop, and also the editor of the diocese newspaper, Solia.
Mr. Morris. Would you spell that for the reporter?

Mr. Martin. The newspaper Solia, S-o-l-i-a.

Now, during the time that I was associated with him, until about late 1954, they could not demonstrate much of sympathy toward the Communists, and I did not notice. They may have made efforts, but if it had been done, it was done behind my back. They knew that I was very much anticommunistic, and also wrote against the Communists, and reported them, and one thing and another, but somehow during the year 1952, while I was in the hospital for 2 months, for 2 major operations, instead of them continuing to publish my paper, because Solia was suspended, the publication, instead of continuing to publish my paper, the Rumanian Tribune, they started publishing a paper called Credinta, C-r-e-d-i-n-t-a, The Faith, in English.

Mr. Morris. When you say they published that paper, who do you

mean by "they"?

Mr. Martin. Bishop Moldovanu and Glicherie Moraru.

Mr. Morris. Would you spell that for the reporter?

Mr. Martin. The first name is G-l-i-c-h-e-r-i-e; the last name is M-o-r-a-r-u.

The reason for that, I suspected it then, was because while I was editor and publisher of this paper, they could not tell me what to do, I just run it the way I thought best for all concerned, the diocese and our country.

So, while they started this paper, Bishop Moldovanu had stated that it was Moraru's ideas and deeds to start this paper, and discontinue

mine.

Of course, I didn't have to discontinue mine because of them, but I discontinued because it couldn't be financed by the general public of the diocese.

And, while they started the paper, they left my name out altogether.

Mr. Morris. You weren't even an editor?

Mr. Martin. No; so I wouldn't have anything to say at the paper.

Mr. Morris. That was after 1950?

Mr. Martin. This was 1952, when they started.

So, I let them run it their own way.

In 1954, during the election—congressional election, Senators, and one thing and another—I used the paper, the Credinta, at giving some advertising to some of my friends, and also write up—like Senator Ferguson, Homer Ferguson, and Congressman George A. Dondero and Congressman Louis Rabaut. So, in a couple of those articles I wanted to accredit to Senator Ferguson and George Dondero their anticommunistic activities and credit them that they always were anti-Communist and pretty good workers for Rumania and against the Communist government.

And, at the time, I noticed that they left out the most important

words of exposing and attacking Communists.

Mr. Morris. Maybe they left it out because it was political.

Mr. Martin. Well. they had no right; all they could do is to tell me that they couldn't publish it, and if I wanted to—

Mr. Morris. You feel if that was the case, they should have told you

so?

Mr. Martin. Absolutely, because I was a newspaperman. That's the duty. If you don't publish a thing the way it is handed to you, you can't take the responsibility of making any correction, which they did.

And, when I received a copy for proofreading, I asked them for the manuscript.

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Martin. Was there any sign that this

Credinta was pro-Communist in orientation?

Mr. Martin. Well, I wouldn't say it was pro-Communist, but I wouldn't, either, say that it was anti, because they never published anything attacking or exposing the communistic activity in Rumania or elsewhere, but they kept kind of quiet. In other words, approving of their deeds.

Mr. Morris. It being a church publication, they possibly felt that they shouldn't go into the things that they considered might possibly

be political?

Mr. Martin. Well, you can have the pretense, but it doesn't make sense because all church newspapers, if it's anything communistic, they always expose them because the Communists hurt the cause of the church.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Martin, at the time of his ordination in 1950 in Budapest——

Mr. Martin. In Bucharest.

Mr. Morris. In Bucharest, did the bishop receive any money from

the Rumanian Communists?

Mr. Martin. Well, I must answer in a different way to expose it. May I make a statement that when he left to be ordained I advised him, as the adviser to the diocese, that he should make no connection whatsoever with anyone in Rumania, political or otherwise, outside of spiritual.

Mr. Morris. You advised him that?

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir: and I have witness to that effect, and I also told him not to touch a single Rumanian lei——

Mr. Morris. That is spelled 1-e-i?

Mr. Martin. L-e-i; which you say is American dollars. Not to touch a single Rumanian lei because as soon as he would do that he would be under obligation to the church, which is under the obligation of the Communist government in Rumania.

Mr. Morris. You being a friend of his, you so advised him prior

to the time of his investment?

Mr. Martin. Positively. And he promised not to touch anything

and accept my advice.

And when he came back I met him at the airport. The first thing I asked him after shaking hands, congratulating him, I asked him whether he followed my advice, whether he touched anything, made any connection with anyone, political or otherwise. "No."

Mr. Morris. He said "No"?

Mr. Martin. That's right; that he did not receive any money.

So it was not known until one of the priests showed me the magazine that I have sent over here.

Mr. Morris. This is the publication which I now present to you.

Will you describe that publication for the record?

Mr. Martin. This is—you may take the name from the English, over here—this is the official publication of the Rumanian patriarchate of Bucharest. The name is Biserica Orthodoxa Romana.

Mr. Morris. What is that?

Mr. Martin. These are the minutes and the decisions of the Holy Synod and the national gatherings of the Rumanian church.

Mr. Morris. In Bucharest? Mr. Martin. In Bucharest.

Mr. Morris. Is it an official publication of any kind?

Mr. Martin. This is official publication of the patriarchate and the Holy Synod. This is volume LXX, 6-8, for the months of June and August of 1952.

Mr. Morris. Where did you receive that volume?

Mr. Martin. This I received as volume from Father Moga.

Mr. Morris. Who is Father Moga?

Mr. Martin. Father Peter Moga, M-o-g-a. Mr. Morris. And who is Father Moga?

Mr. Martin. Father Moga is a Rumanian priest in Detroit, and he received this by mail from the Rumanian patriarchate, from Bucharest.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything in that volume which you have described for the subcommittee that relates to the conversation that you have just described with Bishop Moldovanu?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

After Father Moga called my attention to this, I was rather surprised to see and read about the amount of money that Bishop Moldovanu received from the Holy Synod, or from the patriarchate, because he always denied of receiving anything from them.

Now, as I see here, and as I stated there, in the financial report of the patriarchate, they say that they have given Bishop Moldovanu

1 million lei—

Mr. Morris. What page are you reading from?

Mr. Martin. Page 462. For the purpose of adding it to the funds of the monastery.

Mr. Morris. Who gave Bishop Moldovanu the 1 million lei?

Mr. MARTIN. The Rumanian patriarchate.

Mr. Morris. In Bucharest? Mr. Martin. In Bucharest.

Mr. Morris. Where did he get that money, do you know? Do you have any reason to know where he got that 1 million lei?

Mr. Martin. How he got it?

Mr. Morris. Where did the patriarchate get the 1 million lei? Mr. Martin. Well, according to this here, this magazine, the patriarchate and the Church of Rumania is subsidized by the Government.

Mr. Morris. Does that volume say so?

Mr. Martin. Yes; it's somewhere in here. And, all the clergymen are paid by the Government.

Mr. Morris. You can't tell us precisely where in that volume?

Mr. Martin. No, I have to-well-

Mr. Morris. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Morris. On the record.

Before you answer that last question, Mr. Martin, about how you know that the patriarchate gets its money from the Rumanian Government, is there any other indication in that volume that the bishop

received other lei from the patriarchate?

Mr. Martin. Yes, it's one item here, page 465, of 993,000 lei, which was given to the Cathedral of the Episcopate in America, which would mean the Cathedral of the Episcopate is the Holy Trinity Church, of which Rev. Glicherie Moraru is the pastor.

Mr. Morris. Tell me this: What is the dollar equivalent of 1 million

lei?

Mr. Martin. You get 6 lei to the dollar now, but at the time when they got the money, Moraru claimed he was selling the dollar for 300 leis; that is, he was paying 300 leis for the dollar.

Now, that is his say-so. That is all I know. I don't know more

than that.

Mr. Morris. You mean, that in 1950—

Mr. Martin. No; 1952—1951-52, that's the time I believe they got the money, according to this report.

Mr. Morris. So he claimed to give up 300 lei for every dollar?

Mr. Martin. Well, at the time, he claimed that the rate was 150 lei to the dollar, but he gave double. In other words, black market. He gave 300 lei to the dollar.

Mr. Morris. In Bucharest? Mr. MARTIN. Right here.

Of course, he took the dollars here. Let me put it this way: He received money from various people that wanted to send money to their relatives, whether it was \$20, \$50, or \$100 or more. That money was held back here by Moraru. He wrote the name and address of the party in Rumania to the patriarchate, that the patriarchate should pay such-and-such a party at such-and-such an address the sum of 10,000, 20,000, 50,000—whatever the lei amounted to.

That is the way he is operating.

Mr. Morris. He left the lei in Bucharest?

Mr. MARTIN. Absolutely.

No lei was transferred here, or anything else, but the dollars are kept here and the leis over there.

Mr. Morris. So, as he would get dollars from the people from his

church here, he would-

Mr. Martin. Not only from his church; he contracted with an agency in Indiana Harbor, like Pora's Agency, I think a million and a half lei he sold to that guy, and he got the dollars for it—and different agencies.

Mr. Morris. Where did he get that million and a half lei?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, he sold it.

Mr. Morris. Where did he get the million and a half lei to sell?

Mr. MARTIN. That I don't know.

Mr. Morris. That was not the million, nine hundred? Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. This doesn't represent, to your knowledge, all the leis

that were assigned to him?

Mr. Martin. He takes any amount of dollars in this country, and the patriarchate pays over there any amount of lei this guy asks him to, over there. That is the way the transaction is made. In other words, instead of the patriarchate sending money here through the diplomatic channels, whatever they are, they simply say, "Well, there is so many Rumanian people in the United States that send some help to their relatives in Rumania, why not keep the dollars over here in America, use it for whatever purpose you think best, and we will pay the lei to the people you claim." That is the way the thing goes.

Mr. Morris. You say the official rate of exchange is now 6 to 1? Mr. Martin. Six to one, and Moraru is paying, through the patri-

archate over there, 10 to the dollar.

Mr. Morris. And you say in the past he says he has paid 300 to 1?

Mr. Martin. That's what he said; yes.

Mr. Morris. So, now, to your knowledge, how has he spent the first million lei, the one he received for the building of a church? Has he built a church or monastery?

Mr. Martin. Well, that was received by Bishop Andrei.

Mr. Morris. Bishop Andrei is Bishop Moldovanu? Mr. Martin. Yes, Bishop Moldovanu.

When I put him on the spot, I simply asked him about this 1 million lei. I said, "How do you try to keep things away from me when I am putting my face all over for you people when you get in trouble, I am trying to whitewash you to keep the name of the church clean in the public's eve?"

Well, the answer was, "Well, you know, I just didn't want to say nothing about it because I was, you know, afraid that somebody else would hear about it, and just make so much fuss about a million lei because it's from Rumania, and Rumania is Communist," and one thing

and another.

I said, "It's much better to come out and let the people know outright what you are doing, than working behind the bush, because they will make it bad. Then you will be suspected to really work favorable for the Communists."

So, that was that. And then I was convinced that he did receive the million lei, but he said that the money that he got, he invested it at the Holy See, making improvements of 200 acres of land, and different buildings, and one thing and another, out there.

Mr. Morris. His church has 200 acres of land there ?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And he said that the million lei that he did get, that he made improvements with that?

Mr. Martin. Improvements over that property.
Mr. Morris. But he didn't erect a building, a monastery?

Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. And this would indicate that he received that for the purpose of building the monastery?

Mr. Martin. For the building fund; that's right.

Mr. Morris. And he told you that he made improvements. Do you know of any improvements that he made?

Mr. Martin. Not from that money, to my knowledge. I don't know

what improvements he could make.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any improvements that he made?

Mr. Martin. Well, some repairs to the buildings, and plowing and fertilizing the soil, and all that, but that money came from the people, from the-

Mr. Morris. Congregation?

Mr. Martin. Yes; from the people that belonged to the-

Mr. Morris. With respect to this 993,000 lei that was given to the Episcopate Cathedral in America, that is the episcopate of bishop——

Mr. Martin. Moldovanu.

Mr. Morris. It is not the church of Reverend Moraru?

Mr. Martin. That's the church, but it's under the jurisdiction of Bishop Moldovanu.

Mr. Morris. This 993,000 lei were given to the Reverend Glicherie

Moraru?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. So, the first million were given to Moldovanu, the sec-

ond to the Reverend Moraru?

Mr. Martin. According to the statement here. And, I checked the books. There was no money entered on the church books as a donation from the patriarchate of Rumania for the cathedral.

Mr. Morris. Which item?

Mr. Martin. 993,000.

Mr. Morris. I see.

You have access to the books, do you? Mr. MARTIN. I had had, at the time.

Mr. Morris. At the time.

And, you say there was no entry in the books of this contribution of 900,000?

Mr. Martin. No.

And, when I talked to the priest about it and told him, and asked him-

Mr. Morris. This is the Reverend Moraru?

Mr. Martin. Yes. What became of the money, he always denied it. He said he never received that money. So I said to him, "Maybe you did not receive it, but the money is included in your transaction, because you don't receive cash from Rumania but you have such a transaction, so people don't know."

He said it was a mistake in the financial report of the patriarchate. Mr. Morris. In other words, he said that that was a mistake

[indicating]?

Mr. Martin. That's right.

Mr. Morris. In addition to these two items of 1 million lei to Bishop Moldovanu and 993,000 lei to the Reverend Moraru, you do know, you have testified, that there are other transactions in which people make monetary contributions to the church, and in return have lei assigned

to beneficiaries of some particular transaction in Rumania?

Mr. Martin. I don't want to be contrary. The money is not made or contributed to the Rumanian Orthodox Church in America and then paid to their friends in Rumania. The financial transaction between Moraru and an individual has nothing to do with the church. That is Moraru's business. He is doing this, as any other people would do business, which he has no right to do it, because—

Mr. Morris. In other words, on the side he is carrying on an

exchange?

Mr. Martin. That is right, and he has no license for the carrying out of an exchange business.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any such instances, to your own

knowledge?

Mr. Martin. Of people—

Mr. Morris. Who made such a transaction as you have just described.

Mr. Martin. Oh, yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about them?

Mr. Martin. Well, now, offhand I couldn't—I could give the last name, but I don't remember the address of certain people, but if you really want that, I can check out with the people and give full name and address.

Mr. Morris. Why don't you do that, and we will leave the record

open at this point.

Mr. Martin. I will be happy to.

Mr. Morris. Give us some particular transactions of people who have given Bishop Moldovanu money and, in return, he was—

Mr. Martin. Moraru. He is the agent. He is the transactor. Moldovanu is just sitting back there and waiting for somebody to bring him the—he is not a go-getter. Moraru is the go-getter, so Moraru is dominating the bishop.

Mr. Morris. In addition, you are going to give us, are you not, Mr. Martin, the authority that the patriarchate is subsidized by the Ru-

manian Government, the Communist government of Rumania?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. You will also give us that.

(The information was supplied by Mr. Martin and was placed in the subcommittee record.) Mr. Morris. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Morris. Has the Reverend Moraru ever registered as an agent for the Rumanian Government?

Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge? Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. Did the issue ever come up that he should have registered?

Mr. Martin. Yes; it was in 1941.

Mr. Morris. 1941?

Mr. Martin. Yes, 1941 and 1942, and then the Federal Government went after them, and in 19-

Mr. Morris. Are you sure it's 1941? Mr. Rusher. He is not finished.

Mr. Martin. Yes; that is the time it started, with Free Rumania. It started in 1941. He was the head of it, you know, Free Rumania, which, in other words, at the time was more or less—the Nazis, with the Iron Guard-being anti-Communist, they wanted Rumania to be free of a foreign yoke.

Mr. Morris. This was a committee that was really protesting the

Government that controlled Rumania at that time?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. He was the head of that movement, the Free Rumania

Mr. Martin. Yes. The reason was because King Carol was expelled from Rumania, and this guy got around King Carol and got some money from King Carol, and, according to the records with the Department of Justice, there is 13,000, and I think 500, that is known of it, but he made a statement, Moraru, to a very close friend of his that he got 40,000 from King Carol. I knew of 13,500 from the Department of Justice because I was mixed up in that affair, I am sorry to say, that I struggled hard to free him from this thing because of the church, as a whole, was quite a black mark.

Mr. Morris. Was this registration—did it have anything to do with

the Rumanian Communist government?

Mr. Martin. Not at the time.

Mr. Morris. Or at any subsequent time?

Mr. MARTIN. Not at the time. That was in the early forties, and him and another priest and a newspaper editor were convicted, and Moraru got a fine of \$3,000 fine, and 5 years in jail.

Mr. Morris. But that was for accepting money from King Carol? Mr. Martin. Well, he was convicted as a representative of a foreign government.

Mr. Morris. That is right; but, I mean, that is accepting money from the King Carol group without registering that fact with the Department of Justice?

Mr. Martin. That's right.
Mr. Morris. There have been no such convictions or actions taken against him because of his representation of the Rumanian Communist government?

Mr. MARTIN. Not at the time.

Mr. Morris. Or at any subsequent time?

Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Martin, is there, on page 498 in that volume that we have been referring to, still another grant of Rumanian leis?

Mr. Martin. Yes; it's a grant to the episcopate of the two Americas.

of 933,000 leis.

Mr. Morris. What is the episcopate of the two Americas?

Mr. Martin. Well, that's the diocese, what you would call. The diocese of the two Americas means the North and South America.

Mr. Morris. In other words, that would be to the bishop?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. That would be a grant to Bishop Moldovanu?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What were the dates of those three grants? You have mentioned three. One million lei from the Rumanian patriarchate

for the building of a monastery; what was the date of that?

Mr. Martin. They do not give the date here. It's over in 1951 and 1952, and then they give financial report, which they had to give—I find it some place here—to the Government, of what they did with the money.

Mr. Morris. So, in other words, that grant was made during 1951

or 1952?

Mr. Martin. That's right.

Mr. Morris. What about the other two grants? Mr. Martin. All three grants.

Mr. Morris. All three were during that period?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. You do not know of any other grant since that time? Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. Have you any reason to believe that there have been other grants?

Mr. Martin. Well, I would say yes.

Mr. Morris. What reason do you have to believe that there were other grants?

Mr. Martin. Because this Moraru is accepting dollars here and

order paying of leis over there, so it must be-

Mr. Morris. But you don't know whether the bishop is doing that?

Mr. Martin. No, not the bishop.

Of course, he does it, I imagine, with the consent of the bishop. Of course, he gives the tone.

Mr. Morris. Did any one of the people that we have been talking

about warn you against coming here today?

Mr. Martin. No, not today, but I was told a few days ago, 2 or 3 days ago, by a party that told Moraru that I was publishing, that is, putting out a pamphlet against all his deeds, you know.

Mr. Morris. Who is this? Can you identify for the record who this

person was who told you?

Mr. Martin. Well, he is a priest. I don't know whether-

Mr. Morris. Would you give us his name, but we won't put it in the record.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Morris. What did this man, whose name you have given to us off the record, what did he tell you a few days ago?

Mr. MARTIN. He told me that Reverend Moraru was there, and he told him that "Mr. Martin is going to put out a pamphlet, but from what I understand that pamphlet is so strong, it's going to destroy you." In other words, destroying Moraru.

And he said, "Would you sue him?"

He said, "No, I will not sue him, but I will see what his pamphlet states, but I am not going to sue him, I am going to find some Italian or some colored people that will give him the thrashing of his life."

Mr. Morris. He said that Moraru said that he would find some

colored people that would-

Mr. Martin. Colored or Italian.

Mr. Morris. Who would give you a thrashing?

Mr. Martin. Yes; a good beating, instead of taking me to court. Mr. Morris. That is what the Reverend Moraru told this other person?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Well, he did that about 2 years ago, when I had been working hard to change the administration of the church, and I finally got to a point where I succeeded, with 1 or 2 votes, to overthrow Moraru's administration in committees, and at the time he threatened again that he was going to have certain people that were going to beat me up, and if I am not going to stay put he is going to organize a group of Rumanian churchwomen and they are going to give me a beating right in the church, because he couldn't do his way with me being in there, because he knew every twist and turn I blocked his unproper deeds in the church, or otherwise.

Mr. Morris. Does he know you are coming here to testify today?

Mr. Martin. No. Mr. Morris. Mr. Martin, in this Biserica Orthodoxa Romana there is a decree in there; is there not?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. A decree proclaiming the Rumanian Church part of the—tell us about that proclamation.

Mr. Martin. This is a decree having to do with the opening of the

meeting of the National Church.

Mr. Morris. And this Patriarch Justinian is set up as head of the Rumanian Church, is he not, by this decree?

Mr. MARTIN. He is the head of the church; yes. Mr. Morris. What does this decree do for him?

Mr. Martin. Well, this decree is just to indicate that all the church functioning is done with the governmental approval and decreed by

the government.

Mr. Morris. This decree mentions "His Holiness accompanied by Dr. Petru Groza, president of the Great National Assembly of the RPR, and by Mr. Vasile Pogaceanu, minister of cults, and the Holy Fathers Metropolitans entered the meeting hall, and His Holiness occupied the president's chair."

Mr. MARTIN. That's right.

Now, this minister of cults, he is the head of the churches and school, and he is responsible for financial subsidy or support of church, school, clergy and teachers, and he is a member of the cabinet. So, that is enough of proof that everything is done with the consent of the government, which finances and supports the churches, clergies, school, and teachers.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Martin, by the way, before finishing, has there been any public statement on the part of either the bishop or the Reverend Moraru with respect to these three grants that we have men-

tioned from the Biserica? Mr. Martin. Well, there has been a statement published in the diocese newspaper, Credinta, The Faith, in October 1953, stating that they had received itemized statement from the patriarchate, to the amount of, September 7—it doesn't give the date, whether it was 1951 or 1952— 851,000 leis; September 18, 142,000 leis; and September 28, 7,000 leis, a total of 1 million leis.

They disclaimed the other 993,000 and the 933,000, the patriarchate

disclaims that they did not give that money, only the million leis.

Mr. Morris. Let us put the whole statement in the record from that publication that you have described. It will all go in the record at this point, a translation of that particular article that you have been referring to will have to go in the record at this time.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

[Translation from Rumanian]

[From the newspaper Credinta (The Faith), Detroit, Mich., October 29, 1953]

CERTIFICATE FROM THE RUMANIAN PATRIARCHY

Following a confusing noise created by the owls Trifo-Trutziste, which filled the springtime air a few months ago with their nightly hooting, calculated to infect or to poison public opinion with their shouts that His Eminence Andrei is receiving millions of lei from Rumania for Communist propaganda, I ask, in my capacity of controller, and I received from the Rumanian Patriarchy of Bucharest the following explanations:

Mr. Alexandru Suciu (address in town).

"We acknowledge that the Rumanian patriarchy, in 1951, has given to the Rumanian Orthodox episcopate of the two Americas a gift of 1 million lei, to continue the construction of the monastery Schitul Maicii Domnului of Vatra Romana, U.S.A.

"The Rumanian patriarchy did not pay to this episcopate other sums under [any other name], as the accounting department mistakenly gave to the same account and printed after these listed names the pages 465 and 498

of the periodical Biserica Ortodoxa Romana No. 6-8, 1952.

"Signature of a Patriarch, the Seal of the Rumanian patriarchy, the Office of the Patriarch.

(Signed) N. Grosu, Secretary."

Note of the controller: Our orthodox Christian brothers in America should ask Mr. Trifa about this fund, because His Eminence Andrei repaired the premises of Vatra, occupied today by Trifa, and he bought animals, poultry, and fodder, sold [later] by Trifa and Trutza, for a price [and disposed of the money in a manner] known only to themselves.

BUCHAREST, March 18, 1953.

His Eminence Bishop Andrei Moldovanu, 1771 East State Fair, Detroit 3, Mich., U. S. A.:

In reply to Your Eminence's letter No. 31/953, we forward to you in the original the Rumanian patriarchy certificate relating to the 1 million lei gift, granted by the patriarchy to the Rumanian episcopate of the two Americas, as directed by Your Eminence.

This assistance was granted to the Rumanian Orthodox episcopate of America in 1951 for the continuation of the construction of the monastery Schitul Maicii

Domnului of the Vatra Roman, U.S.A.

A similar certificate, signed by His Sanctity the Patriarch Justinian, was forwarded to Mr. Alexandru Suciu (Sage) of Chicago.

With the authorization of his sanctity the patriarch.

OFFICE OF THE PATRIARCH, N. Grosu, Secretary.

BUCHAREST, March 18, 1953.

Administration of the Patriarchy, Accounting Department No. 2375

We acknowledge that the Rumanian patriarchy, in 1951, granted to the Rumanian Orthodox episcopate of the two Americas 1 million lei for the continuation of the building of the monastery Schitul Maicii Domnului of the Vatra Romana, U. S. A., which was paid on different dates as follows:

Pay order No. 2049 of Sept. 7	L851, 000
Pay order No. 2070 of Sept. 18	L142, 000
Pay order No. 2101 of Sept. 28	L7,000

Total _____ L1, 000, 000

We also acknowledge that those listed in the periodical Biserica Ortodoxa Romana No. 6–8/952, pp. 462, 465, and 498, refer to the 2 above sums, a total of 993,000 lei, the third sum being omitted to be added in the total published in the

report.

The Rumanian patriarchy did not transfer to this episcopate other sums, under other names like Episcopia celor doua Americii [episcopate of the two Americas], Catedrala Episcopala din America [Bishopric Cathedral of America], etc., since the accounting department gave by mistake the names of the same account and, afterward, again by mistake, printed those account names on pages 465 and 498 of the periodical Biserica Ortodoxa Romana [Rumanian Orthodox Church] No. 6–8, 1952.

On page 498 the real figure is not 933,000, but 993,000 as on page 465. It is a typographical error which can be checked with the total in chapter A, which is

exact if the sum of 993,000 is added and not 933,000.

All the titles given to the account of the 993,000 lei, plus the 7,000 lei mentioned above, amounting to a total of 1 million lei, was a grant of the Rumanian patriarchy for the work of construction of the church Schitul Maicii Domnului of the Vatra Romana. The proposed cathedral of the Rumanian Orthodox episcopate of America (of the two Americas) is also the residence of the bishop, bought with the Rumanian Orthodox patriarchy moneys, which [patriarchy] is the owner of the buildings of Vatra Romana where [the patriarchy] does not recognize any other authority than that of the canonic bishop Andrei Moldovanu. The former legionnaire, Viorel Trifa, heretical and false bishop of today—together with the heretic Truta [Trutza]—joining the ranks of the heretics, are no longer members of the Rumanian orthodox Christian community.

For which I give this present certificate.

[SEAL]

JUSTINIAN, Patriarch.

(Translated by Dr. Raoul Gheorghiu, legal analyst, supervised by Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, Chief, Foreign Law Section, Law Library, Library of Congress, August 9, 1956.)

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about the bishop's efforts of repatriation?

Mr. Martin. Pardon me one minute——

Mr. Morris. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Martin. No. Moraru and the Bishop Moldovanu, they have encouraged the visits to Rumania for the purpose of, and the sole purpose, what I can see and adjudge it, was for them to make money, and also to encourage, to a certain extent, a denial of—well, how should I put it—denial of the bad situation in Rumania. In other words, they claimed that these people came back and say that Rumanian people were free and the church was free, and——

Mr. Morris. In other words, they have been encouraging people to

go to Rumania?

Mr. Martin. That's right.

And my estimation, my judgment, is that they used that as favorable propaganda to the Communist government of Rumania.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any efforts they made to go back to

Rumania, to stay?

Mr. Martin. They are soliciting people, trying to influence them to go back and make a visit to Rumania, and, of course, they realize, I think, from what I understood, I am not positive, between \$150 and \$200 per passenger.

Mr. Morris. They supply the money?

Mr. Martin. I beg pardon?

Mr. Morris. Do they supply the money?

Mr. Martin. No; the individual person pays his own money, and then they make from each round trip ticket \$150 to \$200, their commission, or profit, whatever they call, and they get a free ticket for every 20 passenger—plane passenger.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mr. Martin. That's their statement. Moraru's wife was over there just about 5 or 6 weeks ago, and she went free with her child because they had 19 or 20 passengers.

Mr. Morris. Moraru's wife did go to Bucharest?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that the Reverend Moraru

was engaged in any commercial transactions?

Mr. Martin. Yes, I have the information that he sent 1 Chevrolet and 2 Cadillacs, and some people that went over there and came back, seen 1 or 2 of the cars, and over at the patriarchate they were told that those are the cars that the Reverend Moraru sent us.

Mr. Morris. Do you know what the nature of that activity is?

Mr. Martin. I would not; I do not. Mr. Morris. Does he buy the cars?

Mr. Martin. Well, if it was one car, I would say that it would have been a present to the patriarchate for transaction of Moraru's business, giving lei over there, and holding dollars over here.

Mr. Morris. You do know he sent three cars over, and you don't

know anything more about it?

Mr. Martin. No.

Mr. Morris. Do you know, Mr. Martin, whether or not there is any connection, either with Bishop Moldovanu or Mr. Moraru, with the Rumanian Legation in Washington?

Mr. MARTIN. The Rumanian Legation; yes.

Not very long ago some inquiry was made to the Rumanian Legation about this going to Rumania, and the Legation referred people to their representative in Detroit, which would be Reverend Glicherie Moraru.

Mr. Morris. So, when anyone makes inquiry of the Legation about any endeavor to go to Rumania, they are referred to the Reverend

Moraru?

Mr. Martin. Or Bishop Moldovanu.

Mr. Morris. Do they visit the Legation in Washington?

Mr. MARTIN. They do.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that?

Mr. Martin. Well, Moraru visited the Legation about just before I was here, I say about 4 weeks ago.

(See following letter.) Mr. Morris. Thank you very much, Mr. Martin.

DETROIT, MICH., July 30, 1956.

The United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Honorable Committee: On Friday, July 27, 1956, when I testified under oath,

two things were left out from the records.

In November of 1946, Reverend Moraru tried hard to oust me as the editor of the newspaper Solia which was published by the Rumanian Orthodox diocese in the United States, because he could not sell this newspaper services to the Rumanian Communist Legation in Washington, with me in the position of editor and very hostile to the Communist cause.

Also, that in the spring of 1951, I broke up a meeting that was to take place between Mr. Moraru, Bishop Moldovan, and the Rumanian Communist leader, Mr. George Vocila, at the Bishop's See at Grass Lake, Mich. I am making this

statement under oath.1

NICHOLAS N. MARTIN.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following letter to Chairman Eastland from James J. Wadsworth, deputy representative of the United States to the United Nations, was ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on November 21, 1956:)

THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES

TO THE UNITED NATIONS,

New York, N. Y., July 24, 1956.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND,

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: In the absence of Mr. Lodge, who is on vacation, I am pleased to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 20, 1956, enclosing a transcript of the testimony taken before your subcommittee on July 20, concerning pressures exerted on Russian refugees in the United States.

I am confident that Mr. Lodge will appreciate your having forwarded this transcript to him. It will undoubtedly prove useful should the State Department, as the result of its inquiry into this matter, instruct us to take action with respect

to it.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JAMES J. WADSWORTH.

¹ Obviously, not under oath when he wrote the July 30 letter.



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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE Administration of the Internal Security Act AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:05 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senator Welker.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator Welker. The meeting will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn?

You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LAUTNER. I do.

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAUTNER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter? Mr. Lautner. My name is John Lautner, spelled L-a-u-t-n-e-r.

Mr. Morris. Where do you reside? Mr. Lautner. Washington, D. C.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lautner has appeared before this committee before, and he has been asked to come back and testify under the general framework of Soviet activity in the United States, with particular references to the reorganizations of the Communist Party of the United States.

I wonder if you would tell us, for the record, by way of background, Mr. Lautner, what position you achieved in the Communist Party—what were your highest position or positions?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, I was a district organizer of the Communist Party for about 5 years, in the State of West Virginia.

I was head of the New York State Review Commission of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. What is the review commission?

Mr. LAUTNER. The discipline commission of the Communist Party in New York State, from 1947 up to the beginning of 1950.

And also a member of the National Review Commission of the Com-

munist Party in 1948 and 1949, and the beginning of 1950.

Mr. Morris. And you separated from the Communist Party, under circumstances you have previously told us, in 1950?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. On the 17th of January 1950.

Senator Welker. Would you mind putting the mike just a little closer to you, Mr. Lautner?

Mr. LAUTNER. I will.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, with those qualifications I would like to ask Mr. Lautner some questions about Communist Party organization.

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell, first, of your own experiences, the instances of Soviet control, that is control by the U. S. S. R.,

of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. Lautner. Well, let me rephrase it Soviet control. The Soviet is a form of state. And the very same group that controlled that particular state, that form of state, known as the Soviet, or U. S. S. R., that very group controlled the Communist International and, through the Communist International, gave leadership and guidance to all Communist Parties or so-called working class parties who adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in each and every country where such parties were operating.

Mr. Morris. With particular reference to the United States, and particular emphasis on your own experiences, would you answer the

same question?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, the Communist International had control over the policies, over the Communist Party of the United States of America, and sent representatives to this country to supervise and give leadership and guidance in unfolding and developing the policies of the Communist International in the United States.

Leaders of the Communist Party of the United States of America went to the Congresses of the Communist International held in Moscow from time to time and they were elected to the executive com-

mittees of the Communist International.

So in that way they drew upon the experiences of the warlike Communist Party, and the warlike Communist movement through the Communist International, helped the Communist Party of the United States of America in developing its program and policies in this country.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, did you meet any Soviet representa-

tives

Mr. Lautner. I met in the course of my party membership two of them.

Mr. Morris. Who were they?

Mr. LAUTNER. One was a person known to me at the beginning by the name of "Edwards." Edwards later on turned out to be Gerhardt Eisler. And the other one was a person known to me at the beginning as "Alpi"—A-l-p-i—later on he was known to me as Fred Brown, and later on as Farucci Marini, M-a-r-i-n-i.

Mr. Morris. Were there any other Soviet representatives or representatives of any Soviet satellites you encountered during your experiences in the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. I have no recollection.

Mr. Morris. And could you tell us the circumstances through which this control was exercised from the practical point of view from where you were in the control commission and as a district organizer of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. Well, both: Alpi, as Edwards, was involved even in the organizational problems of party leadership in carrying out party policies over here; Edwards, I sat with him at least in three

meetings in party councils.

At one meeting we were discussing some of the mistakes made by the party in the New York organization pertaining to the organiza-

tion of the transport workers.

And another meeting Eisler sat in was on the question of developing a mass Communist Party press where he, in his speech, submitted the success of the German Communist daily, the Rote Fahne, and set that as an example for the Communist Party of the United States to develop that kind of official paper, mass paper.

And on the third occasion, he was in a meeting where the party was discussing the need and necessity to penetrate into the Armed Forces of the United States, specifically in the New York area, the

National Guard units.

And at this meeting, too, he cited as an example the failure of the German Party in the early 1930's to pay attention and bore from within the Stahlheimer Organization, which later on became the base of the Nazi Party as a military organization.

These were the three meetings in which Gerhart Eisler participated.

Mr. Morris. Did he exercise control then?

Mr. LAUTNER. But definitely; his word was our authority in that

meeting—in those meetings.

Then Alpi worked in the organizational department of the Communist Party of the United States from the first time I met him in Detroit in 1930—I am wrong—in the spring of 1931, where he informed me that there was a decision made in the department for me to go to Canada. And then later on he worked as an organizational specialist for the central committee of the Communist Party, U.S. A.

Later on he was a member of the nationality groups commission of the Communist Party. I was a member of that with him at the same

time.

Later on, the Communist Party decided to send in a number of party leaders into one of the most important mass organizations of the party, the International Workers Order. Alpi and myself, Gerhardt and others were sent into this organization to strengthen its ideological leadership there. And then he functioned up to about 1948 or 1947, thereabouts, and left the country.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, I wonder if you could tell us of your

experiences with purges within the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Well, these purges took place from time to time. There were discussions in the party on the ideological differences, earliest purges in the struggle against Trotskyism in the early 1930's, the struggle against

the Radek deviationists in the party, the Bukharinites, Rakosi and Rajk, and these types of deviationists and their purge from the Communist Party.

Later on there were, in the late 1940's, a new wave of purges in the Communist parties in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, in

Bulgaria, in Rumania.

I am perfectly well acquainted with the purges that took place in Hungary.

In the Communist leadership in Hungary there were 3 groups, 3

main groups.

One group was the domestic Communists who shared leadership in

that party.

The other group was the so-called Communist leaders, who gravitated, during the Hitler days, toward the West. Among these were the Spanish veterans, the Communists who came back to Hungary.

And the third group was the Moscow gang, headed by Matthias

Rakosi.

In these struggles in 1949, the Moscow group, Rakosi, Rajk, and others, succeeded in eliminating, in purging and liquidating, these two

other groups.

And only recently, as late as 3 months ago, there is a new evaluation going on in the various Communist parties and Rakosi, the general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, has admitted publicly that these purges were a mistake, that they committed serious errors in conducting these purges and they are being rehabilitated, while they were hanged and shot at the time.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, this particular purge had an indirect

effect on you; did it not?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us how that came about, Mr. Lautner?

Mr. Lautner. In 1949, in the fall, when the Rajk case—R-a-j-k—who was accused of being an imperialist agent, a Titoite and whatnot, during that trial, in Hungary, my name came up through one of the witnesses. This witness alleged that I was the one who, during the war, introduced him to Titoites in Italy, in Bari, Italy, where I served in psychological warfare during the war.

That is true. I introduced a lot of people to a lot of people, and

I was introduced to a lot of people in these days.

But in 1944—in 1943 and 1945, there was no issue of Titoism, there was a war, a World War going on. And the Titoites were fighting

the Germans, just like were doing in Italy.

In the course of that period we were instructed—we had Army instructions— to develop a communications system and a new system for these newly integrated partisans, Yugoslav partisans who were pulled out of the hills and integrated into a new Yugoslav Army.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Lautner, for the purposes of the background of this record, what position did you have in psychological warfare?

Mr. Lautner. I was head of the Hungarian unit in Bari and I was an enlisted man—I was a sergeant.

Mr. Morris. Psychological warfare of the United States Army?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris, At the same time you were an experienced Communist; were you not?

Mr. Lautner. That is right.

Mr. Morris, And what position did you have in the Communist

Party at this time?

Mr. Lautner. At that time I had no position in the Communist Party, because the Communist Party made a decision at the beginning of the war that all those party members who will be drafted into the Army or serve in the Armed Forces, they are automatically out of the party, because they cannot fulfill the preliminary prerequisites of a party member—they cannot attend party meetings, they cannot pay dues, et cetera.

So I was not in the party, technically, at that time.

Mr. Morris. So if anyone should have asked you at that time if you were a member of the Communist Party, would you truthfully have stated that you were not?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is right. But if anybody would have asked, "Are you a Communist," I truthfully would have stated, "Yes." And

Mr. Morris. At that time, were you in contact with Communist

Party officials?

Mr. LAUTNER. Yes. From time to time I got letters from the United States; particularly, I was in communication with Gurley Flynn at this time.

Mr. Morris. Were you receiving any orders from Communists at

that time?

Mr. Lautner. No.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you were really on your own as a

Communist?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is right. What I did receive was trends in the party and the driving toward the dissolution of the Communist Party, the Teheran decisions, the organization of the Communist Political Association, which later was characterized as a revisionist error on the part of Browder.

This type of information I did receive, while I was in the service.

Mr. Morris. Did you receive any assignments from the Communist Party during your service? Mr. Lautner. No.

Mr. Morris. And how did you carry out your positions in psychological warfare as a Communist—did you do it completely on your own or did you take complete orders from the United States Government authorities?

Mr. Lautner. I was assigned to Allied Force headquarters, which was at first the Eisenhower headquarters at Algiers, and then later on it became the Allied headquarters in Casserta, headed by Marshal Alexander, who was the Chief of the Mediterranean Theater of Op-

eration.

Our specific general who was in charge of psychological warfare was General McClure, and we received our instructions through chan-

nels from his headquarters.

Our main job there was to gather intelligence that came through the air raids of the various enemy stations, to gather that and assimilate that, edit it, and give out a daily report.

In addition to that, I was broadcasting for about 6 months to Hun-

gary at that time, out of an Allied Force radio station, in Bari.

In addition to that I was also heading a leaflet-production unit that prepared leaflets for our 15th Air Force bombers when they went on missions so that they could drop these leaflets behind the enemy lines.

This was in the main my work.

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony, is it not, that in 1950, because of some contacts you had at that time, you were purged from the Communist Party?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is right.

Instructions came to this country to get rid of me.

First, they tried to lure me behind the Iron Curtain. I, in all clear conscience, applied for a passport. Fortunately, I didn't get it because at that particular moment there was a diplomatic break between Hungary and the United States over the Vogeler case.

Mr. Morris. What case was that? Mr. Lautner. Vogeler case. Mr. Morris. Robert Vogeler?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is right. I got a letter from Mrs. Shipley, in which she advised me that they cannot issue a passport to Hungary at this time. However, if I decide to go elsewhere in Europe, they are ready to issue a passport for me.

So that scheme of the party leadership over here to lure me behind

the Iron Curtain didn't succeed.

So a few weeks later, another scheme was worked out to get me down to Cleveland, Ohio, where I had a very awful personal experience in a cellar with Communist Party leaders and thugs. a result of that, I am out of the party.

Mr. Morris. That was, Mr. Lautner, contemporaneous with the

purge of Rajk in Hungary?

Mr. Lautner. That is right. It was traced to that. In effect, there is no clearer demonstration of this fact, when I spoke to the Bureau about it in-

Mr. Morris. The Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Lautner. That is right. My expulsion as it is stated in the Daily Worker, is a lie from the beginning to the end—that my expulsion was initiated from abroad, and this party had no alternative but to follow out that instruction. It was most clearly demonstrated in the Flynn case in New York, where I was on the witness stand for 31 days. I was 16 days cross examined in that case. If there was any brainwashing done, as an example, this was it.

For 3 whole days John McTernan, one of the defense attorneys in that case, for 3 whole days tried to break me down and prove that I was a Tito agent, that I had contacts with the Hungarian Titoites

in Hungary.

I told him he was all wet.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that the purge of Noel and Herman Field had something to do with the Rajk purge in Hungary? Mr. LAUTNER. Definitely. In that cellar in Cleveland I was time

and again asked what were my connections with Noel and Herman Field, while they were with the so-called Unitarian Overseas Service; did I in any way try to attempt to build liaison with them and their relief service, that they, the Communist Party, thought was a spy service behind the Iron Curtain at that time.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have some testimony which we will release later on which concerns this very episode, except that this other testimony relates to events that were going on abroad in connection with this very testimony that Mr. Lautner is giving us this morning. That is in connection with Herman Field.

Senator Welker. Very well.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Lautner, have any of these people who were purged at that time—the 1949 purge—been now rehabilitated?

I think you have told us to some extent. I wish you would give

more details.

Mr. Lautner. How can you rehabilitate somebody who was shot and killed? You can establish maybe a mistake was made. And back in the thoughts of the Hungarian people there is still that lingering idea, well, they were branded as traitors of the cause; they were branded as Fascist mad dogs. They were branded as imperialist flunkies; there must be some element, some grain of truth in that.

You cannot rehabilitate completely even those that are alive. They already carry that stigma-that stigma of ostracism throughout their And there is no way to rehabilitate. And a decision by a party oligarchy will not rehabilitate these people in the truest sense of the word. Most of them are shot. Thousands of them were shot.

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Lautner, does this rehabilitation campaign which is now taking place in the year 1956 of people who were purged in the year 1950, do you have any knowledge from your own observations as to the purpose and the manner of reorganization that is being effected?

Mr. Lautner. Yes. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Tell us about it, will you?

Mr. LAUTNER. First, since the death of Stalin, there was some evaluation about the incorrectness or the bad features of a so-called one-The very nature of the Communist Party organizaman leadership. tion and structure demands a polarization of leadership. This socalled collective leadership at the present time is a transitory period. And eventually, a polarization will take place again, when one guy will jump out in the front and he will be another Joe Stalin.

However, an evaluation took place in order how to exploit some of the bad mistakes that were made under the Stalin regime, and how to capitalize, how to exploit some of these self-admitted mistakes, in order to put across again another line, another tactical line around which new forces could be gathered, a new realinement of forces could

And that is exactly what is happening today.

Fortunately, those that study the strategy and factics of the world-wide Communist movement in this instance, European labor leaders, right off the bat, finally and effectively, rejected any kind of a united front activity or united front action with Communist hierarchy or the Communist leaders.

However, there will be gullible sections of populations and some public leaders somewhere who will give a grain of consideration or a little faith that the Russian line as announced by Khrushchev has changed. Nothing changes. Only new tactics, new forms, are being employed today to achieve the very same objective that they originally set out to establish, that is, worldwide Communist domination.

Mr. Morris. Have you read the proceedings of the 20th Congress? Mr. LAUTNER. Yes; I have it.

Mr. Morris. Have you any excerpts from that or what you just said?

Mr. LAUTNER. I have Khruschchev's report right here with me.

Mr. Morris. Will you put the pertinent portions of that report into

the record, Mr. Lautner, please?

Mr. Lautner. Well, these excerpts, first, come from point 5, with the head, "The Soviet Union in the Struggle for the Consolidation of Peace and Internal Security"——

Senator Welker. What are you reading from?

Mr. LAUTNER. This is the official organ of the Communist Information Bureau. The name of it is, "For a Lasting Peace and a People's Democracy," and this is the February 17, 1956 issue.

The next heading says, under point 6, "Some Fundamental Ques-

tions of Present Day International Developments."

By the way, this is that famous 7-hour report that Khrushchev gave to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Congress.

Mr. Morris. What was the date of that?

Mr. Lautner. Well, that was the end, at the beginning of February, this issue.

Mr. Morris. 1956?

Mr. Lautner. 1956, yes.

Well, in speaking about a reorientation which was widely misinterpreted in this country and elsewhere, that the Soviet line changed, well some of these excerpts from the very same person who made that report, contradict that kind of an evaluation. I just want to cite a few of them here.

At one point Khrushchev quotes Lenin and he quotes the following excerpt from Lenin:

All nations will arrive at Socialism. This is inevitable. But not all will do so in exactly the same way. Each will contribute something of its own in one or another form of democracy or one or in another form of variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Our enemies-

says Khrushchev—

like to say that we Leninists advocate violence always and everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeois and the sharp aggravation of the class struggle connected with this are inevitable.

Then he further says:

Leninism teaches that the ruling classes will not surrender their power voluntarily and the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or the nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism, depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, rather than the proletariat.

He is trying to reiterate the old argument and the old accusation that it is not the Communist who resorts to violence but it is the bourgeois, who would not give power over peacefully to them.

Then further down, he says:

In countries where capitalism is still strong and it has a huge military and police apparatus—

Mr. Morris. You are coming to the United States?

Mr. Lautner. It sounds like the United States. We will come to that.

and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will, of course, inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle. Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without these there can be no transition to socialism.

In other words, you must have a strong Communist Party as a vanguard.

And transitions can take different shapes and forms. In countries where there will be a resistance, we will fight them.

And that is the United States.

Now, what does Khrushchev mean that you can, under certain conditions—under certain conditions, there is a possibility? There are two "ifs" of peaceful transition. And Mikoyan in his report to the 20th——

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. Lautner. M-i-k-o-y-a-n—cites the example of Czechoslovakia,

right after the Second World War.

What happened in Central Europe? Anybody who knows a little contemporary history knows that after the defeat of fascism and Hitlerism, there was a political vacuum in central Europe. There were a number of exiled governments, like the Polish and Czechoslovakian Governments in London. Those that were in power during the Hitler regime in central Europe, they were compromised. The new forces that were to come up as political factors in the post secondwar period, never had a chance, because the Moscow boys came back right on the backs of the Red army and through the force and threat of the Red army ground up all anti-Communist democratic forces in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, and by 1948–49, they established their sole domination—the domination of the Communist or workers parties, the one party system.

And the state or form which they organized was known as the

People's Democracies, in Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

So these were the conditions on which Khruschchev, Mikoyan, and others are trying to build now that, under certain conditions it is possible, but if those conditions are not present, force and violence, the old tried and tested Marxism-Lenin doctrine, is still applicable, and the only doctrine that is applicable in the transition to socialism by the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. That is according to the minutes of the 20th Congress?

Mr. Lautner. That is stated very clearly by Khrushchev.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, I wonder if you would tell us of the reorganization of the Communist Party that you were engaged in in 1950 when you were expelled from the Communist Party?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Well, the reorganization actually began in 1948—1948, in September. The Communist Party in this country was under attack. The top leadership, the national board, headed by Dennis, Foster, and others, were arrested and indicted for violating the Smith Act.

At that time I was called into a meeting with Bob Thompson who was a member of the board and two other members of the New York

State secretariat, where Thompson gave a report that Foster, who was in Europe in 1946 and 1947, made a survey on this particular problem, the very problem, with the international leadership, and in his report he related some of the experiences that the other parties have on the other side when they were under attack.

And on the basis of Foster's report, there was a contraction of practically 90 percent of the membership in these parties when they

were under attack on the other side.

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by contraction?

Mr. Lautner. Contraction—by 90 percent of the party membership strayed away and about 10 percent remained. And this 10 percent was the party, the organized force that carried on activities under any and all conditions, whether fascism or nazism or any kind of

repression.

So in 1948, September, at this meeting, Bob Thompson raised the question, "Now, we still have a little chance—we are under attack—to find that 10 percent of the membership that would be most effective, if it integrated now, in carrying out party activities as an organized group under any and all conditions."

And we worked out a plan over there which was known as the three system, the Troyka system, based on the old Russian under-

ground and other undergrounds in Europe.

Mr. Morris. Let me see if I understand: The party reappraised the whole situation?

Mr. Laurner. That is right.

Mr. Morris. They found they were going to take out 10 percent, which 10 percent would be reliable under all circumstances?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. With respect to the remaining 90, what did they do with them?

Mr. Lautner. Well, at that point, that was not even considered. That was not the problem at that moment. At that moment the problem was how to find the 10 percent first. Certain criteria was set up, who shall be integrated into the 10 percent.

Mr. Morris. These people who were selected were the most reliable

ones?

Mr. LAUTNER. The first criterion was absolute devotion and loyalty to the party under any and all conditions.

Second, ability.

Third, being in a mass organization, or in a trade-union movement where there is a lot of elbow room, where one can work and carry

on Communist activities.

Under these criteria that integration of 10 percent began, about late fall in 1948. And at the time I left the Communist Party in 1950, 17th of January, this phase of work was accomplisheed, checked in the New York State organization of the Communist Party, where approximately 3,000 party members were integrated into the underground out of a paper membership of about 30,000 at that time.

Mr. Morris. In 1950 there was a membership of 30,000 in New York State and they selected 3,000 of the most loyal and disciplined and efficient members and they processed them into an underground?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. And you helped—you were a party to that processing?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, that was my main work, to integrate with the so-called vertical structure, certain horizontal features, like finances, party presses, hiding places, contact places, making available paper for printing, giving deposits to small jobbers in the printing industry, to increase their volume of paper supply, a communication system.

These were some of the features that we blended in with that underground at that time. That was my main function in that period of

time.

Mr. Morris. And it is your testimony with respect to the other

27,000, it was just not part of your assignment?

Mr. Lautner. A lot of them drifted away. And then there was a legal party functioning on the top. In the 1950 December convention, they elected some additional alternate members of the national committee to those that were the national committee members of 13, and they carried on their activities on the surface. Most of them went underground, who were not prosecuted, and they just marched back recently like a good platoon on orders to submit themselves to prosecution again. There is another reason for that.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that, Mr. Lautner—you just

made a reference there?

Mr. Lautner. In 1948 our main consideration was to organize the underground to enable the party to function under any and all conditions and to give leadership to this party. So that this myth of leadership was upheld. It was not even a myth. It was a reality.

When Dennis and the others reported to serve sentence, Gil Green,

Bob Thompson, and Henry Winston remained fugitives.

In the party it was a clear indication that this leadership is giving leadership in that particular period, that there is a continuity of leadership in the Communist Party which is very important in the eyes of the party membership.

In addition to these three-

Senator Welker. Just a minute. You say they remained fugitives. What happened there—they jumped bond?

Mr. Lautner. They went underground. Senator Welker. They went underground?

Mr. Lautner. That is right. Instead of reporting to serve sentence—they were sentenced in the first case—instead of reporting like Dennis, Gates, Ben Davis, and the others did, they remained underground—they didn't report.

Senator Welker. And they forfeited their bond?

Mr. Lautner. They forfeited their bond. I think it was \$20,000 each.

Senator Welker. Who furnished that bond; do you know?

Mr. Lautner. Well, I think at that time it was the CRC, the Civil Rights Congress, which was another front organization for the party in collecting funds, to make funds available for these legal defenses, and for other purposes.

Senator Welker. You mean to tell the committee then that these men who didn't accept their sentences, didn't serve their sentences at first, the party actually controlled them and asked them to go

underground?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is correct. Senator Welker. Thank you, sir. Mr. Lautner. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Before departing any further, Mr. Lautner; with respect to the people who would raise funds in the Civil Rights Congress, would any of those, with respect to the 30,000 Communist Party members in 1950, New York, would the other underground

people be engaged?

Mr. Lautner. Well, you see, there is no sharp separation between one who was in the legal party or one who was in the underground. There were instances that party leaders were up in the open party and they were also in the underground. There were instances where the underground person was a respectable trade-union leader.

So it is a fluid situation. What there is, there is a compact, organized force of 3,000. That is the only implication. An organized force of 3,000 party members who carry on as an organized force under any and all conditions, even if the legal party is dissolved.

As far as financing, the manifold activities of the Communist Party, that came from both sources. A lot of money was channeled into the

underground for underground purposes.

I, for example, was asked to make up a list of 20 people in the spring of 1949. At that time the New York State organization of the Communist Party proposed a budget of \$650,000 for the New York organization alone. A certain amount of this money had to be channeled into the underground. I was asked to prepare a list of 20 names, party and nonparty people. And the primary consideration in the selecting of these names would be, whether this individual to whom anywhere from \$10,000 to \$20,000 would be entrusted as party funds, would this individual change his loyalty to the party for \$10,000 or \$20,000. That was the key question there.

Others were asked to prepare such lists.

And I found that at 1 point 3 whole lists of 20 people were given to Bill Norman, the executive secretary of the New York organization. And we left it up to him to select his 20 people out of 60 recommendations—out of 60 names, where to place money for the underground.

So there was an interchange. It depended on what was more important at the moment as far as finances were concerned. There was

no sharp separation there.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, how do you interpret the reemergence from the underground of the Communist leaders who are coming into surrender?

Mr. LAUTNER. Dennis and the others served their sentence. And they came back into civil life. They were on probation for a while. And so somewhere around last January or so, that probation ended. They were ready and free to act again as Communist Party leaders.

For 4 or 5 years you had this situation where the underground leadership gave leadership to the whole party, political leadership.

 ${f Y}$ ou cannot continue that.

There is only one leadership in the Communist Party. So the word went out and these underground leaders, those that were not apprehended in the meantime, like Bob Thompson and Sid Stein, just came marching back and reporting to the authorities ready to stand trial or ready to serve their sentences.

Mr. Morris. Was that movement out of strength or weakness?

Mr. Lautner. That was a calculated movement out of their organization strength.

Mr. Morris. Out of strength or weakness?

Mr. LAUTNER. They determined when, who shall report back, they

determined what shall happen.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have been taking testimony on a proposed amendment to the Smith Act. The bill has gone from Internal Security to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Last week there was a conference of attorneys general out in the West—I think it was in Santa Fe—and there the issue came up as to whether the individual States would join with the Federal Govern-

ment in asking for this amendment to the Smith Act.

The attorneys general last week supported the Bridges-McCarthy bill, which is the name of the bill that is now before the Judiciary

Committee and about which we have been taking testimony.

Now last week there were just a few attorneys general, I think the attorneys general of California, New Jersey, and New York, opposed the position of the Federal Government and opposed the Bridges-McCarthy bill. At least, one of them voiced the opinion that the Communist Party does not attack and does not have as its target the various State governments and there is no conspiracy by the Communists against the State governments.

(A letter to Chairman Eastland from Herbert B. Cohen, attorney general of Pennsylvania, regarding this matter and enclosing statements of himself and other attorneys general, together with the pertinent resolutions of the National Association of Attorneys General, were ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on

May 10 and appear at the end of this testimony.)

Mr. Morris. We have here a man who was district organizer. He had the position of the control officer, one of the control officers of the Communist Party of New York State.

I would like to ask him to testify on that particular point.

Does the Communist Party—did it, while you were one of the State

officials, attempt to conspire against the State?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct. First of all, the State government, as well as the Federal Government, is considered in the thinking and evaluation of the Communist Party leadership, as a political upper structure, a political upper structure that safeguards the vested inter-That is the way they put it.

Now, I personally feel that there are a lot of legal questions involved. I am not an attorney. There are a lot of legal questions involved, in

this whole issue of State rights versus Federal rights.

Mr. Morris. Without getting into that, Mr. Lautner, was there any conspiracy on the part of the Communist Party with respect to the

State government?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, all Communist Party activities, in order to achieve the basic aims of Marxism and Leninism, are directed against all State as well as Federal authority and Federal Government. There is no misunderstanding or no mistake about that because they are both part of the Communist terminology, the upper structure.

Senator Welker. Are you basing that statement upon your own

experiences?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is right. That is right.

Senator Welker. Will you tell us any experiences you had on that?

Mr. Lautner. I was teaching Marxism and Leninism for a number

of years in Communist Party schools.

And it is a very simple proposition. There is an economic foundation in society. The relationship to that economic foundation determines a class relationship. Those that own the means of production, and the means of transportation are one particular class. They have their class interests.

Those that do not own the means of production only work in factories and in transportation, are a class and they have their separate

interests.

On this economic foundation a structure is built. That structure has two parts. It is an ideological structure, the battle for the minds, and a political structure.

Both of these upper structures on this economic foundation, safe-

guard that relationship at the base, at the point of production.

In other words, the bourgeois state as they say it, economic capitalism, that controls the state machine, also controls the Federal Government, the Federal machine.

So when you fight against the bourgeois, when you fight against monopoly and imperialism, you fight against the same state machine as well as the Federal machine. There is no mistake about that.

I did not want to go into the legal, as I said, controversy, state

rights versus Federal rights.

But I also feel that because of the very monolithic nature of the Communist leadership, and the very discipline and authority that is being exercised in the Communist movement, I think a dispersed type of an approach would defeat any attempt to cope with this problem. I think there is long overdue a need for a centralized group to study this movement in all its manifestations, with all of its ramifications, and give the benefit of their study to the authorities, so that they can intelligently handle the problem.

These are very skillful propagandists, they are dedicated professional revolutionists. If you spit them in the face, they will just turn around and will say, "It is raining," and they will try to prove that it is raining. That is the kind of people that you deal with.

I give you one example: They dissolved the Communist Information Bureau in the last few weeks now. Well, why did they do that? To create the impression that their intentions are really peaceful. And they do not want the Communist Information Bureau, anyway;

it has already outlived its usefulness.

But at the same time, Khrushchev warns the worldwide Communist movement and its leadership in the Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, only a few days after the dissolution of the Cominform, and he says—this is a quote that the New York Times carried from the Pravda, and I read the exact quotation:

Simultaneously with the demotion of Joseph Stalin, steps were taken to liquidate the Communist Information Bureau. Pravda asks you, however, it needs to establish suitable links with friends and parties oriented towards socialism—

meaning Communist Party. And the Pravda also makes clear that—the ending of the Communist Information Bureau in no way means a weakening of links between Communist Parties.

These are the exact words from the Prayda.

Mr. Morris. Will you read that again?

Mr. Lautner. And Prayda also makes it clear that "the ending of the Communist Information Bureau in no way means a weakening of links between Communist parties."

Mr. Morris. May I come back to the position of State contentions

with the Communist Party.

Massachusetts had indicted Prof. Dirk J. Struik. Because of the Supreme Court decision in the Steve Nelson case, the case against Struik had been dropped. Do you think at that particular level, a professor in an individual State, that that is the fit subject for a State effort to suppress the Communist activity within its borders?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, I think and I feel that the State has a right to

protect itself against subversion. There is no question about that.

Well, as I said before, these are a lot of legal problems, legal questions involved. I am not competent enough to deal with or to even comment on these problems. But I feel that the State has a right for its own protection to defend itself, and defend the people that they represent in that State, because the State is the duly elected body of people who represent the views and aspirations of the people of that particular State. They have that right. I think they should.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, the last time you testified, you gave us some testimony about Constantin Radzie, who was a member of the control commission of the Communist Party of New York State; did

you not?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. That was in 1952, I believe; was it not, Mr. Lautner; or

Mr. LAUTNER. We were up in New York at that time?

Mr. Morris, Yes; 1952.

Mr. Lautner. 1952; yes—or 1953.

Mr. Morris. At that time it was disclosed that Constantin Radzie, even though he was a member of the control commission of the Communist Party and, therefore, one of the leaders of the Communist Party, had been naturalized in the United States and had stated in his application papers that he had never been a member of the Communist Party and denaturalization proceedings were commenced

against him; were they not?

Mr. LAUTNER. That was said. Well, I don't know whether he took his citizenship paper out or not. All I know is that he was a Communist Party member, since I was, in 1929, and if he took his citizenship papers out after 1929, and if he so alleged that he was not a member of the Communist Party, or of any group that tries to overthrow the United States Government by force and violence, then he was mistaken. He was wrong. He was not telling the truth.

Mr. Morris. Do you know what happened to that denaturalization

proceeding?

Mr. Lautner. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge do you know whether he has been deported?

Mr. Lautner. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Was he denaturalized?

Mr. Lautner. I have no idea—I don't know what happened to him.

Mr. Morris. Since Mr. Lautner has testified, Mr. Chairman, previously, about a Peter Rhodes, I wonder if you will tell us who Peter

Rhodes is?

Mr. LAUTNER. Well, when I graduated from War Department Military Intelligence Training School during the war in 1943, spring, I was immediately shipped overseas with a small group of other soldiers. And we were assigned to Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers, to Eisenhower's headquarters. And we were assigned to Psychological Warfare Branch.

The person who was in charge of all monitoring units of Psychological Warfare Branch was a person by the name of Peter Rhodes. He was a civilian, he was with OWI. And he was our boss, as far as our assignment and work was concerned. He gave us a number of

orientation lectures outside of Algiers at "L. B. R."

And then later on I was assigned to the Balkan unit, up the Adriatic coast. And he came around there from time to time visiting the various units of Psychological Warfare Branch in the Mediterranean theater of operation. He was a simulated lieutenant colonel and he was

our chief in this war period.

He introduced me in Algiers to some of the international leaders of the Veterans of the International Brigade. Through them I got introduced to some of the French deputies who were in Algiers, Communist deputies at that time, Florimond Bonte and the others, and he also introduced me to a woman who was the general secretary of the Algerian Communist Party.

We never spoke about his party membership.

When I came back I had a discussion with John Williamson, who was a member of the national board and labor secretary of the party, and I told him about my experiences with this person. So he was laughing. He says, "I know him."

Then I checked through Dorothy Loeb, who was a section organizer of a sensitive section in New York organization in the party. Peter

Rhodes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, when Winston Burdett testified a year ago he, too, mentioned Peter Rhodes. We have been making a rather concerted effort to try to locate Mr. Rhodes, by way of asking about this particular testimony, to find whether he is a competent witness to testify about the Communist conspiracy in the United States. To date we have not been successful.

Do you have any idea where he is at all?

Mr. Lautner. I have an idea. He was married to a Belgian woman. And I don't know—recently I heard that he was out of the country, he was either in France or Belgium.

The last time I saw him was in 1946. He lived in Knickerbocker Village downtown, had an apartment there, and I went up there a

couple of times to see him.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lautner, you were district organizer in West Virginia, were you not?

Mr. Lautner. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. At that time, did you have people in the political parties of West Virginia?

Mr. Lautner. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Without going into any names, will you tell us generally about that, Mr. Lautner?

Mr. Lautner. Well, since the miners, in the main, were in the Democratic Party in West Virginia, especially in the heavily populated coal areas like Beckley and Logan and Williamson, it was our task to go where the miners were, going to the Democratic Party. And we had, in the party—the chairman of the West Virginia State Youth Committee of the Democratic Party, was a party member.

We elected finally one party member into the State assembly, State

representative, through the Democratic Party.

We made other attempts. We failed there. But we were in the

Democratic Party. We had a little toehold.

Mr. Morris. But the Communist Party does take that activity which you have just described, infiltrating both Republican and Democratic Parties, to your own knowledge—you know that from your own experiences?

Mr. LAUTNER. That is correct. Not to do so would be branded

as sectarianism.

Mr. Morris. Not to do what?

Mr. Lautner. Would be branded as sectarianism which is an error. Mr. Morris. Is there anything else, Mr. Lautner, that you feel would help us, this Internal Security Subcommittee, at this time, which is analyzing Soviet activity as it expresses itself through the organization and reorganization of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. Lautner. Well, offhand, I have— Senator Welker. Any further questions?

Mr. Lautner (continuing). No contribution to make.

(On the basis of earlier testimony by Mr. Lautner, supplemented by other records in the subcommittee files, the staff has prepared a word picture of the activities and characteristics of an ubiquitous Communist agent, who operated in the United States for two decades, and who is most frequently referred to as J. Peters. This document appears as appendix I of this volume.)

Senator Welker. Any further questions, Counsel?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have something here for the record. I thought we could put into the record today—I have been trying to get some verification of it—it is not exactly established yet but we received a letter from Australia this morning in which the man who wrote the letter, who was the secretary of the Australian Committee for the Cultural Freedom, had read in the Newsweek, May 21, 1956, that Mr. Vladmir Mikheev, who was the subject of hearings before the House committee, and that he wanted to point out to this committee that there were 14 witnesses who gave testimony before the Petrov Royal Commission in Australia about the activities of Mikheev when he was in Australia.

This man who wrote the letter to us said that he was then the Tass correspondent in the South Pacific area and was the first Tass corre-

spondent in Australia.

I would like that, Senator, subject to our verifying that it is precisely the same man that this man says he is-I would like that to go into the record in connection with our inquiry into the Tass News Agency which is now underway by this Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator Welker. It will be permitted but it is a great deal of hearsay. We will take it for whatever value it contains. It will be

permitted at this point.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandell has prepared, Mr. Chairman, excerpts from the testimony of the Royal Commission, on this point, and I would like to offer them for the record at this time.

Senator Welker. It is so ordered.

(The material was marked "Exhibit No. 278" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 278

(The following references to Tass are taken from Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, dated 22nd August 1955, issued by the Commonwealth of Australia:)

Tass: This is the abbreviation for Telegrafnois Agenstvo Sovietskavo Soiuga (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union), the organ of the Soviet Government which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of news

(p. 19).

An illustration of the importance which the Moscow Centre attached to this rule of secrecy (which was designed, amongst other things, to minimize the risk of compromising the Ambassador or the Embassy should M. V. D. activities become known) is given in the Moscow Letter No. 6 of 25th November 1952, paragraph 12. The paragraph is in these terms:

"Concerning the Motor Car.

"Both you and Antonov knew the cover story for the purchase of the motor car. In accordance with this cover story all the employees of the Embassy, Pakhomox's acquaintances, and the counter-intelligence have every reason for considering the car to be the property of the Tass agency. The authorization for the purchase of the motor car was given in an unciphered communication in the name of the directorate of the Tass agency. Therefore, Antonov's statement to the Ambassador that he knows nothing about the motor car, that no one told him anything about it in the Tass agency, and that the motor car belonged personally to Pakhomov (which you likewise confirmed to the Ambassador), we consider to be an infringement of the rules of secrecy, which occurred because of an oversight on your part. Your and Antonov's statement to the Ambassador caused the exposure of Pakhomov as our cadre worker.

"In the situation which has now arisen, the motor car should be left in Canberra and it should be used for operational purposes after you or Kislytsin

have obtained a driving license.

"Taking into consideration Antonov's statement that he refuses to take the car because he is afraid to drive a motor car in Sydney, we recommended to Antonov that, pending a final decision, he should take a course of driving lessons and that for this purpose he should use £15 out of the resources of your M. V. D. section" (pp. 87 and 88).

274. Palchomov, who held the overt post of Tass representative, was an M. V. D. worker who had already returned to the U. S. S. R. Antonov, who was also an M. V. D. worker, had relieved him as Tass representative (p. 88).

275. The Letter is of interest also from other points of view. It illustrates the care taken by the Moscow Centre to preserve its activities and the identity of its workers in Australia from the knowledge of our Security Service by procuring the Moscow Directorate of the Tass Agency to send Pakhomov the "cover story" by a communication "in clear" in the belief that communications with Australia were the subject of censorship examination, and in the hope and anticipation that the communication would thus come to the knowledge of our Security Service and lull any suspicions they might have that Pakhomov, the overt Tass representative, was concerned with espionage activities. The Letter shows also that the M. V. D. Resident had funds at his disposal separate from the ordinary Embassy funds (pp. 88 and 89).

277. During Makarov's Residentship, Mosov (code name "Tekhnik") was the Tass representative in Australia. He was an M. V. D. worker under Makarov and subsequently, for a short time, under Sadovnikov. In August 1950 he returned to the U. S. S. R. (p. 89).

281. In June 1950 Pakhomov (code name "Valentin"), another M. V. D. worker, arrived to replace Nosov as Tass representative and to work under Sadovnikov (p. 89).

283. In April 1951 Sadovníkov was recalled to Moscow. An unfavorable report concerning his conduct as an Embassy official which had been made by the Ambassador was the reason for his recall. But he did not know this, and believed that he was merely going on leave and would return after a short interval. Before his departure he was instructed by the Moscow Centre that Pakhomov would act as temporary Resident during his absence and that Mrs. Petrov would take over the M. V. D. cipher work and papers, including the ciphers. This she did (pp. 89 and 90).

284. Pakhomov, however, who had arrived in Australia only in June 1950, had had little opportunity to accustom himself to Australian ways of life or to make acquaintances. From the M. V. D. point of view he was under the further disadvantage that he lived in Sydney and had no diplomatic immunity (p. 90).

285. Pakhomov remained temporary Resident until the end of 1951, when Petrov was appointed temporary Resident in his place. Thereafter, Pakhomov acted as an M. V. D. worker under Petrov, who was promoted to the rank of Colonel during 1952. From the time of Petrov's appointment as temporary Resident, Mrs. Petrov, who had been Pakhomov's cipher clerk and technical assistant, acted as Petrov's cipher clerk and technical assistant (p. 90).

286. Petrov remained temporary Resident until April 1954, when he left the Soviet service. From early in 1953 he had known that he was to return to the U. S. S. R. and to be relieved of his position as temporary Resident. In fact, he was relieved by Kovalenok (code name "Stoun"), an M. V. D. cadre worker, who arrived in Sydney on the 3rd April 1954 as temporary Resident. It was intended that an M. V. D. worker more senior than Kovalenok would later come to Australia as permanent Resident. It is worthy of note that in Moscow Kovalenok had served in the Fourth Directorate of the M. V. D., which was concerned with the training of espionage agents for work in an "Illegal Apparatus" and procuring their entry into foreign countries. This is significant in view of the desire of the Moscow Centre to create an "Illegal Apparatus" in Australia (p. 90).

291. ANTONOV (code name "Ignat") arrived in June 1952. His overt work was that of Tass representative in succession to Pakhomov. Antonov's principal M. V. D. duties—as laid down by the Moscow Centre—were to make the acquaintance of and "study" journalists, Members of the Parliament, and others who were thought to be of interest to the M. V. D. Like Kislytsin, his inadequate understanding of English handicapped him. Antonov left Australia with the

members of the Embassy after Petrov's defection (p. 91).

(f) When Sadovnikov left Australia in 1951 Pakhomov, who still remained responsible for the Tass work and had been in Australia for only a few months, was suddenly called upon to take over the control of Sadovnikov's Apparatus, and both he and Sadovnikov believed that this was merely a temporary expedient (p. 96).

564. There is also a reference to Maclean in one of the G Series of documents, namely, the Enclosure to the Letter of 10th November 1949 (G. 3). It reads:

"Maclean—journalist, sympathetically disposed towards us, a very well informed man. In 'T's' opnion, he will give information."

"T" stands for "Tekhnik," the code name of Nosov, a Tass representative and an M. V. D. worker under Makarov and later under Sadovnikov (p. 159).

691. It is apparently the world-wide Soviet practice for Tass representatives to be recruited espionage agents. It certainly was so in Australia, where Nosov. Pakhomov, and Antonov—in succession the Tass men here—were all active M. V. D. cadre workers (p. 193).

692. The "study" of journalists for the M. V. D. was primarily the task of the Tass representative, who could without exciting attention mix freely with journalists and would be naturally accepted by them as one of themselves. He is thus in the way of gaining access to such information as they have and may be

able to use them as at least unwitting informants (p. 193).

697. Miller told us that in 1943 he had—with the consent of his employer—made an arrangement with Nosov, whom he believed to be merely a Tass representative, to supply Nosov with news which might be of interest for him to cable to Tass. For these services, Miller said, Nosov, with the knowledge and approval of the proprietor of the "Paily Telegraph", paid him a weekly sum of £2. Miller told us that he had earlier been a member of the Communist Party but had ceased to belong to it in 1942 because he disagreed with its policies. There was, he said, nothing improper in the arrangement made by him with Nosov, and such an arrangement to supply information of interest to correspondents of overseas newspapers is, we were told, a common practice in newspaper offices (p. 194).

720. Although, as we have previously pointed out, O'Sullivan must have known that the Tass representatives was an official of a Soviet Government organ, he said that he had no knowledge that Pakhomov was an M. V. D. worker. He said that he gave Exhibit H to Pakhomov with the purpose solely of assisting the

latter to influence journalists to publish Soviet news (p. 198).

721. We think it is most improbable that Pakhomov would have disclosed to O'Sullivan that he was an M. V. D. worker, or that O'Sullivan would have known it, but O'Sullivan's excuse for giving Pakhomov Exhibit H does not explain what appears to be a design to hide the fact that he was its author. Writing in the third person, he inserted some particulars about himself—including an indefinite statement of his age. Nor does his excuse seem to afford an explanation of the references in it to persons believed by O'Sullivan to be connected with our Security Service (p. 198).

722. Whatever O'Sullivan's purpose may have been in supplying Exhibit H, it is clear from the Moscow Letters that the document was got by Pakhomov for M. V. D. purposes, and that after its dispatch to Moscow the Centre took a keen interest in O'Sullivan and regarded him as a promising prospective agent who as a result of his secret meetings with Pakhomov and of his supplying Exhibit H was "on the small hook". That interest became intensified after O'Sullivan became Press Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition in April 1953 (p. 198).

In addition to these M. V. D. workers or collaborators on the Embassy staff,

the following Tass representatives in Australia were M. V. D. workers:

(i) Nosov ("Tekhnik")

(ii) Pakhomov ("Valentin") (iii) Antonov ("Ignat") (p. 297). Paragraph 7 of Letter No. 5 of 27 September 1952 to Canberra.

The information set out in para. 7 of your Letter No. 4 of 28.8.52, should have been notified to us by you by cable. Please take this into consideration

and in future inform us immediately about similar happenings.

We agree that Antonov should not go any more to the editorial office of the "Tribune", (°1). In so far as materials supplied by the Information Bureau and Photo Chronicle (°2) through Tass, intended for the Australian press, are official (°3) and are examined by censorship (°4) upon receipt, it appears expedient to us that Antonov should come to an arrangement with the editorial office of the "Tribune" (°5) that a technical worker should be sent to him for such material when necessary (p. 371).

9. Petrov stated that Exhibit H had been handed to him in February 1952 by one Pakhomov, the then representative of the Tass Agency and said to be a cadre-worker of the M. V. D., who had told him that the document had been supplied to him late in 1951 by a journalist named Fergan O'Sullivan then on

the staff of the "Sydney Morning Herald" (p. 420).

12. The testing of the authenticity of Exhibit J proceeded as follows:

The Petrovs had stated-

(a) that it was typed during three successive days in April or May 1953, at a time when Petrov was in the Canberra Community Hospital, and had been given by its author to one Antonov, the then representative of the Tass Agency and also said to be a cadre-worker of the M. V. D.

(b) that it was typed in the Soviet Embassy at Canberra.

(c) that it was typed by Lockwood (p. 420).

CONCLUSIONS

The following characteristics of Tass demonstrate its illicit character as a

conspiratorial agency:

(1) Its Russian staff has consisted largely of Soviet Military Intelligence personnel who are not professional journalists and who operate under aliases and false credentials.

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of Mr. Lautner, Mr. Chairman.

The following words and phrases are handwritten on the original at the places indicated:

(°1) "edit. of the Tribune."

(°2) "inform. bureau and photo chr."

(°3) "offic."

(°4) "censorship."

^{(°5) &}quot;editorial office Tr." (p. 371).

Senator Welker. Thank you very much for appearing.

And the meeting is now suspended.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the hearing was adjourned.)

(The letter from Herbert B. Cohen, attorney general of Pennsylvania, with related documents, referred to at p. 1435 read as follows):

> COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Harrisburg, July 18, 1956.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Eastland: The attorneys general of California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, and Rhode Island, have authorized me to transmit the enclosed statements to you as an expression of our dissent to the actions of the National Association of Attorneys General at its 50th annual meeting (1956).

Very truly yours,

(Signed) HERBERT B. COMEN, Attorney General.

STATEMENT OF POSITION ON RESOLUTION 14 OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL 50TH ANNUAL MEETING, 1956

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

The undersigned members of the National Association of Attorneys General, believing that the security of the Nation and of each of the States will best be served by uniform Federal investigation, control, and prosecution of subversive activities and having dissented from the action of the association at its 50th annual meeting (1956) endorsing Federal legislation to permit enforcement of State penal statutes in this field, adopt this statement as their formal expression of dissent from such action of the association and desire that this formal expression of dissent be made known to the presiding officers and appropriate committee Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States.

> Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General of California; Joseph D. Craven, Attorney General of Delaware; Thomas M. Kavanagh, Attorney General of Michigan; Miles Lord, Attorney General of Minnesota; Grover C. Richman, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey; Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General of Nevada; Herbert B. Cohen. Attorney General of Pennsylvania; William E. Powers. Attorney General of Rhode Island.

RESOLUTION 14. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

The National Association of Attorneys General, 50th annual meeting, 1956

Be it resolved by the 50th annual meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General, That this association endorses the enactment of Federal legislation authorizing the enforcement of State statutes prescribing criminal penalties for subversive activities involving State or National Governments or either of them; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretariat is requested to forward copies of this resolution to the presiding officers and the appropriate committee chairmen of the Senate

and House of Representatives of the United States.

STATEMENT OF POSITION ON RESOLUTION 15 OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 50TH ANNUAL MEETING, 1956

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION TO GUIDE THE SUPREME COURT

The undersigned members of the National Association of Attorneys General, believing that the delineation of the proper spheres of activities of the Federal and State Governments is properly a function of the Supreme Court of the United States and not one to be circumscribed by legislative enactment and having dissented from the action of the association at its 50th annual meeting (1956) approving enactment by the Congress of legislation attempting so to circumscribe this judicial function, adopt this as a formal expression of their disapproval of such legislation (in particular, H. R. 3 and S. 3143, now pending in the 84th Cong.) and their dissent to such action of the association, and desire that this formal expression of disapproval and dissent be made known to the presiding officers and appropriate committee Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States and to the sponsors of the above-named bills.

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General of California; Joseph D. Craven, Attorney General of Delaware; Thomas M. Kavanagh, Attorney General of Michigan; Miles Lord, Attorney General of Minnesota; Grover C. Richman, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey; Jacob K. Javits, Attorney General of New York; Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General of Nevada; Herbert B. Cohen, Attorney General of Pennsylvania; William E. Powers, Attorney General of Rhode Island.

RESOLUTION 15. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION TO GUIDE THE SUPREME COURT

The National Association of Attorneys General 50th Annual Meeting, 1956

Whereas members of this association have expressed alarm on several occasions in recent years over the increasing tendency of the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that enactments by Congress operate to exclude or supersede any State laws on the same subject matter and to preempt the field for Federal occupancy; and

Whereas such exemptions of Federal power by judicial interpretation have impinged and continue to impinge directly upon the powers reserved to the States and the citizens thereof by the 10th amendment to the Constitution, and thus present a real threat to the continued independence and integrity of the States:

Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the 50th annual meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General, That this association approves the enactment by Congress of legislation to clarify its intent that no future act of Congress shall be considered to exclude any State laws on the same subject matter unless such congressional act contains an express provision to that effect, nor shall such congressional act invalidate a provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such act unless a power expressly granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution of the United States is involved; and be it further

Resolved, That this association extends to the Members of Congress who have introduced H. R. 3 and S. 3143, now pending in the 84th Congress, its sincere appreciation for sponsoring legislation designed to accomplish the objectives set forth above, and the secretariat is requested to bring this resolution to the attention of the presiding officers and to the appropriate committee chairmen of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States as well as

to the sponsors of the named bills.

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Redefection Campaign

TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE To Investigate the Administration of the INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:40 a.m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; Robert McManus, research analyst; Jonathan Mitchell, consultant to the committee; and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator Jenner. Mr. Conal, will you come forward, please.

Do you swear the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CONAL. I do.

Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF BERNARD CONAL, ACCOMPANIED BY LEONARD BOUDIN, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Conal, will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please?
Mr. Conal. Yes. Bernard Conal, 203 West 90th Street, New York.

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation, Mr. Conal?

Mr. CONAL. Community analyst, sir.

Mr. Morris. Community analyst. Would you speak up, please?

Mr. Conal. Community analyst.

Mr. Boudin. Could we hold the questioning until the pictures are over.

Senator Jenner. Take your pictures, gentlemen, and then we will proceed.

Mr. Boudin. Mr. Chairman, could we proceed with the hearing? I am not interested in the photographers taking pictures.

Senator Jenner. Yes. Please take your pictures so that we can go

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what a community analyst is, Mr. Conal?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. I analyze the composition of the population, its conditions, its problems, their similar purchasing habits, their electoral proclivities, and so forth, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us what companies you have been

associated within that work that you have just described for us.

Mr. Conal. What companies I have been associated with?

Mr. Morris. Yes. We mentioned some of them in executive session.

Mr. Conal. Yes.

Mr. Morris. I think it would be more expeditious if you told us which ones you were associated with and at what periods of time.

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. I had my own company, the Voters Research Institute, in 1945 through 1947, and then I was associated with the American Management Council.

Mr. Morris. The American Management Council?

Mr. Conal. Council, yes.

Mr. Morris. Now, was Palmer Weber working with you at that time?

Mr. Conal. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Did you work in this kind of work with Palmer Weber at any time?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir; in Community Inventories.

Mr. Morris. Community Inventories?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. When was that? Mr. Conal. That was subsequent to American Management Council.

Mr. Morris. Yes. Specifically when was it? Mr. Conal. It was 1951-52.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, what was Community Inventories doing at that time in 1951

and 1952 when you were working with Palmer Weber?

Mr. Conal. We were primarily interested in—that is, the firm was interested in-obtaining clients on market analysis or electoral analysis for plant-location work and so forth. These were the main interests of the firm at the time.

It was not a successful operation, sir, and as a consequence the

chief owner of the firm, Mr. Wheat-

Mr. Morris. What is his name?

Mr. Conal. Wheat.

Mr. Morris. W-h-e-a-t?

Mr. Conal. W-h-e-a-t. That is right—liquidated it.

Mr. Morris. In what year? Mr. Conal. That was 1953.

Mr. Morris. 1953. Was that after Palmer Weber testified before this subcommittee?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. You know, of course, do you not, that Palmer Weber testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee and when asked about his membership in the Communist Party, he invoked his privilege against incrimination. Do you recall that, sir?

Mr. Conal. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Morris. And Weber was working with you at that time in Community Inventories?

Mr. Conal. That is right, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, in this connection were you doing any work like this for the political parties?

Mr. Conal. At what time, sir?

Mr. Morris. In 1951, 1952, and 1953, I think, is the period we are

talking about.

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. We had clients—it was called the Connecticut Committee, sir. It was a committee of businessmen that was interested in the analysis of the electorate in Connecticut. Many of the leaders of this committee were businessmen, industrialists, and so forth, who were interested in, most of them, I would say, in the condition of the Republican vote.

We made what were community analyses covering what is broadly called the social-economic problems, issues, electoral issues, and so

forth, of the voters throughout the State.

Mr. Morris. And now, had you done that earlier?

Mr. Conal. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Morris. Had you done that kind of work earlier?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. For another period of time?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. What period of time did you do that previously? Mr. Conal. Well, I think that in the period of 1945-46, and also subsequently in 1947, I made such analyses for Mr. Wallace.

Mr. Morris. That is Henry Wallace?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. Mr. Morris. The Political Action Committee?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you do that at any time subsequent to 1947 and 1948—between 1948 and 1951?

Mr. Conal. I don't recall. I did this work for Mr. Wallace through

1947 and 1948.

Mr. Morris. And whom did you work for in 1949 and 1950?

Mr. Conal. Well, I went into the American Management Council

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, were they doing surveys like this for the

political parties?

Mr. Conal. No, sir. The American Management Council was a dormant research organization of a law firm that was interested in tax analysis and in pensions, I think, too.

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, what law firm was that, Mr. Conal? Mr. Conal. I think the firm was then called Simon & Shur.

Mr. Morris. Simon, S-i-m-o-n?

Mr. Conal. And Shur. Mr. Morris. Spell "Shur." Mr. Conal. S-h-u-r.

I don't recall the full name of the firm. The contents of this work some of this was, they would have certain research aspects, like market research. They had a company, a client of theirs that was interested in getting an analysis of its distribution, the distribution of its sales force and its cost of production as against its cost of sales.

We would make analyses like that for a pharmaceutical firm that was interested in an analysis of its cost-sales distribution, and so forth. They were the ones who obtained the Connecticut committee as a client.

I believe it was the Connecticut committee in 1951 for which we made these various analyses of the issues on a completely objective, nonpartisan basis.

Mr. Morris. And you would supply the results of your surveys to

the people who hired you to give it to them?

Mr. CONAL. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And it is your testimony that you carried out those surveys in a dispassionate, careful way?

Mr. Conal. Absolutely.

Mr. Morris. Now, where were you born, Mr. Conal?

Mr. Conal. I was born in Belfast, Ireland.

Mr. Morris. Pardon?

Mr. Conal. In Belfast, Ireland.

And when did you come to the United States? Mr. Morris. I see.

Mr. Conal. 1924.

Mr. Morris. I see. And have you worked for the United States Government?

Mr. Conal. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Have you worked with any congressional committees in Washington?

Mr. Conal. No. sir.

Mr. Morris. What was your employment during the war? Mr. Conal. I was war activities director for the CIO.

Mr. Morris. War activities director for the CIO?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir; all of the activities of the CIO connected with raising funds for Red Cross and for the various organizations and for obtaining contributions to it of various kinds. I think I received a citation from the Red Cross for it.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you-

Mr. Boudin. Excuse me a second, Judge Morris.

Mr. Morris. How long were you war activities director for the CIO?

Mr. Conal. Up until, I think, the beginning—1943. I was asked by Mr. Hillman, because I was considered an expert in community—

Mr. Morris. "Hillman" is Sidney Hillman?

Mr. Conal. Mr. Sidney Hillman, yes. (Continuing)—whether I would undertake the analysis of the CIO activity—of the PAC's activity at that time in the city, and I functioned for that then.

Mr. Morris. Now, give us the terminal dates for that employment,

would vou, as war director?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. I left—after the election campaign, I was over there in that year, and after, I think, a vacation, I came back and I subsequently tendered my resignation there, and the actual terminal date was March of 1945.

Mr. Morris. I see. And you started in 1942, you say?

Mr. Conal. In 1941, I think. Mr. Morris. 1941. Now, what did you do prior to 1941? Mr. Conal. Well, I was at WPA for a period of time, sir.

Mr. Morris. What part of WPA?

Mr. Conal. The writers' project. Mr. Morris. In New York City, was that?

Mr. Conal. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And then after you ceased being the war activities director of the CIO in 1945, what employment did you take up?

Mr. Conal. I set my own organization up, called the Voters Research Institute, sir. And I was with that, as I indicated before, through 1947.

Mr. Morris. And you were then working with the CIO Political

Action Committee?

Mr. CONAL. Not-

Mr. Morris. Not after 1945? Mr. Conal. Not after 1945.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you do work for them?

Mr. Conal. No, sir; I didn't. I made analyses for various candidates.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you do several surveys on a contract basis

for the PAC?

Mr. Conal. How would you define "contract basis," sir?

Mr. Morris. I thought that would be a term that you would use in connection with your employment.

Mr. Conal. Not with PAC, sir. My work with PAC was wholly

at that time through the CIO.

That is, I was with the New York CIO, which had a New York PAC. I was not in the national PAC. I was with New York.

Mr. Morris. Now, in 1952, did you prepare a survey, a political

survey?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. I made a number of analyses in 1952. One of them I mentioned to you, the one of the Connecticut State-of the various communities in Connecticut. I also made one in Ohio, in the 11th and 22d Congressional Districts in Ohio.

Mr. Morris. I see. And what other surveys did you make at that

Mr. Conal. I am trying to think, sir.

Mr. Morris. You did not do any on a national level, did you, in

Mr. Conal. Of a nationwide level? No. I made certain predictions, I guess, on the basis of the sort of sampling that our studies permitted us to make, but I did not do any national-level study.

Mr. Morris. You did not do any work for the Republican National

Committee at that time?

Mr. Conal. No, sir, not for the Republican National Committee. Mr. Morris. Now, have you done any work for the Democratic National Committee?

Mr. Conal. Well, I was asked by Mr. O'Neill, who was the publicity director then, to do a number of—that was in 1945-46—to do a number of congressional district studies in various narrow-margin districts, and I made a number of these in various parts of the country.

Mr. Morris. And then later, in the 1951, 1952, and 1953 period, you did work generally for the Republican groups; is that right, sir?

Mr. Conal. Well, in most instances, yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And that would be in Connecticut and Ohio?

Mr. Conal. It would depend on the client. For instance, in 1950 I was asked, just before the termination of the campaign in Connecticut, whether I could come in and indicate what the outcome might be as between Mr. Bowles, and I forget who was running against him then, and I was in there briefly for an analysis of that.

As I say, I went in there briefly and made an analysis of that, but there wasn't much that I could do. It was possible to make a rather accurate prediction of the outcome, but I would say that it was luck.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Palmer Weber, Mr. Conal?

Mr. Conal. I pointed out to you, my recollection, the last time I saw him, it was as I was walking out of a restaurant in New York about 6 or 7 months ago, I think.

Mr. Morris. And you have not seen him since—

Mr. Conal. No.

Mr. Morris. Since you and he dissolved the last corporation what was it—in 1953?

Mr. Conal. The Community Inventories. Mr. Morris. The Community Inventories.

Now, have you been a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Conal?

Mr. Conal. Have I been?

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.

Mr. Conal. My answer to that, sir, is that in the last 10 years I have had no party affiliation or membership in any political party what-

Mr. Morris. Now, were you a member of the Communist Party

when you were on the WPA prior to 1941?

Mr. Conal. In view of the long period there, I would decline to answer that under my privilege under the first and under the fifth amendments to the Constitution.

Senator Jenner. The committee will recognize your refusal to answer under the fifth amendment, but not under the first amend-

ment.

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, during this period were you the executive secretary of the New York Conference for Inalienable Rights, specifically in the year 1941?

Mr. Conal. For the same reason, sir, I decline to answer under the

fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator Jenner. Under the fifth amendment?

Mr. Conal. The fifth.
Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist while you acted as executive director for the New York Conference for Inalienable Rights for the year 1941?

Mr. Conal. The same answer, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you a Communist while you were head of the war activities committee for the CIO during the war?

Mr. Conal. The same answer, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you a member of the Communist Party when you commenced your first survey work after the war in 1946 or 1947?

Mr. Boudin. Excuse me a second.

(The witness consults with his attorney.)

Mr. Conal. My answer to that is the one I gave you before, that [in the last 10 years] I have not been a member of any political party.

Mr. Morris. I see. Did you give up your membership in the Com-

munist Party when you began the survey work?

Mr. Conal. That is a serious question, sir. I would like to assert my privilege under the fifth amendment on that.

I think my other answer covered that. I think that I had answered that, that during this 10-year period I have not been a member of any political party.

Mr. Morris. Specifically, I wonder if you would answer the question: Did you give up your Communist Party membership when you

took up your work with the survey groups?

Mr. CONAL. The way you put the question, sir, I would have to decline to answer that under my privilege under the fifth.

Mr. Morris. And when did you first meet Palmer Weber?

Mr. Conal. The first time I ever met him was when he was research director for the National PAC, and some time in 1944 he came to New York and I was first introduced to him.

Mr. Morris. In 1944? Mr. Conal. I think so, sir.

Mr. Morris. And then you and he worked together-

Mr. Conal. No, sir. We did not work together there. I didn't see him again until-oh, I might have seen him off and on at certain meetings, but we did not work together. I did not work together with him at all, sir, until the time that he applied for a job with Community Inventories.

Mr. Morris. Until the time of what? I missed that.

Mr. Conal. Until he applied for a job at Community Inventories.

Mr. Morris. I see. And you gave him the job?

Mr. Conal. Yes, sir. I thought he was qualified to do research work.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, to your knowledge, did you know that he was or ever had been a member of the Communist Party?

(The witness consults with his attorney.)

Mr. Conal. I decline to answer that on the basis of my privilege. Senator Jenner. Your privilege under the fifth amendment?

Mr. Conal. Under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. And you are sure you will not answer that question? It is important, Mr. Conal, because at the time when you were beginning this survey, it is of some interest to the committee whether or not you know that Palmer Weber was a Communist at that time when you hired him.

Mr. Conal. I would stand on my previous answer, sir.

Mr. Morris. Now, are you a Communist now?

Mr. Conal. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will you bear with me 1 minute, Senator, please? Were you a member of the executive committee of the New York County Communist Political Association during the war?

Mr. Conal. I assert my privilege under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you the editor of the Bill of Rights News?

Mr. Conal. Published when?

Mr. Morris. It was published by the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights.

Mr. Conal. What period? Mr. Morris. That was 1944. Mr. Conal. 1944? No, sir.

Mr. Morris. You know nothing of a publication called the Bill of Rights News?

Mr. Conal. No, sir, not in 1944.

Mr. Morris. Well, at any time? Mr. Conal. I don't recall, sir.

Mr. Morris. Have you been connected with the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights?

Mr. Conal. What period was that, sir?

Senator Jenner. Any period. Mr. Morris. Any period. Mr. Boudin. Excuse me.

(The witness consults with his attroney.)

Mr. Conal. I would assert my privilege under the fifth amendment. Mr. Morris. Now, have you been closely associated with William Schneiderman, who was a leading Communist Party member on the west coast?

Mr. Conal. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment, sir.

Mr. Morris. I did not hear you.

Mr. Conal. I assert my privilege under the fifth amendment, sir. Mr. Morris. Now, did you marry Greta Spiro? Is that the name of your wife?
Mr. Conal. Greta Spiro.

Mr. Morris. Spiro.

(The witness consults with his attorney.)

Mr. Conal. I would decline to answer, sir, on my privilege under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know Nathan Gregory Silvermaster? Mr. Conal. I decline to answer that, sir, on the basis of the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, have you written for a publication called "Fight," F-i-g-h-t, which was an official organ of the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mr. Boudin. What was the spelling of that?

Mr. Morris. Fight, F-i-g-h-t; the American League Against War and Fascism.

Mr. Conal. I have no recollection, sir, of anything like that.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of this witness at this time.

Senator Jenner. You will be excused.

Mr. Boudin. Thank you.

Senator Jenner. Call the next witness.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Behrstock.

Mr. Behrstock, will you stand and be sworn, please?

Senator Jenner. Do you swear the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Behrstock. I do, sir. Senator Jenner. All right.

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR BEHRSTOCK, ACCOMPANIED BY LEONARD BOUDIN, HIS ATTORNEY

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, since our last session with Mr. Behrstock, we have received from the department of public safety, city hall, Jersey City, N. J., under date of April 26, 1956, from Lawrence A.

¹ Previous testimony begins on p. 745 (pt. 13).

Whipple, director, a paper which purports to be the Communist Party card of Arthur Behrstock, dated 1940, which gives the section and the branch of the Communist Party that he was at that time alleged associated with.

I have shown you this card in executive session, have I, Mr.

Behrstock?

Mr. Венкsтоск. Is that the same card?

Mr. Morris. Yes, the same card I showed you in executive session. Mr. Behrstock. What was your question?

Mr. Morris. Have you seen this card?

Mr. Behrstock. Yes; if that is the same card.

Mr. Morris. It is the same card. Mr. Boudin. That is a photostat? Mr. Morris. A photostat of a card. Mr. Boudin. Yes, a photostat.

Mr. Morris. Is that your Communist Party card?

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. Behrstock. I would give the same answer now that I gave in executive session, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. And what is that answer?

Mr. Behrstock. That I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the first and the fifth amendments.

Senator Jenner. Your refusal to answer the question on the fifth amendment will be recognized by this committee, but not your refusal under the first amendment.

Mr. Morris. Now, after you testified here, did you go to your employer—who employed you the last time you were here, Mr. Behrstock?

Mr. Behrstock. The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.

Mr. Morris. I see.

Now, after you testified here, did you then go to your employer and deny to him your membership in the Communist Party, which fact you did not deny before the Internal Security Subcommittee?

Mr. Boudin. You mean as to which fact the privilege was pleaded

before the committee?

Mr. Morris. He did not deny it. He said he invoked his privilege under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Boudin. He did not admit it; he did not deny it.

Mr. Morris. That is right.

Mr. Behrstock. I decline to answer that question under the same grounds that I previously stated this morning.

Mr. Morris. Did you not go to your employer and specifically deny

that you had ever been a member of the Communist Party? Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege, Mr. Morris.

Senator Jenner. The photostatic copy of the Communist Party card of Arthur Behrstock will go into the record and become a part of the record.

Mr. Morris. Together with the letter of transmittal, Senator, showing where we got this card?

Senator Jenner. Yes.

(The letter and card referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 281 and No. 281-A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 281

Department of Public Safety, City Hall, Jersey City, N. J., April 26, 1956.

Hon. ROBERT MORRIS,

Chief Counsel, Un-American Activities Committee, Care of Senator Eastland,


United States Senate Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Judge: I am enclosing herewith what apparently appears to be a photostatic copy of Arthur Behrstock's membership in the Communist Party, U. S. A. With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE A. WHIPPLE, Director.

EXHIBIT No. 281-A



Mr. Morris. Now, did you, on May 15, 1953, give a fund-raising party-did you participate in a fund-raising party for Steve Nelson at 60 Hicks Street, in Brooklyn?

Mr. Behrstock. I decline to answer on the same grounds that I pre-

viously stated this morning; namely, the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. You have worked for the Daily Worker in the past; have you not?

Mr. Behrstock. I decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. What was your assignment with SCAP! You know what SCAP is; do you not, Mr. Behrstock?

Mr. Behrstock. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify it for the record, please? Mr. Behrstock. I will have to recall the initials now.

Mr. Boudin. Excuse me a second. I know Judge Morris will forgive me and the witness will, of course, answer. But these questions were taken up 3 times, in 2 executive sessions and 1 public session.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Boudin, you understand-

Mr. Boudin. I am not objecting. I was just reminding you.
Mr. Morris. You understand there was a difference of wording on some of these questions, which was very important. I think you will recall the last time I asked him if Steve Nelson had been at his house or his apartment at 60 Hicks Street.

Mr. Boudin. I am referring to the SCAP situation, which I thought you had covered fully. I just want to call that to your attention, but

we have no objection.

Mr. Morris. We appreciate that, Mr. Boudin. But there are a few things I want to add about the SCAP thing, and I would not want to put them in out of context.

Mr. Boudin. Fair enough.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what your role was in SCAP, Mr. Behrstock?

Mr. Behrstock. As I said before, it was a kind of omnibus job. Its functions were not very clearly defined at the beginning of an occupation, and the job evolved in a certain sense as the occupation bedded down, so to speak.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what SCAP stands for?

Mr. Behrstock. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Mr. Morris. I see.

And then you had this omnibus job that you were telling us about? Mr. Behrstock. Well, omnibus in the sense that it wasn't quite well defined, but in general-

Mr. Morris. Now, did you at that time—what were the terminal

dates of your employment with SCAP?

Mr. Behrstock. The terminal dates?

Mr. Morris. The terminal dates. When did you begin and when

did you end?

Mr. Венкэтоск. I think I came into SCAP probably about July 1944, and I think I ended about June 1946, roughly, give or take a month or so.

Mr. Morris. And what did you do after you left SCAP in 1946?

Mr. Behrstock. What was my job?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Behrstock. I was a free-lance writer.

Mr. Morris. A free-lance writer?

Now, did you write an article called Snafu in Tokyo, in the Nisei Weekender for January 1, 1947?

Mr. Behrstock. May I see the article, Mr. Morris?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. All right.

The last time you testified that you were Chief of the Planning and Operational Division, did you not?

Mr. Behrstock. That is right.

Mr. Morris. And for what particular subdivision of SCAP?

Mr. Behrstock. Civil Information and Education.

Mr. Morris. Now, on the basis of information that you received at that time, did you write this article which has just been shown to you?

Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that article, which is an article that is highly critical of General MacArthur and General MacArthur's administration in Tokyo, which was purportedly written by Arthur Behrstock, a fact which the witness does not deny, but instead invokes the privilege under the fifth amendment, go into the record?

Senator Jenner. It may go into the record and become part of the

official record of his committee.

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 282" and was placed in the subcommittee files.)

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know a Japanese Communist named

Shiga while you were in Japan?

Mr. Behrstock. Offhand, the name isn't familiar, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist while you were with SCAP?

Mr. Bryggersky, Legent the same privilege Little before

Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege I did before.

Mr. Morris. Are you a Communist now?

Mr. Behrstock. The same answer, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put into the record several articles that had more to do, Senator, with the last session that we had, when we put into the record the testimony of Mr. Rastvorov about the head of the trade mission in Japan. I would like to go into the record at this time.

As I say, they bear more on the other hearing, Senator, than this

present hearing.

Senator Jenner. They may go into the record at the proper place. (The newspaper articles referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 283 and 283-A" and appear at p. 815, pt. 14.)

Mr. Morris. What was your relation to the C. I. and E. Library in

Tokyo?

Mr. Венк тоск. My relation to the C. I.—

Mr. Morris. Civil—

Mr. Behrstock. Civil Information and Education.

Mr. Morris. That is right. Mr. Behrstock. Library? Mr. Morris. Library, yes.

Mr. Behrstock. At best, most perfunctory. I had no special connection with the library there.

Mr. Morris. Now, were you acquainted with the radio program known as the Hour of Heroes?

Mr. Behrstock. It is not familiar to me. Radio was not a speciality

of my daily work.

Mr. Morris. Now, do you specifically deny that in the spring of 1946 you met regularly at night with a Japanese Communist named Shiga on the fourth floor of the Radio Tokyo Building in Tokyo?

(The witness consults with his attorney.)

Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. When I asked you about Shiga before, you said you did not recall, as I recall it, Mr. Behrstock.

Mr. Behrstock. I don't recall the name. But on the advice of my

counsel, I am taking the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet with any Japanese Communists on the fourth floor of the Radio Toyko Building in Japan?

Mr. Behrstock. I assert the same privilege.

Mr. Morris. Did you prepare a movie code for Japan?

Mr. Behrstock. A movie code?

Mr. Morris. A movie code.

Mr. Венквтоск. No, sir; I didn't. Mr. Morris. Did you work on it at all?

Mr. Венгатоск. No.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a Japanese named Tamin Suzuki?

Mr. Behrstock. That name is not familiar.

Mr. Morris. Did you know a publication in Japan called the Akahata?

Mr. Behrstock. No. I don't read Japanese, Mr. Morris. Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with that publication?

Mr. Behrstock. No, I am not.

Mr. Morris. You have done no work for that publication?

Mr. Behrstock. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. You do not know that the word "Akahata" means red flag in Japanese?

Mr. Behrstock. Your knowledge of Japanese exceeds mine. Mr. Morris. You were there several years, Mr. Behrstock.

Mr. Behrstock. I should say, Mr. Morris, as I said before, that I am not an expert on the Far East and never have been. I went to the Far East as an infantry officer. I came into MacArthur's headquarters, and my interest in the Far East was as a part of a job at that period, and my interest dwindled very fast, because I am not a far-eastern expert or anything of that kind, and I never knew Japanese other than how to say "Good morning," or something of that kind.

Mr. Boudin. The witness does not, however, contest your translation, Judge Morris. We accept it.

Senator Jenner. How did you happen to be assigned to SCAP?

Mr. Behrstock. Well, if I might make a small personal aside, I was in a replacement depot in Buna, New Guinea, waiting to be assigned to a replacement division as an infantry platoon leader, when Mac-Arthur formed the Psychological Warfare Headquarters, and a stop order, I guess, was put on all people who could write or had any journalistic background, and I think I mentioned that at the last session.

When I was interviewed for this position, I was very much torn,

because I wanted to go in infantry. Put it that way.

Senator Jenner. All right.

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions, Senator. Senator Jenner. I have no further questions.

You will be excused.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before the hearing is over, I would like to put the Certificate of Incorporation of Community Inventories and an amendment, apparently, of the Certificate of Incorporation of Community Inventories, into the record.

Senator Jenner. It may go into the record and become a part of the

official record.

(The documents referred to, entitled "Certificate of Incorporation of Community Inventories, Inc.," and "Certificate of Amendment of Certificate of Incorporation of Community, Inventories, Inc., were marked "exhibit 284 and 284—A" and read as follows:)

Ехнівіт №. 284

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF COMMUNITY INVENTORIES, INC., PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE STOCK CORPORATION LAW

We, the undersigned, for the purpose of forming a corporation pursuant to article 2 of the stock corporation law of the State of New York, do hereby certify:

First: The name of the proposed corporation shall be Community Inventories,

Inc

Second: The purposes for which it is to be formed are:

To market a service analyzing socioeconomic data and information.

To purchase, acquire, sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, transfer, or otherwise

deal in real property.

To acquire, and pay for in cash, stock, or bonds of this corporation or otherwise, the goodwill, rights, assets, and property, and to undertake or assume the whole or any part of the obligations or liabilities of any person, firm, association, or corporation engaged in the same or similar business.

To purchase, hold, sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of shares of the capital stock of, or any bonds, securities or evidences of indebtedness created by any other corporation or corporations organized under the laws of this State or any other State, country, nation, or government, and while the owner thereof to exercise all the rights, powers, and privileges of ownership.

To issue bonds, debentures, or obligations of this corporation from time to time for any of the objects or purposes of the corporation, and to secure the same

by mortgage, pledge, deed or trust, or otherwise.

To purchase, hold, sell, and transfer the shares of its own capital stock; provided it shall not use its funds or property for the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would cause any impairment of its capital except as otherwise permitted by law; and provided further that shares of its own capital stock belonging to it shall not be voted upon directly or indirectly.

In general, to carry on any other similar business in connection with the foregoing, and to have and exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of New York upon corporations formed under the act hereinbefore referred to, and to do any or all of the things hereinbefore set forth to the same extent as natural persons might or could do.

The foregoing clauses shall be construed both as objects and powers, and it is hereby expressly provided that the foregoing enumeration of specific powers shall not be held to limit or restrict in any manner the powers of this corporation.

Third: The total number of shares that may be issued by the corporation is

100. All shares shall be common stock without par value.

The capital of the corporation shall be at least equal to the sum of the aggregate par value of all issued shares having par value, plus the aggregate amount of consideration received by the corporation for the issuance of shares without par value, plus such amounts as, from time to time, by resolution of the board of directors, may be transferred thereto.

Fourth: The office of the corporation is to be located in the city of New York,

county of New York, and State of New York.

The address to which the secretary of state shall mail a copy of process in any action or proceeding against the corporation which may be served upon him Is room 1201, 233 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

Fifth: The duration of the corporation shall be perpetual.

Sixth: The number of its directors shall be three; directors need not be stockholders.

Seventh: The names and post-office addresses of the directors until the first annual meeting of the stockholders are:

Names	Post-office $addresses$
Osborne A. McKegney	2728 Henry Hudson Parkway, Bronx,
	N. Y.
David T. Walsh	265 East 181st St., Bronx, N. Y.
Catherine McKee	398 Hickory Ave., Paramus, N. J.

Eighth: The name and post-office address of each subscriber of this certificate of incorporation and a statement of the number of shares of stock which each agrees to take in the corporation are:

Names	Post-office addresses	Number of shares
Osborne A. McKegney David T. Walsh Catherine McKee	2728 Henry Hudson Parkway, Bronx, N. Y 265 East 181st St., Bronx, N. Y 398 Hickory Ave., Paramus, N. J	1 1 1

Ninth: All of the subscribers of the certificate are of full age, at least twothirds of them are citizens of the United States, at least one of them is a resident of the State of New York and at least one of the persons named as a director is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of New York.

Tenth: The Secretary of State is designated as the agent of the corporation upon whom process in any action or proceeding against the corporation may

be served.

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In witness whereof, we have made, signed, and acknowledged this certificate, this 18th day of July 1952.

OSBORNE A. MCKEGNEY. DAVID T. WALSH. CATHERINE MCKEE.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

On this 18th day of July 1952, before me personally came Osborne A. McKegney, to be known, and known to me to be one of the persons described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and he duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ARTHUR ENGELMANN, Notary Public, State of New York.

Term expires March 30, 1954.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, 88:

On this 18th day of July 1952, before me personally came David T. Walsh, to be known, and known to me to be one of the persons described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and he duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ARTHUR ENGELMANN, Notary Public, State of New York.

Term expires March 30, 1954.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, 88:

On this 18th day of July 1952, before me personally came Catherine McKee, to be known, and known to me to be one of the persons described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and she duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.

ARTHUR ENGELMANN, Notary Public, State of New York.

Term expires March 30, 1954.

EXHIBIT No. 284-A

CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF COMMUNITY INVENTORIES, INC.

PURSUANT TO SECTION THIRTY-SIX OF THE STOCK CORPORATION LAW

We, the undersigned, being the holders of record of all the outstanding shares entitled to vote upon an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation of Community Inventories, Inc., hereby certify as follows:

First: That the name of the Corporation is Community Inventories, Inc.

Second: That the Certificate of Incorporation of the corporation was filed in the office of the Secretary of State, Albany, New York, on the 21st day of July, 1952.

Third: That the Certificate of Incorporation is hereby amended to effect one or more of the changes authorized in Subdivision 2 of Section 35 of the Stock Corporation Law as follows:

A. Authorization of new shares of Preferred stock with par value

B. Authorization of new shares of Preferred stock without par value

C. Reclassification of shares

Fourth: That the Certificate of Incorporation is hereby amended by amending Article Third of the Certificate of Incorporation so that said Article Third shall read as follows:

Third: The total number of shares which may be issued by the corporation is One Thousand One Hundred (1,100). Of the said shares Seven Hundred (700) shall be classified as Preferred Class A and the par value of each such share shall be One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00); Three Hundred (300) shares shall be classified as Preferred Class B, all of which are without par value and One Hundred (100) shares shall be classified as Common Stock, all of which are without par value.

The designations and the powers, preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, of the various classes of stock of the corporation are as follows:

The holders of the Preferred Class A shares shall be entitled to receive out of the net profits or net assets applicable to dividends a cumulative dividend at the rate of seven percent (7%) payable annually beginning twelve (12) months after issue before any dividend shall be paid or set apart for payment to the holders of the Preferred Class B or Common shares, provided however, that whenever a dividend is paid on the Preferred Class A shares and full cumulative dividends thereon for all previous dividend periods have been paid or provided for, the directors shall have the power in their discretion to declare and pay a dividend for a like period on the Preferred Class B shares at the rate of Seven Dollars (\$7.00) per annum. Any further funds applicable to dividends may, in the discretion of the Board of Directors, be distributed to the holders of the Common shares.

The holders of the Preferred Class A and Preferred Class B stock shall be entitled, in case of liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary, before any amount shall be paid to the holders of the Common Stock to be paid One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) per share and the dividends accumulated or declared and unpaid thereon, but shall not partici-

pate in any further distribution of the assets of the corporation.

At the discretion of the corporation the shares of Preferred Class A and Preferred Class B shall be subject to redemption in whole or in part, by lot or pro rata at One Hundred and Ten Dollars (\$110.00) per share if redeemed not later than seven (7) months after issue; at One Hundred and Twenty Dollars (\$120.00) per share if redeemed not later than twelve (12) months after issue; and at One Hundred and Thirty Dollars (\$130.00) per share if redeemed thirty-six (36) months or later after issue.

Except as otherwise provided by Statute, the holders of the Preferred Class A and Preferred Class B shares shall not be entitled to vote, the sole voting power

being vested in the holders of the Common Stock.

The capital of the corporation shall be at least equal to the sum of the aggregate par value of all issued shares having par value, plus the aggregate amount of consideration received by the corporation for the issuance of shares without par value, plus such amounts as, from time to time, by resolution of the Board of Directors, may be transferred thereto.

In witness whereof we have signed this certificate this 8th day of November 1952.

CLAYTON E. WHEAT, Jr., BERNARD CONAL.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, 88:

On this 8th day of November 1952, before me personally came Clayton E. Wheat, Jr., and Bernard Conal, to me known and known to me to be the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and they severally duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

[SEAL]

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, *8:

Mary C. Wheat, being first duly sworn on oath, says that she is the duly elected, qualified, and acting secretary of Community Inventories, Inc., and, as such, is the custodian of the stock book of said corporation; that the persons who have executed the foregoing certificate in person or by proxy constitute the holders of record, as disclosed by said stock book, of all the outstanding shares of said corporation entitled to vote on the amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation of said corporation intended to be effected by the foregoing certificate.

MARY C. WHEAT.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of November 1952.

[SEAL]

Sam Neustadt, Notary Public, State of New York.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

Clayton E. Wheat, Jr., and Mary C. Wheat, being duly and severally sworn, each for himself, deposes and says that he, said Clayton E. Wheat, Jr., is President, and she, said Mary C. Wheat, is Treasurer of Community Inventories, Inc., and that:

(a) the number of additional shares not resulting from a change of shares which the corporation is hereby authorized to issue by the foregoing certificate is one thousand (1,000) shares, and the number of such additional shares with par value is seven hundred (700) shares, and the par value thereof is one hundred dollars (\$100.00) per share and three hundred (300) shares are without par value;

(b) the number of shares changed as provided in subparagraph five of paragraph (C) of subdivision 2 of Section 35 is no shares of the par value of \$no per share and the number of shares resulting from such change is

no shares, and the par value thereof is \$no per share;

(c) the number of shares not resulting from a change of shares of which the par value has been increased is no shares, and the amount of the increase in par value is \$no per share.

CLAYTON E. WHEAT, JR., President.

MARY C. WHEAT,

Treusurer.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of November 1952.

[SEAL] SAM NEUSTADT,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission expires March 30, 1956.

Senator Jenner. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess.

Mr. Boudin. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Boudin. Thank you, Mr. Behrstock. (Whereupon, at 11:25 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)



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